	Defendants,	:				
16						
		: :	:	: :	: : : :	: :
17						
	OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF	:		AP	22-03028	( .
18	ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY					
10	CLAIMANTS, on behalf of the	:				
19	estates of Aldrich Pump LLC					
2.0	and Murray Boiler LLC,	:				
20	Plaintiff,					
21	Pidincili,	•				
21	v.					
22	•	•				
	INGERSOLL-RAND GLOBAL	:				
23	HOLDING COMPANY LIMITED,					
	et al.,	:				
24	,					
	Defendants,	:				
25		: :	:	: :	: : : :	: :

1	Document Page 2 of 87								
			2						
1	OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY	: AP 22-03029 (JCW)							
2	CLAIMANTS, on behalf of the estates of Aldrich Pump LLC	:							
3	and Murray Boiler LLC,	:							
4	Plaintiff,	:							
5	v.	:							
6	TRANE TECHNOLOGIES PLC, et al.,	:							
7	et al.,	:							
8	Defendants,	:							
9	: : : : : : : : : : : : :	: : : : : : : : : : : : : :	:						
	ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES,	: Miscellaneous Pleading							
10	INC. ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENT TRUST, et al.,	No. 22-00303 (JCW) : (Transferred from District							
11	Plaintiffs,	of Delaware)							
12									
13	V.								
14	ALDRICH PUMP LLC, et al.,								
15	Defendants.								
16			:						
17									
18	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS  BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. CRAIG WHITLEY,  UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE								
19	UNITED STATES	BANKRUPTCY JUDGE							
20	Audio Operator:	COURT PERSONNEL							
21									
22	Transcript prepared by:	JANICE RUSSELL TRANSCRIPTS 1418 Red Fox Circle							
23		Severance, CO 80550 (757) 422-9089							
24		trussell31@tdsmail.com							
25	Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording; transcript produced by transcription service.								

Alexander Ricks PLLC BY: MILLER CAPPS, ESQ. 1420 E. 7th Street, Suite 100 Charlotte, NC 28204

## 1 PROCEEDINGS (Call to Order of the Court) 2 THE COURT: Have a seat, everyone. Okay. 3 morning, all. 4 Back in the Aldrich Pump and Murray Boiler cases. 5 We've got an amended agenda on at Docket -- I'm looking at the 6 7 version that's in the Miscellaneous Proceeding where it's filed at Docket 31, but it's been cross-filed as well. I think all 8 9 of you have access to that. We're trying something a little different today. 10 11 We're, had some folks who needed to be elsewhere so we allowed them to appear by video while we, the rest of us are here live 12 and we'll see how that goes. I, I don't want to make a 13 practice of it, but they had conflicts and we needed to make 14 15 sure that we were there. Let's start with trying to get appearance of those who 16 17 are in the courtroom and if lead counsel for the major 18 constituencies could tell me who those folks are, we'll, that'll speed things up a bit. 19 Thank you, your Honor. Brad Erens, E-R-E-20 MR. ERENS: 21 N-S, of Jones Day --THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 22 23 response).

MR. ERENS: -- on behalf of the debtors. I have,

also, Morgan Hirst with me from Jones Day, Michael Evert from

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- the Evert Weathersby firm, and Dave Torberg from Jones Day. 1 2 Also, from the Rayburn Cooper firm, Rick Rayburn, Jack Miller, and Matt Tomsic. And then I have the Chief Legal Officer of 3 Aldrich and Murray, Mr. Allan Tananbaum, in the courtroom as 4 well. 5 THE COURT: All right, very good. 6 7 How about for the ACC? MS. HARDMAN: Good morning, your Honor. Carrie 8 Hardman from Winston & Strawn on behalf of the ACC. With me is 9 David Neier, my colleague, from Winston & Strawn, Jeff Liesemer 10 11 from Caplin & Drysdale, Davis Wright from Robinson & Cole, and Glenn Thompson from Hamilton Stephens Steele & Martin. 12 I believe there may be others on the phone, but I 13 think for purposes of appearance today, that's --14 15 THE COURT: All right. Let's just stop --MS. HARDMAN: -- probably all you need. 16 17 THE COURT: -- there. 18 MS. HARDMAN: Thank you. 19 THE COURT: Okay, very good. 20 FCR? 21 MR. GUY: Good morning, your Honor. Jonathan Guy for the FCR. Mr. Grier is here. Just myself, your Honor. 22 THE COURT: All right. 23
- MR. GUY: Thank you. 24
- 25 THE COURT: Okay. Other parties wishing to announce

- Page 9 of 87 Document 9 1 that are in the courtroom? 2 MR. MASCITTI: Greq Mascitti, McCarter & English, on behalf of the non-debtor affiliates, and we're joined by local 3 counsel, Jim Phillips and Jeff Oleynik, as well as Stacy 4 Cordes. 5 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. MARTIN: Good morning, your Honor. Lance Martin from Ward and Smith. I'm here on behalf, as local counsel, for 8 the Asbestos, the ten Asbestos Trusts in Miscellaneous 9 10 Proceeding 22-00303. Would your Honor like me to read all ten 11 Trusts into the record? THE COURT: No. No, I don't need the Trusts' names. 12 I think we all know who they are from the written submissions. 13 Thank you, your Honor. 14 MR. MARTIN: 15 And lead counsel is appearing by video, Ms. Beth Moskow-Schnoll of Ballard Spahr. 16 17 THE COURT: Okay, very good. 18 Counsel? MR. GUERKE: Good morning, your Honor.
- 19
- 20 MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Good morning, your Honor.
- 21 MR. GUERKE: Kevin Guerke from Young Conaway on behalf of Delaware Claim Processing Facility, LLC. I'm in the 22 courtroom this morning with my partner, Ed Harron, and local 23 counsel, Felton Parrish. 24
- 25 THE COURT: All right.

Anyone else in the courtroom announcing? 1 2 Mr. Waldrep. MR. WALDREP: Your Honor, Tom Waldrep of Waldrep Wall 3 Babcock & Bailey. I'm here, local counsel for the Non-Party 4 Matching Claimants and our lead counsel, Mr. Hogan, is on the 5 line. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay, very good. Ms. Zieq. 8 MS. ZIEG: Good morning, your Honor. Sharon Zieg from 9 Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor on behalf of the DBMP Future 10 11 Claimants' Representative. I'm here today with my local counsel, Miller Capps from Alexander Ricks. 12 13 THE COURT: Okay. Anyone else announcing in the courtroom? 14 MS. ABEL: Shelley Abel, Bankruptcy Administrator. 15 THE COURT: Very good. 16 17 How about on the videoconference? Any others -- you 18 don't need to tell me again if someone's already announced for you -- but anyone else on video that needs to announce an 19 20 appearance? 21 (No response) 22 THE COURT: Very good. If you would tell IT, I'm not getting a, a picture on 23 I'm not sure if someone's turned it off or what, 24 my screen. 25 but --

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Okay. How about telephonic appearances? Anyone else?
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 2
    You may have to -- what is it -- star 6 --
             MR. ELLMAN: Your Honor, this is --
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             THE COURT: Go ahead.
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             MR. ELLMAN: Thank you, your Honor. This is Jeffrey
 5
    Ellman (distortion).
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 7
             THE COURT: Whoever was speaking, you were breaking
         Would you try that again?
 8
    up.
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             MR. ELLMAN: Yes. Can you hear me now, your Honor?
             THE COURT: Yes, sir.
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             MR. ELLMAN: Hi. This is Jeffrey Ellman from Jones
          I'm monitoring the hearing on behalf of DBMP.
12
    Day.
13
             Thank you.
             THE COURT:
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                         Okay.
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             Anyone else needing to announce?
             MR. MASCITTI: Your Honor, I'm embarrassed to have to
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17
    make a correction.
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             THE COURT: Okay.
             MR. MASCITTI: Our local counsel is Stacy Cordes and
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    Brad Kutrow. And Jim Phillips and Jeff Oleynik are not
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    appearing as our local counsel.
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             MR. PHILLIPS: But, but, your Honor, we, we are here
    for the Fiduciary Duty Defendants, so.
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             THE COURT: You, you can tell it's been a long
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25
    weekend. We've all forgotten who we are over an overdose of
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1 turkey, I guess, so. 2 Any other appearances? MR. TAYLOR: Yes, your Honor. Joshua Taylor from 3 Steptoe & Johnson on behalf of the Travelers Insurance 4 5 Companies. THE COURT: Yes, sir. 6 7 Anyone else? (No response) 8 Okay. I think that's got it. 9 THE COURT: Obviously, with the, having a, a hybrid telephonic-10 11 video live conference we're going to have some tech issues and then we've got some folks who have court appearances elsewhere. 12 13 My suggestion -- I don't know if y'all thought about how we approach this calendar -- would be to try to get the people 14 15 with the conflicts out of the way and to that end, perhaps not doing status reports and other matters until we got the motions 16 17 to quash and the anonymization motions filed. 18 Does anyone have a, a better way of approaching this? I'm asking now. This is not arguing with the Judge. 19 If, if there's a better way logically to do that, that's fine, but --20 Ms. Hardman? 21 MS. HARDMAN: Your Honor, Carrie Hardman from the 22 Committee, from Winston & Strawn on behalf of the Committee. 23 24 I, I am not conscious of the conflicts, perhaps, that may permeate the motions to quash. We're simply not involved 25

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Document
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    in those matters.
             THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
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 3
    response).
             MS. HARDMAN: I only wanted to raise we are the very
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    last item on the calendar and thought if we are weighing these
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    issues, if there are pure conflicts, we understand. If there's
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    a way for that item to go somewhat closer to the front, that
    would be great by us since there's a number of us who could
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    then --
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             THE COURT: Right.
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             MS. HARDMAN: -- possibly leave and get out from
    underneath what seems to be a very big storm going through the,
12
13
    the country right now and causing, wreaking havoc with our
    flights as it is.
14
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             So if that's part --
             THE COURT: Okay.
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17
             MS. HARDMAN: -- of the considerations, we just ask
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    that we, we be contemplated as part of that.
             Thank you, your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Does anyone have a feel? We're talking
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    about the, the so-called letter, the status conference on the
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    letters that have been written to the Court and -- and -- on
22
    No. 8.
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THE COURT: Anyone got a feel for the time needs of

MS. HARDMAN: Yes, your Honor. That's Item No. 8.

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that matter? Are we talking about an hour, two hours, or
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 2
    something else?
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             MR. MASCITTI: Your Honor, I would suspect at least an
    hourish.
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             THE COURT: Right.
             MR. MASCITTI: And I -- and my belief is there are
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 7
    probably more attorneys involved in the other matter than that
 8
    matter.
             So --
             THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
 9
10
    response).
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             MR. MASCITTI: -- in terms of balancing which one
    should go first, I think going with the trust discovery issues
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13
    would make the most sense.
             THE COURT: Conversely, anyone got a feel for the
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    trust discovery matters of what the time needs would be there?
             MR. EVERT: From our perspective, your Honor, that,
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    these are motions that have been argued before the Court,
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    frankly, a number of times. So we, we don't anticipate taking
    very long unless, unless new issues are raised by the other
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    side.
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21
             THE COURT: Okay.
22
             Now I'm trying to remember who it was that had, I
    believe it was some of the Trusts that were, there were
23
    afternoon appearances in other courts. Can someone update me
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on those? What time do you need to be free?

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        MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Your Honor, this is Beth Moskow-
Schnoll on behalf of the Trusts. Can you hear me?
         THE COURT: Yes, ma'am.
        MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: I'm -- there was a problem.
Okay.
      Thank you.
         THE COURT: All right.
        MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: I do not -- my other conflict is
not until -- I have a hearing at 2:00 this afternoon.
         THE COURT:
                     Okay.
                     Well, just based on what I know, let's
         All right.
hold off on just the general good-of-the-order type status of
the case announcements. And my 'druthers would be to take up
the issue with regard to the Case Management Order and the, and
the letter that was written to the Court with regard to DBMP
and do that first. 'Cause I will be just upfront.
sure in Aldrich as opposed to DBMP that, based on what I've
read, I'm not at all sure that we are ready to, to address the
CMO in full and there's some resonance to the motion being
unripe at the moment to me. I'll listen to the contrary, but I
think that may be the -- for the folks who wrote the letter, it
strikes me that both they and the ACC have, have accomplished
their purpose already in, in telling me what they thought about
the CMO that's being, that is to be decided in the DBMP case.
And to that end, it's almost like an amicus.
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My off-the-cuff impressions -- and I'm just talking

16 out loud. I'm not ruling now -- is that we may be in a 1 position where (a) I, I try to treat this case independently of 2 DBMP. As y'all are very adept at doing, you learn and, and 3 amend as you go along in these cases and we get a slightly 4 different look in each of the cases. We try to do that while 5 maintaining consistency. So it is not at all assured that 6 7 anything I do in DBMP is going to be done here. But at the same time, we want to make sure everyone has a straight shot at 8 it. 9 So I'll listen at, at this juncture, but I would say 10 11 that if all you were trying to do is to make sure your views were factored into the DBMP decision so you wouldn't be closed 12 out as a practical matter, I think that's already accomplished 13 in this. 14 15 But let's call No. 8 and we'll, we'll talk about where we are and what you want to say about it. I don't want to 16 17

foreclose your arguments. I'm just trying to inform you as to my initial thoughts, okay?

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All right. Who wants to lead off? I'm not sure exactly how we view this procedurally. So let's start with the folks who wrote the letter and then we'll hear from them and then we'll hear back from, from the Representatives in, in counter to that.

And by the way, for everyone's benefit, I saw the motion that has been filed by the Representatives that I think

was scheduled for January, sometime like that. So I'm up to 1 2 date, to speed on what you filed so far. MS. HARDMAN: Thank you, your Honor. 3 THE COURT: All right. 4 MS. HARDMAN: With respect to that motion, I'll bring 5 6 up an issue when we get to it. But --7 THE COURT: Okay. MS. HARDMAN: -- thank you. 8 THE COURT: Very good. 9 10 Mr. Phillips. 11 MR. PHILLIPS: Good morning, your Honor. Jim Phillips from Brooks Pierce for, along with my partner, Jeff Oleynik, on 12 13 behalf of the individual defendants in the fiduciary duty action. 14 Your Honor, there are three issues that we raised. 15 Ι intend to address the first one. My colleague, Greg Mascitti, 16 17 is prepared to address the other two, if that's okay. 18 As you correctly noted, our primary impetus for raising our hand at the point in time when we did at the last 19 DBMP hearing was a concern that, practically, your ruling in 20 DBMP would bind us. And so your statement with regard to 21 understanding both what we say, had to say with regard to those 22 issues and that the cases are different and could call for 23 different resolutions will cause me to be briefer, but still a 24 25 couple of things to share with you this morning, if that's

okay.

THE COURT: Please.

MR. PHILLIPS: So the issue that I would like to address is whether the discovery in the fiduciary duty action, all of the discovery will take place at the same time as the discovery in the subcon and the fraudulent transfer action or whether discovery in those actions and whatever is applicable to the fiduciary duty action will go forward, but issues unique to the fiduciary duty action will remain stayed and, for discovery at a later point in time if and when the fiduciary duty action goes forward.

This issue arose in the context of us negotiating the CMO with the Committee. We thought -- we understood that discovery would be stayed based on the DBMP CMO and then we came to find out based on their Joint Letter to the Court in <a href="DBMP">DBMP</a> that maybe we misunderstood. Our conversation, our meet and confer with the Committee confirmed for us that we had misunderstood. And I want to be clear. We address this in our papers, but the first thing I want to be absolutely and abundantly clear about is what we're not arguing.

The draft CMO in <u>DBMP</u> and, or the CMO in <u>DBMP</u> and the CMO, the draft in our case, states that, "Discovery taken in the subcon and fraudulent transfer proceedings shall be deemed to have occurred in the fiduciary duty proceeding." So we -- we're down with that. We're not arguing that. That's

what we expect.

But the Committee, it seems to us, wants far more than that and what they want, to do all the fiduciary duty discovery now, is inconsistent with the terms of the CMO that we've negotiated, is contrary to notions of judicial economy, and is just plain impractical. To say that we're going to do all the discovery in the fiduciary duty action now ignores the fact that the Fiduciary Duty Defendants haven't answered or made, asserted affirmative defenses. If and when we do that, your Honor, I guarantee you the Committee is going to want discovery on those affirmative defenses. There are going to be issues that we have to take discovery on later.

So their judicial economy argument rings hollow. It makes more sense to do the discovery in the subcon and fraudulent transfer actions now and leave issues that are unique to the fiduciary duty action until later if and when they're required.

Consistent with that, this Court has recognized -- and I'm referring to an April 7, 2022 hearing in <a href="DBMP">DBMP</a> where the Court discussed discovery with the parties and the Court noted that there might be what it called, or what you called "a second tier of litigation," which the Court went on to say would focus on whether the individual defendants breached their fiduciary duties. That's the time to do that discovery. If that day ever comes, issues related to those -- to these -- our

particular defendants and their actions will be the focus and should be the focus of that discovery then. In fact, the DBMP and our draft CMO provides, or recognizes and provides that these issues will be addressed later when it says that:

"The individual defendants will be bound by any final order in the subcon or fraudulent transfer cases except with respect to any findings of fact as to any individual Fiduciary Duty Defendants with respect to any action or inaction such individual defendants did or didn't take."

So we're not bound by the findings in the fraudulent transfer case with regard to those issues that are particular to individuals. They're unique to them. They should be carved out of discovery now.

Two final points, your Honor, that really go to fairness and equity. The CMO provides, the draft CMO, the CMO in <u>DBMP</u> provides that my clients can participate in discovery in the fraudulent transfer and subcon actions if they choose to. If all the discovery happens now, that's really a false choice. They have no choice, but to participate.

And finally, your Honor, the Committee shouldn't have its cake and eat it, too. They shouldn't be able to avoid dispositive motions, motions to dismiss, and go straight to discovery in the fiduciary duty case.

For those reasons, your Honor, we'd ask that at some

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point the Court order that the fiduciary duty discovery that's
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 2
    unique there be stayed until the subcon and fraudulent transfer
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    cases are decided.
             THE COURT: Okay. Thank you --
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             MR. PHILLIPS:
                            Thank you.
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             THE COURT: -- Mr. Phillips.
             MR. MASCITTI: Your Honor, is your preference to
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    address the issues separately or do them all at, on one side?
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    I know in DBMP they were addressed separately.
             THE COURT: I'm at the, the parties' preferences
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11
    there. Is it easier to do it once?
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             MS. HARDMAN: I don't necessarily have a preference,
    your Honor. It seemed to flow well the last time we split it
13
    by issue. It --
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15
             THE COURT: Right.
             MS. HARDMAN:: It's really your preference.
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                                                           I,
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    whatever you prefer.
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             THE COURT: Why don't we take one issue at a time.
                                                                  Ιt
    -- it --
19
             How many parties are anticipating speaking in regard
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    to the motion, just the two?
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22
             MS. HARDMAN: There is likely --
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             THE COURT:
                         Three?
             MS. HARDMAN: -- to be two on our side --
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             THE COURT: Okay.
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MS. HARDMAN: -- I think, and perhaps --1 2 THE COURT: Okay. MS. HARDMAN: -- three. 3 THE COURT: Let's do it issue by issue, then. 4 MS. HARDMAN: Okay. 5 6 THE COURT: Let's start with No. 1. 7 MS. HARDMAN: Okay. THE COURT: Ms. Hardman? 8 MS. HARDMAN: Sounds good, your Honor. Again, Carrie 9 Hardman from Winston & Strawn on behalf of the Committee. 10 11 I think you noted earlier that we're in a bit of a strange posture in that the defendants are raising this this 12 13 time instead of either a mutual filing or plaintiffs in their own adversaries, but I guess that's what we can expect when 14 15 you receive a 7:55 p.m. Thanksgiving Eve letter that was 12 single-spaced pages filled with a whole lot of turkey stuffing 16 17 on our end related to these draft CMOs. 18 So while we don't want any more delay, we thought it practical originally to have this heard, once we received that 19 letter, to have this heard and, and raise this before it was 20 filed at the next December omnibus right before the DBMP 21 22 hearing on the 15th. THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 23 24 response).

MS. HARDMAN: But here we are. So we're going to

1 proceed. Happy to see you, your Honor.

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On the procedural front, just want to get a couple
things out of the way as well. I told you that we did file

4 | that motion. I just want to acknowledge that as well.

With respect to the motion, we were trying to get out of the morass here that we think has been presented by the letter in that there's an attached CMO that is the defendants' version.

9 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 10 response).

MS. HARDMAN: To my mind, that's a motion that's, it's a letter framed as a motion --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. HARDMAN: -- I think. It seems to seek some sort of relief there and we think that that was, perhaps, procedurally improper. So we filed our motion to try and get something before your Honor that you can actually rule on at some point. We're not saying that's today. So I don't want anybody to be caught off guard on that respect. We did file it in accordance with the Rules under the base case CMO.

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).

MS. HARDMAN: That requires us to file for the next available omnibus based on the timing. That would be January 26th. Your Honor, I will bring this up later, but I wanted to

preview this for the sake of all parties. We might request 1 today that you consider it for the 14th instead, given we are 2 effectively arquing these issues before you today. We think 3 those are the three issues that permeate the CMO from both 4 sides and if there's nothing left to negotiate, perhaps we 5 could just see what you think and then proceed on the 14th. 6 We 7 will come back to that. I just wanted to raise that from a procedural perspective. 8 THE COURT: Right. 9 MS. HARDMAN: So in accordance with that strange 10 11 posture, I'm going to ask you to pretend that I'm wearing two hats today as well as Mr. Liesemer. I am standing here on 12 behalf of both the Aldrich ACC, the Committee, as well as the 13 DBMP Committee. So I am speaking on behalf of two entities 14 15 today. From a -- before we get to the specific points in the, 16 17 on the stay of the fiduciary duty discovery, I just want to say 18 that, from our perspective, these procedural postures are entirely different. I wanted to make one clarification that in 19 DBMP we're talking about a discovery plan that has been 20 21 negotiated after we had an entered CMO that I believe was in 22 May --THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 23

MS. HARDMAN: -- way back in May. Those terms have

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response).

1 been on the docket since then. We then went in, had our

2 | discovery exchanged. We've discussed what's available. We've

3 | had our Rule 26(f) conference. We heavily negotiated a

4 discovery plan in <u>DBMP</u> and came to you with a joint filing of

5 | what was left.

Here is a different posture. We are talking apples and oranges. We are still at the CMO stage. We haven't talked about what discovery's available and we'll get to that later, but just wanted to acknowledge that these are two different procedural postures and we think that's important for consideration today.

I'm trying to keep this short, your Honor. I'm cutting through pages.

So when it comes to the stay of the fiduciary duty discovery, I think we have a difference of opinion about the ripeness of this issue. I think you noted that, already. We actually don't think that this is an issue for today's CMO. We think this is an issue for participation in discovery going forward. Mr. Phillips did raise a number of provisions of the CMO as drafted that were there from the get-go and we've been in agreement all along.

One of those he mentioned was that they preserved their rights with respect to the individuals' actions or inactions, then we could proceed with discovery. They've got their rights preserved, from my perspective. That's what we

response).

intended this CMO to represent. All rights are preserved. We are going to go forward with discovery in as much of a one-time and comprehensive basis as we could.

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative)

MS. HARDMAN: It seems that there's no dispute that the discovery that we are conducting in these actions would be binding on all parties subject to those certain reservations whether -- and they can choose to participate or not. Those provisions are laid out in the CMO. We're not sure entirely how we split this baby when we're talking about approach in staying certain kinds of discovery and not others. We can permit discovery to proceed. What discovery we intend to seek is intended to be comprehensive, as I said, and the discovery here arises from the same set of facts. I'm going to repeat myself a bit from the last hearing in DBMP.

We discussed instances with the defendants of where we could bifurcate that discovery --

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).

MS. HARDMAN: -- and we came up with one example. And that is -- and we put that in our pleadings -- the financial wherewithal of an individual defendant. That, to me, is very specific to the fiduciary duty action. I don't think -- our Committee really isn't concerned with that with respect to

fraudulent transfer, but when you talk about the intent of those individuals who are either current or former officers and

directors that's important for the fiduciary duty and the

4 subcon actions.

So I think, you know, if we want to carve out one specific issue, that's fine. We started to talk about that and thought, well, maybe there's some room for us to, to narrow our issue here. So at the least, it's premature to be discussing this today. We could talk about that further among the parties before the hearing on the 14th, but when it comes to all the other issues I, I have to say unless we get those specific examples, we don't see how you bifurcate it.

As we've said to the Court before, the fiduciary duty action rises and falls with the fraudulent transfer and subcon complaints, presume, more so the fraudulent transfer action.

But -- so the discovery we intend to seek is likely to permeate both actions from a practical perspective. I don't think the fiduciary duty defendants are suggesting their clients won't sit for third-party subpoenas if that's where we have to go here in the fraudulent transfer or subcon actions, but, if they want piecemeal discovery, it, we can do more than one deposition if that's, of the same defendant, if that's needed.

We just thought it was inefficient.

So all that said, you know, we could argue the merits of this, but I think my general position here, your Honor, is

that this is premature at this stage. We're happy to discuss 1 further trying to narrow what issues might be carved out, but 2 otherwise think that the CMO as originally drafted and agreed 3 by the parties until the 11th hour before a DBMP hearing should 4 just proceed. 5 THE COURT: Okay. The -- your reference to doing 6 7 something on, on December 14th, do you believe that the entire CMO will either be resolved or that we can tee up all of those 8 issues at this, at that date? 9 MS. HARDMAN: We had originally proposed to the 10 11 defendants that we tee all of this up for then. THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 12 13 response). MS. HARDMAN: I believe based on the circumstances at 14 15 this moment we effectively have submitted materials on both sides sufficient to address what are the true outstanding 16 17 issues. There are a number of very limited additional comments 18 to the CMO that you will see in a blackline that we've attached to the motion. It's between the version filed by the 19 defendants and our version that's filed with that motion. 20 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 21 22 response). It shows a couple of small issues. 23 MS. HARDMAN: believe that at our last meet and confer we actually narrowed 24

those. We thought we had agreement on the language and it

might require just one conversation to sort that out. 1 those are, from my perspective, substantive or are significant 2 issues that can't be resolved. Giving us the opportunity to 3 have that one more call before the 14th narrowing those issues, 4 perhaps submitting another blackline to your Honor with the new 5 version, could get us there. If the defendants feel that they 6 7 have more to say beyond their 12-page letter, if they want to respond to our motion, we would not be opposed to that on a 8 particular time schedule so we at least know when it's coming. 9 But other than that, we would be happy to proceed and 10 11 think that based on what we're doing today it'll be submitted

sufficiently before your Honor such that if maybe there's a

little bit of argument on the 14th, that would be it.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

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Before we get into that, Mr. Phillips, I would like to talk about that general issue, is do you think you'll be in a position in the next month or even January to be able to talk about all of the CMO issues? I'd rather make one ruling and procedurally, that would be more proper if we could.

How, how do you feel about it from your side?

MR. PHILLIPS: Your Honor, without having much discussion other than what we've had previously, I think that we would be in a position by January. The 30, the 14th is a couple of weeks.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. PHILLIPS: And I will also admit that being late to this party that's been going on for a couple of years, I've got a conflict on the 14th that, 'cause I didn't have all the omnibus dates on my calendar at the beginning. And so personally, I'd like to avoid that and move it into January. But I certainly think in January we would be in a position to do that. THE COURT: Mr. Mascitti? MR. MASCITTI: Your Honor, I don't want to short circuit the arguments today because I know everyone loves to argue. We -- you know, your Honor may recall at the hearing in DBMP when you allowed us to appear we had proposed having this all heard on December 14th and the Committee opposed it at that time. So it is somewhat ironic now that the Committee would like it all heard on the 14th. I agree with Mr. Phillips that January would be appropriate and, your Honor, I don't really want to argue these issues twice. THE COURT: Right. MR. MASCITTI: And so if you believe that, if your Honor believes that it would be more appropriate to hear everything at once in January, my suggestion would be we just defer argument on these issues until then.

THE COURT: Anybody else need to jump in on this?

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             Ms. Zieq?
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             MS. ZIEG:
                        Your Honor, I would like to talk about the
    text messaging issue because, as you noted in your, your
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    comments, it's almost like an amicus to the DBMP hearing and I
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    think that as the FCR's representative in DBMP who addressed
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    this issue I need to address the, the briefing they put in
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    their letter that --
             THE COURT: But for purposes --
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             MS. ZIEG: -- in our view --
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             THE COURT: -- of DBMP.
                       -- mischaracterizes the cases and the issue
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             MS. ZIEG:
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    in DBMP.
                                This, this is pointing out to me
             THE COURT: Yeah.
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    why my trying to coordinate the two cases is, is probably a bad
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    idea since procedurally what we're really talking about for the
    moment is, is doing something in DBMP without all the parties
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    present, either. I know I've got most of the major
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    constituencies, but not all of them.
             MR. MASCITTI: Your Honor, if I could just --
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             THE COURT: Yeah.
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             MR. MASCITTI: -- add to my prior comment.
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             We weren't expecting your Honor to rule today on these
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    issues.
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             THE COURT: Right.
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             MR. MASCITTI: What we did expect is that your Honor
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1 | might provide some guidance on those issues consistent with, I

2 | believe the way your Honor is leaning in DBMP, which might

3 | facilitate a consensual resolution of the CMO going forward in

4 this case.

THE COURT: All right.

Here's what I think we ought to do. I don't like it procedurally. I'm not a, a stickler for civil procedure, but the higher courts do expect a little bit of form from us down here and recognizing they think all bankruptcy work is witchcraft, anyway, it's better to have it framed up in a more traditional form.

I'm planning to make a decision in the <u>DBMP</u> case in the December hearing. The reality of my schedule is I'm, I'm in court practically every day between here and there and I would like to give this all the time and whatever other disputes you might have that it warrants and since I'm going to make a ruling in <u>DBMP</u> at the December date, that would also give y'all an opportunity to triangulate based on, on what I say then and tell me why it's different here. And lest anyone be concerned that they'll be roped in by what I decide in <u>DBMP</u>, obviously there's some differences on, on the cases and these motions and the procedural posture, as Ms. Hardman has pointed out. But my view is that if we get that date, then we ought to hear this in January and give you a full run on all of the CMO-related issues and just get it knocked out one time and not

waste your time in the meantime.

So with, with all respect, I think I've got enough <a href="DBMP">DBMP</a> briefing on, on the text devices and the like. I just wanted to know what other parties thought about it, Ms. Zieg. So I -- I -- I think -- I hear you loud and clear there, so.

My thinking would be that we just ride on the motion that's been noticed out for the January date and use that as our vehicle. If you need to, to talk about supplemental briefing on these, these matters and others, I'm happy to discuss that or you can work it out between yourselves, whatever you want.

MS. ZIEG: That's acceptable, your Honor. My only issue is that the cases that they cited for the issue here, but really in <u>DBMP</u>, are completely different than the issues we were addressing at the <u>DBMP</u> hearing. I just wanted to make sure that your Honor, to the extent you read the cases -- and I am sure that you understand that they are completely inapposite of the issue there -- but I just wanted to make sure that we had an opportunity to be heard if any of that briefing was impacting your decision in <u>DBMP</u>.

THE COURT: Well, I can't give glimmers as to what I'm thinking, but, at this juncture, but we try to read all the cases that are pointed out to us, so. Okay?

So for now, my suggestion on this matter is that we incorporate it in the, into the motion the Committee has

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already noticed out for the January date and continue it till
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    that time.
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             If -- do y'all need to set any dates as to briefs and
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    replies, or are you going to use the, the standard Rules?
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             MR. MASCITTI: Your Honor, I expect we'll file a
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    cross-motion, then, for a competing CMO and, and we'll discuss
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    with the Committee a briefing schedule.
             THE COURT: Okay. If y'all can work all that out,
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    that will help us.
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             Okay. Let's take about a five-minute recess.
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             Any of you who were only here for that matter are, are
    welcome to leave.
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             And those who are on by video or telephone, please
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    keep the lines open, receivers muted.
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             And we'll pick up in -- let's see. It's five after --
    let's pick up at a quarter after the hour, okay?
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             MR. NEIER: Thank you, your Honor. We're going to be
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    excused.
             MS. HARDMAN: Thank you, your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Okay. Bye.
         (Recess from 10:05 a.m., until 10:18 a.m.)
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22
                              AFTER RECESS
         (Call to Order of the Court)
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             THE COURT: Okay. Have a seat, everyone.
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             All right. Are we ready to move on? I, I don't want
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to forego the, the traditional good-of-the-order type 1 announcements about the case, but we still in these motions to 2 quash and the motion to anonymize also have some parties who 3 wouldn't be here throughout. 4 So I would suggest that we hear those three motions 5 and -- actually, it's more than that -- but the motions to 6 7 quash and the anonymization motion and then if afterwards there are any status reports to be given, do that. 8 Anyone feel differently? Okay. 9 10 Mr. Guy. 11 MR. GUY: Your Honor, I don't feel differently, but I just wanted to announce that we don't have a direct horse in 12 13 this race. THE COURT: Right. 14 15 MR. GUY: And we want to stay because it's interesting, of course, and we are concerned about the result 16 17 and we want to make sure things move forward. But if I may be 18 excused if I get to my watch, to get my flight, I would 19 appreciate that. 20 THE COURT: All right. MR. GUY: Thank you, your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Okay. You may, of course, Mr. Guy, leave 22 whenever you want to, but we'll try to do what we can. 23

MR. GUY: Everybody might surprise me and arque very

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quickly, your Honor.

1 THE COURT: All right. Well, with that in mind, we were supposed to be doing 2 a status hearing on, on the, the Committee's motion to compel 3 mediation. 4 5 Was there going to be much put on today in that matter? It's on the calendar, but I'm not sure that we have a 6 lot to talk about, or, I mean, the BA's motion to, to compel 7 mediation. 8 MS. ABEL: Your Honor, I'm stealing thunder here, but 9 we have a draft order that is very close to being finalized I 10 11 think we should be able to submit today. THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 12 13 response). MS. ABEL: And that draft order sets all of this out 14 15 for January. The parties are in discussions and we believe 16 that they're going to make some progress on that front. So I don't think we'll need the Court's time on that 17 18 today. 19 THE COURT: Okay. Everyone feel alike on that? 20 21 (No response) 22 THE COURT: Okay. For the, the clerk's, clerk's benefit, No. 1 on the 23 docket, the mandatory mediation, we'll just carry over to the 24 January date, if we need it. 25

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All right. That takes us -- and we can do it
quickly -- we've continued the No. 2 and No. 3 to December
14th, the motions to file confidential documents under seal.
         Everyone agreed there?
                    Yeah. Can we, can we continue it one more
         MR. ERENS:
time to January? We will have it -- we continued it enough
times, your Honor, that we, we will get it done by the, the New
Year, at the latest.
         THE COURT: Anyone feel differently?
    (No response)
         THE COURT: Okay.
         What is that January date? It is --
                     January 26, your Honor.
         MR. ERENS:
                    Okay. The 26th in each of those.
         THE COURT:
        All right.
                    That takes us to Nos. 4 through, I guess
it is, 6 and also No. 7.
         Do the parties have a feeling? They're related
matters.
         I would assume the motions to quash should be heard
together. Do we need to also throw in the anonymization or do
you want to hear that separately or do y'all have another way
of approaching these matters?
                    No need to hear them separately, from our
         MR. EVERT:
perspective, your Honor.
         MR. GUERKE: Your Honor, Kevin Guerke --
         THE COURT: Yeah.
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Mr. GUERKE: -- DCPF. I, I think they could be all
heard together. And we've made some effort to coordinate with
the motion to quash folks and the plan is to have Trust counsel
go first, I'll go second, and then Mr. Hogan and the Matching
Claimants third, your Honor.
         THE COURT: Everyone in agreement?
    (No response)
        THE COURT: Okay.
        Well, we will call Nos. 4 through 7, altogether.
         That, for the clerk who's not potentially looking at
the same docket I've got, the Third-Party Trusts' Motion to
Quash or Modify. There were a variety of responses; No. 5,
Delaware Claims Processing Facility's Motion to Quash or
Modify; No. 6, the Non-Party Certain Matching Claimants' Motion
to Quash or Modify; and the Non-Party Certain Matching
Claimants' Motion to Proceed Anonymously, we're calling all of
those at the same time.
        All right. I'm ready to hear you.
        Mr. Martin?
        MR. MARTIN: Good morning, your Honor. Lance Martin
from Ward and Smith on behalf of the Asbestos Trusts.
counsel on the video is going to be presenting the argument
today, your Honor, but I do have one demonstrative exhibit.
        May I approach?
        THE COURT: You may.
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1 MR. MARTIN: Thank you. (Demonstrative exhibit handed to the Court) 2 THE COURT: Counsel, whenever you're ready. 3 MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Thank you, your Honor. 4 This is Beth Moskow-Schnoll. Can you hear me okay? 5 6 THE COURT: Can we get a little more volume on? Okay. 7 All right. MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Is that, is that any better? 8 I'm trying to --9 10 THE COURT: Much better, yes. Thank you. 11 MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Okay, great. First of all, your Honor, what, what you just 12 received, I sent a copy of those, those few slides to Jones Day 13 earlier this morning before the hearing so, so that they had it 14 15 a little bit before. I, I just wanted to apologize again for not being in 16 17 court in person. I would much prefer to be there, but at the 18 time this was scheduled I already had a, a hearing before the district court in Delaware this afternoon scheduled and -- but 19 I do apologize 'cause I would like to argue in person because 20 this is definitely -- you know, I was going to make a, a joke 21 about the fact that I don't want to look like I'm "phoning" in 22 this argument because I'm not. 23 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 24 25 response).

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             MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: I mean, we have not argued before
    this Court before --
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             THE COURT: Right.
             MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: -- on this issue and, and even
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    though the lawyers from Jones Day said, "Oh, this is something
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    the Court's heard many times, " the Court has not heard it in
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 7
    this case and we do have some different points that we want to
    stress.
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             THE COURT: All right.
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             MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: This is governed by Rule 45,
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    which is not, which is not the standard by which the subpoena
    or the order attached to the subpoena was issued.
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             So it is a different standard and that says that, "The
    court must quash or modify a subpoena that requires disclosure
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    of privileged or other protected matter" -- that's 45(d)(3)(A)
    -- is unduly burdensome under 45(d)(3)(A)(iv), which Mr. Guerke
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    will address, or seeks disclosure or confidential commercial
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    information under Rule 45(d)(3)(B)(i).
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             So, you know, one of the issues is what do the
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    subpoenas to the DCPF Trusts seek? They seek claimants' law
    firms, date claim filed, date claim paid, and then all
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    exposure-related fields.
             THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
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    response).
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             MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: And Aldrich's argument is, like,
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"We don't need a lot of protections here and, and we don't need 1 sampling because this is not PII." 2 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 3 response). 4 5 MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: But while they don't expressly seek trust claimants' personal information, like Social 6 7 Security numbers, names, addresses, that really makes little difference here because, as Mr. Guerke will discuss, the 8 exposure-related fields that are requested may still contain 9 personally identifiable information. But more importantly, 10 11 because DCPF must match the Trust claimants' name and Social Securities, Social Security numbers to names and Social 12 13 Security numbers provided by Aldrich thereby deanonymizing any kind of data prior to production, DCPF is releasing claimant 14 15 identifying information and however Aldrich wants to refer to it, that's what it is. It's, it's personally identifiable 16 17 information related to the claimants. 18 The next issue is because there is this type of information being released, we need to talk about 19 proportionality. Aldrich's ask is not proportional to its 20 21 needs and, and I, I want to turn to my slides at this point. 22 Your Honor --23 THE COURT: Please. MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: -- is it okay if I share my 24

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screen to put them up?

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             THE COURT: Absolutely.
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             MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Thank you.
             So first of all, there's a, we have a cast of common
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    characters here. In all three of these related cases, in
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    Bestwall, DBMP, and, and in Aldrich, the case we're with now,
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    we have across the line Bates White acting as the expert. We
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    have Jones Day and, and for these --
             THE COURT: Hang on. Hang on one moment, Counsel.
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    Were you sharing those documents on the screen? 'Cause we're
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    not seeing them.
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             MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: You're not seeing them?
             THE COURT: No, ma'am.
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             MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Oh, okay. Interesting. Oh,
13
    yeah. It's not showing. Well, you all have a copy. I'll tell
14
15
    you what I'm thinking. I don't know why it's not showing.
             THE COURT: Does, does anyone else feel the need to
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    see printed copies? We can take a moment if those in the
18
    gallery need it.
19
             Okay. Now we're there. Thank you.
                                                  No.
                                                       We were.
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             MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Guys, we were.
                                                  Hold on.
21
        (Pause)
22
             MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Can you see it now?
23
             THE COURT: We see "trust subpoenas compelled data of
    36,000 trust claims."
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             MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: There we go.
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1 THE COURT: Okay.

MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Which is the wrong slide. And

3 | now it's not -- okay.

4 THE COURT: There you are.

5 MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: There we go. Thank you. Thanks

6 | for your patience.

of the cases.

7 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative

8 response).

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MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: So we have a list of common characters across these cases, these three cases. We have Bates White acting as the expert, we have Jones Day, and, and the red is, is the people that are, that are across all three

14 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).

MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: And since Mr. Erens is in the courtroom today, well, actually, he, he's not in <u>DBMP</u> apparently, but still we have the same people at Jones Day that appear across all these. And then, we have the fact that these trust subpoenas are compelling an enormous amount of data.

We've got, you know, Bestwall served their subpoena April 5, 2021 seeking 15,000 trust claimants' data from 11 trusts, then there was DBMP, which was 9,000 trust claimants' data from 11 trusts, and Aldrich is even bigger because it's 12,000 trust claimants' data, but it's from 19 trusts, plus Paddock, so

another debtor. And this amounts to 36,000 trust claimants' data from 19 different trusts, plus Paddock, and it's all going to Jones Day and Bates White.

So the Aldrich subpoena allows Bates White to aggregate all these trust claimants' data postproduction with data from Aldrich's database and other sources, including data from Manville, Verus, and Paddock, into a single, consolidated information clearinghouse while they hold a matching key that deanonymizes the data and we think that's an enormous risk and not only will the data be commingled into one searchable database, but it also allows Bates White to consolidate data from Aldrich's database or other sources into a single, consolidated trust claimant information clearinghouse.

So even if they only consolidate information from sources identified in the Aldrich subpoenas, they will be consolidating confidential, sensitive data collected from 20 different sources into a single, consolidated database.

Now it gets, it gets even more dramatic when you look at what's going on now where there's inter-debtor and third-party debtor subpoenas which are seeking even more information. So what we have here is that Bestwall now has subpoenaed Aldrich Pump and Murray Boiler and DBMP who, by the way, are also represented by Jones Day. They did not file motions to quash, as far as we're aware. And so they have started subpoenaing these other debtors and asking for claims data

which is data contained in any claims database within DBMP's

possession, custody, or control. They also subpoenaed Paddock

for claims data and ballots using the same definition of what

claims data is. And again, it's all flowing to Jones Day and

Bates White. It's all going to the same place. And, and

Aldrich has already indicated that it's going to follow suit

and issue inter-debtor subpoenas as well.

And, and so there's a real risk that despite best practices that protected trust claimant data that's intended for use in only one database may find its way into another database or into another debtor's hands, even if it's done inadvertently, and no matter how well intentioned the effort is to avoid disclosure, we're still going to -- the scenario is ripe for extending the use of trust claimants' data beyond Aldrich's estimation proceeding and the permitted purposes.

So -- and, and besides that, because all the data is going to the same entities, not to even mention all the other experts that are allowed to have access to it, you know, there's a case that we cited, <u>Virginia Department of</u>

Corrections v. Jordan, where, you know, the court there said:

"Even the most rigorous efforts of the recipient of sensitive information to preserve confidentiality in compliance with the provisions of such a protective order may not prevent inadvertent compromise. It is very difficult for the human mind to compartmentalize

and selectively suppress information once learned, no matter how well-intentioned the effort may be to do so."

I mean, and one of our concerns is, like, if we turn over this data, are we going to see a flurry of subpoenas directed to Aldrich, DBMP, or Bestwall that the trust data will get swept up in? It looks like that's going to happen and it's very, very concerning to us.

I'm going to see if I can stop sharing my screen now.

Okay. I think that worked, right? You can all see me
again?

THE COURT: Yes, ma'am.

entities, Jones Day and Bates White, holding almost 150,000 claims files for 12,000 claimants from 20 different sources, 19 trusts and Paddock, plus data for 24,000 claimants in <a href="Bestwall">Bestwall</a> and <a href="DBMP">DBMP</a>, and holding the matching keys to deanonymize each dataset. The same counsel and lead experts are analyzing similar data across three bankruptcies, all for the same purpose, which leads to unprecedented aggregation and commingling of data into a single information clearinghouse and the matched and aggregated production is further accessible by a broad array of retained experts and authorized representatives for Aldrich and Murray, the ACC, the FCR, Trane Technologies Company, and Trane U.S.

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So what are we proposing? I'm sure you know. It's sampling. Sampling really is the solution here. particularly appropriate where confidential data is sought. So -- excuse me. THE COURT: Take a moment. (Pause) MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: DCPF undertakes significant security measures to try to protect all this data, but once it's produced to Aldrich and Bates White those measures can no longer control or protect that trust claimants' data that they and the Trusts have a duty to protect. By limiting disclosure of the trust claimant data to no more than a 10 percent sample, the volume of data leaving DCPF's control and the Trusts' control is drastically reduced and, in turn, the risk of harm to trust claimants through inadvertent disclosure or misuse of the data is reduced significantly. And, and the most important point here is that while the information may be relevant for the estimation proceedings, all of the information is not necessary for these proceedings. There -- there is -- they -- Aldrich has failed to show why they need unfettered access to claimants' sensitive information. Why a sample would not work -- they've never argued that a sample would not work for them and they've never explained how it couldn't work for them. And, you know, especially, there's no need for all of the information to go in

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that, especially when you're balancing it against the need to 1 protect the sensitive, confidential information of 12,000 sick, 2 elderly people, some of them may even be dead. 3 I don't know. And sampling won't modify the substance or quality of the data 4 that Aldrich receives. It only decreases the volume, which is 5 a really good thing. Aldrich will be able to discern the exact 6 7 same patterns from a sample as they would from reviewing all the data and a random sample of no more than 10 percent of the 8 trust claims at issue would, therefore, provide Aldrich with 9 all the data it needs for its estimate, estimation proceedings 10 and Aldrich has never argued otherwise.

But they really can't argue that sampling wouldn't get them what they need because Aldrich's counsel, as I've said, is the same counsel who represented the debtor in Bestwall. in Bestwall when Judge Connolly in the District of Delaware ruled that a 10, that only a 10 percent sample would need to be produced, Bestwall issued a new subpoena and asked the court to approve their resolved claim sample and in that motion they admitted that using a 10 percent sample would -- and this is a quote -- "provide an efficient mechanism by which the parties and the bankruptcy court can address issues presented by the estimation proceeding" and they argued that "approving the 10 percent sample offers a practicable and fair way to proceed and will save time and expense." And, your Honor, we totally agreed with Jones Day. It will save time and expense. In that

Document Page 49 of 87 49 same motion Jones Day cited the Manual for Complex Litigation 1 for the --2 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 3 response). 4 MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: -- proposition that: 5 "Acceptable sampling techniques in lieu of discovery 6 and presentation of voluminous data from the entire 7 population can save substantial time and expense and 8 in some cases provide the only practicable means to 9 collect and present relevant data." 10 11 And Aldrich's only -- their, their own consultant, Bates White, further opined that a 10 percent sample was 12 reliable for performing analyses related to liability 13 estimation and this was despite them previously contending that 14 15 using a sample would be unworkable. And your Honor has also stated that you favor sampling because it saves costs and 16 17 controversy. And finally, your Honor, if the Court orders 18 production of a sample as opposed to the entire claimant 19 population, my guess is that that will become the norm going 20 21

forward for subpoenas like this in estimation proceedings and that would, hopefully, lead to less litigation going forward which would, again, be, be more efficient, less costly, and, and just make things move along. In conclusion, using a random sample mitigates risks, lessens the burden on the Trusts and

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DCPF, and it would be a much more efficient method and it may result in less litigation going forward, your Honor.

So we respectfully ask the Court to grant our motion to quash and order that rather than produce all the claims data

for the 12,000 claimants, that the DCPF Trusts produce a random

6 | 10 percent sample of that data.

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Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Okay. Mr. Guerke.

MR. GUERKE: Good morning, your Honor. Kevin Guerke on behalf of Delaware Claim Processing Facility, LLC.

We join the Trusts' arguments, both made today and also in their written submissions. I appreciate that the Court has heard similar issues on other subpoenas before. So I'll streamline my comments today and will focus on the unique burden on DCPF. Otherwise, we'll rely on our papers, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. GUERKE: DCPF has a duty to protect and maintain the security over the confidential and highly sensitive trust data that it stores for the Trusts. Protecting the security of sensitive claimant data is our highest priority.

Debtors' subpoena requested DCPF to produce seven categories of information from the Trusts. The process involved in responding to those seven categories will be a huge

1 burden. Whether it was the debtors' intent or not, the

- 2 | subpoena will capture sensitive, personal identifying
- 3 | information, including names and Social Security numbers. The
- 4 | primary problem is the debtors' Request G, Paragraph 10 of the
- 5 | subpoena, for all exposure-related fields. That's the seventh
- 6 category, your Honor.
- 7 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
- 8 response).
- 9 MR. GUERKE: This broad, all-exposure field includes
- 10 | five additional subcategories of requested information. Some
- 11 of the data for the all-exposure field's request will contain
- 12 | Social Security numbers and names and other sensitive
- 13 | information. This is usually found in secondary exposure or
- 14 occupational exposure situations where a claimant filled out a
- 15 | narrative response in the claim form describing their exposure
- 16 and listing information that would be considered personal
- 17 | sensitive information. Here, the subpoena seeks information
- 18 | related to 12,000 claimants. Almost 150,000 claims match to
- 19 those 12,000 claimants. There can be multiple exposure records
- 20 associated with each claim that's submitted and each exposure
- 21 record has up to four exposure fields which could contain
- 22 personal identifying information.
- So to comply with the subpoena, each field would have
- 24 | to be manually reviewed by a DCPF employee to respond to the
- 25 | subpoena and then redact and remove the sensitive information

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like names and Social Security numbers. That means DCPF has to
 1
    review and redact up to four exposure fields for each of the
 2
    hundreds of thousands of exposure records associated with the
 3
    nearly 150,000 claims. It's a very labor-intensive process and
 4
    it's a very time-consuming process.
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             The process and data isn't easy to understand and I've
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 7
    had trouble visualizing it and conceptualizing it.
             THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
 8
    response).
 9
             MR. GUERKE: Your Honor, I, I have a, a sample I'd
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11
    like to hand up and hand to counsel to help describe the, the
12
    process.
             May I approach?
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             THE COURT: Please.
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15
         (Printout handed to the Court and counsel)
             THE COURT:
                         Thank you. I can tell already you're
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17
    optimistic about my eyesight.
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             MR. GUERKE: I'm sorry, your Honor. That -- this is a
    -- this would normally be provided in a spreadsheet form --
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20
             THE COURT: Right.
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             MR. GUERKE: -- and we had to print it out and --
             THE COURT: You're fine.
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             MR. GUERKE: -- this is as, as good as we could get
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    it.
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THE COURT: Very good.

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MR. GUERKE: What this is, your Honor, this three-page document, is an example of the end product that we produce in response to a subpoena like this. It's after the review and it's after the redaction. So as I said before, there are 150, nearly 150,000 claim forms in play here. When responding to the subpoena, DCPF will pull the data from, from the claim forms for the fields that were requested, the seven categories --Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative THE COURT: response). MR. GUERKE: -- in Paragraph 10 of the subpoena. There are multiple exposure records associated with each claim. After the information is collected, DCPF has to review each exposure field for names, Social Security numbers, and other personal identifying information and that ends up in the final form for production, which is the document I've handed up. The first page, your Honor, includes claim-related form, claim-related information and it corresponds to Requests A through F in the subpoena for claimant pseudonym, information about the law firm, contact information, the date that the claim was received, the date that the claim was approved, the first payment, and the status. First page is claim-related information. The second page, your Honor, is an example of information that would be pulled and provided in response to

claimant information.

Part G of the subpoena, all exposure-related fields. And you'll see here that this is injured party exposure and there is a column on the right side with, with four-or-five entries with text fields where this particular claimant has filled in narrative responses and, and as you will see, there's information that had to be redacted in, in the production process, names in two or three places for this, this injured

The last page, your Honor, is, relates to secondary-exposure information that also would be captured by Part G of the subpoena. You'll see that this claimant had secondary or take-home exposure from her spouse. She provided her spouse's name and she provided her spouse's Social Security number in two places in the narrative text that she filled in and as you can see, it's, it's been redacted as part of the production process.

A DCPF employee has to review each of these exposure records and then make the redactions. The redacted information is then compiled into a spreadsheet in electronic form similar to the printout that I've handed up. That review has to be done of those exposure records hundreds of thousands of times and the data produced looks like what I've handed up, but to get to that end product the reviewer in this particular case had to review multiple separate exposure records. There's no easy way to do it. It cannot be automated. The review can't

be completed electronically. We must eyeball it by a human and then there is a second-level QC process that we have to go

3 through.

The debtors argue there's minimal burden because they haven't requested personal identifying information specifically, but, but that's not correct. The, the sensitive information is contained within the narrative fields, as I have, as I have shown in this example, that will be produced in response to the all exposure-related fields request in the subpoena. Responding to this subpoena will require DCPF, not a party to this case, as a nonparty to dedicate a team of employees to do this review. Responding to this subpoena will take that team many, many weeks to complete. It's an undeniable, undeniably tedious manual process that could easily be reduced through sampling. The burden we've described, your Honor, is undisputed.

And the costs are not just hard-dollar costs and expense. The subpoena takes away from DCPF's core mission. It takes away from DCPF's business. It distracts and it impedes us from, from processing claims for injured claimants. It can't do its other work when it's doing this work, your Honor, and -- and -- and if there's a situation where DCPF releases sensitive information and there's a data breach, it loses credibility. It strains its business. It could lose business. It's a serious threat.

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So we request, your Honor, respectfully, that the
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    Court quash or modify the subpoena to eliminate the request for
    all-exposure fields, Part G of the subpoena, and order random
 3
    sampling, as described by my colleagues and in our papers.
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    That's the only way to reduce the extensive burden on non-party
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 6
    DCPF.
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             Thank you, your Honor.
             THE COURT:
                         Thank you.
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             Then we had the claimants as well who wanted to be
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    heard?
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             MR. HOGAN:
                         Yes, your Honor. Daniel Hogan --
             THE COURT:
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                         Okay.
             MR. HOGAN: -- on behalf of the Certain Matching
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    Claimants. Can you hear me this morning, your Honor?
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             THE COURT:
                         Yes, sir.
             MR. HOGAN:
                         Wonderful.
                                     Thank you. Daniel Hogan of
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17
    Hogan McDaniel on behalf of the Certain Matching Claimants.
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    Thank you, your Honor, for permitting me to appear via Teams or
    Zoom, or whatever we're on today. I had a scheduling conflict
19
    which prevented me from flying down to Charlotte. I would have
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    loved to have done that and appeared before you personally.
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    Mr. Waldrep is in the court. He admitted me pro hac vice for
    purposes of these proceedings.
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             THE COURT: Yes, sir.
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                         But I wanted to, to thank you for allowing
             MR. HOGAN:
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me to proceed, accordingly.

Your Honor, the Certain Matching Claimants are 10,474 unique meso victims, mesothelioma victims of the debtors' products who have historic, historic claims submitted to the Asbestos Trusts. These individuals are not current claimants of the debtors. They have asserted over a hundred thousand unique claims. They're also not future claimants of, of the debtors. They're historical claimants who long ago resolved their meso claims against the debtors. Also important, your Honor, they have not appeared in these cases in any capacity before today. They are truly strangers to this litigation.

And so, your Honor, you know, we filed a motion to quash. We filed a motion to proceed anonymously. We joined in the motion to quash that were filed by both the Trusts and DCPF and, and we, we join those arguments. And so it's not my intention today, your Honor, to repeat anything that's been argued with the exception, potentially, of touching on the burden, your Honor, that, that affects the Matching Claimants.

Your Honor, let me just talk for a minute about the posture of these proceedings. As you, as you're well aware more than anyone, no one anticipated that we would be arguing these motions before your Honor when these subpoenas were issued and served upon DCPF and the Trusts in Delaware. The Matching Claimants were not served with the subpoenas. The July 1st order that you entered specifically provided that

1 DCPF, after utilizing the matching key, would notify not the

2 | Matching Claimants, but their counsel of record for the

3 | Matching Claimants. This is counsel of record not in these

4 proceedings, your Honor. These are counsel of record in

5 proceedings that have long ago been resolved and been resolved

6 by settlement.

And so it's a, it's a unique construct. The Matching Claimants and their counsel were forced to interpret the meaning of the July 1st order as it applies to the Matching Claimants and, and the provided process to move to quash the subpoenas. If you read the July 1st order, which I know you have as you signed it, it's contemplated that only the Matching Claimants would be allowed, or, or at least specifically articulated that the Matching Claimants would be the ones who would be allowed to move to quash these subpoenas. And nevertheless, we're, we're, we're pleased that both the Trusts and DCPF have moved to quash the subpoenas as well and as I indicated, we joined in the arguments made by them.

Your Honor, I have been retained by at least 52 law firms who, who retained us to help protect this historic data which were -- and these firms and their claimants were identified through the process that unfolds in that, in that order. Each of the firms received from DCPF a separate list of Matching Claimants for each of the ten Delaware Trusts. We worked long and hard to coalesce these lists to aggregate the

precise number of claimants and the unique number of claims

asserted against the Trusts by the Matching Claimants. The

takeaway from this endeavor is, is just an astronomical number,

from our perspective, of both claimants and claims. And so we

echo the arguments about anonymization and about sampling

because we believe that that could really cut down on the

Your Honor, if I could, I'd like to turn now to the anonymization issue because that -- it's an -- that is an issue that is, of course, unique to the Matching Claimants. It hasn't been argued by either DCPF or the Trusts.

Your Honor, the motion to proceed anonymously is, is precipitated by the need of having the, the claimants be named in the public record and from our perspective -- and again, pursuant to the provisions of your July 1, 2021 order -- we believe that the order specifically prohibited us pursuant to Paragraph 13(e) that we should not put their names on the public record. As I indicated during the <u>DBMP</u> hearing, your Honor, I'm not interested in a contempt ruling from you with regard to the form of order and I realize that, you know, when, when this motion to quash was filed I didn't anticipate that I'd be arguing this motion --

THE COURT: Right.

burden.

MR. HOGAN: -- in front of you, your Honor, the very Judge who issued the order. But nevertheless, I, I'm not

names of the Matching Claimants.

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interested in, in a contempt order, as I read Paragraph 13(e)
applying to me as counsel to the Matching Claimants, and
perceived the prohibition as preventing me from pleading the

And so from that perspective, your Honor, just so you have an understanding of why it is that we, you know, we, we believe it's important to proceed anonymously, in terms of the, the balancing test that's required to evaluate whether or not it's appropriate to proceed anonymously, we believe that the fear of harm caused by the disclosure of the identity of these litigants in pursuing a motion to quash is against their, is against the public interest. We -- we weigh -- we believe that the balance weighs in favor where these claimants are not litigants pursuing current claims, but are proceeding solely to protect their identities and their personal information. Protecting settlement information is a routine feature of litigation because it fosters settlements and protects all involved parties and we believe that Aldrich has not provided an adequate justification for allowing a wholesale release of, of over 10,000 Matching Claimants. And so from our perspective, we've got both the form of the language of your order as well as the balancing of the -- of -- of the need.

Secondarily, your Honor, and I believe importantly, if you read the -- the -- Aldrich's objection to our motion to quash and our motion to proceed anonymously, they recite to a

subset of mesothelioma claimants that were filed by individual 1 law firms and they, in fact, attached to their motion and to 2 the declaration excerpts of each of those complaints. 3 we did there, your Honor, is we went back to -- because I have 4 a list of each of the -- of the Matching Claimants 5 for each of these specific law firms as identified by DCPF --6 7 and we went back and reviewed and, in fact, upon a review of those eight complaints two of the complaints which purportedly 8 evidence the public dissemination of Matching Claimants and 9 identities in reality name individuals who do not appear on the 10 11 matching key list provided to us by DCPF.

So from our perspective, assuming a comparable rate of error, at least 25 percent of the potential Matching Claimants are, arguably, inaccurate and at that rate there's a real potential here, your Honor, that over 2600 individuals, if, if I extrapolate that 25 percent error rate, could have their identities and PII, or personally identifying information, improperly and unnecessarily disclosed to Aldrich. And so from our perspective, your Honor, we believe that we should be allowed to proceed anonymously.

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And also, your Honor, I just, so the record's clear, you know, we are, of course, relying on our papers, but I also ask that, to the extent that the Court rules against the Matching Claimants on the motion to proceed anonymously, that they be afforded the same 30-day stay to allow for an appeal as

you allowed in the <u>DBMP</u> case so that we can proceed with an appeal. And I believe that order was just entered yesterday, if I'm not mistaken, in the <u>DBMP</u> proceeding and we would just ask for that same protection, assuming that you don't agree with our arguments on the motion to proceed anonymously.

Your Honor, again, turning to the motion to quash, I don't intend to repeat any of the arguments that were made by counsel for both the Trusts and DCPF, but I just wanted to touch upon, your Honor, a couple points that are specific to the Matching Claimants.

From our perspective, your Honor, Aldrich relies upon the Third Circuit's recently reversed decision in, in <a href="Bestwall">Bestwall</a> and they argue that the DCPF and the Trusts have been ordered to comply with the Bestwall subpoenas that are more expansive than the subpoenas that are issued here. However, the issue preclusion arguments presented in <a href="Bestwall">Bestwall</a> are inapplicable in this instance as neither the Trusts nor DCPF have appeared in the Aldrich bankruptcy proceedings until today to argue against the subpoena motions. And so the privity requirements really don't, are inapplicable in this instance.

Regarding the, the, the statutory basis for the extensive discovery sought, as my, as counsel for the Trusts and DCPF have argued, there really isn't a statutory basis.

And so I'll just rely upon those arguments, your Honor. But arguably, we're concerned about the reverse engineering of the

individual, identities of these individual Matching Claimants 1 and we are significantly concerned about the, the 2 identification of personal identifying information for these 3 individuals. 4 And so from our perspective, your Honor -- I don't 5 want to belabor the point -- I think you called it an "echo 6 7 chamber" as it relates to the arguments made in, in DBMP and I don't care to belabor the record. So we will rely upon our, 8 our filings and arguments made hereto and join in the arguments 9 made previously and ask that the Court quash the subpoenas 10 11 and/or allow us to proceed anonymously. Thank you, your Honor. 12 13 THE COURT: Thank you. Did the Kazan firm intend to speak? I saw there was a 14 15 motion to quash that shows on the docket. Maybe that was long ago in Delaware, but --16 17 (No response) 18 THE COURT: All right, very good. Are we ready to hear, then, from the debtors' side? 19 20 Anyone else that wanted to be speaking in opposition? 21 (No response) Go ahead, Mr. Hirst. 22 THE COURT: Good morning, your Honor, and thank you. 23 MR. HIRST: Morgan Hirst of Jones Day on behalf of the debtors. I'll speak 24 briefly on the motions to quash. Mr. Evert will speak on the 25

motions to proceed anonymously.

Mr. Hogan stole my line, stealing your line about the "echo chambers." By my count, this is your fifth go-around between this case and <u>DBMP</u> on these subpoenas and while I certainly would like to show you that I will give the best argument of any of them, recognizing that I'm not the smartest of the various lawyers who've argued before you, I'm going to go the path less traveled and try and be one of the briefer arguments that you've heard --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HIRST: -- on these motions. And, and part of that -- and I'm -- I'm -- I'm vested, or I have the ability to do that because the arguments you heard today are no different than the arguments you've heard before in some cases from DCPF in the <u>DBMP</u> case last October when they appeared before you; in some cases, as Mr. Hogan acknowledged, from him a month ago in <u>DBMP</u>; in some cases, from other litigants in our case as well. Nothing has changed and nothing is any different and we trust your Honor's rulings won't be any different.

As the movants, they have a very heavy burden in order to quash these subpoenas, none of which, we think, they have met. The relevance and -- and your Honor, I think, spoke on the relevance and necessity of this information multiple times and I didn't hear any credible argument that the information here is not relevant and necessary to our case. The subpoenas

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here -- and your Honor has found this -- do not seek any PII and I feel like in the DCPF part of the argument we were penalized for that. We were, we were accused of creating greater burden because we aren't seeking PII. Of course, we aren't seeking PII because they objected when the Bestwall debtor did just that. And so we aren't seeking any PII. We've made that clear. We don't believe any of the information we're frankly seeking is confidential at all, but, if it is, your Honor, your order that we crafted and your Honor granted when you granted these, the ability to issue these subpoenas is best described as a protective order on steroids. It is as robust a set of confidentiality protections as I've ever seen. Many of the fears that Trusts' counsel raised in her motion just simply are not permitted under the terms of your order. We cannot do some of those things. There are wide, robust protections for this data. And, and so in light of that, I think the confidentiality issues have been addressed multiple times. Sampling issue we heard today and your Honor has now heard, I know, at least three times, including from DCPF last October in the DBMP case. And your Honor has, has dispatched with that repeatedly. And as a reminder, we are not seeking the entirety of the DCPF database. We are seeking the 12,000 Matching Claimants that relate to our case. We are seeking very limited fields of information. While we saw the overlay

from DCPF counsel, we're certainly well aware that their

- database almost certainly contains many, many, many more 1 2 fields. We are not seeking those. We are seeking a limited amount of information. And so there's simply no benefit to the 3 sample that they're asking for here and there's no reason to do 4 it. 5 On burden, as your Honor knows and as your Honor has 6 7 ordered, we will be paying --THE COURT: Well, let's stop there --8 MR. HIRST: Yeah. 9 THE COURT: -- and go back to the, to the point. 10 11 What about the contention that they're making that you're going to pick up a bunch of personal information out of 12 13 the narratives? What do you say there? MR. HIRST: Well, No. 1, maybe this gets me to the 14 15 practical point on all of this --THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 16 17 response). 18 MR. HIRST: -- your Honor, which is your Honor's ordered as of yesterday this information to be produced in the 19 20 DBMP case. THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 21 22 response). MR. HIRST: And it's, we think it's a substantially 23
  - similar set of Matching Claimants. So the, that is happening. The burden that was discussed is going to be taken on.

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No. 2, maybe more fundamentally, in Bestwall my
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    understanding is that DCPF is about to comply with the subpoena
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    that they were previously ordered to this week, as soon as this
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    week. And keep in mind, that subpoena they are responding to
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    in Bestwall, your Honor, is a far more invasive, I quess would
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    be the word they might use, subpoena that does seek PII. And
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    so all of that information, as I understand it -- and again,
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    I'm not in the Bestwall case. In fact, I was dismayed when I
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    looked at the cast of characters to not see my name anywhere,
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    but --
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             THE COURT: That's not a lost billing opportunity.
                         I, I, I know, your Honor. I got to, I'll
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             MR. HIRST:
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    have to figure out a way to earn it, but --
             THE COURT:
                         Bankruptcy work is kind of slow these days
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    for most attorneys, Mr. Hirst.
             MR. HIRST: I might have to go back to actually
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    regular litigation, your Honor.
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             But -- so all of this -- the PII they spoke about is
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    all being produced, as I understand it, to Bestwall, anyway.
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    And so to the point that they are going to have to do this
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    laborious redactions they've talked about, No. 1, that's a
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    product of their own making. They demanded, essentially, that
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    we do that by objecting when Bestwall made it easy for them,
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    let's say, and asked for the PII, which wouldn't have required
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    the redactions. They objected and they convinced Judge
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1 Connolly until he was later reversed to substantiate that. We
2 did not seek the PII specifically 'cause we didn't, we wanted
3 to avoid that objection.

And so, No. 1 -- we're kind of damned if we do, damned if we don't, from our perspective -- is to try to narrow this as much as possible, trying to seek as narrow a category of some information as possible while still getting us the relevant information, but, No. 2, there is no additional burden here because it's being done already in <a href="mailto:DBMP">DBMP</a>. It's being done already in <a href="mailto:DBMP">DBMP</a>. It's being done already in <a href="mailto:Bestwall">DBMP</a>. It's being done already in <a href="mailto:Bestwall">DBMP</a>. It's being done already in <a href="mailto:Bestwall">Bestwall</a>. And so there's no, there's no reason it should be any different here. And I guess third and finally on your question, your Honor, we have the PII. Remember, the claimants at issue here are folks who had sued and resolved claims against us. And so we already have their PII, which is part of the reason we certainly don't want it, but -- so to the extent, God forbid, it was exposed to us again, we have it, already.

And so the harm in that, I see, is very minimal when you consider and when you're weighing the balance of the benefit versus the burden on it.

THE COURT: What do you say about the contention about cross-pollination between the cases? Is all this data going to go into the other two cases and --

MR. HIRST: Well, your Honor, I intend to follow the order you issued in this case and even though, again, I'm not

- 69 on the list here, I think everybody else does, too. And that's 1 2 not permitted by your Honor's order. We aren't, we aren't permitted to aggregate. We aren't permitted to see what 3 they're going to see in the other things. So --4 Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 5 THE COURT: 6 response). MR. HIRST: -- I trust that we're going to follow your 7 order and I trust that if we don't, we're probably going to be 8 9 hearing from you. THE COURT: You're not anticipating a further motion, 10 11 though, to make those -- those --MR. HIRST: I'm not anticipating such a motion. And 12 keep in mind, my understanding of when we have sought the 13 database, or when the databases have been sought, that's the 14 15 individual database for when Bestwall, I think it was, sought our database. That's our individual database. 16 17 THE COURT: Right. 18 MR. HIRST: Has nothing to do with what is being 19
  - MR. HIRST: Has nothing to do with what is being obtained from the Trusts. And so, yes, to answer your question, no, we do not intend to seek that from the other parties.

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So with that, your Honor, again, the practical point, 'cause you've heard this all before, is all of this information is going to be produced in <a href="DBMP">DBMP</a> in response to, basically, an identical subpoena for what we think is an overlapping set of

1 | claimants. All this information is going to be produced to

2 Bestwall on a far more expansive subpoena on what we think is

3 | an over, a substantially similar set of Matching Claimants.

4 There's simply no reason for -- it can be done and there's

5 simply no reason for it to not occur here as well, your Honor.

And so absent any other questions, I will cede the table to Mr. Evert on the anonymization motion.

THE COURT: Mr. Evert?

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MR. EVERT: Thank you, your Honor.

Again, we don't want to belabor it. We want to make sure the Court has everything it has. Our papers are pretty extensive. I know the Court's reviewed them. I heard one of the other lawyers say this morning, "Everything's already been said, but not everyone said it." So I'll, I'll try not to add to that list.

So on the anonymization motion, your Honor, frankly, I think you said it best when you summarized your ruling in the <a href="DBMP">DBMP</a> case on this motion. You, you said that the, that the <a href="James v. Jacobson">Jacobson</a> factors had not been met, which we agree with. You said that there was no evidence in the case that they've been met and even if there was such evidence of what had been alleged, they hadn't been met. You said that your previous order, which we agree with, certainly did not intend to prohibit the Matching Claimants from putting their names in the public record. That order was designed to stop information

1 derived from the subpoenas from going into the public record.

2 | Clearly, the, the claimants knew their names before the

3 | subpoenas were ever issued. You said that there's an

4 | independent duty of the Court to ensure open proceedings and a

5 strong preference in the Rules and the case law for parties to

6 be named. And again, even if, even if there was evidence and

7 | even if there was some indication that would have been alleged

8 | in regard to the Jacobson factors was present, you said it

9 didn't amount to much more than "we just don't want to have

10 | that information out there." And that's certainly the way we

11 feel about it.

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Now, now the only thing new that's been raised today is this issue of the purported inaccuracies in the matching key. It's kind of interesting in a way. So what this derives from, your Honor, is in our reply to the anonymization motion we attached eight complaints that tried to illustrate for whoever the decider of fact was going to be of exactly the kind of information that is out there in the public forum, already, for all of these claimants who already filed lawsuits for their asbestos-related claims. And ironically, the other side has said, "Well, two of the eight aren't on the matching key."

Well, we, we would dispute that, your Honor. We've, we've looked at the matching key and, and all eight are on the matching key. However, we have no way to verify that 'cause we don't know the names of the claimants 'cause they've asked to

proceed anonymously.

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So there's a particular irony in that, in that argument, but the bottom line is, your Honor, notwithstanding whether or not the matching key that somehow is underinclusive, which is what they're alleging which I think would be good for them, the, the fact is all of this information has been in public fora throughout the country when lawsuits have been

So as a result, your Honor, the idea now that there is some private interest that needs to be protected that has not been protected over the long term just, to us, is -- is -- it's, it's apparent that that's, doesn't meet the factors and there's no, no severe harm as required by the case law.

So with that, your Honor, I'll stop, unless the Court has questions, and, and cede, cede the table.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. EVERT: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anyone else?

filed related to the mesotheliomas.

19 (No response)

20 THE COURT: Rejoinder arguments?

MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Yes, your Honor. Beth Moskow-Schnoll.

First of all, Mr., Mr. Hirst, I'm very sorry. If you want, I can add your name to the slide and recirculate them in case I offended you. I didn't mean to.

1 MR. HIRST: As long as you send it to me, I'll be 2 happy.

MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: So, you know, one thing that struck me was that Mr. Hirst said that he didn't hear any credible argument as to why information sought isn't relevant or necessary, but one of the highlights of my argument was that all the information is not necessary. By their own words, they acknowledge that sampling is just fine. And, and I think they underscored my point about the fact that they're overasking in that, you know, they said, "We already have the claimants' PII. We don't need that." And yet in <a href="Bestwall">Bestwall</a>, they asked for it, even though they have it and they don't need it. And in <a href="Bestwall">Bestwall</a> when they were told by Judge Connolly that they would, could only ask for a 10 percent sample, they came back and said, "Ten percent sample's great. We can work with that. It's efficient. It works great."

So -- and what's -- what is, really stood out to me based on their argument is that, again, they never addressed the sampling, the sampling argument we made. They never said why sampling wouldn't work. They never said that they couldn't make do with a 10 percent sample, that it wouldn't provide them with all the information they need, and the reason, your Honor, they didn't do that is because they can't make that argument. They've never made that argument and, and that's what, that's what's really sticking in our craw right now, is that the

information for the 12,000 claimants is not necessary. 1 2 can make do and, and proceed with estimation with only a 10 It will not harm them. Their -- it can --3 percent sample. their own words come back to haunt them on that fact, 4 efficient, reliable, accurate. 5 A sample would work just fine, your Honor, and that's 6 7 what we're asking for. Thank you. 8 THE COURT: All right. 9 10 Mr. Guerke? 11 MR. GUERKE: Thank you, your Honor. Kevin Guerke 12 again for DCPF. There was an argument made that the same arguments 13 have been made before and they're being made today and the 14 15 Court should just rule as it has in the past. But the information presented today, that DCPF presented today, the 16 17 sample I provided, the explanation I provided, has not 18 previously been presented. We submitted an affidavit from DCPF's COO, Richard Winner. It's part of the record. 19 20 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 21 response). That has not been disputed in any way. 22 MR. GUERKE: So the burden that we've described in great detail is, 23

is undenied, unchallenged, and it's a fact, your Honor.

Everything we've presented is, is a fact. And it's our job to

24

25

- object. No matter how many times that they try to do this, 1 it's our job to object. It's our job to protect the data of 2 trust claimants and it's, under Rule 45, it's the Court's role 3 to protect nonparties like DCPF when we're, when we're 4 protecting our very valuable data. 5 So the debtors can't and haven't disputed that there 6 are 12,000 claimants in play. The, the debtors can't and 7 haven't disputed that there are nearly 150,000 claims involved 8 here and that there's a narrative element to the claim forms 9 that will include personal identifying information. 10 11 fact. And the fact that we have to manually review all the claim records is undisputed and unchallenged. 12 13 Your Honor today is wearing a different hat as the compliance court, not the issuing court, with a different role, 14 15 different obligations, and a different standard focusing on the non-party burden, not the debtors' need and not the relevancy 16 17 of the, of the data requested. And we've met our burden today, 18 your Honor, and we ask that you quash or modify the, the subpoena as we've requested. 19 20 THE COURT: All right. 21 Anything from you, Mr. Hogan? 22 MR. HOGAN: No, your Honor. I'll rely upon arguments previously made and our submissions. 23
- Thank you for your time, your Honor. 24 25 THE COURT: Okay.

1 Has that got it? Are we done? All right.

On the anonymization, I'm, I'm inclined to rule the same as I have previously. I believe that the burden hadn't been met to show that there would be harm by the disclosures and I think the public interest outweighs it.

So that ruling is, should be consistent with the earlier ruling in DBMP on that topic.

On the, the motions to quash, two changes, I guess.

First of all, as pointed out, we didn't have a party that might be subject to collateral estoppel appearing in this case. So that is not the, the basis of my ruling here.

The second change is, perhaps I am hidebound or -- my wife would say so, anyway -- but you, you have gotten through to me on the sampling issue. I agree that's a new argument today as to what exactly might be disclosed and I'm sensitive to the disclosure of these non-parties' information.

So I'm adopting the 10 percent sampling. Frankly, the first time I got this issue my assumption was that, is Judge Connolly had done it previously and we were not going to be the compliance court, that that would likely be implemented, anyway. The time that I most recently discussed this with counsel, I guess in the <u>DBMP</u> case, it sounded like that it was going to be six of one or half dozen of another as to whether you took a sample or whether you took all of it, and there might be, actually, more problems in agreeing on a random

- 1 | sample than there would be in just taking all the data.
- 2 Recognizing now that we're going to see some of this
- 3 information in narrative form and that you might have
- 4 information that is, in fact, PII, I want to reduce the harm
- 5 | there as much as possible. So I'll leave it to y'all to talk
- 6 | about how you formulate that random sample, but my inclination
- 7 | is to limit that.
- 8 So the motion to quash is, motions to quash are
- 9 granted, to that extent, and otherwise denied, all right? Got
- 10 it? Everybody understand?
- 11 (No response)
- 12 THE COURT: I understand the debtor would like to have
- 13 | as much information as possible, but we are -- I'm a little
- 14 | concerned about all of this is ballooning up and we're getting
- more and more demands for a great deal of data and I want to
- 16 make sure that we are mindful of costs in these cases and of
- 17 | the privacy concerns and that we're not getting any more than
- 18 | we need. So you'll see that in a lot of area.
- 19 Mr. Hirst?
- 20 MR. HIRST: Your Honor, just some questions on that so
- 21 | we have some guidance moving forward 'cause I do worry -- and,
- 22 | your Honor, luckily not in this case yet, but I've seen it in
- 23 | the others -- that agreeing on a sample is easier said than
- 24 done.
- 25 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative

response).

2 MR. HIRST: Would your Honor like us -- the concern I 3 heard raised was a field, not the number of claimants, but --

4 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative

5 response).

MR. HIRST: -- a field that had the PII in it. Would you like us to work with them to narrow down that field in some manner? Is that where you would like us to, to pick the sample and -- 'cause I didn't hear any claim that the amount of claimants impacted anything. I heard it was that field of exposure-related evidence. And so we're just trying to get some guidance so we're not back --

THE COURT: I heard something different this morning from the other side. Maybe -- what I would suggest is this:

Let's take the ruling as it is. And, and, of course, the 30 days that was, stay is, would be in effect as well in these cases. Why don't we -- we've got a December 14th hearing date. Why don't y'all work on the, the sample size and whether there are any fields that can be reduced and we can touch base about those again at the next hearing before a written order is entered.

MR. HIRST: Okay.

THE COURT: That will give you a little bit of an opportunity to get to the technical fine points that I might not have gotten. But as -- obviously, when Judge Connolly was

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ordering a 10 percent sample, someone was contemplating the
 1
    mechanisms of how to get a truly random sample there, so.
 2
             MR. ERENS: Right. Your Honor, could we have one
 3
    second, please?
 4
 5
             THE COURT: You want to take about a ten-minute
 6
    recess?
             Maybe this would be a good time.
 7
             MR. ERENS:
                         Okay.
             THE COURT: Everyone feel that? We'll take our mid-
 8
    morning break, then, right now and pick up again, oh, as close
 9
    to 30 minutes after the hour as we can.
10
11
         (Recess from 11:22 a.m., until 11:34 a.m.)
                              AFTER RECESS
12
         (Call to Order of the Court)
13
             THE COURT: Okay. Have a seat, everyone.
14
15
             Recognizing that that was a, a alteration of what we
    have done previously, did anyone have anything else we need to
16
17
    talk about regarding that?
18
             Mr. Hirst?
             MR. HIRST: Just mainly some questions and maybe one
19
    comment, your Honor.
20
             So in light of your ruling, which I will admit we were
21
    slightly surprised by, we do need to talk to our experts as
22
    well. And so I don't think December 14th is necessarily time.
23
    'Cause we're in a situation now where Bates White's going to
24
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qet, in Bestwall, everything, plus PII --

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THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
 1
 2
    response).
             MR. HIRST: -- from DCPF. In DBMP, they're going to
 3
    get everything without PII and here, we're going to get some 10
 4
    percent amount. And so I want to talk to Bates White as we
 5
    work with --
 6
 7
             THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
    response).
 8
             MR. HIRST: -- the, the movants here to, to figure out
 9
    the, the right thing. And so I would suggest -- and I don't
10
11
    think we have anything else necessarily up at the December
    hearing, anyway -- I wouldn't mind till, till the January
12
13
    hearing to decide on that. So that's Thing 1.
             Thing 2 was the arguments we heard today on the number
14
15
    was all, as I understood it, based on burden. In other words,
16
    to do what they have to do with redactions for 12,000 claims --
17
             THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
18
    response).
             MR. HIRST: -- takes too much. And so your Honor
19
20
    mentioned the number 10 percent. We want to work with our
    experts and consider this, but we think maybe the easiest
21
    thing, to avoid six months of litigation since this is all
22
    about burden, is to allow us to pick the 10 percent since we're
23
    the ones seeking the discovery and since the argument is all
24
    about burden. And so I know, your Honor, you know, we've just
25
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1
    been thinking --
 2
             THE COURT:
                         I thought it was all about estimation,
    though, and if --
 3
             MR. HIRST: Well, it is -- well, but to --
 4
             THE COURT: -- if you cherry pick 10 percent, what's
 5
    that going to be useful for at, at an estimation hearing?
 6
 7
             MR. HIRST: We don't know yet 'cause we just, we've
    just considered today. Obviously, the estimation sample's
 8
    going to be the estimation sample. That's a different issue,
 9
    but we're talking here -- this is a discovery issue now and the
10
11
    objection was based entirely, that I heard, on burden. And so
    if, you know, we, we need to find out what we think is the most
12
13
    relevant information to get.
             And, and so, anyway, your Honor, it's something we'll
14
15
    talk to movants about. I just wanted to tee that up for,
    potentially --
16
17
             THE COURT: Okay.
             MR. HIRST: -- a January hearing, if that'll work for
18
19
    your Honor.
             THE COURT: Any -- Mr. Guerke, is that, that
20
21
    satisfactory?
             MR. GUERKE: The process of having a discussion with
22
    the debtors, certainly, your Honor. The, the cherry picking
23
    the sample, absolutely not. We, we will oppose that. And we
24
    asked for random sampling and, and that's --
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THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
 1
 2
    response).
             MR. GUERKE: -- what we would like, your Honor.
 3
                         And again, on, on the burden point --
 4
             MR. HIRST:
             THE COURT:
                         Ms. Moskow --
 5
             MR. HIRST: -- your Honor, we just don't know why
 6
 7
    random matters from their burden objection perspective. But
    we'll, we'll deal with that and we can come back to your Honor
 8
    and talk more about that if we need to.
 9
             THE COURT: How about the folks on by video?
10
11
             MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Your Honor, I was, I was just
    going to say that it's, it's not just the burden argument.
12
    It's the fact that if they, it's not necessary for them to have
13
    a hundred percent of the claimants' data. I think that was the
14
15
    other point. Only -- 10 percent will get them everything they
    need and it should be a random sample --
16
17
             THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
18
    response).
             MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: -- for the reasons the Court --
19
20
             THE COURT: Mr. --
21
             MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: -- has already stated.
22
             THE COURT:
                         Mr. Hogan, you got anything?
                         No, your Honor. I just confer [sic] with
23
             MR. HOGAN:
    the comments made.
24
25
                         Any opposition to us touching base about
             THE COURT:
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this at the January hearing?
 1
 2
             MR. HOGAN:
                         No, sir.
                         Hopefully, that'll give you a chance to
 3
             THE COURT:
    talk about your needs and, and in any event, if, if you -- I
 4
    was thinking not only burden, but also of needless exposure of
 5
    the possibility of a hack and, and having a lot of people's
 6
 7
    data affected. So --
             MR. HIRST: But the number is ultimately --
 8
                         -- both matter.
             THE COURT:
 9
                         The number is ultimately 1200, though,
10
             MR. HIRST:
11
    right, your Honor?
12
             THE COURT:
                         Right.
             MR. HIRST:
                         That's, I guess that's the point we're
13
    raising.
14
15
             THE COURT:
                         Right. But as to how you select them, the
    thing that I will want to hear next in January is if it's not
16
17
    random, what is the usefulness --
18
             MR. HIRST:
                         Yep.
                         -- of it at estimation, okay?
19
             THE COURT:
             MR. HIRST: And we'll -- and to the extent that's the
20
    direction we, after five minutes of thinking about it, continue
21
    to go, we'll obviously provide an explanation for that for your
22
    Honor.
23
             THE COURT: All right, very good.
24
             We'll talk about it, then, on that January date,
25
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1 which, again, is the 26th.

You can note that we'll have a status hearing on this particular motion, but, but I granted in part and denied in part the motions to quash and denied the anonymization motion, all right?

What else do we need to discuss? Did we have generalized case affairs, status reports, other good-of-the-order type announcements?

MR. ERENS: Your Honor, just very briefly, just a couple things going on.

So we, we've had discussion, as Ms. Abel indicated, on mediation.

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).

MR. ERENS: There's two orders to be submitted to your Honor. One is the order approving mediation and the other will be the mediation protocol and, potentially, the, the selection of the mediator. So the parties are, as Ms. Abel indicated, close on the first item. We intend to work with the parties on the second item and we all agreed, I think, based on the first order you'll see to have those additional items also put on the January hearing.

So January will be, I think, as follows: We have the DCPF matter we just did; the CMO matter we just did, or I guess we didn't just do it, but --

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THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
 1
 2
    response).
             MR. ERENS: -- did this morning; the FCR's sampling
 3
    motion will be back up for January. That's on the claims file.
 4
    And I believe that is it, in addition to mediation I just
 5
    mentioned. So we'll have a, a pretty full day.
 6
 7
             THE COURT:
                         That -- before we move off of that, does
    everyone feel like we can accomplish all that in one day?
 8
    hearing cases in a divisional office the next day. So I'm not
 9
    available at the moment unless I move something and, and if so,
10
11
    I need to get started now.
             MR. ERENS: Let us get back to Chambers on that.
12
                                                                We
13
    think so. For, for mediation, we may not actually need a
              It's being targeted as a hearing if the parties can't
14
    hearing.
15
    agree, but we may just be submitting an order either then or in
16
    advance.
17
             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
18
             MR. ERENS: So that may not actually be an item.
             Sampling on the claim files is something that the
19
    parties are discussing now that also may be resolved or can be
20
    continued.
21
             So I think we should be fine, but your Honor does have
22
    all day --
23
             THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
24
25
    response).
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1
             MR. ERENS:
                         -- on the 26th? Okay.
 2
             THE COURT:
                         I do, yes.
                         So I think we should be fine on that.
 3
             MR. ERENS:
             That's, that's really it, your Honor.
 4
 5
             MR. EVERT:
                         December hearing.
                         The December 14th hearing, as a result,
 6
             MR. ERENS:
 7
    nothing's up and we can release that hearing date if --
             THE COURT:
                         All right.
 8
                         -- if you need it.
 9
             MR. ERENS:
                         That'll be fine with me. I could use the
10
             THE COURT:
11
    time.
12
             MR. ERENS:
                         Okay.
             THE COURT:
                         Anyone else?
                                        The ACC or FCR, any of the
13
    other parties wish --
14
15
             Mr. Davis -- Mr. Wright?
             MR. WRIGHT: Davis Wright from Robinson & Cole.
16
17
             Nothing additional from the Committee, your Honor.
18
             THE COURT: Okay.
             Mr. Grier, it looks like Mr. Guy has left. You don't
19
    have anything on your behalf, do --
20
21
             MR. GRIER:
                         I've been abandoned, your Honor.
                         Okay, very good.
22
             THE COURT:
             If there's nothing else, then we will release all of
23
    you and try to get you on your way. I hope the travel is not
24
    too bad, but we will stand in recess and get you moving on.
25
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