Case 22-00303 Doc 73 Filed 03/23/23 Fntered 03/23/23 20:02:30 Desc Main Docket #0073 Date Filed: 3/23/2023

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA CHARLOTTE DIVISION

In re

v.

Chapter 11

ALDRICH PUMP LLC, et al.1

Case No. 20-30608 (JCW)

Debtors.

ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, INC. ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENT TRUST *et al*.

Miscellaneous Proceeding

No. 22-00303 (JCW)

Plaintiffs,

(Transferred from District of Delaware)

ALDRICH PUMP LLC, et al.

Defendants.

DECLARATION OF KEVIN A. GUERKE IN SUPPORT OF DELAWARE CLAIMS PROCESSING FACILITY, LLC'S (I) RESPONSE TO DEBTORS' MOTION FOR REHEARING CONCERNING THE ISSUE OF SAMPLING ON DCPF'S SUBPOENA-RELATED MOTIONS AND (II) JOINDER

I, Kevin A. Guerke, declare:

1. I am a partner in the law firm of Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP ("Young Conaway"). I am a member in good standing of the Bar of the State of Delaware. I submit this declaration in connection with the Delaware Claims Processing Facility, LLC's (the "DCPF") (i) response to the motion filed by the above-captioned Debtors² seeking reversal of the Court's

² Capitalized terms not defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed to them in the DCPF's *Delaware Claims Processing Facility, LLC's (I) Motion To Quash Or Modify Subpoena And (II) Joinder* [D.I. 4-2] (the "Motion to Quash").



¹ The Debtors are the following entities (the last four digits of their respective taxpayer identification numbers follow in parentheses): Aldrich Pump LLC (2290) and Murray Boiler LLC (0679). The Debtors' address is 800-E Beaty Street, Davidson, North Carolina 28036.

ruling on the issue of sampling [Docket No. 54] and (ii) joinder to *Third-Party Asbestos Trusts'*Opposition to Debtors' Motion for Rehearing Concerning the Issue of Sampling on DCPF's Subpoena-Related Motions filed contemporaneously herewith.

- Attached hereto as Tab 1 is a true and correct copy of the November 30, 2022
 Hearing Transcript.
- 3. Attached hereto as Tab 2 is a true and correct copy of the hearing demonstrative used by DCPF during the November 30, 2023 Hearing.
- 4. Attached hereto as Tab 3 is a true and correct copy of the December 19, 2022 email from Morgan R. Hirst re: In re Aldrich Pump LLC et al (Case No. 20-30608).
- 5. Attached hereto as Tab 4 is a true and correct copy of the February 9, 2023 Hearing Transcript.
- 6. Attached hereto as Tab 5 is a true and correct copy of the February 10, 2023 email from Morgan R. Hirst re: In re Aldrich Pump LLC et al (Case No. 20-30608).
- 7. Attached hereto as Tab 6 is a true and correct copy of the January 26, 2023 Hearing Transcript.
- 8. Attached hereto as Tab 7 is a true and correct copy of the Delaware Claims Processing Facility, Invoice 12, Nov. 2, 2022 and Delaware Claims Processing Facility, Invoice 13, Jan. 18, 2023.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

Dated: March 23, 2022 YOUNG CONAWAY STARGATT & TAYLOR, LLP

/s/ Kevin A. Guerke

Kevin A. Guerke (No. 4096) (admitted pro hac vice)

Rodney Square

1000 North King Street

Wilmington, Delaware 19801 Telephone: (302) 571-6600 Facsimile: (302) 571-1253 Email: kguerke@ycst.com

Attorney for Delaware Claims Processing Facility, LLC

TAB 1

	Page 2 of 88	}	
			1
1	UNITED STATES WESTERN DISTRIC		
2	WESTERN DISTRIC		
_			
3	IN RE:	:	Case No. 20-30608 (JCW) (Jointly Administered)
4	ALDRICH PUMP LLC, ET AL.,	:	Chapter 11
5	Debtors,	:	Charlotte, North Carolina
6		:	Wednesday, November 30, 2022 9:30 a.m.
7		:	
8		: :	
9	OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMANTS,	:	AP 21-03029 (JCW)
10	Plaintiff,	:	
11	V.	•	
12		•	
13	ALDRICH PUMP LLC, MURRAY BOILER LLC, TRANE TECHNOLOGIES COMPANY LLC, AND	:	
14	TRANE U.S. INC.,	•	
15		•	
16	Defendants,	:	
17		: :	
18	OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY	:	AP 22-03028 (JCW)
19	CLAIMANTS, on behalf of the estates of Aldrich Pump LLC	:	
20	and Murray Boiler LLC, Plaintiff,	:	
21			
22	V.	:	
23	INGERSOLL-RAND GLOBAL HOLDING COMPANY LIMITED, et al.,	:	
24	·	:	
25	Defendants,	: :	

	Page 3 of 88					
		2				
1	OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY	: AP 22-03029 (JCW)				
2	CLAIMANTS, on behalf of the	:				
3	estates of Aldrich Pump LLC and Murray Boiler LLC,	:				
4	Plaintiff,	:				
5	v.	:				
6	TRANE TECHNOLOGIES PLC, et al.,	:				
7	Defendants,	:				
8	Defendants,	:				
9						
10	ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, INC. ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY	_				
11	Plaintiffs,	of Delaware)				
12						
13	V.					
14	ALDRICH PUMP LLC, et al.,					
15	Defendants.					
16						
17						
18	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. CRAIG WHITLEY, UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE					
19	ONTIED STATES	DAVINOTICI GODGE				
20	Audio Operator:	COURT PERSONNEL				
21	Transcript prepared by:	JANICE RUSSELL TRANSCRIPTS				
22	Transcript prepared by.	1418 Red Fox Circle Severance, CO 80550				
23		(757) 422-9089 trussell31@tdsmail.com				
24						
25	Proceedings recorded by electronic produced by transcription services.	ronic sound recording; transcript vice.				

	Page 6 of 88				
			5		
1	APPEARANCES (continued):				
2	For Non-Party Matching Claimants:	Waldrep Wall BY: THOMAS W. WALDREP, JR., ESQ			
3	Claimailes.	370 Knollwood Street, Suite 600 Winston-Salem, NC 27103			
4	For Fiduciary Duty	Brooks Pierce			
5	Defendants:	BY: JIM W. PHILLIPS, JR., ESQ. JEFFREY E. OLEYNIK, ESQ.			
6		P. O. Box 26000 Greensboro, NC 27420			
7		, and the second			
8	ALSO PRESENT:	ALLAN TANANBAUM, ESQ. Chief Legal Counsel of Debtors			
9		JOSEPH GRIER, FCR			
10		521 E. Morehead St, Suite 440 Charlotte, NC 28202			
11		SHELLEY ABEL			
12		Bankruptcy Administrator 402 West Trade Street, Suite 200			
13		Charlotte, NC 28202			
14	APPEARANCES (via Teams):				
15	For Asbestos Trusts:	Ballard Spahr			
16		BY: BETH MOSKOW-SCHNOLL, ESQ. 919 North Market St., 11th Floor			
17		Wilmington, DE 19801-3034			
18	For Non-Party Matching Claimants:	Hogan McDaniel BY: DANIEL K. HOGAN, ESQ.			
19		1311 Delaware Avenue Wilmington, DE 19806			
20					
21	APPEARANCES (via telephone):				
22	For DBMP LLC:	Jones Day BY: JEFFREY B. ELLMAN, ESQ.			
23		1221 Peachtree St., N.E., #400 Atlanta, GA 30361			
24					
25					

1 PROCEEDINGS (Call to Order of the Court) 2 THE COURT: Have a seat, everyone. Okay. 3 morning, all. 4 Back in the Aldrich Pump and Murray Boiler cases. 5 We've got an amended agenda on at Docket -- I'm looking at the 6 7 version that's in the Miscellaneous Proceeding where it's filed at Docket 31, but it's been cross-filed as well. I think all 8 9 of you have access to that. We're trying something a little different today. 10 11 We're, had some folks who needed to be elsewhere so we allowed them to appear by video while we, the rest of us are here live 12 and we'll see how that goes. I, I don't want to make a 13 practice of it, but they had conflicts and we needed to make 14 15 sure that we were there. Let's start with trying to get appearance of those who 16 17 are in the courtroom and if lead counsel for the major constituencies could tell me who those folks are, we'll, 18 that'll speed things up a bit. 19 MR. ERENS: Thank you, your Honor. Brad Erens, E-R-E-20 21 N-S, of Jones Day --THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 22 response). 23

MR. ERENS: -- on behalf of the debtors. I have, also, Morgan Hirst with me from Jones Day, Michael Evert from

24

- the Evert Weathersby firm, and Dave Torberg from Jones Day. 1 Also, from the Rayburn Cooper firm, Rick Rayburn, Jack Miller, 2 and Matt Tomsic. And then I have the Chief Legal Officer of 3 Aldrich and Murray, Mr. Allan Tananbaum, in the courtroom as 4 well. 5 THE COURT: All right, very good. 6 7 How about for the ACC? MS. HARDMAN: Good morning, your Honor. Carrie 8 Hardman from Winston & Strawn on behalf of the ACC. With me is 9 David Neier, my colleague, from Winston & Strawn, Jeff Liesemer 10 11 from Caplin & Drysdale, Davis Wright from Robinson & Cole, and Glenn Thompson from Hamilton Stephens Steele & Martin. 12 I believe there may be others on the phone, but I 13 think for purposes of appearance today, that's --14 15 THE COURT: All right. Let's just stop --MS. HARDMAN: -- probably all you need. 16 17 THE COURT: -- there. 18 MS. HARDMAN: Thank you. 19 THE COURT: Okay, very good. 20 FCR? 21 MR. GUY: Good morning, your Honor. Jonathan Guy for the FCR. Mr. Grier is here. Just myself, your Honor. 22 THE COURT: All right. 23
- MR. GUY: Thank you. 24
- 25 THE COURT: Okay. Other parties wishing to announce

- Page 10 of 88 9 1 that are in the courtroom? 2 MR. MASCITTI: Greq Mascitti, McCarter & English, on behalf of the non-debtor affiliates, and we're joined by local 3 counsel, Jim Phillips and Jeff Oleynik, as well as Stacy 4 Cordes. 5 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. MARTIN: Good morning, your Honor. Lance Martin from Ward and Smith. I'm here on behalf, as local counsel, for 8 the Asbestos, the ten Asbestos Trusts in Miscellaneous 9 10 Proceeding 22-00303. Would your Honor like me to read all ten 11 Trusts into the record? THE COURT: No. No, I don't need the Trusts' names. 12 I think we all know who they are from the written submissions. 13 Thank you, your Honor. 14 MR. MARTIN: 15 And lead counsel is appearing by video, Ms. Beth Moskow-Schnoll of Ballard Spahr. 16
- 17 THE COURT: Okay, very good.
- 18 Counsel?

22

23

- 19 MR. GUERKE: Good morning, your Honor.
- MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Good morning, your Honor. 20
 - MR. GUERKE: Kevin Guerke from Young Conaway on behalf of Delaware Claim Processing Facility, LLC. I'm in the courtroom this morning with my partner, Ed Harron, and local counsel, Felton Parrish.
- 25 THE COURT: All right.

Anyone else in the courtroom announcing? 1 2 Mr. Waldrep. MR. WALDREP: Your Honor, Tom Waldrep of Waldrep Wall 3 Babcock & Bailey. I'm here, local counsel for the Non-Party 4 Matching Claimants and our lead counsel, Mr. Hogan, is on the 5 line. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay, very good. Ms. Zieq. 8 MS. ZIEG: Good morning, your Honor. Sharon Zieg from 9 Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor on behalf of the DBMP Future 10 11 Claimants' Representative. I'm here today with my local counsel, Miller Capps from Alexander Ricks. 12 13 THE COURT: Okay. Anyone else announcing in the courtroom? 14 15 MS. ABEL: Shelley Abel, Bankruptcy Administrator. 16 THE COURT: Very good. 17 How about on the videoconference? Any others -- you 18 don't need to tell me again if someone's already announced for you -- but anyone else on video that needs to announce an 19 20 appearance? 21 (No response) 22 THE COURT: Very good. If you would tell IT, I'm not getting a, a picture on 23 I'm not sure if someone's turned it off or what, 24 my screen. 25 but --

```
Okay. How about telephonic appearances? Anyone else?
 1
    You may have to -- what is it -- star 6 --
 2
             MR. ELLMAN: Your Honor, this is --
 3
             THE COURT: Go ahead.
 4
             MR. ELLMAN: Thank you, your Honor. This is Jeffrey
 5
    Ellman (distortion).
 6
 7
             THE COURT: Whoever was speaking, you were breaking
         Would you try that again?
 8
    up.
 9
             MR. ELLMAN: Yes. Can you hear me now, your Honor?
             THE COURT: Yes, sir.
10
11
             MR. ELLMAN: Hi. This is Jeffrey Ellman from Jones
          I'm monitoring the hearing on behalf of DBMP.
12
13
             Thank you.
             THE COURT:
14
                         Okay.
15
             Anyone else needing to announce?
             MR. MASCITTI: Your Honor, I'm embarrassed to have to
16
17
    make a correction.
18
             THE COURT: Okay.
             MR. MASCITTI: Our local counsel is Stacy Cordes and
19
    Brad Kutrow. And Jim Phillips and Jeff Oleynik are not
20
    appearing as our local counsel.
21
22
             MR. PHILLIPS: But, but, your Honor, we, we are here
    for the Fiduciary Duty Defendants, so.
23
24
             THE COURT: You, you can tell it's been a long
25
    weekend. We've all forgotten who we are over an overdose of
```

1 turkey, I guess, so. 2 Any other appearances? MR. TAYLOR: Yes, your Honor. Joshua Taylor from 3 Steptoe & Johnson on behalf of the Travelers Insurance 4 5 Companies. THE COURT: Yes, sir. 6 7 Anyone else? (No response) 8 THE COURT: Okay. I think that's got it. 9 Obviously, with the, having a, a hybrid telephonic-10 11 video live conference we're going to have some tech issues and then we've got some folks who have court appearances elsewhere. 12 13 My suggestion -- I don't know if y'all thought about how we approach this calendar -- would be to try to get the people 14 15 with the conflicts out of the way and to that end, perhaps not 16 doing status reports and other matters until we got the motions 17 to quash and the anonymization motions filed. 18 Does anyone have a, a better way of approaching this? I'm asking now. This is not arguing with the Judge. 19 If, if there's a better way logically to do that, that's fine, but --20 Ms. Hardman? 21 MS. HARDMAN: Your Honor, Carrie Hardman from the 22 Committee, from Winston & Strawn on behalf of the Committee. 23

I, I am not conscious of the conflicts, perhaps, that may permeate the motions to quash. We're simply not involved

24

- 1 in those matters.
- THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
- 3 response).
- 4 MS. HARDMAN: I only wanted to raise we are the very
- 5 last item on the calendar and thought if we are weighing these
- 6 issues, if there are pure conflicts, we understand. If there's
- 7 | a way for that item to go somewhat closer to the front, that
- 8 | would be great by us since there's a number of us who could
- 9 then --
- 10 THE COURT: Right.
- MS. HARDMAN: -- possibly leave and get out from
- 12 underneath what seems to be a very big storm going through the,
- 13 the country right now and causing, wreaking havoc with our
- 14 | flights as it is.
- So if that's part --
- 16 THE COURT: Okay.
- 17 MS. HARDMAN: -- of the considerations, we just ask
- 18 | that we, we be contemplated as part of that.
- 19 Thank you, your Honor.
- 20 THE COURT: Does anyone have a feel? We're talking
- 21 about the, the so-called letter, the status conference on the
- 22 letters that have been written to the Court and -- and -- on
- 23 No. 8.
- MS. HARDMAN: Yes, your Honor. That's Item No. 8.
- 25 THE COURT: Anyone got a feel for the time needs of

that matter? Are we talking about an hour, two hours, or 1 2 something else? 3 MR. MASCITTI: Your Honor, I would suspect at least an hourish. 4 5 THE COURT: Right. MR. MASCITTI: And I -- and my belief is there are 6 7 probably more attorneys involved in the other matter than that 8 matter. So --THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 9 10 response). 11 MR. MASCITTI: -- in terms of balancing which one should go first, I think going with the trust discovery issues 12 13 would make the most sense. THE COURT: Conversely, anyone got a feel for the 14 15 trust discovery matters of what the time needs would be there? 16 MR. EVERT: From our perspective, your Honor, that, 17 these are motions that have been argued before the Court, 18 frankly, a number of times. So we, we don't anticipate taking very long unless, unless new issues are raised by the other 19 side. 20 21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 Now I'm trying to remember who it was that had, I believe it was some of the Trusts that were, there were 23 afternoon appearances in other courts. Can someone update me 24

on those? What time do you need to be free?

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Your Honor, this is Beth Moskow-Schnoll on behalf of the Trusts. Can you hear me? THE COURT: Yes, ma'am. MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: I'm -- there was a problem. Thank you. Okay. THE COURT: All right. MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: I do not -- my other conflict is not until -- I have a hearing at 2:00 this afternoon. THE COURT: Okay. Well, just based on what I know, let's All right. hold off on just the general good-of-the-order type status of the case announcements. And my 'druthers would be to take up the issue with regard to the Case Management Order and the, and the letter that was written to the Court with regard to DBMP and do that first. 'Cause I will be just upfront. sure in Aldrich as opposed to DBMP that, based on what I've read, I'm not at all sure that we are ready to, to address the CMO in full and there's some resonance to the motion being unripe at the moment to me. I'll listen to the contrary, but I think that may be the -- for the folks who wrote the letter, it strikes me that both they and the ACC have, have accomplished their purpose already in, in telling me what they thought about the CMO that's being, that is to be decided in the DBMP case. And to that end, it's almost like an amicus. My off-the-cuff impressions -- and I'm just talking

out loud. I'm not ruling now -- is that we may be in a position where (a) I, I try to treat this case independently of DBMP. As y'all are very adept at doing, you learn and, and amend as you go along in these cases and we get a slightly different look in each of the cases. We try to do that while maintaining consistency. So it is not at all assured that anything I do in DBMP is going to be done here. But at the same time, we want to make sure everyone has a straight shot at it.

So I'll listen at, at this juncture, but I would say that if all you were trying to do is to make sure your views were factored into the <u>DBMP</u> decision so you wouldn't be closed out as a practical matter, I think that's already accomplished in this.

But let's call No. 8 and we'll, we'll talk about where we are and what you want to say about it. I don't want to foreclose your arguments. I'm just trying to inform you as to my initial thoughts, okay?

All right. Who wants to lead off? I'm not sure exactly how we view this procedurally. So let's start with the folks who wrote the letter and then we'll hear from them and then we'll hear back from, from the Representatives in, in counter to that.

And by the way, for everyone's benefit, I saw the motion that has been filed by the Representatives that I think

was scheduled for January, sometime like that. So I'm up to 1 2 date, to speed on what you filed so far. MS. HARDMAN: Thank you, your Honor. 3 THE COURT: All right. 4 MS. HARDMAN: With respect to that motion, I'll bring 5 up an issue when we get to it. But --6 7 THE COURT: Okay. MS. HARDMAN: -- thank you. 8 THE COURT: Very good. 9 10 Mr. Phillips. 11 MR. PHILLIPS: Good morning, your Honor. Jim Phillips from Brooks Pierce for, along with my partner, Jeff Oleynik, on 12 13 behalf of the individual defendants in the fiduciary duty action. 14 Your Honor, there are three issues that we raised. 15 Ι intend to address the first one. My colleague, Greg Mascitti, 16 17 is prepared to address the other two, if that's okay. 18 As you correctly noted, our primary impetus for raising our hand at the point in time when we did at the last 19 DBMP hearing was a concern that, practically, your ruling in 20 DBMP would bind us. And so your statement with regard to 21 understanding both what we say, had to say with regard to those 22 issues and that the cases are different and could call for 23 different resolutions will cause me to be briefer, but still a 24 couple of things to share with you this morning, if that's 25

okay.

THE COURT: Please.

MR. PHILLIPS: So the issue that I would like to address is whether the discovery in the fiduciary duty action, all of the discovery will take place at the same time as the discovery in the subcon and the fraudulent transfer action or whether discovery in those actions and whatever is applicable to the fiduciary duty action will go forward, but issues unique to the fiduciary duty action will remain stayed and, for discovery at a later point in time if and when the fiduciary duty action goes forward.

This issue arose in the context of us negotiating the CMO with the Committee. We thought -- we understood that discovery would be stayed based on the DBMP CMO and then we came to find out based on their Joint Letter to the Court in DBMP that maybe we misunderstood. Our conversation, our meet and confer with the Committee confirmed for us that we had misunderstood. And I want to be clear. We address this in our papers, but the first thing I want to be absolutely and abundantly clear about is what we're not arguing.

The draft CMO in <u>DBMP</u> and, or the CMO in <u>DBMP</u> and the CMO, the draft in our case, states that, "Discovery taken in the subcon and fraudulent transfer proceedings shall be deemed to have occurred in the fiduciary duty proceeding." So we -- we're down with that. We're not arguing that. That's

what we expect.

But the Committee, it seems to us, wants far more than that and what they want, to do all the fiduciary duty discovery now, is inconsistent with the terms of the CMO that we've negotiated, is contrary to notions of judicial economy, and is just plain impractical. To say that we're going to do all the discovery in the fiduciary duty action now ignores the fact that the Fiduciary Duty Defendants haven't answered or made, asserted affirmative defenses. If and when we do that, your Honor, I guarantee you the Committee is going to want discovery on those affirmative defenses. There are going to be issues that we have to take discovery on later.

So their judicial economy argument rings hollow. It makes more sense to do the discovery in the subcon and fraudulent transfer actions now and leave issues that are unique to the fiduciary duty action until later if and when they're required.

Consistent with that, this Court has recognized -- and I'm referring to an April 7, 2022 hearing in DBMP where the Court discussed discovery with the parties and the Court noted that there might be what it called, or what you called "a second tier of litigation," which the Court went on to say would focus on whether the individual defendants breached their fiduciary duties. That's the time to do that discovery. If that day ever comes, issues related to those -- to these -- our

particular defendants and their actions will be the focus and should be the focus of that discovery then. In fact, the DBMP and our draft CMO provides, or recognizes and provides that these issues will be addressed later when it says that:

"The individual defendants will be bound by any final order in the subcon or fraudulent transfer cases except with respect to any findings of fact as to any individual Fiduciary Duty Defendants with respect to any action or inaction such individual defendants did or didn't take."

So we're not bound by the findings in the fraudulent transfer case with regard to those issues that are particular to individuals. They're unique to them. They should be carved out of discovery now.

Two final points, your Honor, that really go to fairness and equity. The CMO provides, the draft CMO, the CMO in <u>DBMP</u> provides that my clients can participate in discovery in the fraudulent transfer and subcon actions if they choose to. If all the discovery happens now, that's really a false choice. They have no choice, but to participate.

And finally, your Honor, the Committee shouldn't have its cake and eat it, too. They shouldn't be able to avoid dispositive motions, motions to dismiss, and go straight to discovery in the fiduciary duty case.

For those reasons, your Honor, we'd ask that at some

point the Court order that the fiduciary duty discovery that's 1 2 unique there be stayed until the subcon and fraudulent transfer cases are decided. 3 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you --4 MR. PHILLIPS: Thank you. 5 6 THE COURT: -- Mr. Phillips. MR. MASCITTI: Your Honor, is your preference to 7 address the issues separately or do them all at, on one side? 8 9 I know in DBMP they were addressed separately. THE COURT: I'm at the, the parties' preferences 10 11 there. Is it easier to do it once? 12 MS. HARDMAN: I don't necessarily have a preference, your Honor. It seemed to flow well the last time we split it 13 by issue. It --14 15 THE COURT: Right. MS. HARDMAN:: It's really your preference. 16 I, 17 whatever you prefer. 18 THE COURT: Why don't we take one issue at a time. Ιt -- it --19 How many parties are anticipating speaking in regard 20 to the motion, just the two? 21 22 MS. HARDMAN: There is likely --23 THE COURT: Three? MS. HARDMAN: -- to be two on our side --24

25

THE COURT: Okay.

```
MS. HARDMAN: -- I think, and perhaps --
 1
 2
             THE COURT: Okay.
 3
             MS. HARDMAN: -- three.
             THE COURT: Let's do it issue by issue, then.
 4
             MS. HARDMAN: Okay.
 5
 6
             THE COURT: Let's start with No. 1.
 7
             MS. HARDMAN: Okay.
             THE COURT: Ms. Hardman?
 8
             MS. HARDMAN: Sounds good, your Honor. Again, Carrie
 9
    Hardman from Winston & Strawn on behalf of the Committee.
10
11
             I think you noted earlier that we're in a bit of a
    strange posture in that the defendants are raising this this
12
13
    time instead of either a mutual filing or plaintiffs in their
    own adversaries, but I guess that's what we can expect when
14
15
    you receive a 7:55 p.m. Thanksgiving Eve letter that was 12
    single-spaced pages filled with a whole lot of turkey stuffing
16
17
    on our end related to these draft CMOs.
18
             So while we don't want any more delay, we thought it
    practical originally to have this heard, once we received that
19
    letter, to have this heard and, and raise this before it was
20
    filed at the next December omnibus right before the DBMP
21
    hearing on the 15th.
22
             THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
23
24
    response).
```

MS. HARDMAN: But here we are. So we're going to

proceed. Happy to see you, your Honor.

On the procedural front, just want to get a couple
things out of the way as well. I told you that we did file

4 | that motion. I just want to acknowledge that as well.

With respect to the motion, we were trying to get out of the morass here that we think has been presented by the letter in that there's an attached CMO that is the defendants' version.

9 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 10 response).

MS. HARDMAN: To my mind, that's a motion that's, it's a letter framed as a motion --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. HARDMAN: -- I think. It seems to seek some sort of relief there and we think that that was, perhaps, procedurally improper. So we filed our motion to try and get something before your Honor that you can actually rule on at some point. We're not saying that's today. So I don't want anybody to be caught off guard on that respect. We did file it in accordance with the Rules under the base case CMO.

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).

MS. HARDMAN: That requires us to file for the next available omnibus based on the timing. That would be January 26th. Your Honor, I will bring this up later, but I wanted to

preview this for the sake of all parties. We might request today that you consider it for the 14th instead, given we are effectively arguing these issues before you today. We think those are the three issues that permeate the CMO from both sides and if there's nothing left to negotiate, perhaps we could just see what you think and then proceed on the 14th. We will come back to that. I just wanted to raise that from a procedural perspective.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. HARDMAN: So in accordance with that strange posture, I'm going to ask you to pretend that I'm wearing two hats today as well as Mr. Liesemer. I am standing here on behalf of both the Aldrich ACC, the Committee, as well as the DBMP Committee. So I am speaking on behalf of two entities today.

From a -- before we get to the specific points in the, on the stay of the fiduciary duty discovery, I just want to say that, from our perspective, these procedural postures are entirely different. I wanted to make one clarification that in DBMP we're talking about a discovery plan that has been negotiated after we had an entered CMO that I believe was in May --

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).

MS. HARDMAN: -- way back in May. Those terms have

1 been on the docket since then. We then went in, had our

2 discovery exchanged. We've discussed what's available. We've

3 | had our Rule 26(f) conference. We heavily negotiated a

4 discovery plan in DBMP and came to you with a joint filing of

5 | what was left.

Here is a different posture. We are talking apples and oranges. We are still at the CMO stage. We haven't talked about what discovery's available and we'll get to that later, but just wanted to acknowledge that these are two different procedural postures and we think that's important for consideration today.

I'm trying to keep this short, your Honor. I'm cutting through pages.

So when it comes to the stay of the fiduciary duty discovery, I think we have a difference of opinion about the ripeness of this issue. I think you noted that, already. We actually don't think that this is an issue for today's CMO. We think this is an issue for participation in discovery going forward. Mr. Phillips did raise a number of provisions of the CMO as drafted that were there from the get-go and we've been in agreement all along.

One of those he mentioned was that they preserved their rights with respect to the individuals' actions or inactions, then we could proceed with discovery. They've got their rights preserved, from my perspective. That's what we

intended this CMO to represent. All rights are preserved. We are going to go forward with discovery in as much of a one-time and comprehensive basis as we could.

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative

response).

MS. HARDMAN: It seems that there's no dispute that the discovery that we are conducting in these actions would be binding on all parties subject to those certain reservations whether -- and they can choose to participate or not. Those provisions are laid out in the CMO. We're not sure entirely how we split this baby when we're talking about approach in staying certain kinds of discovery and not others. We can permit discovery to proceed. What discovery we intend to seek is intended to be comprehensive, as I said, and the discovery here arises from the same set of facts. I'm going to repeat myself a bit from the last hearing in DBMP.

We discussed instances with the defendants of where we could bifurcate that discovery --

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).

MS. HARDMAN: -- and we came up with one example. And that is -- and we put that in our pleadings -- the financial wherewithal of an individual defendant. That, to me, is very specific to the fiduciary duty action. I don't think -- our Committee really isn't concerned with that with respect to

fraudulent transfer, but when you talk about the intent of those individuals who are either current or former officers and

directors that's important for the fiduciary duty and the

4 subcon actions.

So I think, you know, if we want to carve out one specific issue, that's fine. We started to talk about that and thought, well, maybe there's some room for us to, to narrow our issue here. So at the least, it's premature to be discussing this today. We could talk about that further among the parties before the hearing on the 14th, but when it comes to all the other issues I, I have to say unless we get those specific examples, we don't see how you bifurcate it.

As we've said to the Court before, the fiduciary duty action rises and falls with the fraudulent transfer and subcon complaints, presume, more so the fraudulent transfer action.

But -- so the discovery we intend to seek is likely to permeate both actions from a practical perspective. I don't think the fiduciary duty defendants are suggesting their clients won't sit for third-party subpoenas if that's where we have to go here in the fraudulent transfer or subcon actions, but, if they want piecemeal discovery, it, we can do more than one deposition if that's, of the same defendant, if that's needed.

We just thought it was inefficient.

So all that said, you know, we could argue the merits of this, but I think my general position here, your Honor, is

that this is premature at this stage. We're happy to discuss 1 further trying to narrow what issues might be carved out, but 2 otherwise think that the CMO as originally drafted and agreed 3 by the parties until the 11th hour before a DBMP hearing should 4 just proceed. 5 THE COURT: Okay. The -- your reference to doing 6 7 something on, on December 14th, do you believe that the entire CMO will either be resolved or that we can tee up all of those 8 issues at this, at that date? 9 MS. HARDMAN: We had originally proposed to the 10 11 defendants that we tee all of this up for then. THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 12 13 response). MS. HARDMAN: I believe based on the circumstances at 14 15 this moment we effectively have submitted materials on both 16 sides sufficient to address what are the true outstanding 17 issues. There are a number of very limited additional comments 18 to the CMO that you will see in a blackline that we've attached to the motion. It's between the version filed by the 19 defendants and our version that's filed with that motion. 20 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 21 22 response). It shows a couple of small issues. 23 MS. HARDMAN: believe that at our last meet and confer we actually narrowed 24

those. We thought we had agreement on the language and it

might require just one conversation to sort that out. None of those are, from my perspective, substantive or are significant issues that can't be resolved. Giving us the opportunity to have that one more call before the 14th narrowing those issues, perhaps submitting another blackline to your Honor with the new version, could get us there. If the defendants feel that they have more to say beyond their 12-page letter, if they want to respond to our motion, we would not be opposed to that on a particular time schedule so we at least know when it's coming.

But other than that, we would be happy to proceed and think that based on what we're doing today it'll be submitted sufficiently before your Honor such that if maybe there's a little bit of argument on the 14th, that would be it.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Before we get into that, Mr. Phillips, I would like to talk about that general issue, is do you think you'll be in a position in the next month or even January to be able to talk about all of the CMO issues? I'd rather make one ruling and procedurally, that would be more proper if we could.

How, how do you feel about it from your side?

MR. PHILLIPS: Your Honor, without having much discussion other than what we've had previously, I think that we would be in a position by January. The 30, the 14th is a couple of weeks.

THE COURT: Right.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. PHILLIPS: And I will also admit that being late to this party that's been going on for a couple of years, I've got a conflict on the 14th that, 'cause I didn't have all the omnibus dates on my calendar at the beginning. And so personally, I'd like to avoid that and move it into January. But I certainly think in January we would be in a position to do that. THE COURT: Mr. Mascitti? MR. MASCITTI: Your Honor, I don't want to short circuit the arguments today because I know everyone loves to argue. We -- you know, your Honor may recall at the hearing in DBMP when you allowed us to appear we had proposed having this all heard on December 14th and the Committee opposed it at that time. So it is somewhat ironic now that the Committee would like it all heard on the 14th. I agree with Mr. Phillips that January would be appropriate and, your Honor, I don't really want to argue these issues twice. THE COURT: Right. MR. MASCITTI: And so if you believe that, if your Honor believes that it would be more appropriate to hear everything at once in January, my suggestion would be we just defer argument on these issues until then.

THE COURT: Anybody else need to jump in on this?

1 Ms. Zieq? 2 MS. ZIEG: Your Honor, I would like to talk about the text messaging issue because, as you noted in your, your 3 comments, it's almost like an amicus to the DBMP hearing and I 4 think that as the FCR's representative in DBMP who addressed 5 this issue I need to address the, the briefing they put in 6 7 their letter that --THE COURT: But for purposes --8 MS. ZIEG: -- in our view --9 10 THE COURT: -- of DBMP. -- mischaracterizes the cases and the issue 11 MS. ZIEG: 12 in DBMP. This, this is pointing out to me THE COURT: Yeah. 13 why my trying to coordinate the two cases is, is probably a bad 14 15 idea since procedurally what we're really talking about for the moment is, is doing something in DBMP without all the parties 16 17 present, either. I know I've got most of the major 18 constituencies, but not all of them. MR. MASCITTI: Your Honor, if I could just --19 20 THE COURT: Yeah. MR. MASCITTI: -- add to my prior comment. 21 22 We weren't expecting your Honor to rule today on these 23 issues. 24 THE COURT: Right. 25 MR. MASCITTI: What we did expect is that your Honor

might provide some quidance on those issues consistent with, I 1 believe the way your Honor is leaning in DBMP, which might

facilitate a consensual resolution of the CMO going forward in 3

this case. 4

2

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: All right.

Here's what I think we ought to do. I don't like it procedurally. I'm not a, a stickler for civil procedure, but the higher courts do expect a little bit of form from us down here and recognizing they think all bankruptcy work is witchcraft, anyway, it's better to have it framed up in a more traditional form.

I'm planning to make a decision in the DBMP case in the December hearing. The reality of my schedule is I'm, I'm in court practically every day between here and there and I would like to give this all the time and whatever other disputes you might have that it warrants and since I'm going to make a ruling in DBMP at the December date, that would also give y'all an opportunity to triangulate based on, on what I say then and tell me why it's different here. And lest anyone be concerned that they'll be roped in by what I decide in DBMP, obviously there's some differences on, on the cases and these motions and the procedural posture, as Ms. Hardman has pointed out. But my view is that if we get that date, then we ought to hear this in January and give you a full run on all of the CMOrelated issues and just get it knocked out one time and not

waste your time in the meantime.

So with, with all respect, I think I've got enough

DBMP briefing on, on the text devices and the like. I just

wanted to know what other parties thought about it, Ms. Zieg.

So I -- I -- I think -- I hear you loud and clear there, so.

My thinking would be that we just ride on the motion that's been noticed out for the January date and use that as our vehicle. If you need to, to talk about supplemental briefing on these, these matters and others, I'm happy to discuss that or you can work it out between yourselves, whatever you want.

MS. ZIEG: That's acceptable, your Honor. My only issue is that the cases that they cited for the issue here, but really in <u>DBMP</u>, are completely different than the issues we were addressing at the <u>DBMP</u> hearing. I just wanted to make sure that your Honor, to the extent you read the cases -- and I am sure that you understand that they are completely inapposite of the issue there -- but I just wanted to make sure that we had an opportunity to be heard if any of that briefing was impacting your decision in <u>DBMP</u>.

THE COURT: Well, I can't give glimmers as to what I'm thinking, but, at this juncture, but we try to read all the cases that are pointed out to us, so. Okay?

So for now, my suggestion on this matter is that we incorporate it in the, into the motion the Committee has

already noticed out for the January date and continue it till 1 that time. 2 If -- do y'all need to set any dates as to briefs and 3 replies, or are you going to use the, the standard Rules? 4 MR. MASCITTI: Your Honor, I expect we'll file a 5 cross-motion, then, for a competing CMO and, and we'll discuss 6 7 with the Committee a briefing schedule. THE COURT: Okay. If y'all can work all that out, 8 that will help us. 9 Okay. Let's take about a five-minute recess. 10 11 Any of you who were only here for that matter are, are welcome to leave. 12 And those who are on by video or telephone, please 13 keep the lines open, receivers muted. 14 15 And we'll pick up in -- let's see. It's five after -let's pick up at a quarter after the hour, okay? 16 17 MR. NEIER: Thank you, your Honor. We're going to be 18 excused. MS. HARDMAN: Thank you, your Honor. 19 20 THE COURT: Okay. Bye. (Recess from 10:05 a.m., until 10:18 a.m.) 21 22 AFTER RECESS (Call to Order of the Court) 23 THE COURT: Okay. Have a seat, everyone. 24 25 All right. Are we ready to move on? I, I don't want

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

- to forego the, the traditional good-of-the-order type announcements about the case, but we still in these motions to quash and the motion to anonymize also have some parties who wouldn't be here throughout. So I would suggest that we hear those three motions and -- actually, it's more than that -- but the motions to quash and the anonymization motion and then if afterwards there are any status reports to be given, do that. Anyone feel differently? Okay. Mr. Guy. MR. GUY: Your Honor, I don't feel differently, but I just wanted to announce that we don't have a direct horse in this race. THE COURT: Right. MR. GUY: And we want to stay because it's interesting, of course, and we are concerned about the result and we want to make sure things move forward. But if I may be excused if I get to my watch, to get my flight, I would appreciate that. THE COURT: All right. MR. GUY: Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. You may, of course, Mr. Guy, leave whenever you want to, but we'll try to do what we can.
 - MR. GUY: Everybody might surprise me and arque very quickly, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. 1 Well, with that in mind, we were supposed to be doing 2 a status hearing on, on the, the Committee's motion to compel 3 mediation. 4 5 Was there going to be much put on today in that matter? It's on the calendar, but I'm not sure that we have a 6 7 lot to talk about, or, I mean, the BA's motion to, to compel mediation. 8 MS. ABEL: Your Honor, I'm stealing thunder here, but 9 we have a draft order that is very close to being finalized I 10 11 think we should be able to submit today. THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 12 13 response). MS. ABEL: And that draft order sets all of this out 14 15 for January. The parties are in discussions and we believe 16 that they're going to make some progress on that front. So I don't think we'll need the Court's time on that 17 18 today. 19 THE COURT: Okay. Everyone feel alike on that? 20 21 (No response) 22 THE COURT: Okay. For the, the clerk's, clerk's benefit, No. 1 on the 23 docket, the mandatory mediation, we'll just carry over to the 24 January date, if we need it. 25

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

```
All right. That takes us -- and we can do it
quickly -- we've continued the No. 2 and No. 3 to December
14th, the motions to file confidential documents under seal.
         Everyone agreed there?
         MR. ERENS: Yeah. Can we, can we continue it one more
time to January? We will have it -- we continued it enough
times, your Honor, that we, we will get it done by the, the New
Year, at the latest.
         THE COURT: Anyone feel differently?
    (No response)
         THE COURT: Okay.
         What is that January date? It is --
                     January 26, your Honor.
         MR. ERENS:
                    Okay. The 26th in each of those.
         THE COURT:
        All right. That takes us to Nos. 4 through, I guess
it is, 6 and also No. 7.
        Do the parties have a feeling? They're related
matters.
         I would assume the motions to quash should be heard
together. Do we need to also throw in the anonymization or do
you want to hear that separately or do y'all have another way
of approaching these matters?
                    No need to hear them separately, from our
         MR. EVERT:
perspective, your Honor.
         MR. GUERKE: Your Honor, Kevin Guerke --
         THE COURT: Yeah.
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

```
Mr. GUERKE: -- DCPF. I, I think they could be all
heard together. And we've made some effort to coordinate with
the motion to quash folks and the plan is to have Trust counsel
go first, I'll go second, and then Mr. Hogan and the Matching
Claimants third, your Honor.
         THE COURT: Everyone in agreement?
    (No response)
        THE COURT: Okay.
        Well, we will call Nos. 4 through 7, altogether.
         That, for the clerk who's not potentially looking at
the same docket I've got, the Third-Party Trusts' Motion to
Quash or Modify. There were a variety of responses; No. 5,
Delaware Claims Processing Facility's Motion to Quash or
Modify; No. 6, the Non-Party Certain Matching Claimants' Motion
to Quash or Modify; and the Non-Party Certain Matching
Claimants' Motion to Proceed Anonymously, we're calling all of
those at the same time.
        All right. I'm ready to hear you.
        Mr. Martin?
        MR. MARTIN: Good morning, your Honor. Lance Martin
from Ward and Smith on behalf of the Asbestos Trusts.
counsel on the video is going to be presenting the argument
today, your Honor, but I do have one demonstrative exhibit.
        May I approach?
        THE COURT: You may.
```

1 MR. MARTIN: Thank you. (Demonstrative exhibit handed to the Court) 2 THE COURT: Counsel, whenever you're ready. 3 MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Thank you, your Honor. 4 This is Beth Moskow-Schnoll. Can you hear me okay? 5 6 THE COURT: Can we get a little more volume on? Okay. 7 All right. MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Is that, is that any better? 8 I'm trying to --9 10 THE COURT: Much better, yes. Thank you. 11 MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Okay, great. First of all, your Honor, what, what you just 12 13 received, I sent a copy of those, those few slides to Jones Day earlier this morning before the hearing so, so that they had it 14 15 a little bit before. I, I just wanted to apologize again for not being in 16 17 court in person. I would much prefer to be there, but at the 18 time this was scheduled I already had a, a hearing before the district court in Delaware this afternoon scheduled and -- but 19 I do apologize 'cause I would like to argue in person because 20 this is definitely -- you know, I was going to make a, a joke 21 about the fact that I don't want to look like I'm "phoning" in 22 this argument because I'm not. 23 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 24 25 response).

1 MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: I mean, we have not argued before this Court before --2 3 THE COURT: Right. MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: -- on this issue and, and even 4 though the lawyers from Jones Day said, "Oh, this is something 5 the Court's heard many times, " the Court has not heard it in 6 7 this case and we do have some different points that we want to stress. 8 THE COURT: All right. 9 MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: This is governed by Rule 45, 10 11 which is not, which is not the standard by which the subpoena or the order attached to the subpoena was issued. 12 13 So it is a different standard and that says that, "The court must quash or modify a subpoena that requires disclosure 14 15 of privileged or other protected matter" -- that's 45(d)(3)(A) -- is unduly burdensome under 45(d)(3)(A)(iv), which Mr. Guerke 16 17 will address, or seeks disclosure or confidential commercial 18 information under Rule 45(d)(3)(B)(i). So, you know, one of the issues is what do the 19 20 subpoenas to the DCPF Trusts seek? They seek claimants' law firms, date claim filed, date claim paid, and then all 21 exposure-related fields. 22 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 23 24 response).

MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: And Aldrich's argument is, like,

"We don't need a lot of protections here and, and we don't need 1 sampling because this is not PII." 2 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 3 response). 4 5 MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: But while they don't expressly seek trust claimants' personal information, like Social 6 7 Security numbers, names, addresses, that really makes little difference here because, as Mr. Guerke will discuss, the 8 exposure-related fields that are requested may still contain 9 personally identifiable information. But more importantly, 10 11 because DCPF must match the Trust claimants' name and Social Securities, Social Security numbers to names and Social 12 13 Security numbers provided by Aldrich thereby deanonymizing any kind of data prior to production, DCPF is releasing claimant 14 15 identifying information and however Aldrich wants to refer to it, that's what it is. It's, it's personally identifiable 16 information related to the claimants. 17 18 The next issue is because there is this type of information being released, we need to talk about 19 proportionality. Aldrich's ask is not proportional to its 20 21 needs and, and I, I want to turn to my slides at this point. 22 Your Honor --23 THE COURT: Please. MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: -- is it okay if I share my 24

25

screen to put them up?

1 THE COURT: Absolutely. 2 MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Thank you. So first of all, there's a, we have a cast of common 3 characters here. In all three of these related cases, in 4 Bestwall, DBMP, and, and in Aldrich, the case we're with now, 5 6 we have across the line Bates White acting as the expert. We have Jones Day and, and for these --7 THE COURT: Hang on. Hang on one moment, Counsel. 8 Were you sharing those documents on the screen? 'Cause we're 9 10 not seeing them. 11 MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: You're not seeing them? THE COURT: No, ma'am. 12 MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Oh, okay. Interesting. Oh, 13 yeah. It's not showing. Well, you all have a copy. I'll tell 14 15 you what I'm thinking. I don't know why it's not showing. THE COURT: Does, does anyone else feel the need to 16 17 see printed copies? We can take a moment if those in the 18 gallery need it. 19 Okay. Now we're there. Thank you. No. We were. 20 MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Guys, we were. Hold on. 21 (Pause) MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Can you see it now? 22 THE COURT: We see "trust subpoenas compelled data of 23 36,000 trust claims." 24 25 MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: There we go.

1 THE COURT: Okay.

MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Which is the wrong slide. And

3 | now it's not -- okay.

- 4 THE COURT: There you are.
- 5 MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: There we go. Thank you. Thanks
- 6 for your patience.
- 7 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
- 8 response).
- 9 MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: So we have a list of common
- 10 characters across these cases, these three cases. We have
- 11 Bates White acting as the expert, we have Jones Day, and, and
- 12 | the red is, is the people that are, that are across all three
- 13 of the cases.
- 14 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
- 15 response).
- 16 MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: And since Mr. Erens is in the
- 17 | courtroom today, well, actually, he, he's not in DBMP
- 18 | apparently, but still we have the same people at Jones Day that
- 19 appear across all these. And then, we have the fact that these
- 20 trust subpoenas are compelling an enormous amount of data.
- 21 We've got, you know, Bestwall served their subpoena April 5,
- 22 | 2021 seeking 15,000 trust claimants' data from 11 trusts, then
- 23 | there was DBMP, which was 9,000 trust claimants' data from 11
- 24 trusts, and Aldrich is even bigger because it's 12,000 trust
- 25 | claimants' data, but it's from 19 trusts, plus Paddock, so

another debtor. And this amounts to 36,000 trust claimants' data from 19 different trusts, plus Paddock, and it's all going to Jones Day and Bates White.

So the Aldrich subpoena allows Bates White to aggregate all these trust claimants' data postproduction with data from Aldrich's database and other sources, including data from Manville, Verus, and Paddock, into a single, consolidated information clearinghouse while they hold a matching key that deanonymizes the data and we think that's an enormous risk and not only will the data be commingled into one searchable database, but it also allows Bates White to consolidate data from Aldrich's database or other sources into a single, consolidated trust claimant information clearinghouse.

So even if they only consolidate information from sources identified in the Aldrich subpoenas, they will be consolidating confidential, sensitive data collected from 20 different sources into a single, consolidated database.

Now it gets, it gets even more dramatic when you look at what's going on now where there's inter-debtor and third-party debtor subpoenas which are seeking even more information. So what we have here is that Bestwall now has subpoenaed Aldrich Pump and Murray Boiler and DBMP who, by the way, are also represented by Jones Day. They did not file motions to quash, as far as we're aware. And so they have started subpoenaing these other debtors and asking for claims data

which is data contained in any claims database within DBMP's possession, custody, or control. They also subpoenaed Paddock for claims data and ballots using the same definition of what claims data is. And again, it's all flowing to Jones Day and Bates White. It's all going to the same place. And, and Aldrich has already indicated that it's going to follow suit and issue inter-debtor subpoenas as well.

And, and so there's a real risk that despite best practices that protected trust claimant data that's intended for use in only one database may find its way into another database or into another debtor's hands, even if it's done inadvertently, and no matter how well intentioned the effort is to avoid disclosure, we're still going to -- the scenario is ripe for extending the use of trust claimants' data beyond Aldrich's estimation proceeding and the permitted purposes.

So -- and, and besides that, because all the data is going to the same entities, not to even mention all the other experts that are allowed to have access to it, you know, there's a case that we cited, <u>Virginia Department of</u>

Corrections v. Jordan, where, you know, the court there said:

"Even the most rigorous efforts of the recipient of sensitive information to preserve confidentiality in compliance with the provisions of such a protective order may not prevent inadvertent compromise. It is very difficult for the human mind to compartmentalize

and selectively suppress information once learned, no matter how well-intentioned the effort may be to do so."

I mean, and one of our concerns is, like, if we turn over this data, are we going to see a flurry of subpoenas directed to Aldrich, DBMP, or Bestwall that the trust data will get swept up in? It looks like that's going to happen and it's very, very concerning to us.

I'm going to see if I can stop sharing my screen now.

Okay. I think that worked, right? You can all see me
again?

THE COURT: Yes, ma'am.

entities, Jones Day and Bates White, holding almost 150,000 claims files for 12,000 claimants from 20 different sources, 19 trusts and Paddock, plus data for 24,000 claimants in Bestwall and DBMP, and holding the matching keys to deanonymize each dataset. The same counsel and lead experts are analyzing similar data across three bankruptcies, all for the same purpose, which leads to unprecedented aggregation and commingling of data into a single information clearinghouse and the matched and aggregated production is further accessible by a broad array of retained experts and authorized representatives for Aldrich and Murray, the ACC, the FCR, Trane Technologies Company, and Trane U.S.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

So what are we proposing? I'm sure you know. It's sampling. Sampling really is the solution here. particularly appropriate where confidential data is sought. So -- excuse me. THE COURT: Take a moment. (Pause) MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: DCPF undertakes significant security measures to try to protect all this data, but once it's produced to Aldrich and Bates White those measures can no longer control or protect that trust claimants' data that they and the Trusts have a duty to protect. By limiting disclosure of the trust claimant data to no more than a 10 percent sample, the volume of data leaving DCPF's control and the Trusts' control is drastically reduced and, in turn, the risk of harm to trust claimants through inadvertent disclosure or misuse of the data is reduced significantly. And, and the most important point here is that while the information may be relevant for the estimation proceedings, all of the information is not necessary for these proceedings. There -- there is -- they -- Aldrich has failed to show why they need unfettered access to claimants' sensitive information. Why a sample would not work -- they've never argued that a sample would not work for them and they've never explained how it couldn't work for them. And, you know, especially, there's no need for all of the information to go in and Aldrich has never argued otherwise.

that, especially when you're balancing it against the need to protect the sensitive, confidential information of 12,000 sick, elderly people, some of them may even be dead. I don't know. And sampling won't modify the substance or quality of the data that Aldrich receives. It only decreases the volume, which is a really good thing. Aldrich will be able to discern the exact same patterns from a sample as they would from reviewing all the data and a random sample of no more than 10 percent of the trust claims at issue would, therefore, provide Aldrich with all the data it needs for its estimate, estimation proceedings

But they really can't argue that sampling wouldn't get them what they need because Aldrich's counsel, as I've said, is the same counsel who represented the debtor in Bestwall. And in Bestwall. And in Bestwall. And in Bestwall when Judge Connolly in the District of Delaware ruled that a 10, that only a 10 percent sample would need to be produced, Bestwall issued a new subpoena and asked the court to approve their resolved claim sample and in that motion they admitted that using a 10 percent sample would -- and this is a quote -- "provide an efficient mechanism by which the parties and the bankruptcy court can address issues presented by the estimation proceeding" and they argued that "approving the 10 percent sample offers a practicable and fair way to proceed and will save time and expense." And, your Honor, we totally agreed with Jones Day. It will save time and expense. In that

Page 50 of 88 49 same motion Jones Day cited the Manual for Complex Litigation 1 for the --2 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 3 response). 4 MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: -- proposition that: 5 "Acceptable sampling techniques in lieu of discovery 6 and presentation of voluminous data from the entire 7 population can save substantial time and expense and 8 in some cases provide the only practicable means to 9 collect and present relevant data." 10 11 And Aldrich's only -- their, their own consultant, Bates White, further opined that a 10 percent sample was 12 reliable for performing analyses related to liability 13 estimation and this was despite them previously contending that 14 15 using a sample would be unworkable. And your Honor has also stated that you favor sampling because it saves costs and 16 17 controversy.

And finally, your Honor, if the Court orders production of a sample as opposed to the entire claimant population, my guess is that that will become the norm going forward for subpoenas like this in estimation proceedings and that would, hopefully, lead to less litigation going forward which would, again, be, be more efficient, less costly, and, and just make things move along. In conclusion, using a random sample mitigates risks, lessens the burden on the Trusts and

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

50 DCPF, and it would be a much more efficient method and it may 1 result in less litigation going forward, your Honor. 2 So we respectfully ask the Court to grant our motion 3 to quash and order that rather than produce all the claims data 4 for the 12,000 claimants, that the DCPF Trusts produce a random 5 10 percent sample of that data. 6 Thank you, your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Thank you very much. 8 Okay. Mr. Guerke. 9 Good morning, your Honor. Kevin Guerke 10 MR. GUERKE: 11 on behalf of Delaware Claim Processing Facility, LLC. We join the Trusts' arguments, both made today and 12 13 also in their written submissions. I appreciate that the Court has heard similar issues on other subpoenas before. So I'll 14 15 streamline my comments today and will focus on the unique burden on DCPF. Otherwise, we'll rely on our papers, your 16 17 Honor. 18 THE COURT: Thank you. MR. GUERKE: DCPF has a duty to protect and maintain 19 the security over the confidential and highly sensitive trust 20 data that it stores for the Trusts. Protecting the security of 21 sensitive claimant data is our highest priority. 22

Debtors' subpoena requested DCPF to produce seven categories of information from the Trusts. The process involved in responding to those seven categories will be a huge

23

24

1 burden. Whether it was the debtors' intent or not, the

- 2 | subpoena will capture sensitive, personal identifying
- 3 information, including names and Social Security numbers. The
- 4 | primary problem is the debtors' Request G, Paragraph 10 of the
- 5 | subpoena, for all exposure-related fields. That's the seventh
- 6 category, your Honor.
- 7 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
- 8 response).
- 9 MR. GUERKE: This broad, all-exposure field includes
- 10 | five additional subcategories of requested information. Some
- 11 of the data for the all-exposure field's request will contain
- 12 | Social Security numbers and names and other sensitive
- 13 | information. This is usually found in secondary exposure or
- 14 occupational exposure situations where a claimant filled out a
- 15 | narrative response in the claim form describing their exposure
- 16 and listing information that would be considered personal
- 17 | sensitive information. Here, the subpoena seeks information
- 18 | related to 12,000 claimants. Almost 150,000 claims match to
- 19 those 12,000 claimants. There can be multiple exposure records
- 20 associated with each claim that's submitted and each exposure
- 21 record has up to four exposure fields which could contain
- 22 personal identifying information.
- So to comply with the subpoena, each field would have
- 24 to be manually reviewed by a DCPF employee to respond to the
- 25 subpoena and then redact and remove the sensitive information

- 52 like names and Social Security numbers. That means DCPF has to 1 review and redact up to four exposure fields for each of the 2 hundreds of thousands of exposure records associated with the 3 nearly 150,000 claims. It's a very labor-intensive process and 4 it's a very time-consuming process. 5 The process and data isn't easy to understand and I've 6 7 had trouble visualizing it and conceptualizing it. THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 8 response). 9 MR. GUERKE: Your Honor, I, I have a, a sample I'd 10 11 like to hand up and hand to counsel to help describe the, the 12 process. 13 May I approach? THE COURT: Please. 14 15 (Printout handed to the Court and counsel) THE COURT: Thank you. I can tell already you're 16 17 optimistic about my eyesight. 18 MR. GUERKE: I'm sorry, your Honor. That -- this is a -- this would normally be provided in a spreadsheet form --19 20 THE COURT: Right. 21 MR. GUERKE: -- and we had to print it out and --THE COURT: You're fine. 22 MR. GUERKE: -- this is as, as good as we could get 23 24 it.
- THE COURT: Very good.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

What this is, your Honor, this three-page MR. GUERKE: document, is an example of the end product that we produce in response to a subpoena like this. It's after the review and it's after the redaction. So as I said before, there are 150, nearly 150,000 claim forms in play here. When responding to the subpoena, DCPF will pull the data from, from the claim forms for the fields that were requested, the seven categories --THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response). MR. GUERKE: -- in Paragraph 10 of the subpoena. There are multiple exposure records associated with each claim. After the information is collected, DCPF has to review each exposure field for names, Social Security numbers, and other personal identifying information and that ends up in the final form for production, which is the document I've handed up. The first page, your Honor, includes claim-related form, claim-related information and it corresponds to Requests A through F in the subpoena for claimant pseudonym, information about the law firm, contact information, the date that the claim was received, the date that the claim was approved, the first payment, and the status. First page is claim-related information. The second page, your Honor, is an example of information that would be pulled and provided in response to

claimant information.

Part G of the subpoena, all exposure-related fields. And you'll see here that this is injured party exposure and there is a column on the right side with, with four-or-five entries with text fields where this particular claimant has filled in narrative responses and, and as you will see, there's information that had to be redacted in, in the production process, names in two or three places for this, this injured

The last page, your Honor, is, relates to secondary-exposure information that also would be captured by Part G of the subpoena. You'll see that this claimant had secondary or take-home exposure from her spouse. She provided her spouse's name and she provided her spouse's Social Security number in two places in the narrative text that she filled in and as you can see, it's, it's been redacted as part of the production process.

A DCPF employee has to review each of these exposure records and then make the redactions. The redacted information is then compiled into a spreadsheet in electronic form similar to the printout that I've handed up. That review has to be done of those exposure records hundreds of thousands of times and the data produced looks like what I've handed up, but to get to that end product the reviewer in this particular case had to review multiple separate exposure records. There's no easy way to do it. It cannot be automated. The review can't

be completed electronically. We must eyeball it by a human and then there is a second-level QC process that we have to go

3 through.

haven't requested personal identifying information specifically, but, but that's not correct. The, the sensitive information is contained within the narrative fields, as I have, as I have shown in this example, that will be produced in response to the all exposure-related fields request in the subpoena. Responding to this subpoena will require DCPF, not a party to this case, as a nonparty to dedicate a team of employees to do this review. Responding to this subpoena will take that team many, many weeks to complete. It's an undeniable, undeniably tedious manual process that could easily be reduced through sampling. The burden we've described, your Honor, is undisputed.

And the costs are not just hard-dollar costs and expense. The subpoena takes away from DCPF's core mission. It takes away from DCPF's business. It distracts and it impedes us from, from processing claims for injured claimants. It can't do its other work when it's doing this work, your Honor, and -- and -- and if there's a situation where DCPF releases sensitive information and there's a data breach, it loses credibility. It strains its business. It could lose business. It's a serious threat.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

So we request, your Honor, respectfully, that the Court quash or modify the subpoena to eliminate the request for all-exposure fields, Part G of the subpoena, and order random sampling, as described by my colleagues and in our papers. That's the only way to reduce the extensive burden on non-party DCPF. Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. Then we had the claimants as well who wanted to be heard? MR. HOGAN: Yes, your Honor. Daniel Hogan --THE COURT: Okay. MR. HOGAN: -- on behalf of the Certain Matching Claimants. Can you hear me this morning, your Honor? THE COURT: Yes, sir. MR. HOGAN: Wonderful. Thank you. Daniel Hogan of Hogan McDaniel on behalf of the Certain Matching Claimants. Thank you, your Honor, for permitting me to appear via Teams or Zoom, or whatever we're on today. I had a scheduling conflict which prevented me from flying down to Charlotte. I would have loved to have done that and appeared before you personally. Mr. Waldrep is in the court. He admitted me pro hac vice for purposes of these proceedings. THE COURT: Yes, sir. But I wanted to, to thank you for allowing MR. HOGAN:

me to proceed, accordingly.

Your Honor, the Certain Matching Claimants are 10,474 unique meso victims, mesothelioma victims of the debtors' products who have historic, historic claims submitted to the Asbestos Trusts. These individuals are not current claimants of the debtors. They have asserted over a hundred thousand unique claims. They're also not future claimants of, of the debtors. They're historical claimants who long ago resolved their meso claims against the debtors. Also important, your Honor, they have not appeared in these cases in any capacity before today. They are truly strangers to this litigation.

And so, your Honor, you know, we filed a motion to quash. We filed a motion to proceed anonymously. We joined in the motion to quash that were filed by both the Trusts and DCPF and, and we, we join those arguments. And so it's not my intention today, your Honor, to repeat anything that's been argued with the exception, potentially, of touching on the burden, your Honor, that, that affects the Matching Claimants.

Your Honor, let me just talk for a minute about the posture of these proceedings. As you, as you're well aware more than anyone, no one anticipated that we would be arguing these motions before your Honor when these subpoenas were issued and served upon DCPF and the Trusts in Delaware. The Matching Claimants were not served with the subpoenas. The July 1st order that you entered specifically provided that

1 DCPF, after utilizing the matching key, would notify not the

2 | Matching Claimants, but their counsel of record for the

3 | Matching Claimants. This is counsel of record not in these

4 proceedings, your Honor. These are counsel of record in

5 proceedings that have long ago been resolved and been resolved

6 by settlement.

And so it's a, it's a unique construct. The Matching Claimants and their counsel were forced to interpret the meaning of the July 1st order as it applies to the Matching Claimants and, and the provided process to move to quash the subpoenas. If you read the July 1st order, which I know you have as you signed it, it's contemplated that only the Matching Claimants would be allowed, or, or at least specifically articulated that the Matching Claimants would be the ones who would be allowed to move to quash these subpoenas. And nevertheless, we're, we're, we're pleased that both the Trusts and DCPF have moved to quash the subpoenas as well and as I indicated, we joined in the arguments made by them.

Your Honor, I have been retained by at least 52 law firms who, who retained us to help protect this historic data which were -- and these firms and their claimants were identified through the process that unfolds in that, in that order. Each of the firms received from DCPF a separate list of Matching Claimants for each of the ten Delaware Trusts. We worked long and hard to coalesce these lists to aggregate the

burden.

precise number of claimants and the unique number of claims asserted against the Trusts by the Matching Claimants. The takeaway from this endeavor is, is just an astronomical number, from our perspective, of both claimants and claims. And so we echo the arguments about anonymization and about sampling because we believe that that could really cut down on the

Your Honor, if I could, I'd like to turn now to the anonymization issue because that -- it's an -- that is an issue that is, of course, unique to the Matching Claimants. It hasn't been argued by either DCPF or the Trusts.

Your Honor, the motion to proceed anonymously is, is precipitated by the need of having the, the claimants be named in the public record and from our perspective -- and again, pursuant to the provisions of your July 1, 2021 order -- we believe that the order specifically prohibited us pursuant to Paragraph 13(e) that we should not put their names on the public record. As I indicated during the DBMP hearing, your Honor, I'm not interested in a contempt ruling from you with regard to the form of order and I realize that, you know, when, when this motion to quash was filed I didn't anticipate that I'd be arguing this motion --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HOGAN: -- in front of you, your Honor, the very Judge who issued the order. But nevertheless, I, I'm not

names of the Matching Claimants.

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

interested in, in a contempt order, as I read Paragraph 13(e)
applying to me as counsel to the Matching Claimants, and
perceived the prohibition as preventing me from pleading the

And so from that perspective, your Honor, just so you have an understanding of why it is that we, you know, we, we believe it's important to proceed anonymously, in terms of the, the balancing test that's required to evaluate whether or not it's appropriate to proceed anonymously, we believe that the fear of harm caused by the disclosure of the identity of these litigants in pursuing a motion to quash is against their, is against the public interest. We -- we weigh -- we believe that the balance weighs in favor where these claimants are not litigants pursuing current claims, but are proceeding solely to protect their identities and their personal information. Protecting settlement information is a routine feature of litigation because it fosters settlements and protects all involved parties and we believe that Aldrich has not provided an adequate justification for allowing a wholesale release of, of over 10,000 Matching Claimants. And so from our perspective, we've got both the form of the language of your order as well as the balancing of the -- of -- of the need.

Secondarily, your Honor, and I believe importantly, if you read the -- the -- Aldrich's objection to our motion to quash and our motion to proceed anonymously, they recite to a

subset of mesothelioma claimants that were filed by individual law firms and they, in fact, attached to their motion and to the declaration excerpts of each of those complaints. And what we did there, your Honor, is we went back to -- because I have a list of each of the -- of the -- of the Matching Claimants for each of these specific law firms as identified by DCPF -- and we went back and reviewed and, in fact, upon a review of those eight complaints two of the complaints which purportedly evidence the public dissemination of Matching Claimants and identities in reality name individuals who do not appear on the matching key list provided to us by DCPF.

So from our perspective, assuming a comparable rate of error, at least 25 percent of the potential Matching Claimants are, arguably, inaccurate and at that rate there's a real potential here, your Honor, that over 2600 individuals, if, if I extrapolate that 25 percent error rate, could have their identities and PII, or personally identifying information, improperly and unnecessarily disclosed to Aldrich. And so from our perspective, your Honor, we believe that we should be allowed to proceed anonymously.

And also, your Honor, I just, so the record's clear, you know, we are, of course, relying on our papers, but I also ask that, to the extent that the Court rules against the Matching Claimants on the motion to proceed anonymously, that they be afforded the same 30-day stay to allow for an appeal as

you allowed in the <u>DBMP</u> case so that we can proceed with an appeal. And I believe that order was just entered yesterday, if I'm not mistaken, in the <u>DBMP</u> proceeding and we would just ask for that same protection, assuming that you don't agree with our arguments on the motion to proceed anonymously.

Your Honor, again, turning to the motion to quash, I don't intend to repeat any of the arguments that were made by counsel for both the Trusts and DCPF, but I just wanted to touch upon, your Honor, a couple points that are specific to the Matching Claimants.

From our perspective, your Honor, Aldrich relies upon the Third Circuit's recently reversed decision in, in Bestwall and they argue that the DCPF and the Trusts have been ordered to comply with the Bestwall subpoenas that are more expansive than the subpoenas that are issued here. However, the issue preclusion arguments presented in Bestwall are inapplicable in this instance as neither the Trusts nor DCPF have appeared in the Aldrich bankruptcy proceedings until today to argue against the subpoena motions. And so the privity requirements really don't, are inapplicable in this instance.

Regarding the, the, the statutory basis for the extensive discovery sought, as my, as counsel for the Trusts and DCPF have argued, there really isn't a statutory basis.

And so I'll just rely upon those arguments, your Honor. But arguably, we're concerned about the reverse engineering of the

individual, identities of these individual Matching Claimants 1 and we are significantly concerned about the, the 2 identification of personal identifying information for these 3 individuals. 4 And so from our perspective, your Honor -- I don't 5 want to belabor the point -- I think you called it an "echo 6 7 chamber" as it relates to the arguments made in, in DBMP and I don't care to belabor the record. So we will rely upon our, 8 our filings and arguments made hereto and join in the arguments 9 made previously and ask that the Court quash the subpoenas 10 11 and/or allow us to proceed anonymously. Thank you, your Honor. 12 13 THE COURT: Thank you. Did the Kazan firm intend to speak? I saw there was a 14 15 motion to quash that shows on the docket. Maybe that was long 16 ago in Delaware, but --17 (No response) 18 THE COURT: All right, very good. Are we ready to hear, then, from the debtors' side? 19 20 Anyone else that wanted to be speaking in opposition? 21 (No response) THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Hirst. 22 Good morning, your Honor, and thank you. 23 MR. HIRST: Morgan Hirst of Jones Day on behalf of the debtors. I'll speak 24 briefly on the motions to quash. Mr. Evert will speak on the 25

motions to proceed anonymously.

Mr. Hogan stole my line, stealing your line about the "echo chambers." By my count, this is your fifth go-around between this case and <u>DBMP</u> on these subpoenas and while I certainly would like to show you that I will give the best argument of any of them, recognizing that I'm not the smartest of the various lawyers who've argued before you, I'm going to go the path less traveled and try and be one of the briefer arguments that you've heard --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HIRST: -- on these motions. And, and part of that -- and I'm -- I'm -- I'm vested, or I have the ability to do that because the arguments you heard today are no different than the arguments you've heard before in some cases from DCPF in the <u>DBMP</u> case last October when they appeared before you; in some cases, as Mr. Hogan acknowledged, from him a month ago in <u>DBMP</u>; in some cases, from other litigants in our case as well. Nothing has changed and nothing is any different and we trust your Honor's rulings won't be any different.

As the movants, they have a very heavy burden in order to quash these subpoenas, none of which, we think, they have met. The relevance and -- and your Honor, I think, spoke on the relevance and necessity of this information multiple times and I didn't hear any credible argument that the information here is not relevant and necessary to our case. The subpoenas

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

here -- and your Honor has found this -- do not seek any PII and I feel like in the DCPF part of the argument we were penalized for that. We were, we were accused of creating greater burden because we aren't seeking PII. Of course, we aren't seeking PII because they objected when the Bestwall debtor did just that. And so we aren't seeking any PII. We've made that clear. We don't believe any of the information we're frankly seeking is confidential at all, but, if it is, your Honor, your order that we crafted and your Honor granted when you granted these, the ability to issue these subpoenas is best described as a protective order on steroids. It is as robust a set of confidentiality protections as I've ever seen. Many of the fears that Trusts' counsel raised in her motion just simply are not permitted under the terms of your order. We cannot do some of those things. There are wide, robust protections for this data. And, and so in light of that, I think the confidentiality issues have been addressed multiple times. Sampling issue we heard today and your Honor has now heard, I know, at least three times, including from DCPF last October in the DBMP case. And your Honor has, has dispatched with that repeatedly. And as a reminder, we are not seeking the entirety of the DCPF database. We are seeking the 12,000 Matching Claimants that relate to our case. We are seeking very limited fields of information. While we saw the overlay

from DCPF counsel, we're certainly well aware that their

- database almost certainly contains many, many, many more 1 2 fields. We are not seeking those. We are seeking a limited amount of information. And so there's simply no benefit to the 3 sample that they're asking for here and there's no reason to do 4 it. 5 On burden, as your Honor knows and as your Honor has 6 7 ordered, we will be paying --THE COURT: Well, let's stop there --8 MR. HIRST: Yeah. 9 THE COURT: -- and go back to the, to the point. 10 11 What about the contention that they're making that you're going to pick up a bunch of personal information out of 12 13 the narratives? What do you say there? MR. HIRST: Well, No. 1, maybe this gets me to the 14 15 practical point on all of this --THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 16 17 response). 18 MR. HIRST: -- your Honor, which is your Honor's ordered as of yesterday this information to be produced in the 19 20 DBMP case. THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 21 22 response). MR. HIRST: And it's, we think it's a substantially 23 24
 - similar set of Matching Claimants. So the, that is happening. The burden that was discussed is going to be taken on.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

```
No. 2, maybe more fundamentally, in Bestwall my
understanding is that DCPF is about to comply with the subpoena
that they were previously ordered to this week, as soon as this
week. And keep in mind, that subpoena they are responding to
in Bestwall, your Honor, is a far more invasive, I quess would
be the word they might use, subpoena that does seek PII. And
so all of that information, as I understand it -- and again,
I'm not in the Bestwall case. In fact, I was dismayed when I
looked at the cast of characters to not see my name anywhere,
but --
         THE COURT: That's not a lost billing opportunity.
                     I, I, I know, your Honor. I got to, I'll
         MR. HIRST:
have to figure out a way to earn it, but --
         THE COURT:
                    Bankruptcy work is kind of slow these days
for most attorneys, Mr. Hirst.
         MR. HIRST: I might have to go back to actually
regular litigation, your Honor.
         But -- so all of this -- the PII they spoke about is
all being produced, as I understand it, to Bestwall, anyway.
And so to the point that they are going to have to do this
laborious redactions they've talked about, No. 1, that's a
product of their own making. They demanded, essentially, that
we do that by objecting when Bestwall made it easy for them,
let's say, and asked for the PII, which wouldn't have required
the redactions. They objected and they convinced Judge
```

1 Connolly until he was later reversed to substantiate that. We
2 did not seek the PII specifically 'cause we didn't, we wanted
3 to avoid that objection.

And so, No. 1 -- we're kind of damned if we do, damned if we don't, from our perspective -- is to try to narrow this as much as possible, trying to seek as narrow a category of some information as possible while still getting us the relevant information, but, No. 2, there is no additional burden here because it's being done already in DBMP. It's being done already in DBMP. It's being done already in DBMP. It's being done already in DBMP. It's being done already in Bestwall. And so there's no, there's no reason it should be any different here. And I guess third and finally on your question, your Honor, we have the PII. Remember, the claimants at issue here are folks who had sued and resolved claims against us. And so we already have their PII, which is part of the reason we certainly don't want it, but -- so to the extent, God forbid, it was exposed to us again, we have it, already.

And so the harm in that, I see, is very minimal when you consider and when you're weighing the balance of the benefit versus the burden on it.

THE COURT: What do you say about the contention about cross-pollination between the cases? Is all this data going to go into the other two cases and --

MR. HIRST: Well, your Honor, I intend to follow the order you issued in this case and even though, again, I'm not

- Page 70 of 88 69 on the list here, I think everybody else does, too. And that's 1 2 not permitted by your Honor's order. We aren't, we aren't permitted to aggregate. We aren't permitted to see what 3 they're going to see in the other things. So --4 Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 5 THE COURT: 6 response). 7 MR. HIRST: -- I trust that we're going to follow your order and I trust that if we don't, we're probably going to be 8 9 hearing from you. THE COURT: You're not anticipating a further motion, 10 11 though, to make those -- those --MR. HIRST: I'm not anticipating such a motion. And 12 keep in mind, my understanding of when we have sought the 13 database, or when the databases have been sought, that's the 14 15 individual database for when Bestwall, I think it was, sought 16 our database. That's our individual database. 17 THE COURT: Right. 18 MR. HIRST: Has nothing to do with what is being obtained from the Trusts. And so, yes, to answer your 19 question, no, we do not intend to seek that from the other 20 parties. 21 So with that, your Honor, again, the practical point, 22
 - So with that, your Honor, again, the practical point, 'cause you've heard this all before, is all of this information is going to be produced in DBMP in response to, basically, an identical subpoena for what we think is an overlapping set of

24

25

1 | claimants. All this information is going to be produced to

2 Bestwall on a far more expansive subpoena on what we think is

3 | an over, a substantially similar set of Matching Claimants.

4 There's simply no reason for -- it can be done and there's

5 simply no reason for it to not occur here as well, your Honor.

And so absent any other questions, I will cede the table to Mr. Evert on the anonymization motion.

THE COURT: Mr. Evert?

MR. EVERT: Thank you, your Honor.

Again, we don't want to belabor it. We want to make sure the Court has everything it has. Our papers are pretty extensive. I know the Court's reviewed them. I heard one of the other lawyers say this morning, "Everything's already been said, but not everyone said it." So I'll, I'll try not to add to that list.

So on the anonymization motion, your Honor, frankly, I think you said it best when you summarized your ruling in the DBMP case on this motion. You, you said that the, that the Jacobson factors had not been met, which we agree with. You said that there was no evidence in the case that they've been met and even if there was such evidence of what had been alleged, they hadn't been met. You said that your previous order, which we agree with, certainly did not intend to prohibit the Matching Claimants from putting their names in the public record. That order was designed to stop information

1 derived from the subpoenas from going into the public record.

2 | Clearly, the, the claimants knew their names before the

3 | subpoenas were ever issued. You said that there's an

4 | independent duty of the Court to ensure open proceedings and a

5 strong preference in the Rules and the case law for parties to

6 be named. And again, even if, even if there was evidence and

7 | even if there was some indication that would have been alleged

8 | in regard to the Jacobson factors was present, you said it

9 didn't amount to much more than "we just don't want to have

10 | that information out there." And that's certainly the way we

11 | feel about it.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Now, now the only thing new that's been raised today is this issue of the purported inaccuracies in the matching key. It's kind of interesting in a way. So what this derives from, your Honor, is in our reply to the anonymization motion we attached eight complaints that tried to illustrate for whoever the decider of fact was going to be of exactly the kind of information that is out there in the public forum, already, for all of these claimants who already filed lawsuits for their asbestos-related claims. And ironically, the other side has said, "Well, two of the eight aren't on the matching key."

Well, we, we would dispute that, your Honor. We've, we've looked at the matching key and, and all eight are on the matching key. However, we have no way to verify that 'cause we don't know the names of the claimants 'cause they've asked to

proceed anonymously.

So there's a particular irony in that, in that argument, but the bottom line is, your Honor, notwithstanding whether or not the matching key that somehow is underinclusive, which is what they're alleging which I think would be good for them, the, the fact is all of this information has been in public fora throughout the country when lawsuits have been filed related to the mesotheliomas.

So as a result, your Honor, the idea now that there is some private interest that needs to be protected that has not been protected over the long term just, to us, is -- is -- it's, it's apparent that that's, doesn't meet the factors and there's no, no severe harm as required by the case law.

So with that, your Honor, I'll stop, unless the Court has questions, and, and cede, cede the table.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. EVERT: Thank you, your Honor.

18 THE COURT: Anyone else?

19 (No response)

THE COURT: Rejoinder arguments?

MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Yes, your Honor. Beth Moskow-Schnoll.

First of all, Mr., Mr. Hirst, I'm very sorry. If you want, I can add your name to the slide and recirculate them in case I offended you. I didn't mean to.

1 MR. HIRST: As long as you send it to me, I'll be 2 happy.

MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: So, you know, one thing that struck me was that Mr. Hirst said that he didn't hear any credible argument as to why information sought isn't relevant or necessary, but one of the highlights of my argument was that all the information is not necessary. By their own words, they acknowledge that sampling is just fine. And, and I think they underscored my point about the fact that they're overasking in that, you know, they said, "We already have the claimants' PII. We don't need that." And yet in Bestwall, they asked for it, even though they have it and they don't need it. And in Bestwall when they were told by Judge Connolly that they would, could only ask for a 10 percent sample, they came back and said, "Ten percent sample's great. We can work with that. It's efficient. It works great."

So -- and what's -- what is, really stood out to me based on their argument is that, again, they never addressed the sampling, the sampling argument we made. They never said why sampling wouldn't work. They never said that they couldn't make do with a 10 percent sample, that it wouldn't provide them with all the information they need, and the reason, your Honor, they didn't do that is because they can't make that argument. They've never made that argument and, and that's what, that's what's really sticking in our craw right now, is that the

- information for the 12,000 claimants is not necessary. 1 can make do and, and proceed with estimation with only a 10 2 It will not harm them. Their -- it can --3 percent sample. their own words come back to haunt them on that fact, 4 efficient, reliable, accurate. 5 A sample would work just fine, your Honor, and that's 6 7 what we're asking for. Thank you. 8 THE COURT: All right. 9 10 Mr. Guerke? 11 MR. GUERKE: Thank you, your Honor. Kevin Guerke 12 again for DCPF. 13 There was an argument made that the same arguments have been made before and they're being made today and the 14 15 Court should just rule as it has in the past. But the information presented today, that DCPF presented today, the 16 17 sample I provided, the explanation I provided, has not 18 previously been presented. We submitted an affidavit from DCPF's COO, Richard Winner. It's part of the record. 19 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 20 21 response). That has not been disputed in any way. 22 MR. GUERKE: So the burden that we've described in great detail is, 23
 - is undenied, unchallenged, and it's a fact, your Honor.

Everything we've presented is, is a fact. And it's our job to 25

- object. No matter how many times that they try to do this, 1 it's our job to object. It's our job to protect the data of 2 trust claimants and it's, under Rule 45, it's the Court's role 3 to protect nonparties like DCPF when we're, when we're 4 protecting our very valuable data. 5 So the debtors can't and haven't disputed that there 6 are 12,000 claimants in play. The, the debtors can't and 7 haven't disputed that there are nearly 150,000 claims involved 8 here and that there's a narrative element to the claim forms 9 that will include personal identifying information. 10 11 fact. And the fact that we have to manually review all the claim records is undisputed and unchallenged. 12 13 Your Honor today is wearing a different hat as the compliance court, not the issuing court, with a different role, 14 15 different obligations, and a different standard focusing on the non-party burden, not the debtors' need and not the relevancy 16 17 of the, of the data requested. And we've met our burden today, 18 your Honor, and we ask that you quash or modify the, the subpoena as we've requested. 19 20 THE COURT: All right. 21 Anything from you, Mr. Hogan? 22 MR. HOGAN: No, your Honor. I'll rely upon arguments previously made and our submissions. 23
- Thank you for your time, your Honor. 24 25 THE COURT: Okay.

Has that got it? Are we done? All right.

On the anonymization, I'm, I'm inclined to rule the same as I have previously. I believe that the burden hadn't been met to show that there would be harm by the disclosures and I think the public interest outweighs it.

So that ruling is, should be consistent with the earlier ruling in DBMP on that topic.

On the, the motions to quash, two changes, I guess.

First of all, as pointed out, we didn't have a party that might be subject to collateral estoppel appearing in this case. So that is not the, the basis of my ruling here.

The second change is, perhaps I am hidebound or -- my wife would say so, anyway -- but you, you have gotten through to me on the sampling issue. I agree that's a new argument today as to what exactly might be disclosed and I'm sensitive to the disclosure of these non-parties' information.

So I'm adopting the 10 percent sampling. Frankly, the first time I got this issue my assumption was that, is Judge Connolly had done it previously and we were not going to be the compliance court, that that would likely be implemented, anyway. The time that I most recently discussed this with counsel, I guess in the <u>DBMP</u> case, it sounded like that it was going to be six of one or half dozen of another as to whether you took a sample or whether you took all of it, and there might be, actually, more problems in agreeing on a random

- 1 | sample than there would be in just taking all the data.
- 2 Recognizing now that we're going to see some of this
- 3 | information in narrative form and that you might have
- 4 | information that is, in fact, PII, I want to reduce the harm
- 5 | there as much as possible. So I'll leave it to y'all to talk
- 6 | about how you formulate that random sample, but my inclination
- 7 | is to limit that.
- 8 So the motion to quash is, motions to quash are
- 9 granted, to that extent, and otherwise denied, all right? Got
- 10 | it? Everybody understand?
- 11 (No response)
- 12 THE COURT: I understand the debtor would like to have
- 13 | as much information as possible, but we are -- I'm a little
- 14 | concerned about all of this is ballooning up and we're getting
- more and more demands for a great deal of data and I want to
- 16 make sure that we are mindful of costs in these cases and of
- 17 | the privacy concerns and that we're not getting any more than
- 18 | we need. So you'll see that in a lot of area.
- 19 Mr. Hirst?
- 20 MR. HIRST: Your Honor, just some questions on that so
- 21 | we have some guidance moving forward 'cause I do worry -- and,
- 22 | your Honor, luckily not in this case yet, but I've seen it in
- 23 | the others -- that agreeing on a sample is easier said than
- 24 done.
- 25 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative

response).

2 MR. HIRST: Would your Honor like us -- the concern I 3 heard raised was a field, not the number of claimants, but --

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).

MR. HIRST: -- a field that had the PII in it. Would you like us to work with them to narrow down that field in some manner? Is that where you would like us to, to pick the sample and -- 'cause I didn't hear any claim that the amount of claimants impacted anything. I heard it was that field of exposure-related evidence. And so we're just trying to get some guidance so we're not back --

THE COURT: I heard something different this morning from the other side. Maybe -- what I would suggest is this:

Let's take the ruling as it is. And, and, of course, the 30 days that was, stay is, would be in effect as well in these cases. Why don't we -- we've got a December 14th hearing date. Why don't y'all work on the, the sample size and whether there are any fields that can be reduced and we can touch base about those again at the next hearing before a written order is entered.

MR. HIRST: Okay.

THE COURT: That will give you a little bit of an opportunity to get to the technical fine points that I might not have gotten. But as -- obviously, when Judge Connolly was

```
ordering a 10 percent sample, someone was contemplating the
 1
    mechanisms of how to get a truly random sample there, so.
 2
             MR. ERENS: Right. Your Honor, could we have one
 3
    second, please?
 4
 5
             THE COURT: You want to take about a ten-minute
 6
    recess?
             Maybe this would be a good time.
 7
             MR. ERENS:
                         Okay.
             THE COURT: Everyone feel that? We'll take our mid-
 8
    morning break, then, right now and pick up again, oh, as close
 9
    to 30 minutes after the hour as we can.
10
11
         (Recess from 11:22 a.m., until 11:34 a.m.)
12
                              AFTER RECESS
         (Call to Order of the Court)
13
             THE COURT: Okay. Have a seat, everyone.
14
15
             Recognizing that that was a, a alteration of what we
    have done previously, did anyone have anything else we need to
16
17
    talk about regarding that?
18
             Mr. Hirst?
             MR. HIRST: Just mainly some questions and maybe one
19
    comment, your Honor.
20
             So in light of your ruling, which I will admit we were
21
    slightly surprised by, we do need to talk to our experts as
22
    well. And so I don't think December 14th is necessarily time.
23
    'Cause we're in a situation now where Bates White's going to
24
    qet, in Bestwall, everything, plus PII --
25
```

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 1 2 response). MR. HIRST: -- from DCPF. In DBMP, they're going to 3 get everything without PII and here, we're going to get some 10 4 percent amount. And so I want to talk to Bates White as we 5 work with --6 7 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response). 8 MR. HIRST: -- the, the movants here to, to figure out 9 the, the right thing. And so I would suggest -- and I don't 10 11 think we have anything else necessarily up at the December hearing, anyway -- I wouldn't mind till, till the January 12 13 hearing to decide on that. So that's Thing 1. Thing 2 was the arguments we heard today on the number 14 15 was all, as I understood it, based on burden. In other words, 16 to do what they have to do with redactions for 12,000 claims --17 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 18 response). MR. HIRST: -- takes too much. And so your Honor 19 mentioned the number 10 percent. We want to work with our 20 experts and consider this, but we think maybe the easiest 21 thing, to avoid six months of litigation since this is all 22 about burden, is to allow us to pick the 10 percent since we're 23 the ones seeking the discovery and since the argument is all 24 about burden. And so I know, your Honor, you know, we've just 25

```
1
    been thinking --
                         I thought it was all about estimation,
 2
             THE COURT:
    though, and if --
 3
             MR. HIRST: Well, it is -- well, but to --
 4
             THE COURT: -- if you cherry pick 10 percent, what's
 5
    that going to be useful for at, at an estimation hearing?
 6
 7
             MR. HIRST: We don't know yet 'cause we just, we've
    just considered today. Obviously, the estimation sample's
 8
    going to be the estimation sample. That's a different issue,
 9
    but we're talking here -- this is a discovery issue now and the
10
11
    objection was based entirely, that I heard, on burden. And so
    if, you know, we, we need to find out what we think is the most
12
13
    relevant information to get.
             And, and so, anyway, your Honor, it's something we'll
14
15
    talk to movants about. I just wanted to tee that up for,
16
    potentially --
             THE COURT: Okay.
17
             MR. HIRST: -- a January hearing, if that'll work for
18
19
    your Honor.
             THE COURT: Any -- Mr. Guerke, is that, that
20
21
    satisfactory?
             MR. GUERKE: The process of having a discussion with
22
    the debtors, certainly, your Honor. The, the cherry picking
23
    the sample, absolutely not. We, we will oppose that. And we
24
```

asked for random sampling and, and that's --

25

```
THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
 1
 2
    response).
             MR. GUERKE: -- what we would like, your Honor.
 3
                         And again, on, on the burden point --
 4
             MR. HIRST:
             THE COURT:
                         Ms. Moskow --
 5
             MR. HIRST: -- your Honor, we just don't know why
 6
 7
    random matters from their burden objection perspective. But
    we'll, we'll deal with that and we can come back to your Honor
 8
    and talk more about that if we need to.
 9
             THE COURT: How about the folks on by video?
10
11
             MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: Your Honor, I was, I was just
    going to say that it's, it's not just the burden argument.
12
    It's the fact that if they, it's not necessary for them to have
13
    a hundred percent of the claimants' data. I think that was the
14
15
    other point. Only -- 10 percent will get them everything they
    need and it should be a random sample --
16
17
             THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
18
    response).
             MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: -- for the reasons the Court --
19
20
             THE COURT: Mr. --
21
             MS. MOSKOW-SCHNOLL: -- has already stated.
22
             THE COURT:
                         Mr. Hogan, you got anything?
                         No, your Honor. I just confer [sic] with
23
             MR. HOGAN:
    the comments made.
24
25
             THE COURT: Any opposition to us touching base about
```

```
this at the January hearing?
 1
 2
             MR. HOGAN:
                         No, sir.
                         Hopefully, that'll give you a chance to
 3
             THE COURT:
    talk about your needs and, and in any event, if, if you -- I
 4
    was thinking not only burden, but also of needless exposure of
 5
    the possibility of a hack and, and having a lot of people's
 6
 7
    data affected. So --
             MR. HIRST: But the number is ultimately --
 8
                         -- both matter.
             THE COURT:
 9
                         The number is ultimately 1200, though,
10
             MR. HIRST:
11
    right, your Honor?
                         Right.
12
             THE COURT:
             MR. HIRST:
                         That's, I guess that's the point we're
13
    raising.
14
15
             THE COURT:
                         Right. But as to how you select them, the
    thing that I will want to hear next in January is if it's not
16
17
    random, what is the usefulness --
18
             MR. HIRST: Yep.
                         -- of it at estimation, okay?
19
             THE COURT:
             MR. HIRST: And we'll -- and to the extent that's the
20
    direction we, after five minutes of thinking about it, continue
21
    to go, we'll obviously provide an explanation for that for your
22
    Honor.
23
             THE COURT: All right, very good.
24
             We'll talk about it, then, on that January date,
```

which, again, is the 26th.

You can note that we'll have a status hearing on this particular motion, but, but I granted in part and denied in part the motions to quash and denied the anonymization motion, all right?

What else do we need to discuss? Did we have generalized case affairs, status reports, other good-of-the-order type announcements?

MR. ERENS: Your Honor, just very briefly, just a couple things going on.

So we, we've had discussion, as Ms. Abel indicated, on mediation.

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).

MR. ERENS: There's two orders to be submitted to your Honor. One is the order approving mediation and the other will be the mediation protocol and, potentially, the, the selection of the mediator. So the parties are, as Ms. Abel indicated, close on the first item. We intend to work with the parties on the second item and we all agreed, I think, based on the first order you'll see to have those additional items also put on the January hearing.

So January will be, I think, as follows: We have the DCPF matter we just did; the CMO matter we just did, or I guess we didn't just do it, but --

```
THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
 1
 2
    response).
             MR. ERENS: -- did this morning; the FCR's sampling
 3
    motion will be back up for January. That's on the claims file.
 4
    And I believe that is it, in addition to mediation I just
 5
    mentioned. So we'll have a, a pretty full day.
 6
 7
             THE COURT:
                         That -- before we move off of that, does
    everyone feel like we can accomplish all that in one day?
 8
    hearing cases in a divisional office the next day. So I'm not
 9
    available at the moment unless I move something and, and if so,
10
11
    I need to get started now.
             MR. ERENS: Let us get back to Chambers on that.
12
                                                                We
    think so. For, for mediation, we may not actually need a
13
              It's being targeted as a hearing if the parties can't
14
15
    agree, but we may just be submitting an order either then or in
16
    advance.
17
             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
18
             MR. ERENS: So that may not actually be an item.
             Sampling on the claim files is something that the
19
    parties are discussing now that also may be resolved or can be
20
    continued.
21
             So I think we should be fine, but your Honor does have
22
    all day --
23
24
             THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
25
    response).
```

```
1
             MR. ERENS:
                        -- on the 26th? Okay.
 2
             THE COURT:
                         I do, yes.
                         So I think we should be fine on that.
 3
             MR. ERENS:
             That's, that's really it, your Honor.
 4
 5
             MR. EVERT:
                         December hearing.
                         The December 14th hearing, as a result,
 6
             MR. ERENS:
 7
    nothing's up and we can release that hearing date if --
             THE COURT:
                         All right.
 8
                         -- if you need it.
 9
             MR. ERENS:
                         That'll be fine with me. I could use the
10
             THE COURT:
11
    time.
12
             MR. ERENS:
                         Okay.
             THE COURT: Anyone else?
                                       The ACC or FCR, any of the
13
    other parties wish --
14
15
             Mr. Davis -- Mr. Wright?
             MR. WRIGHT: Davis Wright from Robinson & Cole.
16
17
             Nothing additional from the Committee, your Honor.
18
             THE COURT: Okay.
             Mr. Grier, it looks like Mr. Guy has left. You don't
19
    have anything on your behalf, do --
20
             MR. GRIER: I've been abandoned, your Honor.
21
                         Okay, very good.
22
             THE COURT:
             If there's nothing else, then we will release all of
23
    you and try to get you on your way. I hope the travel is not
24
    too bad, but we will stand in recess and get you moving on.
25
```

```
87
 1
             Mr. Waldrep, you need to see me?
             MR. WALDREP: Yes.
 2
              THE COURT: All right.
 3
         (Proceedings concluded at 11:41 a.m.)
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
10
                               CERTIFICATE
              I, court approved transcriber, certify that the
11
12
    foregoing is a correct transcript from the official electronic
13
    sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled
14
    matter.
    /s/ Janice Russell
15
                                            December 5, 2022
16
    Janice Russell, Transcriber
                                                   Date
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

TAB 2

Case 22-00303 Doc 73-2 Filed 03/23/23 Entered 03/23/23 20:02:39 Desc Tab 2 Page 2 of 4

Claimant Pseudonym	FirmName	ContactEmail	FirmAddress1	FirmAddress2	FirmAddress3	FirmCity	FirmState FirmZip	DateReceived	Approved	FirstPaymentDate	StatusDescription

Case 22-00303 Doc 73-2 Filed 03/23/23 Entered 03/23/23 20:02:39 Desc Tab 2 Page 3 of 4

			l					ı	1	1	1	1	1					1	1	Bystander		
Claimant			Industry	Industry						Altered		Date	Date	Circumstances				Site	Bystander		Bystander	
Pseudonym	Employer	Occupation	Description	Other	SiteName	SiteCity	SiteState	Handled	Fabricated		Employed		Last	None	CircumstancesDescription	ApprovedSiteCode	AlternateApprovedSiteCode		FirstName		LastName	Product
r secony.		Brick Layer	·	one	Sicramo	Jacoby	Sitestate	False	False	False	False) 12/31/1962		XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX		33016894 GENERAL CHEMICAL COMPANY FRONT ROYAL, VA	country				- Toulet
					Wedgewood Garden										The claimant was exposed to asbestos fibers that her husband, XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX							
			Construction		Apartments Eclectic Corporation	Annandale Falls Church		False	False	False	True		3 12/30/1972 2 12/31/1975		fibers and dust. Claimant was the general contractor of his building company. He visited sites daily where homes were being built and walked among the tradesmen while they were working. The constant repairing an building included the handling, sawing, mixing and installation of asbestos products.							
		Office Worker	Construction					False	False	True	True	1/1/1963	3 1/1/1972	False	As an office worker, she worked in office most of time. Sometimes she would have to go into the plant to talk to a worker regarding their pay or work as a machine operator. When she walked through the plant or worked as a machine operator, she worked beneath boller steam pipes covered in asbestos insulation. These pipes were blown down regularly causing asbestos fibers to fall in the work area, onto her, the machinery, and the floor. Maintenance workers replaced and repaired asbestos insulation products in her work area on a regular basis.							
		Office	Other	Pentagon Building				False	False	False	False		2 12/31/1971		The claimant worked in a building where asbestos-containing OCF products were used in construction and maintenance.	10015878 PENTAGON BUILDING						

Case 22-00303 Doc 73-2 Filed 03/23/23 Entered 03/23/23 20:02:39 Desc Tab 2 Page 4 of 4

Claimant Pseudonym	ExposedToOEP	OtherRelationship	ExposureStartDate	ExposureEndDate	ExposureDesc
					Clamaint was exposed to and inhaled the asbestos dust on EOEP s
					(XXXXXXXXXXXX, SSN XXXXXXXXXXX) clothing and personal
					belonging when she shook out his clothes, when she did his laundry
	True	Spouse	1/1/1960	12/31/1962	and when they hugged.
					Clamaint was exposed to and inhaled the asbestos dust on EOEP s
					(XXXXXXXXXXXX, SSN XXXXXXXXXXX) clothing and personal
					belonging when she shook out his clothes, when she did his laundry
	True	Spouse	1/1/1966	12/31/1968	and when they hugged.
					Claimant was married to the EOEP. She was exposed to and inhaled
					the visible asbestos dust on the EOEP s clothes and personal
					belongings when she shook out his clothes, when she did his laundry
	True	Spouse	1/1/1972	12/31/1975	and when they hugged.

TAB 3

Case 22-00303 Doc 73-3 Filed 03/23/23 Entered 03/23/23 20:02:39 Desc Tab 3 Page 2 of 4

From: Hirst, Morgan R. <mhirst@JonesDay.com>
Sent: Monday, December 19, 2022 5:48 PM

To: moskowschnollb@ballardspahr.com; 'Burns, Tyler'; Guerke, Kevin A.;

dkhogan@dkhogan.com; bsullivan@sha-llc.com; Harron, Edwin; Ramsey, Natalie D.; Wright, Davis L.; Kevin C. Maclay; Todd Phillips; Glenn C. Thompson; Robert A. Cox, Jr.;

Guy, Jonathan P.; Felder, Debra L.

Cc: Erens, Brad B.; Cahow, Caitlin K.; Michael Evert (CMEvert@ewhlaw.com); Clare M.

Maisano; C. Richard Rayburn, Jr.; Jack Miller

Subject: In re Aldrich Pump LLC et al (Case No. 20-30608) **Attachments:** Aldrich Murray Proposed Sampling Strata.pdf

Counsel:

In response to Judge Whitley's November 30 sampling ruling in regard to the Debtors' subpoena served on DCPF, we wanted to begin a dialogue with you to see if we can agree to a sampling methodology. After discussing the issue with Bates White, we suggest that we confer on the structure of the sample first so that we can better ascertain where we differ, if at all.

As we understand Judge Whitley's ruling, the goal is to draw a representative random sample of ten percent of the Aldrich Pump and Murray Boiler ("<u>Aldrich Murray</u>") mesothelioma claims resolved through settlement or verdict between January 1, 2005 and Aldrich Murray's bankruptcy petition date of June 18, 2020 (the "<u>Aldrich Murray Random Sample</u>"). The purpose of the Aldrich Murray Random Sample is to govern the claims for which data is produced by DCPF in response to Aldrich's subpoena.

For the Aldrich Murray Random Sample to best aid in the estimation of Aldrich Murray's asbestos liability, reorganization plan formulation, and/or plan confirmation, the sampling methodology should be a straightforward application of stratified random sampling techniques. The stratification is important to ensure that events that could have a disproportionate impact on the analysis of the Debtors' settlement history, such as claims resolved through high-value settlement, are included in the sample in an efficient manner. Stratification increases the probability that low-frequency events are included, while properly weighting those events and keeping the total sample size similar to that ordered by Judge Whitley. This will allow the Aldrich Murray Random Sample to be a representative and efficient sample that can provide a reliable cross-section of Aldrich Murray's mesothelioma claims' settlement history.

In light of the above, the <u>first question</u> posed is whether you agree that the sample for this purpose should be a stratified random sample?

Assuming you are in agreement, the <u>second question</u> posed concerns the appropriate "categories" with which to stratify. We propose the following:

The data for the Aldrich Murray Random Sample are first restricted to the following population:

- Mesothelioma claims resolved through verdict or settlement (with a resolution amount greater than \$0)
- Resolved between January 1, 2005 and June 18, 2020

These data are then stratified using the following categories:

- Debtor
 - □ Aldrich
 - □ Murray
- Resolution type
 - □ Verdict

Case 22-00303 Doc 73-3 Filed 03/23/23 Entered 03/23/23 20:02:39 Desc Tab 3 Page 3 of 4

- □ Settlement
- Resolution period
 - □ Prior to 2014
 - □ 2014 and later
- Group deal status
 - ☐ Group Deal (whether on or off-complaint)
 - □ Individual Resolution
- Resolution amount category:
 - \Box > \$0, < \$10,000
 - $\square \geq \$10,000, < \$50,000$
 - $\square \geq $50,000, < $100,000$
 - $\square \geq \$100,000, < \$150,000$
 - $\square \geq \$150,000, < \$200,000$
 - $\square \geq $200,000, < $250,000$
 - $\square \geq $250,000, < $500,00$
 - $\square \geq $500,000$

Finally, to simplify the trusts' matching procedures to their internal databases, the DCPF sample would be limited to only include claimants who have a full SSN available.

For your further information, attached please find a spreadsheet outlining the approximate (based on current data) population of claims included in each of the suggested stratifications for the roughly 12,000 claimants about which information was requested from DCPF. Of course, because some claimants made claims against both Debtors, the total number of claims is greater than 12,000.

Please let us know at your earliest convenience if the above sample structure is acceptable to you. If so, we can then move to the next step of attempting to reach agreement on the selection of the sample within this construct.

Morgan R. Hirst Partner


JONES DAY® - One Firm WorldwidesM

110 North Wacker Drive Suite 4800 Chicago, Illinois 60606 Office +1.312.269.1535 Mobile +1.773.490.2039 mhirst@jonesday.com

¹ The original matching key sent to DCPF was already limited to a subset of claimants. While there are about 28,000 claimants with resolved mesothelioma claims in the Debtors' data, the original matching key was restricted to approximately 12,000 claimants—or about 40% of resolved mesothelioma claimants—by limiting to mesothelioma claims resolved through settlement or verdict, since 2005, and with a full SSN available. Therefore, a limitation to 10% of the 12,000 claimants originally sent to DCPF would actually correspond to a sample of only 4% of overall mesothelioma claimants.

^{***}This e-mail (including any attachments) may contain information that is private, confidential, or protected by attorney-client or other privilege. If you received this e-mail in error, please delete it from your system without copying it and notify sender by reply e-mail, so that our records can be corrected.***

The original matching key sent to DCPF was already limited to a subset of claimants. While there are about 28,000 claimants with resolved mesothelioma claims in the Debtors' data, the original matching key was restricted to approximately 12,000



claimants—or about 40% of resolved mesothelioma claimants—by limiting to mesothelioma claims resolved through settlement or verdict, since 2005, and with a full SSN available. Therefore, a limitation to 10% of the 12,000 claimants originally sent to DCPF would actually correspond to a sample of only 4% of overall mesothelioma claimants.

TAB 4

	Page 2 of 9	98		1
				1
1			NKRUPTCY COURT F NORTH CAROLINA	
2	CHARLO	TTE I	DIVISION	
3	IN RE:	:	Case No. 20-30080-JCW	
4	DBMP LLC,	:	Chapter 11	
5	Debtor,	:	Charlotte, North Carolina Thursday, February 9, 2023	
6		:	9:30 a.m.	
7		: : :	: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	:
8	OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMANTS, and SANDER L.	:	AP 22-3045 (JCW)	
9	ESSERMAN, etc.,	•		
10	Plaintiffs,	:		
11	v.	:		
12	CERTAINTEED LLC (f/k/a CERTAINTEED CORPORATION)	:		
13	(a/k/a "OLD CERTAINTEED"),	:		
14	Defendant,	:		
15		: : :		:
16	DBMP LLC,	:	AP 20-3004 (JCW)	
17	Plaintiff,	:		
18	v.	:		
19	THOSE PARTIES LISTED ON APPENDIX A TO COMPLAINT and	:		
20	JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-1000,	:		
21	Defendants,	:		
22		: : :		:
23				
24				
25				

	Page 3 of 9	8
		2
1	THE ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, INC. ASBESTOS	: Case No. 22-00302 (JCW)
2	PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENT TRUST, et al.,	: (Transferred from the District of Delaware)
3		:
4	Plaintiffs,	:
5	v.	
3	DBMP LLC,	•
6	Defendant.	:
7		:
8		
9		OF PROCEEDINGS
10		ABLE J. CRAIG WHITLEY, B BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
11	APPEARANCES:	
12	For Debtor/Defendant, DBMP LLC:	Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A. BY: GARLAND CASSADA, ESQ.
13		M. BENNETT WRIGHT, ESQ.
14		101 N. Tryon Street, Suite 1900 Charlotte, NC 28246
15		Jones Day
16		BY: GREGORY M. GORDON, ESQ. 2727 North Harwood St., Suite 500 Dallas, Texas 75201
17		
18	Audi o Onemakan	COLIDE DED COMME
19	Audio Operator:	COURT PERSONNEL
20	Transcript prepared by:	JANICE RUSSELL TRANSCRIPTS 1418 Red Fox Circle
21		Severance, CO 80550 (757) 422-9089
22		trussell31@tdsmail.com
23		
24	Proceedings recorded by electroproduced by transcription ser	ronic sound recording; transcript
25	produced by cranscription ser	v 106.

	Page 4 of 9	
		3
1	APPEARANCES (continued):	
2	For Debtor/Defendant, DBMP LLC:	Jones Day BY: JEFFREY B. ELLMAN, ESQ.
3	DBMF HIC.	1221 Peachtree Street, N.E., #400 Atlanta, GA 30361
4		Jones Day
5		BY: JAMES M. JONES, ESQ. 250 Vesey Street
6		New York, NY 10281
7	For Plaintiff, ACC:	Robinson & Cole LLP BY: DAVIS LEE WRIGHT, ESQ.
8		1201 N. Market Street, Suite 1406 Wilmington, DE 19801
9		Winston & Strawn LLP
10		BY: DAVID NEIER, ESQ. CRISTINA CALVAR, ESQ.
11		200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166-4193
12		Caplin & Drysdale
13		BY: JAMES P. WEHNER, ESQ. One Thomas Circle, N.W.,
14		Washington, DC 20005
15		Hamilton Stephens BY: ROBERT A. COX, JR., ESQ.
16		525 North Tryon St., Suite 1400 Charlotte, NC 28202
17		NATHANIEL ROSE, ESQ.
18	For Plaintiff, Future	Young Conaway
19	Claimants' Representative, Sander L. Esserman:	BY: SEAN GREECHER, ESQ. SHARON ZIEG, ESQ.
20		1000 North King Street Wilmington, DE 19801
21		Alexander Ricks PLLC
22		BY: FELTON E. PARRISH, ESQ. 1420 E. 7th Street, Suite 100
23		Charlotte, NC 28204
24		
25		

	Page 5 of 9	
		4
1	APPEARANCES (continued):	
2	For Defendants, CertainTeed LLC, et al.:	Goodwin Procter LLP BY: HOWARD S. STEEL, ESQ.
3		STACY DASARO, ESQ. 620 Eighth Avenue
4		New York, NY 10018
5		Rayburn Cooper & Durham, P.A. BY: JOHN R. MILLER, JR., ESQ.
6		227 West Trade Street, Suite 1200 Charlotte, NC 28202
7	For Certain Matching	Waldrep Wall
8	Claimants:	BY: DIANA SANTOS JOHNSON, ESQ. 370 Knollwood Street, Suite 600
9		Winston-Salem, NC 27103
10	APPEARANCES (via telephone):	
11	For Certain Matching	Hogan McDaniel
12	Claimants:	BY: DANIEL K. HOGAN, ESQ. 1311 Delaware Avenue
13		Wilmington, DE 19806
14	For Plaintiff, ACC:	Winston & Strawn LLP BY: CARRIE HARDMAN, ESQ.
15		200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166-4193
16		
17		SANDER L. ESSERMAN Future Claimants' Representative
18		2323 Bryan Street, Suite 2200 Dallas, TX 75201-2689
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1 PROCEEDINGS (Call to Order of the Court) 2 THE COURT: Have a seat, everyone. Good morning. 3 (Counsel greet the Court) 4 THE COURT: I'll start with the obvious. If any of 5 y'all are wondering whether I'm applying for a, a role in a 6 Dustin Hoffman pandemic movie, I am not. My dermatologist is 7 working me over with some Etofex and, and I am not blanching 8 because of your arguments or any other reason, so. Sorry you 9 have to put up with that, but we're near the end. 10 11 All right. Any preliminaries before we call for appearances? Ready to go? 12 (No response) 13 THE COURT: All right. Who's announcing? You want to 14 15 start for the debtor and the debtor's counsel? MR. GORDON: Good morning. Greg Gordon, Jones Day, 16 here on behalf of the debtor. My partner, Jeff Ellman, is here 17 on behalf of the debtor and Jim Jones is here as well. 18 THE COURT: Okay, very good. 19 20 Mr. Steel. 21 MR. STEEL: Good morning, your Honor. Howard Steel, Goodwin Procter, on behalf of CertainTeed. I'm here with my 22 colleague, Stacy Dasaro from Goodwin, and Jack Miller from 23 Rayburn Cooper. 24 25 THE COURT: Okay, very good.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. CASSADA: Good morning, your Honor. Garland Cassada of Robinson Bradshaw here also for the debtor and I'm accompanied by Bennett Wright of our firm. THE COURT: All right, very good. ACC? MR. NEIER: Good morning, your Honor. David Neier on behalf of the ACC and with me today is Cristina Calvar --THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response). MR. NEIER: -- Jim Wehner, Davis Wright, Rob Cox, and Nathaniel --MR. ROSE: Rose. MR. NEIER: -- Rose. THE COURT: Okay. MR. GREECHER: Good morning, your Honor. Sean Greecher from Young Conaway on behalf of the FCR. Here with my partner, Sharon Zieq, also here with Felton Parrish. And Mr. Esserman, our client, is on the phone. THE COURT: Very good. Others in the courtroom announcing? Anyone else? Yes. Good morning, your Honor. MS. SANTOS-JOHNSON: Oh. Diana Santos-Johnson with Waldrep Wall. We are local counsel to Dan Hogan. He's going to be arguing No. 4, the motion to alter or amend, on behalf of the Matching Claimants by phone.

```
1
             THE COURT:
                         All right, very good.
 2
             Anyone else in the courtroom needing to announce?
             MR. NEIER: Your Honor, I should have added that
 3
    Ms. Hardman is on the phone as well.
 4
 5
             THE COURT: All right, very good.
 6
                    Telephonic appearances. Anyone who needs to
 7
    announce that has not or has not been announced for you?
             What is it, Star 6?
 8
             THE COURTROOM DEPUTY:
                                    Star 6.
 9
             THE COURT: Star 6 unmutes.
10
11
         (No response)
12
                         No one? Okay, very good.
             THE COURT:
             All right. Are there any preliminaries? Do we need
13
    to have the general status of, of the case before we start in
14
15
    on the matters on the agenda?
             MR. GORDON:
                          Good morning again, your Honor.
16
17
    Gordon, Jones Day, on behalf of the debtor. I do have a status
18
    report to make.
19
             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
             MR. GORDON: It involves a number of different
20
21
    components. So it'll take me a, a few minutes to go through
22
    this.
             I think we were last before your Honor, at least in
23
    terms of an omnibus hearing on January 5.
24
25
             THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
```

response).

MR. GORDON: So I'm not going to take these in any particular order.

The first thing is <u>LTL</u>. Your Honor's, I'm sure, aware of the fact that we did receive a ruling in that case a week ago Monday. A three-judge panel of the Third Circuit issued an opinion that reversed Judge Kaplan's decision denying the motion to dismiss and that ruling, of course, mooted his decisions on the preliminary injunction and the automatic stay. I just want to say a few things about this, nothing terribly long.

But the basic premise for the opinion is that, purportedly based on the different standard for dismissal in the Third Circuit, LTL in the eyes of the Panel was not sufficiently in financial distress to qualify for bankruptcy and the primary basis for that, what the Panel termed the most important basis for its finding with respect to financial distress, was the fact that the funding agreement in LTL, your Honor probably remembers this --

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).

MR. GORDON: -- included not only a funding commitment from the other company created in the divisional merger, the, the new JJCI, but also included a funding commitment from the ultimate parent company, Johnson & Johnson.

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 1 2 response). MR. GORDON: And in the Panel's view, that Johnson & 3 Johnson backstop was the equivalent, I think it said, of "a \$61 4 billion ATM machine." The Panel itself noted the irony of 5 concluding that a bankruptcy filing is commenced in bad faith 6 7 on the basis that an agreement to fund the case as well as the debtor's liability for asbestos claims provided overly generous 8 protection for the claimants. In effect, in, in the view of 9 LTL, I think the Panel concluded that too much good faith was 10 11 bad faith. Where we are is that, LTL believes, and I think DBMP 12 13 is of a similar view, that the decision's wrong. Among other things, we view it as inconsistent with Third Circuit 14 15 authority, Supreme Court authority --THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 16 17 response). MR. GORDON: -- and we believe it effectively ignores 18 the purposes and intent of Section 524(q), including the 19 objective to fairly and equitably treat future claimants. 20 There will be a petition for rehearing filed in the Third 21 Circuit, just so your Honor knows. That's due by Monday. 22 There's 14 days to file that. 23 Couple of other things I would note about this. We've 24

not had an opportunity to discuss the decision with the

Committee or the FCR, but it is our view that this opinion has no material impact on this case for at least two reasons. One, as your Honor knows, it was issued in a different Circuit whose standard for dismissal differs significantly from the standard in the Fourth Circuit and the facts of the case are, are different and in particular, as I just noted, the funding agreement includes J&J as a co-obligor to the extent of the value of the Old JJCI and, of course, that difference presented the question of whether there was a difference in the financial distress of Old JJCI versus LTL. We don't have a similar issue in this case because we just have the -- the -- the only funder under the funding agreement in our case is the funding from New CertainTeed. There's no co-obligation from the ultimate parent or any other company.

Having said that, from my perspective, the opinion may provide your Honor with some comfort, notwithstanding its result, in this case and the reason I say that is because the Panel did not express concerns about divisional mergers, generally. It didn't find that the restructuring of, of Old JJCI harmed the claimants. In fact, it found the opposite, that the restructuring put the claimants in a more favorable position than they had been in before. And of course, to reach that conclusion the, the Panel necessarily found or had to find that the funding agreement was enforceable and provided the benefits to the claimants that LTL said it would. And, and

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

11 obviously here, your Honor has from time to time raised concerns about the impact of the restructuring and the funding agreement on the claimants and, you know, this, this may, again, provide some comfort to the Court in that respect. So I'll move on to the next topic unless there's any questions your Honor has about the LTL decision. THE COURT: If others want to address that, I'll wait until they give their status --MR. GORDON: Sure. THE COURT: -- okay? All right. I'm sure there's a disagreement about what it means. The second, the second thing I want to MR. GORDON: report on is something that your Honor hasn't heard anything about for a while. That's Amiel Gross. THE COURT: Okay. MR. GORDON: So your Honor may recall last spring that we informed the Court and the Committee and the FCR promptly after learning about it that in April of 2021 a former attorney with Saint-Gobain Corporation -- and that was Amiel Gross -had filed a whistleblower complaint and that was filed with the Occupational Health and Safety Administration. And your Honor may recall that that complaint had alleged that, that the corporation, or that Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, Saint-Gobain Corporation, Mark Rayfield, the CEO of Saint-Gobain

Corporation, and Tom Kinisky, Saint-Gobain's former CEO, had

Page 13 of 98 retaliated against him for certain protected activity 1 concerning Saint-Gobain's defense of environmental litigation 2 and that was litigation, your Honor may remember, that was 3 unrelated to DBMP, unrelated to the corporate restructuring, 4 and unrelated to the bankruptcy case. You may recall that 5 Saint-Gobain and the other defendants denied the allegations. 6 7 They maintained that Mr. Gross was terminated --THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 8 response). 9 MR. GORDON: -- for violations of company policy. 10 11 your Honor, I'm sure, remembers that although the complaint was largely unrelated to, well, I should put it this way. Although 12 unrelated to Mr. Gross' allegations about the defense of 13 environmental claims, I'm sure you recall that his complaint 14 15 included statements about the pre-bankruptcy corporate 16 restructuring with respect to DBMP and also, the bankruptcy 17 filings, bankruptcy filing, and those statements, of course,

18 prompted a request by the Committee and the FCR to depose

Mr. Gross and a motion on their part to reopen the record in 19

the preliminary injunction adversary proceeding to include his 20

deposition testimony. And you may remember that we didn't 21

oppose that motion. The deposition was taken and the Court did 22

reopen the record to include that testimony and in fact, the 23

deposition was conducted in June of 2021. 24

25

Mr. Gross' testimony thereafter featured pretty

prominently in the Committee and FCR's August 2021 privilege challenge motion. I'm sure your Honor recalls that.

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).

MR. GORDON: In our response we pointed out that the testimony, in our view, had nothing to do with the intentional fraudulent conveyance theory with respect to which it was offered and we also pointed out that we felt that much of his testimony was comprised of speculation and surmise about the restructuring and bankruptcy in which Mr. Gross was not involved.

But the update is this with respect to Mr. Gross.

Early motion practice in his whistleblower proceeding resulted in the dismissal of all but one count of his complaint and that one remaining count concerned certain statements made by Saint-Gobain Corporation to the media. Dispositive motions on that remaining count were due to be filed in January of 2023. On December 5 of 2022 -- so last, just this past December -- Mr. Gross filed a letter requesting that his case be dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge granted that request and dismissed what was left to Mr. Gross' case on December 7, 2022. And I did bring with me today, if your Honor wants it or, and/or if the other parties want it, copies of the order by which that case has been dismissed. As the order reflects, the case was not settled. Mr. Gross dismissed his claims unilaterally. No

- Page 15 of 98 defendant made any payment to Mr. Gross, nor was any 1 consideration of any kind provided to Mr. Gross. All of, all 2 of the defendants in that action have maintained from the 3 beginning -- and your Honor heard this before --4 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 5 6 response). 7 MR. GORDON: -- and they continue to maintain today that his claims were false and they were groundless. 8 But I did want to provide that update because there 9 was a fair amount of --10 11 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 12 response). MR. GORDON: -- of attention paid to Mr. Gross about a 13 14 year ago. 15 THE COURT: Okay. MR. GORDON: All right. Next update I have, your 16 17 Honor, is on estimation. As I think I mentioned in the last
 - couple of hearings, we sent a proposed discovery sample to the Committee and the FCR on November the 2nd. We included with that a memorandum from Bates White explaining how this proposed sample was drawn. On December the 9th, we received from the Committee and the FCR a series of written questions about the sample and they were, the questions were submitted to us to assist the experts' review, the Committee's and the FCR's experts' review and consideration of the sample.

19

20

21

22

23

24

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Shortly after the last hearing -- and this occurred on January the 9th -- we sent to the Committee and the FCR answers to the questions that they provided that relate to the sample. We had an initial meet and confer on estimation issues on February the 1st. We now have a meet and confer session scheduled tomorrow afternoon specifically to discuss the sample. I think that both sides remain hopeful that we can reach agreement on a single sample in the case and as I've mentioned in the past, if the parties are unable to reach agreement on a sample, this issue would likely be presented to your Honor for --THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response). MR. GORDON: -- your assistance. THE COURT: Okay. MR. GORDON: At the February 1 estimation meet and confer the parties also discussed issues with respect to the claimant representatives' document requests and the debtor's response to those requests. I think, in fact, resolution of

MR. GORDON: At the February 1 estimation meet and confer the parties also discussed issues with respect to the claimant representatives' document requests and the debtor's response to those requests. I think, in fact, resolution of some of those issues will depend on the outcome of the negotiations or the discussions that are occurring with respect to the sample, but we did discuss other items unrelated to the sample and we -- we -- we have since that meet and confer session provided some additional information to the Committee and the FCR with respect to the discovery and I think both

sides are committed to continuing to work on the issues and, and committed to making every effort they can to reach a consensual resolution of outstanding discovery issues.

You may also recall that at the last hearing I, I mentioned that we were about to serve our first set of discovery requests on the Committee and the FCR with respect to estimation. We, in fact, did that shortly after the last hearing on February the, after that hearing, and then on February the 6th the Committee and the FCR served on us responses, their responses and objections to our discovery.

Next item I have, your Honor, is trust discovery.

Briefing has continued in the Manville Matching Claimants'
appeal from the Court's order denying their request to proceed
anonymously. Since the last hearing in this court the debtor
filed its responsive brief. That occurred on January 26th and
the Manville Matching Claimants' reply brief is actually due
today.

With respect to the DCPF Trusts, since the last
hearing the DCPF made the required production of information by
the due date in the order, which was January the 13th. As we
reported, the DCPF Matching Claimants also filed an appeal from
this Court's order denying their request to proceed
anonymously. No briefing has occurred yet in that appeal, but
there is now a briefing schedule and that schedule is this:
The Matching Claimants' opening brief is due on February 27th,

the debtor's responsive brief is due on March 29, and the claimants' reply brief is due on April the 12th.

I also reported at the last hearing that on December the 30th the DCPF Matching Claimants filed with the District Court a motion for stay pending appeal. The debtor filed its objection to that on January 13th and a reply was filed by the claimants on January the 20th. No decision has yet been rendered with respect to that motion for stay.

And then lastly, your Honor, on trust discovery, as your Honor knows based on pleadings you've received and reviewed and today's agenda, the DCPF Matching Claimants have also filed a motion to amend or modify the order denying their motion to quash and, of course, that will be heard later today. Mr. Cassada will handle that.

Next item I have is Paddock, the Paddock discovery. There has been progress with respect to the debtor's efforts to obtain discovery from Paddock and that's discovery of claims information and ballot information, as your Honor may recall. On January the 6th, the day after our last hearing here, we had a hearing before Judge Silverstein in Delaware to address ongoing objections of the Paddock Trust Parties about the confidentiality provisions applicable to the claims data as well as issues they raised about the discoverability of the ballot information. DBMP had agreed to accept the confidentiality provisions in your Honor's order in the Aldrich

case and Judge Silverstein ultimately after argument found 1 those provisions in that order to be sufficient for purposes of 2 protecting the confidentiality of the information and she 3 ordered Paddock to promptly produce the claims information that 4 was sought and, in fact, after the hearing Paddock did produce 5 the Paddock claims information. That occurred on January the 6 7 11th. What's been produced so far was information where there was an exact match. 8 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 9 10 response). 11 MR. GORDON: What's still being resolved is and the parties are meeting and conferring on data where there is a, 12 13 there is a match, but it's not a perfect match. And so there's some back and forth with respect to that issue. 14 15 On the ballots, at the end of the hearing Judge Silverstein ordered that the information should be produced, 16 but not for all the ballots. You may recall we had asked for 17 all ballots. 18 Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 19 THE COURT: 20 response). She ruled that we would be limited to 21 MR. GORDON: ballots for DBMP claimants only and she required us to use an 22 anonymization protocol, including a matching key and the like, 23 similar to what we were using with the claims data. 24

And so the current status of the ballot information is

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

process.

that we're in discussions with Paddock and the Trust Parties on the form of order reflecting Judge Silverstein's ruling and, of course, once we reach agreement on that we'll have the order entered and we should be in a position, then, to obtain that, the ballot information that Judge Silverstein permitted. Next item I have is PIO process. About 2100 proofs of claim were submitted. Of those, approximately 700 have been or likely will be withdrawn because those claimants determined they did not have pending mesothelioma claims. Of the remaining approximately 1400 claims, only 6 have not submitted a PIQ. We're continuing to review the submitted PIQs and are working with the plaintiff law firms to cure deficiencies and our objective remains to resolve all issues consensually if we can or at least narrow any remaining issues and then, of course, if we can't reach a full resolution of all issues as to PIQs, we'll come back to your Honor and ask for your assistance with respect to that. Next item I wanted to report on was where we stand with the discovery referee. THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response). The parties have been working on a form MR. GORDON:

of order to appoint the referee and to set up the referee

of the order and I think at this point, although we're not

The -- the -- both sides have been exchanging drafts

entirely clear, we've resolved all issues but one and we can discuss that a little bit later. Mr. Ellman will handle this to the extent we have an issue, but our hope is to be able to share an agreed form of order with Judge Bridges shortly after this hearing and then submit the order to the Court.

And we did want your Honor to know that we did notify the other two candidates, Judge Briggs and Judge Ervin, of our selection of Judge Bridges. So they're aware of where we are.

THE COURT: All right.

response).

MR. GORDON: And then one other update with respect to this. Your Honor may recall that I had indicated that shortly before the hearing on January 5 -- I think it was on January 3 -- the Committee and the FCR had sent us a letter. It was a detailed 13-page letter describing their concerns about our revised privilege log. You may recall that we revised the -- THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative

MR. GORDON: -- privilege log over the summer. And while we're waiting for the referee process to commence, we went ahead and prepared a detailed response letter that we sent to the Committee and the FCR on February the 6th. Per that letter, we indicated that there are certain categories of log entries for which we've agreed to conduct some follow-up work to address the concerns raised by the Committee and the FCR. And it goes without saying, I guess, but any issues that we

can't resolve with respect to the privilege log obviously will
be --

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. GORDON: -- addressed by Judge Bridges in his capacity as the discovery referee.

And then the last thing I have on my list is investment guidelines. Given the changes in the interest rate environment, the debtor has been looking for ways to invest idle cash in a safe and prudent manner that might achieve a better or higher return for the estate. And your Honor may recall that the Cash Management Order -- you probably don't 'cause this dates back to January of 2020 -- provides that "idle cash will be invested in an account through the Vanguard Group or other broker acceptable to the Bankruptcy Administrator. " And then it goes on to say "solely in instruments backed by the full faith and credit of the United States." We have, we had proposed to the Bankruptcy Administrator that we invest some of the idle cash in 12-month Treasury bills purchased through JPMorgan accounts and those offer higher rates of return than the current investments. shared that proposal with Ms. Abel on January 24, she agreed to it on February the 1st, and we informed the Committee and the FCR that we had reached that agreement on the next day, February 2nd. We believe that agreement complies in all

respects with the Cash Management Order, specifically the provision I just quoted to you.

At this point in time the, the investments have not been made yet, but we're in the process of setting those up with JPMorgan and that should occur shortly.

THE COURT: Okay, very good. That it?

MR. GORDON: Yep.

THE COURT: All right.

How about from the ACC or FCR? Mr. Wehner?

MR. WEHNER: Good morning, your Honor. Jim Wehner for the Committee.

Before Mr. Neier addresses anything else that is going on today, I wanted to talk briefly about the LTL decision.

Your Honor, the Committee is considering the implications of the Third Circuit's LTL decision. Unsurprisingly, we do not agree that it has no bearing on this case. We disagree with some of the sunnier findings that Mr. Gordon has extracted from that decision. Your Honor, in our view, the LTL decision is a repudiation of the bankruptcy strategy employed by the debtor. It calls out the emptiness of conjuring up a subsidiary into existence, loading it with liability, putting it in bankruptcy, and then with a promise to pay all of its liabilities through a so-called funding agreement. The decision insists that bankruptcy is a matter of substance, not just of form.

Despite the debtor's attempts to downplay the

decision, we think the Third Circuit's reasoning is very 1 2 instructive and while it is true that the LTL decision noted that Judge Kaplan in New Jersey made an observation that the 3 Fourth Circuit standard is different, we note that the Fourth 4 Circuit has not ever addressed the unique circumstances of the 5 6 Texas twostep. And the Fourth Circuit in Carolin observed that 7 it, for example, it's objective futility -- a futility inquiry is designed to ensure that a bankruptcy petition has "some 8 relation to the statutory objective of resuscitating a 9 financially troubled debtor. " That same court, as you know, 10 11 disregarded a debtor's terminal euphoria about the prospects of a successful reorganization. 12 13 So as I said, the Committee is still analyzing this decision, but we're, we're very actively doing so and to see 14 15 how it might help us resolve this case sooner than anyone might 16 have otherwise hoped. 17 Thank you. 18 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Neier? 19 MR. NEIER: Good morning, your Honor. David Neier on 20 behalf of the Committee. 21 Just with respect to Mr. Gross, since there were some 22 comments here which were made. The, the Committee's inquiry 23 with respect to Mr. Gross, as Mr. Gordon acknowledges, was 24

completely unrelated to his employment claim and he gave a

sworn deposition and there are, at least in part, documents and 1 2 other testimony that corroborated what Mr. Gross said in his sworn deposition and obviously, we're hoping that, to see more 3 of those documents and more of that testimony. Once the 4 privilege review begins with Judge Bridges, this will be 5 something that we will be raising with him. The fact that he 6 has, his employment claim was found to be without merit or 7 whatever, has nothing, has really no bearing on the unrelated 8 matter that he gave testimony about. 9 And with respect to the discovery referee protocol, 10 11 Mr. Ellman was handling that, really, just with Ms. Hardman. Ms. Hardman is now on the no-fly list having entered her eighth 12 month and with your Honor's permission, if we're going to seek 13 the Court's guidance on, really, what comes down to one 14 15 sentence, I would ask that she be allowed to do that by phone. She has given me her notes, but --16 17 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 18 response). MR. NEIER: -- she's been -- she's been -- she's been 19 interfacing with Mr. Ellman on this subject and Mr. Ellman has 20 said he has no objection. 21 22 THE COURT: Anyone opposed? 23 (No response) That would be fine. 24 THE COURT: Thank you, your Honor.

25

MR. NEIER:

Page 26 of 98 25 1 THE COURT: All right. 2 Mr. Ellman. Jeffrey Ellman from Jones Day on behalf 3 MR. ELLMAN: of the debtor. 4 I do think we have a form of order. I believe 5 Mr. Neier actually has a version that has the one sentence we 6 7 had drafted and a new sentence that I, I saw for the first time this morning, a competing sentence. So we have one sentence 8 we're down to. 9 But effectively, the order appoints Judge Bridges. 10 11 provides for him -- I don't, I don't need to go through all of it, but I'm happy to -- it does provide for him to, you know, 12 13 retain assistance and how that will happen and how the bills will get paid and it talks about the disputes he's going to 14 15 cover, the reports he's going to issue, and the timing for us to brief those with your Honor. So that's in there and I can 16 17 go through it. The one issue that's in dispute is while he is working 18 on his report -- and this is at Paragraph 12 of the order on 19 20 Page 6, at least on Page 6 of my version. I don't know if it's 21 the same in yours Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 22 THE COURT: 23

response).

MR. NEIER: Bottom of 6, top of 7.

MR. ELLMAN: Top of 7 as well.

1 THE COURT: Okay. MR. ELLMAN: So the issue is, is should Judge Bridges 2 have the ability to have ex parte communications with your 3 Honor. Our view was -- you know, earlier in the order it says 4 he's going to be an independent third party. Our view was he 5 really should just do his recommendation, do his work, write 6 7 his report, make his recommendations to your Honor independently, and then you'll review it. And we had written a 8 sentence which is, I'm not sure which color it's in. It's the 9 second version of the sentence in your order. It's in red. 10 11 That really just says he's not going to have ex parte communications with you about the topic of his report and 12 13 recommendation. I know you have some discussions, but those were just --14 15 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response). 16 17 MR. ELLMAN: -- you know, general discussions --18 THE COURT: Welcome to the case --MR. ELLMAN: -- and the like. 19 THE COURT: -- discussions. 20 21 MR. ELLMAN: And he hasn't, obviously, started. So he couldn't have, you know --22 THE COURT: 23 Right. MR. ELLMAN: -- discussed with you his report and 24 recommendation. If he needs quidance from the Court, he can do 25

that, you know, with the parties available to see it. 1 2 We had the impression -- we were, I quess, incorrect -- that we'd all agreed on that last time we were 3 either here or on Teams, wherever we were. That's how the 4 Court preferred to proceed, your Honor preferred to proceed, 5 but we thought it made the most sense to do it that way. As 6 7 you see, there's a second sentence Ms. Hardman can describe to you where, where they have taken a kind of opposite approach, I 8 think the idea being -- well, she'll describe it -- but the 9 idea being that could be helpful to Judge Bridges to be able to 10 11 talk to you. So whatever the Court prefers is, obviously, what 12 13 we'll do. Our view was it made more sense to us to have a real independent person just do the work and then report to you and 14 15 any communication could be done on the record, so to speak, or, as you pointed out in your e-mail recently to Judge Bridges, 16 17 copying all the parties. And that's our preferred approach. 18 So that's really where we are on this. And again, I'm happy to walk through the process in the order, any of the 19 terms of it. Obviously, you haven't had a chance to read it. 20 So --21 Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 22 THE COURT: 23 response). MR. ELLMAN: -- you might want to do that. 24

And as Mr. Gordon indicated, we were working on this

- 28 until last night. So we haven't had a chance yet to share it 1 2 with Judge Bridges. I think as a courtesy it'd be nice to send it to him to make sure he doesn't have any concerns or 3 comments. We haven't done that yet. 4 So I think we would like to resolve this, at least 5 this one-sentence issue, with you today, your Honor, and then 6 7 have an opportunity to share this with Judge Bridges and see if he has any feedback, take that into account, and then submit 8 the order. 9 10 THE COURT: Ms. Hardman? 11 MR. ELLMAN: Thank you. Ms. Hardman, do you care to weigh in on 12 THE COURT: this? 13 14 MR. NEIER: Maybe --15 MS. HARDMAN: I do, your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Before you start --16 17 MS. HARDMAN: Thank --18 THE COURT: -- congratulations. I know this is a very exciting time for you, so, particularly the part of trying to 19 20 work and be expected at the same time. 21 MS. HARDMAN: It is. It is. Thank you, your Honor. 22 I do appreciate that and I appreciate you permitting me to
 - I do appreciate that and I appreciate you permitting me to speak telephonically today, especially on substance, albeit limited substance.
- THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HARDMAN: As Mr. Neier noted, I am on the no-fly 1 There's something about liability for delivering 2 children midair, I suppose. 3 So we are --4 THE COURT: My brother is a flight attendant with 5 American and he's very appreciative, so. 6 7 MR. NEIER: And, and there might be an extra charge for the new passenger. 8 THE COURT: Certainly. 9 10 MS. HARDMAN: Perhaps, perhaps. 11 THE COURT: Go ahead. MS. HARDMAN: That's -- well, until I need a second 12 13 seat I will, I will telephonically appear, your Honor. We are, as Mr. Ellman noted, down to one issue of 14 15 dispute. I understand that you should have the draft in front 16 of you at this point --17 THE COURT: I do. 18 MS. HARDMAN: -- and we are down to Paragraph 12. 19 Great. The blue language is the plaintiffs' language and as 20 Mr. Ellman noted, the red is the debtor/defendant's language. 21 At the last hearing before your Honor on January 25th where we 22 had a status conference to discuss the selection of Judge 23 Bridges, the debtor had indicated that they were fine with 24 whatever process your Honor and Judge Bridges were happy with 25

as far as communications go and yet in the last few, few weeks or days, I suppose, it seems that this position has changed ever so slightly from their, from their perspective.

It seems that, perhaps, there's, they're convinced there's an issue here, but we just, we just don't see it.

Rather, we consider that you and Judge Bridges are, are an, an arm or an extension of one another such that Judge Bridges is this adjunct of the judicial function that you serve, your Honor.

10 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 11 response).

MS. HARDMAN: He's an extension of the Court in this respect which, to us, is a different position than some third party. And efficiencies, at the very least, support continued communication between your Honor and Judge Bridges as you've had at this point years of institutional knowledge on the case and the nuanced issues that permeate the privilege assertions and the corporate restructuring. To us, it seems otherwise inefficient to have Judge Bridges start completely anew when you can short circuit some of that background in decisions you've issued, procedure, and the like. We'll, of course, provide the parties' positions to Judge Bridges on various issues, but if you are able to help Judge Bridges get caught up to speed, all the better from our perspective.

Even more than that from this quasi-judicial function

that Judge Bridges will serve, we don't see it, again, as the same third party kind of communication. Those reports and recommendations coming from Judge Bridges will be going to you for consideration, in any event.

We took a look at this as well just to see what happens in other contexts and I know that there is a forbidden term in the bankruptcy world --

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).

MS. HARDMAN: -- and I will do my best not to reference that term, but it is an analogous circumstance in the District Court that exists under the special master role.

So we looked at that to see whether or not there were circumstances where this was provided for or not and it seems that it's entirely in your discretion, your Honor, but there is also ample case law to support a wide-ranging latitude for a special master to communicate with the District Court, lots and lots of case law that support ample communications between them, because it's a special relationship and, in fact, a couple of courts were cited saying that there's a lack of case law on the prohibition of those communications.

So it seems to us, given that analogous circumstance and efficiencies that are needed here, especially given this has been many years in the making, that continued lines of open communication between the referee and this Court would be

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

appropriate here. Of course, what our language shows you there is that it's entirely in your discretion, your Honor.

Alternatively, if, if you rather, we can propose to remove both sentences and, perhaps, (indiscernible) discussed and let you work at your discretion, but given the debtor and defendants wanted to have an express prohibition, we just thought we'd put in some discretionary language for you to consider.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Here, here's the way I view it and I'm not even sure that Judge Bridges and I at this point understand this the same way at the moment. But I believe, in general -- and this is a close call. We want to be efficient and we don't want to elevate things that are simple factual inquiries into legal disputes in the courtroom, but at the same time I also don't want to reduce Judge Bridges' role. And I'm not even sure I'm entitled to call him Judge Bridges in this context, folks. canons of judicial ethics say that a former judge is not to be referred to as a judge, but for present purposes Bridges is, is, essentially, acting as a mediator by name, if not. I don't want to turn him into a law clerk and that wouldn't be appropriate and it really kind of reduces the purposes of us doing what we're doing here. Since I'm asking and relying on his expertise in, in the privilege area, asking him to review this and give me a report and recommendation, I don't want to

put my fingerprints all over that recommendation. If I want to know what I think, I can do that now.

So, so the bottom line is that -- and for the same reason, I've held off on giving him my canvassing list of Fourth Circuit privilege authorities. That might be useful, but I wanted to talk to y'all one more time about that before we did because you may not agree that those are the appropriate cases and you might start reading too much into them. I, I think most of what I have on my list came from you or from hornbooks. So the characterizations aren't even all mine.

But the bottom line is that I think we ought to stay away from me communicating directly about this case with Judge Bridges. Now he and I are friends so we would have communications normally about this. We're friends in the sense that we don't socialize, but at the same time I, I used to see him on a monthly basis in our Shelby Division.

So I would rather not have direct communications and instead say that he ought to e-mail you folks if he's asking for, "Well, what is this all about." I don't want you to have to brief everything to him, but if you can refer him to places in the record or the appropriate pleadings or orders, or whatever, it would probably be better for transparency that all of you see what questions he asks and then if there's something that he still needs to ask something, invite him to participate telephonically to save money, or, if he needs to be here in

person on one of our days where he can come in to court and ask those questions and y'all can all weigh in on, on what the answers should be. I'd rather stay out of this.

The local lawyers will tell you my preference is not to do business by e-mail. It doesn't show up in our case docket and others can't see where it is. So I don't like doing things outside of court that don't reflect and certainly in this circumstance, it's almost like his recommendation is like a magistrate recommendation coming to district judges and most of the district courts I know keep a hands-off approach there.

So with that said, the one thing I did want to mention to you, two things I want to mention to you about Judge Bridges. One, you do need to run your proposed order by him. He has some restrictions based on being a retired state court judge that -- that -- how things are worded and what he's doing. So we want to make sure those are taken care of. Last thing we want to do him is get him in trouble with the Administrative Office in, in Raleigh, so.

The other is that since he's not going to be calling me to ask about "what, what's this all about," we need to give him some sort of access to CM-ECF. We can get him the training down here and get him a login. Unfortunately, because he is acting as a mediator the Government wants to charge for those views. Y'all can spare him some of that, but, by providing the documents yourselves, if you already have them. But I think

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT:

what we're going to have to do is set it up where he has his own account or his attorney has an account so that that can be done. And Tara Salmons in our clerk's office, I've already told him, can help him with establishing that, so. I'd rather keep my fingers out of this, okay? So -and we'll have the conversations in the courtroom that we need to have, all right? MR. ELLMAN: Thank you, your Honor. Jeffrey Ellman again. I was just going to point out, we did receive the correspondence you forwarded to us and you'll see in Paragraph 2 the last sentence there is -- we haven't shared this with Judge Bridges yet -- but that is directly from his e-mail the language that he said he wanted, as we understood it --THE COURT: Okay. MR. ELLMAN: -- to address a concern he had. So he, if he has other concerns, he'll tell us. But I wanted to let you know we did --THE COURT: Okay. MR. ELLMAN: -- address that. And, of course, any costs he would have on accessing documents, the order would provide that we will reimburse him. So there's no issue with that. Obviously, we'll help him as much as we can.

The other part about it is all concerned

may want to talk to him a little further about his manpower 1 needs in this. He's not familiar with the case and he doesn't 2 know what's coming down the, the track and lest he gets 3 steamrolled by a freight train, I -- I -- he may want a law 4 firm involved. He's been talking to me about a single person 5 helping him. That's his business, but y'all might be able to 6 7 give him a little more of the length and breadth of this to --MR. ELLMAN: Yeah. We agree, your Honor. 8 THE COURT: -- and tell him what 9 MR. ELLMAN: And, and the order, again, provides he 10 11 can hire a firm if he would like to, subject to --THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 12 13 response). MR. ELLMAN: -- you know, disclosures and 14 15 disinterestedness. We would make sure there's no conflict. But obviously, it is up to Judge Bridges how he wants to do 16 17 this. So we haven't talked to him about that. I think we will 18 be doing that shortly. THE COURT: One of the things you'll appreciate much 19 about him is being a Superior Court judge he's used to doing 20 things by himself without law clerk assistance, but he may 21 benefit from, from some legal assistance in this. 22 So not telling you to do it. I'm just, I would 23 appreciate you having an in-depth discussion with him about 24

that before we, we finish up.

1 MR. ELLMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Other --

3 MS. HARDMAN: Your Honor?

4 THE COURT: Yes, Ms. Hardman.

MS. HARDMAN: I appreciate it. Sorry to interrupt. I just wanted to address a couple of comments you made.

We are happy to take that information and, and your reactions under, under our guidance and, and Mr. Ellman and I will try to finalize that order. I think sending Judge Bridges a version of the order that we all agree on is probably the best move so that he can then further have, review and comment on something that at least is agreed in concept at that point.

You raise a good point about access to documents and there are certainly ways that we bankruptcy lawyers have to, to access those and a claims agent has been retained in this case to make those documents free for the review. So hopefully, at least those will be easily accessible by Judge Bridges on a goforward basis.

And the other item I wanted to add, your Honor, with respect to the status update that Mr. Gordon provided he noted that there was a privilege log response letter sent to us on the 6th.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. HARDMAN: Even three days ago, we are clearly still reviewing and we will revert. Of course, from our

```
perspective, we just want an expeditious resolution of those
 1
    issues. And so if there will be changes made to the log or a
 2
    re-review occurring, we just, we will be focused on making sure
 3
    that that's done as quickly as possible so that Judge Bridges
 4
    has an opportunity to meaningfully consider all of these issues
 5
 6
    at once.
 7
             THE COURT: All right. Anything else?
         (No response)
 8
             THE COURT: All right.
 9
10
             Mr. --
11
             MR. ELLMAN: Just, just one --
             THE COURT: Mr. Ellman.
12
             MR. ELLMAN: -- thing, your Honor.
13
             From what Ms. Hardman said as far as finalizing the
14
15
    order, my understanding is we'll just use the language in
16
    Paragraph 12 in red that was proposed by the debtor and I, I
17
    think with that we'd be -- we understood what you wanted, your
18
    Honor -- I think with that we'd basically have an order we
    could share with Judge Bridges, you know, as soon as today.
19
             THE COURT: Well --
20
21
             MS. HARDMAN: Your --
22
             THE COURT: -- let me -- let me -- before --
23
             MS. HARDMAN: Your Honor?
             THE COURT: Before you respond, Ms. Hardman, let me
24
25
    say this one thing.
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I don't prefer that we transact case business by email, but if we're getting down to things that aren't legal decisions, points of contention, if it's just a, "Hey, the lawyers and I think that we should do this, " and y'all are all involved in the e-mail, an e-mail will be okay. I just don't want to do any substantive business with regard to that. y'all are just talking something over with Judge Bridges, I don't know that we need to bring that into court if you're wanting to just say, "Would the Court mind if we do things this The parties have already discussed it with him and" --MR. NEIER: Your Honor, maybe I can make a suggestion that we just leave both sentences out. MR. ELLMAN: Well, I -- I -- I think Judge Bridges and I think probably more than one of our candidates have expressed a desire to have some clear guidance. THE COURT: Yeah. MR. ELLMAN: And I think it's good to have the guidance in there and all the sentence says is there'll be no ex parte communications. It doesn't talk about how, whether it's by e-mail or on the docket. There'll be no ex parte communications about the report and recommendation. I think that's the, that's pretty straightforward and if the, if the communication's by e-mail, we just get copied. If they're, obviously, on the docket, then everyone sees them.

So I would suggest we --

THE COURT: Well --1 2 MR. ELLMAN: -- just use that language. It's pretty 3 simple. THE COURT: I'm just going to make the call on this 4 one and save you some time. I, I think the words in red should 5 be used and not the words in blue. 6 7 MR. ELLMAN: Okay. That is part my preference and my 8 THE COURT: practice. There are some judges around the country who have a 9 little more hands-on with the attorneys than I do, but I want 10 11 to make sure, again, transparency is achieved and that I'm not 12 having any conversations about case matters that, that y'all 13 are not in a position to see, so. MR. ELLMAN: Thank you, your Honor. 14 15 THE COURT: All right? Okay. Any other status, good-of-the-order type 16 17 announcements, the like? 18 (No response) THE COURT: All right. I just want to make sure I 19 didn't have -- all right. 20 So to surmise or to summarize, I should not count on 21 receiving Christmas cards from Judge Ervin nor from Judge 22 Grimm, certainly not from Judge Kaplan and Judge Silverstein. 23 Well, it's going to be a dull year. 24

Ready to move on to the calendar? Is there a

- preferred batting order today? Are we going to take these 1 matters in the order which they appear on the agenda or are we 2 going to do something else? 3 MR. GORDON: Greq Gordon, your Honor, on behalf of the 4 debtor. 5 And I should say one thing. Again, I do have the 6 7 order on Amiel Gross if anybody wants it. I don't know if your Honor wants it. 8 THE COURT: I don't need it. 9 10 MR. GORDON: Okay. 11 So just let me know if you want it. With respect to the first three items on the agenda, 12 all of which relate to the, in one way or another, to the 13 receivership complaint and the receiver motion, the defendants 14 15 in that action made a proposal yesterday to resolve all those That proposal is currently under review by the 16 17 Committee and the FCR. We're hopeful that that proposal will 18 resolve all those matters and we would ask -- and I believe this is joined in by both the Committee and the FCR -- that we 19 push this off to the next hearing and, in the hope that this, 20 these matters will be fully resolved. 21 THE COURT: All right.
- 22
- Others? Mr. Neier? 23
- MR. NEIER: Your Honor, we, we join in Mr. Gordon's 24 request. Obviously, it's his, mostly his motions and our 25

responses, but we join in the request. We're, we're optimistic 1 2 that we can resolve this particular dispute, that is, the, if I can use the broad term, the receivership dispute. 3 THE COURT: Okay. 4 Is anyone opposed to doing that? 5 What's our March date, the --6 7 MR. ELLMAN: I believe it's the 16th. MR. NEIER: March 16th, your Honor. 8 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: March 16th. 9 10 THE COURT: -- 16th? Okay. 11 We'll continue 1 through 3 to March 16th, 9:30. 12 MR. NEIER: Thank you, your Honor. I, I appreciate the efforts to try to 13 THE COURT: bridge the gap on that. I was going to ask whether we needed 14 15 to have those fights today since the complaint has at least been filed, so. 16 17 That leaves us with No. 4, then, the motion to alter 18 or amend? 19 MR. GORDON: That's correct, your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Any other matters before we get to that? 21 (No response) 22 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Ready to take that 23 matter up. Who will be arguing on behalf of the movant? 24 MR. HOGAN: Your Honor, good morning. This is Daniel 25

43 Hogan of Hogan McDaniel on behalf of the Certain Matching 1 2 Claimants and Additional Matching Claimants. 3 Can you hear me, your Honor? THE COURT: I can. 4 Everyone else? 5 6 MR. HOGAN: Thank you. 7 THE COURT: All good? You're coming through loud and clear. 8 Thank you, sir. And let me start by 9 MR. HOGAN: thanking the Court for your accommodation and allowing me to 10 11 appear telephonically. As I had indicated to your clerk, I had recently been, tested positive for COVID and did not want to 12 13 subject the Court or any of the other litigants to potential exposure. 14 15 THE COURT: Well, we all appreciate that and I think we'll be able to do all right with, with what we have before 16 17 us. 18 So please proceed. Thank you, your Honor. 19 MR. HOGAN: 20 This is our motion to alter or amend the order denying the Non-Party Certain Matching Claimants' motion and joinder to 21 22 quash or modify the subpoenas. As the Court's aware, you ordered, you, you entered that order back in November of 2022. 23 The Court is also painfully aware, I'm sure, of the hearing 24

that was held in Aldrich Pump which is, largely, the predicate

for this motion.

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).

MR. HOGAN: The Matching Claimants believe that it is appropriate in these circumstances, considering those findings and rulings that you issued in <u>Aldrich Pump</u> on November 30th where nearly identical arguments were raised, for the Court to reconsider its order regarding the motion to quash as it relates to the Matching Claimants.

In, in ruling in <u>Aldrich</u>, your Honor, you'll recall that you expressed concern regarding the confidential and sensitive nature of the information that was sought in the subpoenas. The Court indicated that it was sensitive to the disclosures of non-party information and that it wanted to reduce harm as much as possible. The Court also noted the economic and privacy concerns implicated by the expansive nature of the request in <u>Aldrich Pump</u>.

Aldrich Pump conflict with and run contrary to the order that you entered in this case, primarily because of the same privacy and economic considerations that we have in this case. At that hearing, your Honor, you indicated that your position on the issue of random sampling of data had changed after hearing arguments of counsel in Aldrich Pump. I'm not going to quote you back what you said at that, in that transcript, your Honor,

but if you look at Page 76, 13 to 21, you'll see that you had indicated that, that the arguments had gotten through to you on sampling and the need for sampling. Accordingly, it's our position that the Court misunderstood the implications of compliance with the DBMP orders and we believe it's, it's critical where the Court misapprehends the parties' position

It's a pretty discrete argument, your Honor, but let me, if I could, address some of the arguments that had been made in anticipation of what you're going to hear from DBMP.

THE COURT: Okay.

that reconsideration is appropriate.

MR. HOGAN: They indicated initially that the Matching Claimants never made the arguments that we seek to pursue now in, in denying the motion to quash, okay? We believe that that argument blatantly ignores the realities of these proceedings. The Matching Claimants have joined in the motion to quash the DBMP subpoenas and specifically joined in the objections surrounding the issue of sampling that were made by the Trusts. The fact that the Trusts later withdrew those, their motion to quash doesn't change the fact that we had joined and made those arguments. Joinders are generally allowed, as the Court's well aware.

The Court should also reject the conclusory argument that DBMP made regarding the anonymity order, your Honor.

You'll recall that the argument that they made was that because

we hadn't identified ourselves and, that we had somehow ignored the Court's order that was entered. Your, your Honor, you

3 entered at Docket 30 the order denying the motion to quash.

And specifically in that order it provides that:

"The requirements of the movants to identify themselves shall be stayed until the 31st day following entry of this order to permit the movants, such movants, if desired, to seek a stay pending appeal."

We did that, your Honor, but the argument that DBMP makes is that we somehow flouted, flouted it because we didn't receive the stay within 31 days. That's their argument, but that's not what your order provides. It provides that we seek it. And so we did that. We filed it timely. That's before the District Court, together with our appeal on the anonymity order. And so we believe that that argument is baseless.

Turning to their next argument, your Honor, they argue that the motion to quash is rendered moot by the Trusts' compliance with the DBMP subpoena. We argue that you can provide, you can grant us meaningful relief by requiring that the produced documents be returned and that a sample would be constructed similar to what was allowed in Aldrich Pump.

DBMP also argues that the redaction of the PII, the, you know, the private information of these individual claimants, really makes our arguments baseless, but it's our

1 position that the redaction of the Matching Claimants' PII does

2 | not eliminate the risk, especially to the extent that a sample

3 | would. And so from our perspective and being consistent with

4 | what you did in Aldrich Pump, a sample is more appropriate.

5 The redaction does not eliminate the risk. A sample does, your

6 Honor.

The next argument that I would address is that, they make, is that we lack standing to challenge the order denying the motion to quash, but that argument is baseless. It, it indicates that we rest, you know, we relied solely on the burden that DCPF had, but, but that ignores the pleadings. We made arguments based on the burden imposed on the Matching Claimants independent of the burdens imposed on the Trusts associated with the disclosure of the PII. DBMP has consistently ignored that fact in that the claim submission information of the Matching Claimants it seeks from the Trusts. It's not, it's not DCPF's information. It's the Matching Claimants' information. And so from our perspective that's a, that's a baseless argument.

In, in closing, your Honor, we believe the circumstances are appropriate for the Court to, to retract its order and to enter an order consistent with Aldrich Pump and limit, limit the disclosure of the information to a 10 percent sample.

THE COURT: Okay.

```
MR. HOGAN: I reserve some time, if I could, your
 1
 2
    Honor, to respond to DBMP's argument.
             THE COURT: All right.
 3
             Who's going to be arguing? Mr. Cassada?
 4
             MR. CASSADA: Yes, your Honor. I've got, I've got
 5
 6
    this one.
 7
             MR. WRIGHT: Shall we put these slides?
             MR. CASSADA: Your Honor, we have, as has been
 8
    customary, we've prepared some slides for our presentation this
 9
10
    morning.
11
             Because there have been a lot of things said both in
    this case and in other cases about this trust discovery order
12
13
    and what it means and what happened in prior proceedings, I
    feel it's incumbent upon me to --
14
15
             THE COURT: One moment, Counsel.
             MR. BENNETT: I might need some help.
16
17
         (Pause)
18
             THE COURT: All right, Mr. Cassada.
                         Your, your Honor, Dan, Dan Hogan again.
19
             MR. HOGAN:
             If I could, could I ask Mr. Cassada to e-mail me a, a
20
    copy of this slide presentation so that I can see it as well?
21
             MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, I just e-mailed that to as
22
    many people as I have e-mails for of this group and including
23
    Mr. Hogan.
24
25
             MR. CASSADA: Yeah.
                                  I'll --
```

```
THE COURT: Okay. Take a moment.
 1
 2
             MR. CASSADA: Yeah.
 3
             THE COURT: Let's hold for a moment and get Mr. Hogan
    up to speed with the rest of us.
 4
 5
             Want to take a look at your e-mail and see if it's
 6
    there?
 7
             MR. HOGAN: I, I'm looking at it currently, your
    Honor. I do not yet have it, but I am refreshing my browser or
 8
    my, my Outlook consistently. I still don't have it. And so as
 9
    soon as I get it, I'll let you know.
10
11
             THE COURT: Why don't we take a five or ten-minute
    recess and, and let him get that and have a look at it before
12
13
    it starts and that'll give everyone a break for comfort and we
    won't have a further interruption.
14
15
             Let's pick up at about --
             MR. HOGAN:
                         Thank you.
16
17
             THE COURT: -- 20 minutes of the hour.
18
             MR. BENNETT: Thank you.
         (Recess from 10:31 a.m., until 10:45 a.m.)
19
20
                              AFTER RECESS
        (Call to Order of the Court)
21
22
             THE COURT: Have a seat.
23
             All right. I assume we've got all our tech resolved
    and we're ready to go?
24
25
             MR. CASSADA: I'm sorry. Does Mr. --
```

Mr. Hogan, do you have a copy of the presentation?

MR. HOGAN: Your Honor, I have it. Thank you.

3 THE COURT: Okay.

Please proceed.

MR. CASSADA: Okay. Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, as I was saying before, there have been, there's a lot of litigation in this court where we look back at what happened in the past or we examine orders and, and that's certainly been true for the, the trust discovery order that your Honor entered last February and I feel like it's important today for me to make sure that the parties understand what the trust order does because there've been a lot of representations about the risk imposed on, in this case, the Matching Claimants and others, by productions under the discovery order and, and what, what evidence your Honor heard and what you ruled on before and, and I believe the record is, is clear, your Honor, that virtually none of the concerns that Mr. Hogan mentioned are valid and a lot of things he says about, about the facts, I don't believe, are supported by the record.

He begins by asserting a fundamental proposition that this Court misunderstood the implications of its order -- it's -- his order and he relies on the <u>Aldrich</u> hearing for that.

Notice, he doesn't say what it is that he thinks the Court misunderstood. If you look at the order, the, the issue in question there was was the fact that part of the data requested

- 1 were exposure fields and there were some exposure fields, by,
- 2 | by no means all exposure fields, but a small percentage or
- 3 portion of the exposure fields might contain personal
- 4 | identifying information. That was, that proposition was put on
- 5 the table.
- 6 Now Mr. Hogan and, and the parties said in that case,
- 7 | well, you didn't, you never understood this before and, and
- 8 that's really what Mr. Hogan is, is saying today and he, and he
- 9 points to your language saying you didn't understand that. As
- 10 | we'll examine today, your Honor, you fully, fully understood
- 11 | that. That, that issue was thoroughly litigated before you
- 12 | both at the October 21, '21 hearing when you, after which you
- 13 | approved the trust discovery order, and then later when we were
- 14 drafting the order. In fact, your Honor actually gave
- 15 directions on language that was designed to address that very
- 16 | issue and that language is in, in your order, Paragraph 7,
- 17 | which acknowledges that some of the exposure fields might
- 18 | contain PII.
- 19 THE COURT: We're getting some feedback from some
- 20 | folks. If you don't have your receiver muted and you're not
- 21 | speaking, please do so.
- Go ahead, Mr. Cassada.
- MR. CASSADA: Yeah.
- 24 THE COURT: Sorry to interrupt.
- MR. CASSADA: You, you acknowledged in the order that

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

some of the exposure fields might contain PII and you required the PII to be removed. And you did that in two ways. you gave DCPF and the Trusts the option of, of scrubbing the exposure data and then you, and then you said that the anonymized mass production from which they would scrub exposure data would be sent to Bates White and then Bates White would review the production and Bates White shall, you required Bates White to scrub any PII. The result is when the anonymized matched production was complete and ready to be sent for the parties, it would contain no PII, period. And that's, in fact, what you ordered. That's, in fact, what happened in DBMP and your Honor may require [sic] it was actually -- today is, is, virtually, the one-year anniversary of when we hashed this It was the second Thursday in February when we issue out. brought to you the order that we were trying to enter and, and one of the major obstacles to the order was to resolve the PII and exposure field issue. So that happened. So going down the list -- and, and that was an argument that was made in connection with requesting the order

So going down the list -- and, and that was an argument that was made in connection with requesting the order from you to approve the subpoena. Now when we served the subpoena on the Trusts and the Trusts objected, they did not raise that issue and it would have been silly for them to raise that issue since, since you had already resolved it and it was, and it was expressed in the order.

Now Mr. Hogan says that, that you didn't understand

the issue when you heard argument in early October. Well, he never argued the issue. It was not before you so you couldn't have misunderstood an argument that was never made. He's --now -- he says, "Well, wait a minute. Wait a minute. I did arque it because I joined in the objections that the Trusts filed," but the Trusts never made the argument and he hasn't pointed to you, to anywhere where that argument was made in October when, when you considered his motion, a motion to

So your Honor, with that, I'm going to -- I'll -- I'm going to go through my slides here and hopefully, by the end of this there will be no misunderstanding by anyone, including the Matching Claimants, regarding, regarding what the order means, what its implications are, and what issues were, have been, have been resolved.

First, your Honor, as Mr. Gordon, as Mr. Gordon pointed out earlier, the data's been produced pursuant to your order. It's been produced. It, it has no PII. The PII has been scrubbed and that was by agreement between DBMP and DCPF. DCPF has taken the steps necessary to scrub the PII. We agreed to pay their cost in doing so. We've been billed and we've pay, we paid at least part of the bill and we just received the other part recently.

THE COURT: Okay.

guash.

MR. CASSADA: So as things stand today, the, the

data's been produced and there is no PII in it. And as I

mentioned, the, the PII and the exposure field issue was fully

resolved and it -- it's simply -- it's simply no longer an

4 issue.

So against that backdrop, your Honor, we believe there are many reasons to deny the relief requested. One is that the Matching Claimants persist in litigating in this court without identifying themselves and your Honor entered an order requiring them to do that, giving them 31 days to get a stay from the Court. They haven't done that and for that reason you should strike their pleadings and that should be the end of this.

Second, the, their arguments are moot for the reasons I just mentioned. The data's been produced. It contains no PII. There's no meaningful remedy to be provided now because the purposes, the concerns they raise about PII have all been satisfied. The burden's been borne. There's no risk to the claimants, if there ever was a risk, because the PII doesn't exist.

The, the claimants, they, they lack standing. Now Mr. Hogan's made clear that he's not here to argue that the order imposes a burden on DCPF. He's saying it, it imposes a burden on the claimants because their PII is going to be out there. There's no PII. Your Honor, we'll look at the record and, and we'll go down memory lane and, and recall that, in

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

55 fact, you did resolve this issue and it was litigated. was no misunderstanding. In fact, there was a, an excellent resolution to the problem that addressed the PII concerns and the burden. And finally, your Honor, I think, I think your trust discovery order and the, and the clearing up of any misunderstandings require us to look at the trust discovery order and, and make clear exactly, exactly what it means. Your Honor, this is a, a timetable that shows what's happened since a year ago this Thursday when we were, when we were in the court. I won't go over all of this in detail, but, but you do recall, I think, that, that you entered the order on February 17 and that order was the result of three hearings before the Court and a lot of evidence and, and as I indicated earlier, the result was that you, you approved the trust discovery. You didn't approve it as, as originally requested. There were a lot of changes to it. DBMP served, issued and served the subpoenas. The DCPF Trusts moved to quash. The Matching Claimants moved to

They joined in, in the Trusts' objections. As I indicated before, no objection raised the PII and exposure field issue.

On August 26, the DCPF Trusts withdrew their objection. This was two days after the Third Circuit ruled and reversed Judge Connolly's order quashing the, the Bestwall

1 subpoena. The Delaware Court transferred the subpoena

2 proceedings to this Court. In the meantime, I, I think it was

3 early October, you actually heard the motions to quash. No

4 | mention at that hearing of any PII and exposure fields that we

5 needed to be concerned about.

In the meantime, as indicated before, the DCPF scrubbed and produced, first, what we call the stub production.

These were the --

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).

MR. CASSADA: -- Matching Claimants who didn't oppose the subpoenas and then after your Honor entered the order the DCPF produced the remaining data, again scrubbed of any PII. The cost to DBMP is, roughly, \$86,000, your Honor. You can see those, those two figures are on the timeline.

DBMP did request not only information about the claims made and what exposures were indicated in those claims, but did request a litany of, of personal information. And this, this was requested in the Bestwall subpoena as well. There was a anonymization process there that was suggested to take place after the production where the personal information would be separated from the exposure information. That process is actually, has been undertaken in, in the Bestwall case.

Your Honor, when Judge Connolly quashed the subpoena

and he cited his reason for doing so, the request for all the personal information, in this case we changed our request and we skinnied it down to non-PII information and you, and you can see the, the exact information we've requested here and then we ended up with these fields of, of information. The -- and we were clear in our request that we were not requesting any personal identifying information.

In connection with the DCPF's objection, we took a deposition of Richard Winner. He's the Chief Operating Officer and, and he explained in his deposition that the exposure-related fields were, were text fields and that, that it was possible and potentially, that claimants would put their name in one of the text fields or even, I think he cited the example -- and you heard this in Aldrich -- where you had a claimant who was claiming secondary exposure through someone who was occupationally exposed. They might put the name and maybe even the Social Security number of the occupationally exposed person. And so the, the idea was even though you're not requesting it, it might, yeah, it might be in there.

Your Honor, we, we keep hearing from Mr. Hogan and others that we're seeking -- they have a word, "formulation," that they use -- highly sensitive, personal, confidential, identifying information. In fact, he says "a wealth," we're seeking "a wealth" of it, but, your Honor, I, I just showed you what we, what we sought. None of it is, is PII and in fact, I

think your Honor knows that when Judge Beyer considered the request for this same information from the co-defendants, including Paddock, when the committee in that case moved to

4 strike the subpoena, she looked at it and she said, "This is

5 not sensitive information. It's not privileged. This is the

6 kind of information you'd expect to see in a complaint." And

7 in fact, the, the persons who are subject to the subpoena are

8 persons who actually filed claims against DBMP.

So your Honor, we're not seeking settlement amounts. We're not seeking medical information, not seeking financial data. We're not seeking anything that could be reasonably described as personal, sensitive, personal, confidential information.

Now the only evidence on what the Trusts and DCPF consider to be sensitive, personal, and confidential is the testimony offered by Richard Winner -- and this was a declaration that was filed -- and he described in his declaration what the claimants' personal identify or highly sensitive, personal, and confidential information is. I won't read, but you can, you can read it and see that we're requesting none of that information.

Now sort of panning out as to what we were requesting, your Honor, I think, I believe you may recall that we explained to you back on November, October 21 when we were first here that there, that there is a database that DBMP has that

includes information and data for 318,000 claimants and at the very beginning of the case the ACC and FCR requested that we provide that information to their experts. And so DBMP extracted data for all of the claimants and sent it to the experts -- and this is common in an asbestos chapter 11 case -- and that information includes personal identifying information. It includes medical information. It includes information on settlements.

So it -- it includes -- it includes the whole thing and, and all of the experts for the parties in this case have that information subject to a protective order. There are, as indicated, there are, roughly, 9,389 claims in the database that were made by mesothelioma claimants for whom, that have been resolved either through verdict or settlement. They've been resolved and/or paid unless they were defense verdicts and, and the information that we sought for the Trusts focuses on, on those claimants. The DCPF Trusts themselves contain database, bases that have millions, millions of claims in them. So we're -- and, and these millions of claims, Mr. Winner testified that there are dozens and dozens of fields of information for each, for each claimant.

So you can see, your Honor, we're asking only for information for claimants relevant to us and these are claimants who sued us and who, for whom we paid money and we're seeking only a handful of, of relevant fields. I think the way

```
to, I think the way to look at our request is that we're going
 1
    to the Trusts and saying, "Look, these individuals sued us and
 2
    we paid them money. Did they assert a claim against you and,
 3
    if they did, what did they say about their exposures?" And
 4
    that's obviously a relevant request because those settlements
 5
 6
    are going to be a very important focus of this Court at the
 7
    estimation trial.
             Turning a little, turning to the order, I, I think I
 8
    should begin by saying that, that you entered an order and
 9
    it's, it's an excellent order, your Honor. It is, it is very
10
11
    protective of claimants. And you don't have to take my word
             You mentioned judges who may not include you on their
12
    for it.
    Christmas card list. You could get a Christmas card from Judge
13
    Silverstein.
14
15
             THE COURT:
                         I doubt that.
             MR. CASSADA: Well, on January 6th, Mr. Gordon --
16
17
             THE COURT: Let me hasten to say I -- I -- I know
18
    Judge Silverstein. So --
19
             MR. CASSADA: Okay.
20
             THE COURT: -And --
21
             MR. CASSADA: Well, maybe you'll hear.
22
             MS. ZIEG: Not sending Christmas cards.
             THE COURT: But I think we've pushed a little work her
23
    way of late.
24
```

MR. CASSADA: Well, your -- your --

25

She probably had enough, already. 1 THE COURT: 2 MR. CASSADA: Your trust discovery order made her job really -- because when, when we went up and we asked Judge 3 Silverstein, we had served the subpoenas asking for the same 4 dataset that we're requesting here, she approved the dataset 5 over the objection of -- of the -- a lot of the same type of 6 7 claimants here, same lawyers, and she said, basically, that, "It looks to me like this order that Judge Whitley entered in 8 Aldrich, which is the DBMP order, "is adequate and covers 9 this. So let me know if you have any objection to it. " And of 10 11 course, the Caplin firm appearing for some of the Paddock claimants came in just with a litany of objections and on 12 13 January 6 your, this order was sort of put on the table. THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 14 15 response). MR. CASSADA: And she patiently listened to the 16 17 complaints about whether the order provided adequate protection 18 and she, she rejected all of the requests for modification and she applied the order as it's, as it's currently entered. 19 So, so you did, at least in that, that aspect of what 20 we sent up to her, we, I think we made the job easier, easier 21 for her. 22 Your Honor, as, as far as the order itself goes, I 23 think there's, there are two sort of important data extracts 24 that -- that we have -- that we focus on and that the order 25

defines. And one is what we call the matching key and the other is the anonymized matched production. The matching key comes from the debtor's database.

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).

MR. CASSADA: And it's, it's put together, it's created by Bates White and essentially, it's a list of the, of the 9,000 or so resolved claims with their Social Security numbers and then with a number that's created. We call it a, a numerical pseudonym. So that, that comes from our database. It comes from us, okay?

The anonymized matched production is the production of matching data for those claimants that, that comes from the DCPF Trusts and, and when that is complete and sent to the parties you just have data that's not associated with any personal information. The data's only associated with this numerical pseudonym.

So that's, that's why we say that, that's an anonymized matched production. And here's, here's how it works.

So within the DBMP database we have the names of the claimants. And these are -- this is hypothetical information. Of course we're not using real names and Social Security numbers here. We have the names of the claimants and we have Social Security numbers and Bates White assigns a numerical

pseudonym to each claimant and that's the matching key. And then we provide that to the Trusts and, and then the Trusts use, they use the name and the Social Security number in order to match with the information that we've requested, which is, you know, did they find a, file a claim, what's the status of the claim, what did they say about their exposures. They use that to match it with a, with the information. And then they anonymize it by deleting the names and Social Security numbers leaving only the pseudonyms and they deliver that. This says to DBMP. Actually, they deliver it to Bates White and Bates White is kind of a, the funnel that examines the data, makes sure it complies with the order, and, and sends, and sends it out.

So that's how it, that's how it works, your Honor.

And then once the parties get the, the data, they can gather information from DBMP's database on exposures and they can add that to the anonymized data they've, they've provided and they can find data from other sources in discovery and they can add that. But critically, anytime any data is added, no PII is included with it.

So, so the result is in this anonymized matched production and any extract or anything created from it there's never any identifying information.

So -- and there -- I should mention at this point the matching key, contrary to what you've been told, including, I

1 | noticed, in the Aldrich hearing, the matching key is, remains

2 | in the hands only of Bates White and the claims experts for the

3 ACC and the FCR. That matching key never goes to anyone else

4 and in fact, it's, the order says it's going to be kept under

5 lock and key by those two, by those three entities and they're

going to limit who has access to it and it, and they strictly

7 | limit what you can do with the matching key.

So anything, the only information that goes outside of the claims experts is anonymized data. There's, there's one exception to that which I'll, which I'll mention when we get to that.

And the, the anonymized matched production, as I've indicated, it, it can only be used by the people who are authorized to use it only for permitted purpose and only for, for those persons who, "need to know it in order to achieve a permitted purpose."

So your Honor, our, our first argument is that you, we ask you to enforce your order denying anonymity. In that order you, you denied their motion and you required them to identify themselves by full name and you stayed that for 31 days to permit them to seek a stay pending appeal. The 31 days have gone by. You -- and it was, it was either on the 30th or 31st day that they decided to run into the District Court and seek a stay pending appeal. I don't believe your order meant that they would get a stay beyond the 31 days if the District Court

- hadn't stayed it. I, I believe you allowed them that amount of time so they could, would have time to go to the District Court
- and to get relief and to, and to ask the District Court to
- 4 provide that relief by the 31st day.
- 5 THE COURT: Which District Judge was the case assigned to?
- 7 MR. CASSADA: I believe it's Judge Conrad.
- 8 THE COURT: Okay.
- 9 MR. CASSADA: Yeah. I believe Judge Conrad. He's,
 10 he's been getting these.
- So basically, your Honor, you've told them they can't
- 13 themselves and it's, and they, they just haven't gotten the,

keep coming in here and litigating without identifying

- 14 the message. And, and they want to -- with this relief they're
- 15 requesting there, they just want to prolong the situation.
- 16 We're going to be litigating these issues -- it was, it was 2-
- 17 | 1/2 years ago when we requested this data and now we've finally
- 18 gotten the data they want to claw it back. It's time to turn
- 19 the page.

12

- And you did say, your Honor, that we stay that for 30
- 21 days, but otherwise, we're going to list, they either going to
- 22 list themselves in the pleadings or we were going to have to
- 23 strike the pleadings. So that's, that was the very clear
- 24 direction that you gave.
- Our second argument, your Honor, is that the, the

burden and privacy arguments are moot because the data has already been redacted and, and produced. And the case law is pretty clear that when documents requested have already been produced in response to a subpoena, then a motion to quash should be denied as moot.

Now there is an exception to that, as Mr. Hogan points out, that if you can provide meaningful relief, then, then maybe, you know, maybe it's not moot. But there's no meaningful relief that's to be provided here because the PII concerns he's mentioned have been resolved. There's no PII to worry about and to the extent there, there's any argument here about the burden that the Trusts or DCPF had to bear to do it, that burden, whatever it is, has already been borne and the data scrubbed and produced and we've agreed to pay for it and in fact, either have or have almost completely paid for that.

So there's no reason to provide, grant any relief at all here. And in fact, if you -- not only would it be meaningless at this point for you to require a return of the data, it will create a huge burden in the case. It'll set, set the case back and -- and then -- and now we'll be involved in sample litigation. And you know, our experience has been that we don't, it's not real easy to agree on a sample.

Now Mr. Hogan says, "Well, it's easy. Just do a simple random sample." Well, I think, our experience and I think Judge Beyer's come to understand that that would be not

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

useful to have a simple random sample and that you shouldn't approve any sample without an evidentiary hearing where you actually hear from experts on sampling. And again, it's not, not necessary here. In the -- I think in Bestwall, eventually, on the sampling that would apply to the case file review --THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response). MR. CASSADA: -- Judge Beyer just said you -- "Okay. You each have your own sample. So we're not going to, we're not going to have a trial now on sampling." But in that case they have the full dataset for the claims discovery and there's no, there's no reason to sample that because the full dataset, it is useful, just like the Committee has the full dataset for the, for 300,000 plus claimants. This, it's, it's really rich data that allows the Court to understand the trends of litigation over time and to basically rule confidently at estimation. If you do, if you do what Mr. Hogan's invited you to do, then, I mean, you're going to be the Judge at estimation and you're going to have to make findings and you're going to

have some parties who, one party or the other may complain that you didn't give them, you didn't give them what they needed or you picked a sample that, that wasn't representative or didn't, didn't achieve what it was supposed to achieve.

So there's no reason to go down that path. We've got the data. There's no PII concerns. There's no burden concern.

And then finally, before we actually get to the merits, the Matching Claimants lack standing to assert an undue burden on behalf of the DCPF. So maybe I misunderstood

Mr. Hogan's argument here. Because the burden, I think the burden you heard in Aldrich was that it will be very burdensome to have to scrub the data. I thought he was arguing that.

He's saying he's not arguing that at all. He's arguing that it's a burden on the claimants because all their PII's going to be out there, but we know that that burden doesn't exist because the data's been produced and there's no PII. And I will point out in your order your Honor said unequivocally don't produce any PII. So it's not an issue and the only conceivable issue there could be is is what burden is there in actually producing the information after scrubbing it.

So I want to, I want to get to the question of what actually happened and I think the standard that Mr. Hogan has to assert is a very, it's a very high standard to get the relief he's requesting. He has to show that there was a, sort of a patent misunderstanding. The Court just, just completely sort of whiffed on, on understanding the, the evidence and the argument and that's not, that's not at all the case. As I indicated in the DBMP [sic] case when you heard their motion to quash, the issue wasn't even raised.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

In Aldrich -- and I, I, I want to be respectful when I say this because I don't know exactly how these arguments came to pass -- but whatever it is, I think in, in my view, the DCPF and the Trusts sort of misstated that the issue of exposure field PII was "new." And maybe that's, maybe they were just saying this is new in the Aldrich case, but it seemed to me they were saying something a little bit broader than that. And I've, I've got here some quotes of what you heard when, when you heard the motions to quash in Aldrich. Ms. Moskow-Schnoll for the Trusts, she said, you know: "Aldrich is arguing we don't need a lot of protections here and we don't need sampling 'cause this is not PII, but as Mr. Guerke" -- I apologize if I've mispronounced his name -- "will discuss, the exposurerelated fields that are requested may still contain personally identifiable information." So there she's saying there's the issue. "These exposure fields, they're saying no PII, but there is." And then Mr. Guerke, who's, who represented DCPF, your Honor -- and by the way, he's with the Young Conaway firm who, as you know, represents the FCR in this case. In our case we had Mr. Rubinstein representing DCPF -- well, he said: "Some of the data for the all exposure fields request will contain Social Security numbers and names. I have a sample I'd like to hand up and hand to counsel

to help describe."

So he's saying, "Look, man. Exposure fields might contain PII," and then he said at one point, "The information presented today, the sample I provided, the explanation I provided was not, has not previously been presented." Now -- and, and as you'll see from the record, if he was, if he was saying that this Court had never heard that and didn't know about this issue and, that was not correct. Now again, he may have just been saying that, that you haven't heard it in, in this case.

So when we turn -- turning to this case, when we had our big hearing on October 21, 2021 and we were arguing about the, the order and whether it exposed any risk to claimants, Mr. Rubinstein pointed out that Rick Winner, DCPF's COO, when he was deposed and testified that:

"In the DCPF's databases the exposure data sometimes does include personal identifiable information, names, Social Security numbers, and the only way to scrub those data is to go line-by-line through each victim before the data are produced. That is a tremendous burden, "he says.

And then I cut the, the next sentence in the quote. I wish I had included it. He says, "It would help, it would perhaps be less of a burden if the debtor were limited to a sample." So he's, he's making the same argument there that you

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

heard from, from the lawyers for the Trusts and DCPF in the Aldrich case. So you had, you had heard that before.

You ruled -- on December 12, your Honor, you, you approved the trust discovery order. We made a few amendments to it, but when, but then we had discussions about the form of the order. And so that was the hearing we had a year ago today. And in that hearing the order included a, a footnote with some findings on what it was that we were seeking and, and we thought that this footnote fairly reflected sort of statements you made during your bench ruling. But what we explained was that -- that -- after filing our initial motion, the debtor filed a revised form of order to incorporate the privacy and security protections in the order entered by Judge Beyer in the Bestwall case. That was something that you asked the parties to consider doing and we talked with DCPF. You heard all this. They wouldn't agree to, agree to anything, but we, on our own, we modified the order and made it consistent with hers.

And then subsequently -- and this was after Judge

Connolly ruled -- the debtor further modified the relief sought
in its motion by filing a second revised form of order on

July 29, 2021 in which the debtor -- and this is the language
that, that was the focus of this hearing -- deleted from its
request "all of the data fields requiring production of
personal identifying information regarding any claimant." That

was the key, the key language. And second, "proposed a protocol for anonymization of the remaining requested data by the Trusts before production to the debtor."

So the Trusts, DCPF objected to including that finding and Mr. Rubinstein explained, explained why he objected in, in the next slide and he said:

"Our other principal concern here is that the finding that the debtor is asking the Court to make in Footnote 2 is not accurate. The debtor's took a rather extraordinary discovery on discovery and deposed DCPF's Chief, Chief Operating Officer, Richard Winner, last summer and Mr. Winner testified unequivocally that the data fields that the debtor is currently seeking will involve the disclosure of PII." So what he was saying was you can't include a finding that the subpoenas now and your order don't require the production of, of PII in the face of this evidence that's undisputed where Mr. Winner says, "Yeah, some of them may include PII."

Now DCPF's lawyer went on to say:

"The debtor isn't, to be clear and to be fair to the debtor, the debtor isn't affirmatively seeking the production of PII, but when you're seeking data for 9,000 people the data fields that the debtor's seeking will involve some leakage of personal identifiable

information."

Now I explained at the hearing, your Honor, that we wanted an order that was clear that there would be no PII produced because we anticipated that we would be in Delaware in front of the same judge who quashed the Bestwall --

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).

MR. CASSADA: -- subpoena because it had PII and we wanted to, to show the judge that we had modified the subpoena not to include PII and that addressed the judge's concerns.

So it was very important to us that this order be a clean order that resulted in no production of, of PII. And we had that colloquy on the record and, of course, your Honor can go back and look at the transcript and see how much discussion there was on this point.

But then, but then your Honor suggested after hearing the parties:

"But are you" -- you're addressing the debtor here -"is the debtor opposed, going back to Footnote 2, to
adding clarifying language that, while you're not
asking for this information, you have -- basically,
you all agree that there's a possibility that a
claimant may have included that in the exposure fields
and that you're not opposed to redacting that before
the Trusts turn loose of the information."

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

So what you were suggesting here is if you want a clean order that doesn't provide PII, then, then let's just put that in the order. Let's just put --THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response). MR. CASSADA: -- in there that they can, that they can redact it. And, and this was a discussion on the record. DCPF counsel responded to, when we indicated that we were agreeable to such language, he said: "The debtor alluded to some new language that they might be fine with that would essentially involve our scrubbing or their scrubbing personally identifiable information that ends up in the data fields that the debtor's seeking, even if the debtor isn't affirmatively seeking personally identifiable information. That's the first we're hearing about it this morning. We obviously haven't seen the debtor's proposed language. We'd be delighted to evaluate it." So at the hearing DCPF and DBMP agreed to try to negotiate language and that's the way the hearing ended. wanted us to enter an order soon and, and not get hung up about this, but did suggest to us that we try to negotiate this language. In fact, sometime during that week -- I don't have

it here -- but we did notify the Court that we were able to

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

reach an agreement on the language. And that, the agreement that we reached was to add Footnote 7 to the order. Footnote 7 basically memorializes the evidence, that Mr. Winner testified, that: "When claimants describe how they were exposed to products for which a DCPF Trust is responsible, it is possible that they may list individuals by name and/or To the extent any of the names appear in the SSN. exposure-related fields, DCPF and the Manville Trust may" -- key word there -- "redact such names and Social Security numbers prior to the production of the anonymized matched production." Now you said they may do it. There was also this reservation about the burden of doing that. But --THE COURT: Hmm. MR. CASSADA: So you said, "You may do it." didn't order them to do it, but then you said: "In addition, prior to the delivery of the anonymized matched production to the other retained claimants, Bates White shall search for and permanently delete any such names and Social Security numbers that may be inadvertently included in the anonymized matched production." So that was, that was the resolution. That addressed both the risk of, of what was called PII leakage. It also

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

addressed burden. Because it said they, they can do it. If they want to avoid the burden, send it to Bates White. Bates White'll do it before that anonymized production goes out.

And so that's the, that's the, the way it resolved.

That footnote makes crystal clear that this is not an issue

that was new. It was not something the Court understood [sic].

In fact, the Court understood it very well. There's a -- there

-- there was a lot of dialogue and evidence referenced in the

hearings and the Court was helpful in achieving a resolution of

the issue. So -- so that -- that's it on that.

Okay. So there's another -- there -- there's another understanding that I think the parties may have about the order that's not true and, and I think it's important to, to clear this up because it, it addresses what really is one of the most fundamentally important protections in the order. And that is at the same Aldrich hearing Ms. Moskow-Schnoll --again, she was representing the Trusts -- she was summarizing sort of what this order does, you know, what it results in, and she, she talked about -- I wasn't here, but I think she had some charts that were showing all the different people who would have access to this information. "And gosh, this is so bad because all this PII is out there and they're not going to be able to, to limit use of, of the information in one case. How can they unforget what, how can they forget that when they go to another case? You can't unforget that." She went on and

on about it. Critically, here's what she said. She said: 1 "So in summary, we have two entities, Jones Day and 2 Bates White, holding almost 150,000 claims files" --3 files. I don't know why she says "files" -- "for 4 12,000 claimants from different sources, 19 trusts in 5 Paddock, plus 24,000 claimants in Bestwall and DBMP 6 7 and holding the matching keys to deanonymize each subset." 8 So what's she's telling the Court is her understanding 9 is that Jones Day is not, they're not only going to be 10 11 permitted access to this anonymized matching key, but they're going to have the matching key. And so they're going to be 12 13 able to deanonymize it and that shows that there's really no privacy at all. And the, the declaration that they submitted 14 15 to support their position also had Mr. Winner in there and in his declaration he says the same thing, that this matching key 16 17 is, it's going to be passed around. Everyone's going to have 18 it. And so the idea that this is an anonymized database is a farce because the people who had the anonymized database have 19 the matching key. It's just not so, your Honor. That's not 20 what the order said. That's not what you ordered. 21 And in the order, Section 9(d), it says: 22 "The matching key will be possessed only by the claims 23 expert for each of the debtor, the ACC, and the FCR 24 and it's going to be separate. At all times it's 25

going to be kept separately from the anonymous trust data. The two will never, will never meet."

And it -- and whoever holds it at any of these three claims experts' firms has to store it in a separate password-protected location.

So the matching key is going to be in the exclusive domain of, of the experts. That's Section 9(d).

Plus, the matching key, it can only be used for limited purposes. It can only be used by the experts to match non-PII data from the debtor's database with the anonymized trust data. That's what I showed you before when I showed you the anonymized matched production.

So in order to match it, obviously you need to know who the claimants are. And so the, that's the job of the claims experts and they'll, they'll match it and they'll, and the result will be this anonymized matched production that has other, other data in it.

The matching key can also, it can also be used to verify the accuracy of the data matching or defense challenges to the accuracy. So the experts are each going to do this on their own and they're going to -- and -- and the other experts can use the matching key to see if they did it right.

And then the second bullet is that it can be used to provide sufficient identifying information to authorized representatives to permit individual claims analysis. That

1 | means that the claims experts can, point, pointing to, to

2 | individual or smaller groups of claims but not the aggregate,

3 | can identify the claimants for the claimant representative so

4 | they can analyze the claim files for those claimants. That's

5 something that all of the parties are interested in doing and

6 | that's a key part of, of the reason for the discovery.

But that's, that's the only thing, things that the matching key can be used for.

So to the extent that, that the Court may have concluded after <u>Aldrich</u> that, that this was a new issue, I think, I, I'm sure the Court didn't believe it was a new issue in the, in the DBMP case or that the order really was as flimsy as the DCPF and Trust lawyers were arguing that it was. It's, it's simply not true and I think your Honor should understand that this is, as I said before, it's an excellent order.

Just a, a few more comments about the order. It's, it's filled with provisions that protect the data and this is not just protecting the matching key. That's separate. This is protection the, protecting the anonymized data. The data -- if anyone broke into someone's office and pulled this anonymized data, it would be worthless to them. They wouldn't be able to steal anyone's identity. There's nothing in there. It's just a bunch of numbers with, with information about what, what they said about their exposures to asbestos.

Notwithstanding that, we treat it like the, the formula for

Coca-Cola or something. I mean, it's -- and all of these 1 provisions are identified here, but, but it's, it's restricted 2 to be used only for permitted purposes, which are defined in 3 the order, which is related to estimation and plan of 4 reorganization. It's -- the access to the matched production, 5 it's limited to individuals and only from, from the parties or 6 their lawyers or their retained experts and only those who have 7 a clear need to know it. You have to, before anyone's allowed 8 to lay their eyes on this matched production, they have to 9 execute a joinder requiring that they consent to be bound by 10 11 the Court's order and submit to the Court's jurisdiction. Every -- each individual who gets access has to provide for 12 13 security to keep it safe. There are restrictions about how it can be used in the court. There's an immunity from discovery. 14 15 The matched production can't be, you know, can't be discovered by someone else. Has to be deleted within 30 days after the 16 end of the case and, and when it's deleted there's a 17 declaration that anyone who has access has to sign it and 18 submit it to the Court saying that they've complied with the 19 order. 20 Couple of things in, in closing here, your Honor. 21 Mr. Winner, again the Chief Operating Officer for Delaware 22 Claims Processing Facility, I asked him -- there's all, all 23 this, these concerns he raised in his declaration about a 24 I asked him if he was aware of any situation where 25 breach.

DCPF produced data on a mass scale where there was some kind of data breach and he said, no.

I will say they -- Mr. Winner said in his deposition:

"Anytime someone asks of this, we insist on a sample.

Because that's all you need and that limits the, the implications of a breach for that. So we, we got to have a sample."

So we listed -- you may recall this from the last hearing -- all the cases where there were huge numbers of claims for which data was sought where no sampling was ordered and we asked Mr. Winner, "Yeah. You said you always request this. Can you describe situations where there's been the case where you've actually, a sample has actually been ordered," and he, he couldn't. He -- there was no example where DCPF had actually convinced the judge to limit the production to a sample except, of course, the District Court in, in Bestwall. The District Court approved, ordered that there had to be a sample in that case. That decision was eventually overturned by the, the Third Circuit.

In a hearing, in a status conference before the judge, before the Fourth Circuit ruled, Judge Connolly explained the situation when he entered the order. He said, "It was Memorial Day Weekend and I wrote this opinion in a couple of hours." He was actually at the, at the beach on vacation and he got word that the time period in ruling on this had, had run and -- and

they -- and they needed an order. So he said he, he prepared
this opinion in a couple of hours with a very, very able clerk,
but "it was a mass, mass rush."

He also said, "It looks like I had a very fundamental misunderstanding of a basic fact, which, which kind of concerns me. Because the lawyer's asking for the relief." He -- he had -- he had come to believe from that things that, a fact that wasn't true. And then he said here, "I'm having to rush now this time" -- this is when we had brought up this new subpoena that we said complied with his order -- "which I did last year which is probably why we're in a mess."

So, so I don't think, I don't think the Court should put a lot of stock in the, in that order as a model for, for whether there should be a sample. In fact, I pointed out earlier when you entered your order you had three hearings. You spent hours and hours listening to what the evidence was, examining the provisions of the order. It was a, it was a very meticulous, careful process and he did not, Judge Connolly did not have that, have that luxury.

And so that, that's it, your Honor. As I indicated, we believe the Court should enforce its anonymity order. The relief they're requesting, it's moot at this point. We've got the data. It's scrubbed. There's no PII. There's no risk, there's no standing, and, and there's no question but this Court fully understood these issues about PII and exposure

- 1 fields and resolved it.
- 2 Thank you, your Honor.
- THE COURT: Thank you.
- 4 Mr. Hogan? Need a minute?
- 5 MR. HOGAN: Thank you, your Honor. I just unmooted
- 6 | my, muted my line.
- 7 MS. ZIEG: Excuse me, your Honor.
- 8 MR. HOGAN: Daniel Hogan on behalf of the Matching
- 9 Claimants.
- 10 THE COURT: Hang, hang on one moment.
- 11 Ms., Ms. Zieg?
- 12 MR. HOGAN: Yes, sir.
- MS. ZIEG: Good morning, your Honor. Sharon Zieg from
- 14 Young Conaway on behalf of the FCR. Just a couple of things I
- 15 | wanted to note for the record first.
- 16 There were a lot of characterizations in that about
- 17 | what the trust discovery order says and doesn't say.
- 18 | THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
- 19 response).
- 20 MS. ZIEG: I'm not sure we agree with everything that
- 21 | he said about what it says and doesn't say and who has access
- 22 and who doesn't have access to it. I, I think at one point he
- 23 | said that the lawyers don't have access to the matching key,
- 24 | like Jones Day doesn't have access to the matching key. I
- 25 | think that's inaccurate. As long as you entered a joinder and

```
you're agreeing to keep it anonymized, it says that -- in 8(a)
 1
 2
    it says that you can have access to the matching key, its
    retained experts and authorized representatives.
 3
             So I -- I just -- I'm not sure -- we haven't even
 4
    qotten it here yet, but I just want to -- we did just sign a
 5
    joinder and send it to the debtor. So I'm, I'm not sure what
 6
    we're getting yet from them, but I just want to put a
 7
    placeholder in that I'm not sure if everything he said about
 8
    how the trust discovery order works.
 9
                         There's a joinder to this motion that the
10
             THE COURT:
11
    FCR just signed?
             MS. ZIEG: No, no, no. The joinder to -- you file a
12
13
    joinder to the order --
             THE COURT: Oh, I see.
14
15
             MS. ZIEG: -- the trust discovery --
             THE COURT: Okay.
16
17
             MS. ZIEG:
                       -- order.
18
             THE COURT: All right.
                        I don't think this really has to do with
19
             MS. ZIEG:
20
    this motion.
                  It's just that Mr. Cassada, Cassada --
21
             THE COURT: You want to keep your powder dry --
22
             MS. ZIEG:
                       -- went, went --
             THE COURT: -- in the future.
23
             MS. ZIEG: -- very broad into exactly how that worked
24
```

and I just wanted to make sure. I'm not sure we agree with

25

```
everything, the way he said it. And maybe we should talk about
 1
 2
    it and that's fine. But I did just sign a joinder to this
    order and I was thinking I was going to get access to it.
 3
             And the other thing I wanted to note is that, looking
 4
    at the Slides 15 and 16 about the extract of what you get from
 5
    the DCPF and from -- actually, everything comes through
 6
 7
    Dr. Bates -- from what I've seen in the Bestwall case I just
    wanted to say that this is an oversimplification of what
 8
    information we really get. There's an, there's a lot of
 9
    information in, for instance, the exposure type and the
10
    exposure fields. It's not as simple as just the word "direct"
11
    or "indirect," or whatever. There's a lot more information
12
13
    here.
             THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
14
15
    response).
             MS. ZIEG: And I just wanted to be clear for the
16
17
    record that this isn't, this isn't actually what you get. You
18
    get something far more informative than this.
19
             THE COURT: Note your --
20
             MS. ZIEG:
                        Thank you.
21
             THE COURT: -- your view of it.
             MR. CASSADA: Your Honor, can I hand you up a copy, a
22
    hard copy of our slides?
23
             THE COURT: I'll be happy to take one. Thank you.
24
25
        (Hard copy of slides handed to the Court)
```

1 THE COURT: Are we ready to go to, Mr. Hogan? MR. CASSADA: I did, I did want to comment on 2 Ms. Zieg's understanding of the order. 3 THE COURT: Do we really need to? Ms. Zieq hasn't --4 the FCR hasn't taken a position on this motion as yet. 5 MR. CASSADA: Okay. All right. Well, I --6 7 MS. ZIEG: Your, your Honor, I have, I'm taking no --THE COURT: She doesn't necessarily agree --8 MS. ZIEG: -- position on the motion --9 THE COURT: -- with what you said. 10 11 MS. ZIEG: -- at all. I just wanted to make sure. Because there was a lot put in this record just now about what 12 13 things say and don't say and what the information is and isn't and who gets access and who doesn't and I just wanted to make 14 15 sure that it didn't go unsaid that we don't necessarily agree with --16 17 THE COURT: And it's been said, so. 18 MS. ZIEG: -- the evidence that he presented. MR. CASSADA: All right. And I --19 THE COURT: Let's go back to Mr. Hogan, instead. 20 21 MR. HOGAN: Your Honor, thank you. Daniel Hogan of Hogan McDaniel on behalf of the Matching Claimants and Certain 22 Additional Matching Claimants. 23 I, I, of course, want to echo the comments just made 24 by Ms. Zieg as it relates to the production of documentation. 25

We are privy to what's actually being produced by virtue of the subpoena. And so I have no way of knowing. I surmised, of course, that what is contained on Pages 15 and 16 is a -- is -- it's a, as characterized, an oversimplification of what, in fact, is being produced.

And I would also note that, that it appears that, in addition to Bates White, other additional parties, including professionals, do have access to the matching key. And so those, those characterizations, I just wanted to note that we, we disagree with those.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HOGAN: Going to the arguments made, your Honor, let's start, of course, with the anonymity order. In looking at the order that you entered on, I believe it was, the 30th or 29th of November, the order provides that:

"The requirements that the movants identify themselves shall be stayed until the 31st day following the entry of this order to permit movants (if desired) to seek a stay pending appeal from the District Court. Movants are hereby relieved of any obligation to seek a stay from this Court before seeking a stay in the District Court."

I note, your Honor -- and of course, it's your order and, and I respect it -- but I -- I just -- I note the order doesn't provide that we have to obtain a stay pending appeal

from the District Court, you know. There's time limits for us
to make those applications. We abided by those app, by those
time limits and made the application. And so the argument
that, that you should somehow enforce the anonymity order and
strike what we're, we're attempting to do is wholly

6 | inappropriate, from our perspective.

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Turning next to the argument regarding the fact that the privacy arguments that we made are moot because the data has already been redacted and produced. Your Honor, from our perspective, from the get-go we've made it clear that our position is that this doc, that this data, you know, that there's a burden independent of the burden imposed on the Trusts associated with the disclosure of the Matching Claimants' personal information. DBMP has consistently ignored the fact that the claims submission information of the, of the Matching Claimants is what is being sought from the Trusts and that the Matching Claimants have privacy concerns. The Trusts seek, the Trusts are being forced to disclose a wealth of information that belongs to the Matching Claimants. indisputable, okay? From our perspective, this information is -- is -- is obviously very sensitive and as you noted during the Aldrich hearing, you recognized that there's going to be PII contained within the narrative form of certain of the responses to, to the subpoena and it's that narrative, narrative form that gives rise to the disclosure of PII. I, I

- 1 hear the debtors repeatedly say that, "We're not requesting it.
- 2 | We're not," but the reality is and looking at the charts that
- 3 | there's going to be an element of it that's going to be
- 4 disclosed in some narrative aspects and you recognized that
- 5 | very issue in Aldrich the, the day after you entered the order
- 6 in DBMP.
- 7 And so we -- we -- I just wanted to bring to the
- 8 | Court's attention that inconsistency, as we see it, no
- 9 disrespect intended, but we -- we -- we see it as, as a germane
- 10 | issue and gives rise to us to have the ability to make the
- 11 | argument that we're making today.
- 12 Turning to the issue of standing, from our perspective
- 13 | the Matching Claimants have standing to assert an undue burden.
- 14 The burden, as I indicated, is, is independent of the burden
- 15 | imposed on the Trusts. It's a burden that falls on these
- 16 claimants. This is their information. That seems to be
- 17 | glossed over by DBMP. They -- they -- they want the
- 18 | information under no uncertain terms. They're entitled to it.
- 19 | I know they're relying upon your order, your Honor, but, but
- 20 they gloss over the fact that this is information that, of, of
- 21 | a number of individual claimants and it's important information
- 22 and it should be protected.
- 23 Turning to the issue that the Court has fully
- 24 understood and resolved the PII and the exposure field issue.
- 25 Your Honor, I just point out that the Matching Claimants

weren't privy to any of the arguments and, and we had not appeared in any capacity in this case until, really, in March of 2022 and that's in Delaware, right? And so this case, from our perspective, didn't get transferred to your Honor until late last year when, when the, the, the order entering the motion to transfer this proceeding to the North Carolina Bankruptcy Court was entered.

And so I don't know that -- that we can be -- that those arguments can be imposed upon us. We weren't privy to them. We weren't, we weren't in privity with anyone at that point relative to the arguments that were made. And so, from our perspective, they're, they're not relevant to us. That's not to say that they're not relevant to the determination of this motion, your Honor, but from our perspective, we weren't privy to them. And so they're, they're not relevant as it relates to us.

The, the next argument that the Court's trust discovery order fully protects the claimants' privacy, from our perspective, flies in the face of your finding which, where you recognized in Aldrich that we're going to be seeing some information in narrative form and we're going, and you might have that information that is, in fact, PII and that you, the Court, wants to reduce the harm there as much as possible. It's from that perspective, as we see it, that we should be entitled to have the Court review this order, revise this

1 order, and, and limit, ultimately, what is being produced to a

- 2 sample. The, the argument that we're, we have no basis that,
- 3 | that there's no relief that we could be granted is inaccurate.
- 4 The Court could order that the materials that have been
- 5 produced could be clawed back, that a sample could be created
- 6 | consistent with what was done in Aldrich Pump, and then from
- 7 our perspective, that -- that -- that is the, the proper
- 8 outcome.
- 9 Unless the Court has any questions for me, I'll rest
 10 on my submissions, your Honor.
- 11 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much.
- 12 All right, folks. Let me see if I can get these in a
- 13 | form that you can use.
- 14 First, the interpretation of the order requiring the
- 15 | Matching Claimants to identify themselves unless a stay was
- 16 obtained, I do not agree with the interpretation of the
- 17 | Matching Claimants themselves. What I was doing at that point
- 18 | in time was saying I don't see the grounds either to rule
- 19 substantively on the, on the motion in their favor nor to grant
- 20 | a stay, but out of an abundance of caution, realizing that once
- 21 | the information is out, then you can't get relief once it's,
- 22 | it's already gone, I would stay my ruling for, for 30 days so
- 23 that a, a stay could be sought by the, from the District Court.
- 24 | I did not say, intend to say that if you filed the application
- 25 | for a stay at District Court, then it would be stayed until the

1 District Court decided whether there was a stay. That's not in

- 2 | the order and that would be nonsensical under the
- 3 | circumstances. The bottom line is that I didn't see grounds
- 4 | for anonymity and I didn't see grounds that would warrant a
- 5 stay pending appeal, but, just in case, I'll give you time to
- 6 run to District Court and see if there's an obvious error made
- 7 | there that they want to stop that matter.

So bottom line is since that hasn't happened in that time frame, they didn't see anything egregious.

I've listened today and I will, I'm not going to strike the motion to amend, but, rather, I'm not going to allow any more participation by the Matching Claimants unless they identify themselves going forward, save and except for a, a Notice of Appeal of this ruling. The bottom line is I don't think it's proper. I have concerns about it, particularly since we have such a large number of potential claimants here and what is essentially as a, a practical matter devolving in these cases into a, a contest of wills between the, the tort firms of America and the corporate community as to how divisional merger bankruptcies are to be pursued and whether it's proper to pursue in these cases.

I have no idea who the Matching Claimants are at this juncture. It is possible -- don't overread this -- it is possible that the Matching Claimants are simply a representation of the tort firms themselves protecting their

pecuniary interests. That's a possibility. What we have, I was asking these questions in <u>Aldrich</u> of why do you care so much about the estimation and, and someone acknowledged that part of this was the fear that they were going to get tarred with the, with the <u>Garlock</u> brush that, of making nondisclosures.

So there, there are interests apart from the clients' interests here. The general rule in Federal Court is that your opponents need to know who you are. None of the exceptions to that Rule apply here. I don't see any reason for a stay and I'm going to have to enforce my earlier order.

So if you -- I'm leaving the motion to amend and the briefing that's allowed. That can stay. Anything further, unless the District Court chooses to grant you a stay pending appeal, I'm going to have to at that point just decline to hear you. All right. That's the first part.

As to the, the merits of the, the order, that could be the end of it, but I'm going to go ahead and address these so that we don't have to, if the District Court feels otherwise, we don't have to have a remand to consider it further.

As to standing, again I don't see an undue burden on the claimants. In fact, let me back up one step farther.

Did the Court understand the arguments that were made in this case at the time they were made? As the record reflects, we obviously had a good bit of interaction with

regard to these provisions and discussion and I would decline to find that I misapprehended what you were arguing.

Now there may be an argument in the <u>Aldrich</u> case that I should have stayed consistent with this ruling and no order's been entered there, is my understanding, and I'm not encouraging a motion for rehearing on that, but, if it comes, it comes. If anything, we had been careful in this case, DBMP, to try to address the privacy concerns and what I did was intentional there. Some time passed and it may be argued that I should have done the same thing.

You will note that in <u>Aldrich</u> I was doing two things. I don't want to talk too much about the <u>Aldrich</u> decision because those folks aren't here, but the bottom line was I had two concerns. One was, as I recall it, this was the first time I had actually been presented with demonstratives that showed me exactly what kind of information can be in the narratives. That made a little bit of an impression, but -- and this is where being married for 36 years will help you out -- I'm not one to believe that I've never made an error, either, and I may have in <u>Aldrich</u> because I don't recall, did not then recall all of the, the Footnote 2 and the efforts that we had made to scrub data. I was thinking, primarily, about my secondary concern, which was the need for sampling in these cases, generally, and it might not have been the appropriate thing to do then. I'm not going to decide that today.

But the bottom line is the costs in these cases are spiraling ever higher. We are getting into more and more of a morass of litigation that's going to require more and more privilege reviews, estimation, claims file requests, and, and the like and my concern was, overall, that we need to start pulling these cases towards getting to a resolution, not going the other way around, and I view sampling as a way that we can avoid some of the costs and expense, delay, etc., that are occasioned by these cases.

So for better or worse, those two things were on my mind at the time and if there is an error that has been made, in my opinion it would be in the <u>Aldrich</u> case, not in this one because this one got very careful consideration and effectively, we dealt with that.

So as to standing, I don't see a particular burden here. I agree with Mr. Cassada that while there might be an interest in, in the Matching Claimants as to the information that is being provided, the law I'm not sure is where most of us would feel emotionally. We would say yes, that is your information, but I'm not sure that, legally, that information isn't owned by the Trusts instead of the claimants. But you've got at least some sort of interest there in the data itself and we tried to accommodate that and it was carefully accommodated and I'm satisfied that the accommodations in this case were sufficient to protect the information.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

And that kind of feeds into the third part of this as to whether or not there is a risk of inadvertent disclosure and whether this is moot and I believe at this juncture it really The information's been provided, scrubbed, as I, as been represented in court. There is no PII in the documentation and I'm going to decline the motion to alter or amend. And ask the prevailing party, the debtors, to draw an order consistent with those remarks and the arguments made in their briefing, okay? Anything else? (No response) THE COURT: Anyone -- everyone good for the day? (No response) Well, I'm pleased that you've been able to THE COURT: work some on, on the first three matters. I hope you, those are productive. If not, we'll, we'll talk about them next month. And hope everyone travels safely home and that you enjoy your weekend. As always, you always provide me a lot to think about and we'll look forward to that in the future. Court's in recess. Thank you, your Honor. MR. GORDON: Thank you, your Honor. MR. ELLMAN: (Proceedings concluded at 12:00 p.m.)

1	<u>CERTIFICATE</u>		
2	I, court-approved transcriber, certify that the		
3	foregoing is a correct transcript from the official electronic		
4	sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled		
5	matter.		
6	/s/ Janice Russell February 13, 2023		
7	Janice Russell, Transcriber Date		
8			
9			
10			
11			
12			
13			
14			
15			
16			
17			
18			
19			
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			

Case 22-00303 Doc 73-5 Filed 03/23/23 Page 1 of 10

TAB 5

Case 22-00303 Doc 73-5 Filed 03/23/23 Entered 03/23/23 20:02:39 Desc Tab 5 Page 2 of 10

From: Hirst, Morgan R. <mhirst@JonesDay.com> Sent: Friday, February 10, 2023 11:33 AM

To: Guerke, Kevin A.; Ramsey, Natalie D.; Guy, Jonathan P.

Cc: moskowschnollb@ballardspahr.com; Burns, Tyler; dkhogan@dkhogan.com;

bsullivan@sha-llc.com; Harron, Edwin; Wright, Davis L.; Kevin C. Maclay; Todd E.

Phillips; Glenn C. Thompson; Robert A. Cox, Jr.; Felder, Debra L.; James Wehner; Enright, Michael; Erens, Brad B.; Cahow, Caitlin K.; Michael Evert (CMEvert@ewhlaw.com); Clare M. Maisano; C. Richard Rayburn, Jr.; Jack Miller; Dikovics, Rachel; Bennett, Lynda A.;

Andrew Anselmi; Zachary D. Wellbrock; Timothy P. Duggan; Joseph H. Lemkin

RE: In re Aldrich Pump LLC et al (Case No. 20-30608) Subject:

Counsel:

Our negotiations with the ACC and FCR regarding sampling in the Aldrich/Murry bankruptcies are continuing. However, as the DCPF and Verus related parties have elected not to participate in those discussions, we wanted to make you aware of recent communication on the topic we have had with the ACC.

As we have made clear throughout, and as Mr. Evert told Judge Whitley multiple times during our last omnibus hearing on January 30, the Debtors disagree with the Court's oral ruling on November 30 ordering that the Debtors be limited to a ten percent sample on their subpoenas to DCPF and the associated trusts. After further discussion with our client, we are strongly considering seeking reconsideration of Judge Whitley's November 30 sampling ruling. We will make a decision one way or the other before our omnibus hearing next Tuesday. If we elect to seek reconsideration, we will so inform the Court at next Tuesday's omnibus hearing (which I should note is scheduled to begin at 1pm, not 9:30 as is our customary time) and file our motion in ample time to have it heard at the next omnibus hearing on March 30. For your information, the standing order in this bankruptcy provides that any such Motion would be due to be filed on March 9, with responses due on March 23. We will also ask the Court to order the parties to disclose by March 23 any witnesses they intend to have testify at the March 30 hearing to allow time for any necessary discovery.

In addition, to the extent Verus, its related trusts, and its related Matching Claimants seek to prosecute their Motions to Quash/Motions to Proceed Anonymously that have been transferred to Judge Whitley, we will ask the Court to set them for hearing for the same March 30 omnibus hearing. Those motions are fully briefed, but we will ask the Court to set a March 16 witness disclosure deadline to, again, allow time for any necessary discovery.

As noted, we have shared the above with the ACC and FCR (who are copied on this message) and wanted to keep you aware of the discussions. If you have questions, please let us know. Thanks, and have a good weekend.

Morgan R. Hirst Partner JONES DAY® - One Firm WorldwidesM 110 North Wacker Drive **Suite 4800** Chicago, Illinois 60606 Office +1.312.269.1535 Mobile +1.773.490.2039 mhirst@jonesday.com

Case 22-00303 Doc 73-5 Filed 03/23/23 Entered 03/23/23 20:02:39 Desc Tab 5 Page 3 of 10

From: Guerke, Kevin A. <KGuerke@ycst.com> Sent: Monday, January 30, 2023 7:56 AM

To: Hirst, Morgan R. <mhirst@JonesDay.com>; Ramsey, Natalie D. <NRamsey@rc.com>; Guy, Jonathan P.

<jguy@orrick.com>

Cc: moskowschnollb@ballardspahr.com; Burns, Tyler <burnst@ballardspahr.com>; dkhogan@dkhogan.com; bsullivan@sha-llc.com; Harron, Edwin <eharron@ycst.com>; Wright, Davis L. <DWright@rc.com>; Kevin C. Maclay <kmaclay@capdale.com>; Todd E. Phillips <tphillips@capdale.com>; Glenn C. Thompson <gthompson@lawhssm.com>; Robert A. Cox, Jr. <RCox@lawhssm.com>; Felder, Debra L. <dfelder@orrick.com>; James Wehner <jwehner@capdale.com>; Enright, Michael <MENRIGHT@RC.com>; Erens, Brad B. <bberens@JonesDay.com>; Cahow, Caitlin K. <ccahow@Jonesday.com>; Michael Evert (CMEvert@ewhlaw.com) <CMEvert@ewhlaw.com>; Clare M. Maisano <cmmaisano@ewhlaw.com>; C. Richard Rayburn, Jr. <rrayburn@rcdlaw.net>; Jack Miller <jmiller@rcdlaw.net>; Dikovics, Rachel <rdikovics@lowenstein.com>; Bennett, Lynda A. <LBennett@lowenstein.com>; Andrew Anselmi <AAnselmi@acllp.com>; Zachary D. Wellbrock <zwellbrock@acllp.com>; Timothy P. Duggan tduggan@stark-stark.com>; Stark.com>; Joseph H. Lemkin <jlemkin@stark-stark.com>

Subject: RE: In re Aldrich Pump LLC et al (Case No. 20-30608)

** External mail **

Morgan,

DCPF does not plan to make a sampling counterproposal. It reserves all its rights and plans to review and comment on any proposal or agreement.

Thanks,

Kevin



Kevin A. Guerke, PartnerYoung Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP
Rodney Square, 1000 North King Street
Wilmington, DE 19801
P: 302.571.6616

KGuerke@ycst.com | www.youngconaway.com | vCard

This message may contain confidential attorney-client communications or other protected information. If you believe you are not an intended recipient (even if this message was sent to your e-mail address), you may not use, copy, or retransmit it. If you believe you received this message by mistake, please notify us by return e-mail, and then delete this message. Thank you for your cooperation.

From: Hirst, Morgan R. < mhirst@JonesDay.com>

Sent: Friday, January 27, 2023 1:55 PM

To: Ramsey, Natalie D. < NRamsey@rc.com >; Guy, Jonathan P. < iguy@orrick.com >

Cc: moskowschnollb@ballardspahr.com; Burns, Tyler < burnst@ballardspahr.com >; Guerke, Kevin A.

< <u>KGuerke@ycst.com</u>>; <u>dkhogan@dkhogan.com</u>; <u>bsullivan@sha-llc.com</u>; <u>Harron, Edwin < eharron@ycst.com</u>>; <u>Wright,</u>

Davis L. <<u>DWright@rc.com</u>>; Kevin C. Maclay <<u>kmaclay@capdale.com</u>>; Todd E. Phillips@capdale.com>; Glenn

C. Thompson <<u>gthompson@lawhssm.com</u>>; Robert A. Cox, Jr. <<u>RCox@lawhssm.com</u>>; Felder, Debra L.

<dfelder@orrick.com>; James Wehner <jwehner@capdale.com>; Enright, Michael <MENRIGHT@RC.com>; Erens, Brad

B.

berens@JonesDay.com; Cahow, Caitlin K. <ccahow@Jonesday.com; Michael Evert (CMEvert@ewhlaw.com)

<<u>CMEvert@ewhlaw.com</u>>; Clare M. Maisano <<u>cmmaisano@ewhlaw.com</u>>; C. Richard Rayburn, Jr.

<rrayburn@rcdlaw.net>; Jack Miller <jmiller@rcdlaw.net>; Dikovics, Rachel <rdikovics@lowenstein.com>; Bennett,

Lynda A. <LBennett@lowenstein.com>; Andrew Anselmi <AAnselmi@acllp.com>; Zachary D. Wellbrock

Case 22-00303 Doc 73-5 Filed 03/23/23 Entered 03/23/23 20:02:39 Desc Tab 5 Page 4 of 10

<<u>zwellbrock@acllp.com</u>>; Timothy P. Duggan <<u>tduggan@stark-stark.com</u>>; Joseph H. Lemkin <<u>jlemkin@stark-stark.com</u>> **Subject:** RE: In re Aldrich Pump LLC et al (Case No. 20-30608)

All:

As some or all of you heard at yesterday's Aldrich omnibus hearing, yesterday the ACC sent a response to the Debtors' sampling proposal of December 19. We want to move quickly to review the proposal with our experts. Although, as you know, the Debtors believe the sample methodology selected should not be relevant to the DCPF/Verus/Trusts/Matching Claimants, various counsel for those parties were active on our last meet and confer and expressed positions regarding sampling methodologies. Obviously, we want to be able to simultaneously evaluate proposals, if any, of the DCPF/Verus/Trusts/Matching Claimants.

Do any or all of the DCPF/Verus/Trusts/Matching Claimants intend to proffer a counterproposal to the Debtors' sampling proposal of December 19 (which is copied at the bottom of these email)? Or are those parties content to accede to any agreement that may be reached on the issue between the Debtors and the ACC and FCR?

Please let us know. Thanks and have a nice weekend.

Morgan R. Hirst Partner

JONES DAY® - One Firm Worldwide™

110 North Wacker Drive Suite 4800 Chicago, Illinois 60606 Office +1.312.269.1535 Mobile +1.773.490.2039 mhirst@jonesday.com

From: Hirst, Morgan R.

Sent: Thursday, January 5, 2023 11:43 AM

To: 'Ramsey, Natalie D.' <NRamsey@rc.com>; Guy, Jonathan P. <jguy@orrick.com>

Cc: moskowschnollb@ballardspahr.com; Burns, Tyler <burnst@ballardspahr.com>; Guerke, Kevin A.

<<u>KGuerke@ycst.com</u>>; <u>dkhogan@dkhogan.com</u>; <u>bsullivan@sha-llc.com</u>; Edwin J. Harron <<u>eharron@ycst.com</u>>; Wright, Davis L. <<u>DWright@rc.com</u>>; Kevin C. Maclay <<u>kmaclay@capdale.com</u>>; Todd E. Phillips <<u>tphillips@capdale.com</u>>; Glenn

C. Thompson <<u>gthompson@lawhssm.com</u>>; Robert A. Cox, Jr. <<u>RCox@lawhssm.com</u>>; Felder, Debra L.

<<u>dfelder@orrick.com</u>>; James Wehner <<u>iwehner@capdale.com</u>>; Enright, Michael <<u>MENRIGHT@RC.com</u>>; Erens, Brad

B.

bberens@jonesday.com>; Cahow, Caitlin K. <ccahow@jonesday.com>; Michael Evert (CMEvert@ewhlaw.com)

<CMEvert@ewhlaw.com>; Clare M. Maisano <cmmaisano@ewhlaw.com>; C. Richard Rayburn, Jr.

<rrayburn@rcdlaw.net>; Jack Miller <jmiller@rcdlaw.net>

Subject: RE: In re Aldrich Pump LLC et al (Case No. 20-30608)

Natalie:

To your first question- if you could send the meeting invite that would be great. If you have questions you can send in advance, we might be better prepared and be more productive. Either way, look forward to talking next week. Thanks.

Morgan R. Hirst Partner JONES DAY® - One Firm Worldwide™ 110 North Wacker Drive Suite 4800

Case 22-00303 Doc 73-5 Filed 03/23/23 Entered 03/23/23 20:02:39 Desc Tab 5 Page 5 of 10

Chicago, Illinois 60606 Office +1.312.269.1535 Mobile +1.773.490.2039 mhirst@jonesday.com

From: Ramsey, Natalie D. <<u>NRamsey@rc.com</u>>
Sent: Thursday, January 5, 2023 11:42 AM
To: Guy, Jonathan P. <jguy@orrick.com>

Cc: Hirst, Morgan R. <mhirst@JonesDay.com>; moskowschnollb@ballardspahr.com; Burns, Tyler

<burnst@ballardspahr.com>; Guerke, Kevin A. <

KGuerke@ycst.com>; dkhogan@dkhogan.com; bsullivan@sha-llc.com; Edwin J. Harron <

eharron@ycst.com>; Wright, Davis L. <

DWright@rc.com>; Kevin C. Maclay <

kmaclay@capdale.com>; Todd E. Phillips@capdale.com>; Glenn C. Thompson <

gthompson@lawhssm.com>; Robert A. Cox, Jr. <

RCox@lawhssm.com>; Felder, Debra L. <

dfelder@orrick.com>; James Wehner <

jwehner@capdale.com>; Enright, Michael <

MENRIGHT@RC.com>; Erens, Brad B.

berens@JonesDay.com>; Cahow, Caitlin K. <

ccahow@Jonesday.com>; Michael Evert (CMEvert@ewhlaw.com) <

CMEvert@ewhlaw.com>; Clare M. Maisano <

cmmaisano@ewhlaw.com>; C. Richard Rayburn, Jr. <

rrayburn@rcdlaw.net>; Jack Miller <

jmiller@rcdlaw.net>

Subject: Re: In re Aldrich Pump LLC et al (Case No. 20-30608)

Speaking for the Committee, we are not yet at a place where we can discuss or evaluate the proposal. We have a number of questions regarding what is intended. As a first step, we think a counsel call would be helpful.

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 5, 2023, at 11:36 AM, Guy, Jonathan P. < jguy@orrick.com > wrote:

Morgan and Natalie Is this counsel only? I believe it would be helpful for the experts to attend. They are the ones that must agree in the end. Thanks

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 5, 2023, at 11:17 AM, Ramsey, Natalie D. <NRamsey@rc.com> wrote:

This message originated from outside your organization

Morgan – let's go with the time on the 12th. Do you want us to circulate an invitation or would you prefer to do so?

From: Hirst, Morgan R. < mhirst@JonesDay.com>

Sent: Thursday, January 5, 2023 10:23 AM

^{**} External mail **

Case 22-00303 Doc 73-5 Filed 03/23/23 Entered 03/23/23 20:02:39 Desc Tab 5 Page 6 of 10

Cc: Brad B. Erens < berens@jonesday.com>; Cahow, Caitlin K.

<ccahow@Jonesday.com>; Michael Evert (CMEvert@ewhlaw.com)

<CMEvert@ewhlaw.com>; Clare M. Maisano <cmmaisano@ewhlaw.com>; C. Richard

Rayburn, Jr. <rrayburn@rcdlaw.net>; Jack Miller <jmiller@rcdlaw.net>

Subject: RE: In re Aldrich Pump LLC et al (Case No. 20-30608)

CAUTION: **EXTERNAL EMAIL**

Hi Natalie:

Happy New Year to you. Be happy to do a meeting on this.

Of the times you mention, the best ones would be either Wednesday 1/11 at 5-6 Eastern or Thursday 1/12 at 10-11 eastern. Let us know if one of those works. Given the DCPF parties are copied on this and I know wanted to be part of any discussion, I presume those times work for them as well.

Thanks much.

Morgan R. Hirst

Partner

JONES DAY® - One Firm WorldwidesM

110 North Wacker Drive **Suite 4800** Chicago, Illinois 60606 Office +1.312.269.1535 Mobile +1.773.490.2039 mhirst@jonesday.com

From: Ramsey, Natalie D. <NRamsey@rc.com> Sent: Wednesday, January 4, 2023 1:13 PM

To: Hirst, Morgan R. <mhirst@JonesDay.com>; moskowschnollb@ballardspahr.com; 'Burns, Tyler' <burnst@ballardspahr.com>; Guerke, Kevin A. <KGuerke@ycst.com>; dkhogan@dkhogan.com; bsullivan@sha-llc.com; Edwin J. Harron <eharron@ycst.com>; Wright, Davis L. <DWright@rc.com>; Kevin C. Maclay <kmaclay@capdale.com>; Todd E. Phillips <tphillips@capdale.com>; Glenn C. Thompson <gthompson@lawhssm.com>; Robert A. Cox, Jr. <RCox@lawhssm.com>; Guy, Jonathan P. <jguy@orrick.com>; Felder, Debra L. <dfelder@orrick.com>; James Wehner <jwehner@capdale.com>; Enright, Michael < MENRIGHT@RC.com>

Cc: Erens, Brad B. <bereens@JonesDay.com>; Cahow, Caitlin K.

<ccahow@Jonesday.com>; Michael Evert (CMEvert@ewhlaw.com)

<CMEvert@ewhlaw.com>; Clare M. Maisano <cmmaisano@ewhlaw.com>; C. Richard

Rayburn, Jr. <rrayburn@rcdlaw.net>; Jack Miller <jmiller@rcdlaw.net>

Subject: RE: In re Aldrich Pump LLC et al (Case No. 20-30608)

** External mail **

Morgan,

Case 22-00303 Doc 73-5 Filed 03/23/23 Entered 03/23/23 20:02:39 Desc Tab 5 Page 7 of 10

Would you be available on Wednesday, the 11th, between 4-6pm ET or Thursday, the 12th, between 9:30-11am ET or 3-4pm ET for a meet and confer regarding the proposed sampling strata and protocol?

Thank you, Natalie

From: Hirst, Morgan R. < mhirst@JonesDay.com>
Sent: Monday, December 19, 2022 5:48 PM

To: moskowschnollb@ballardspahr.com; 'Burns, Tyler' <burnst@ballardspahr.com>; Guerke, Kevin A. <

KGuerke@ycst.com>; dkhogan@dkhogan.com; bsullivan@shallc.com; Edwin J. Harron <

eharron@ycst.com>; Ramsey, Natalie D. <

NRamsey@rc.com>; Wright, Davis L. <

DWright@rc.com>; Kevin C. Maclay

kmaclay@capdale.com>; Todd E. Phillips <

tphillips@capdale.com>; Glenn C. Thompson <

gthompson@lawhssm.com>; Robert A. Cox, Jr. <

RCox@lawhssm.com>; Guy, Jonathan P. <

jguy@orrick.com>; Felder, Debra L. <dfelder@orrick.com>

Cc: Brad B. Erens

berens@jonesday.com>; Cahow, Caitlin K.

<ccahow@Jonesday.com>; Michael Evert (CMEvert@ewhlaw.com)

<<u>CMEvert@ewhlaw.com</u>>; Clare M. Maisano <<u>cmmaisano@ewhlaw.com</u>>; C. Richard

Rayburn, Jr. rrayburn@rcdlaw.net; Jack Miller jmiller@rcdlaw.net>

Subject: In re Aldrich Pump LLC et al (Case No. 20-30608)

CAUTION: EXTERNAL EMAIL

Counsel:

In response to Judge Whitley's November 30 sampling ruling in regard to the Debtors' subpoena served on DCPF, we wanted to begin a dialogue with you to see if we can agree to a sampling methodology. After discussing the issue with Bates White, we suggest that we confer on the structure of the sample first so that we can better ascertain where we differ, if at all.

As we understand Judge Whitley's ruling, the goal is to draw a representative random sample of ten percent of the Aldrich Pump and Murray Boiler ("Aldrich Murray") mesothelioma claims resolved through settlement or verdict between January 1, 2005 and Aldrich Murray's bankruptcy petition date of June 18, 2020 (the "Aldrich Murray Random Sample"). The purpose of the Aldrich Murray Random Sample is to govern the claims for which data is produced by DCPF in response to Aldrich's subpoena.

For the Aldrich Murray Random Sample to best aid in the estimation of Aldrich Murray's asbestos liability, reorganization plan formulation, and/or plan confirmation, the sampling methodology should be a straightforward application of stratified random sampling techniques. The stratification is important to ensure that events that could have a disproportionate impact on the analysis of the Debtors' settlement history, such as claims resolved through high-value settlement, are included in the sample in an efficient manner. Stratification increases the probability that low-frequency events are included, while properly weighting those events and keeping the total sample size similar to that ordered by Judge Whitley. This will allow the Aldrich Murray Random Sample to be a representative and efficient sample that can provide a reliable cross-section of Aldrich Murray's mesothelioma claims' settlement history.

In light of the above, the <u>first question</u> posed is whether you agree that the sample for this purpose should be a stratified random sample?

Case 22-00303 Doc 73-5 Filed 03/23/23 Entered 03/23/23 20:02:39 Desc Tab 5 Page 8 of 10

Assuming you are in agreement, the <u>second question</u> posed concerns the appropriate "categories" with which to stratify. We propose the following:

The data for the Aldrich Murray Random Sample are first restricted to the following population:

- 1. Mesothelioma claims resolved through verdict or settlement (with a resolution amount greater than \$0)
- 2. Resolved between January 1, 2005 and June 18, 2020

These data are then stratified using the following categories:

- 3. Debtor
 - 1. Aldrich
 - 2. Murray
- 4. Resolution type
 - 1. Verdict
 - 2. Settlement
- 5. Resolution period
 - 1. Prior to 2014
 - 2. 2014 and later
- 6. Group deal status
 - 1. Group Deal (whether on or off-complaint)
 - 2. Individual Resolution
- 7. Resolution amount category:
 - 1. > \$0, < \$10,000
 - $2. \geq \$10,000, < \$50,000$
 - $3. \geq $50,000, < $100,000$
 - 4. \geq \$100,000, \leq \$150,000
 - $5. \geq \$150,000, < \$200,000$
 - 6. > \$200,000, < \$250,000
 - 7. \geq \$250,000, \leq \$500,00
 - 8. \geq \$500,000

Finally, to simplify the trusts' matching procedures to their internal databases, the DCPF sample would be limited to only include claimants who have a full SSN available.

For your further information, attached please find a spreadsheet outlining the approximate (based on current data) population of claims included in each of the suggested stratifications for the roughly 12,000 claimants about which information was requested from DCPF. Of course, because some claimants made claims against both Debtors, the total number of claims is greater than 12,000.

Please let us know at your earliest convenience if the above sample structure is acceptable to you. If so, we can then move to the next step of attempting to reach agreement on the selection of the sample within this construct.

¹ The original matching key sent to DCPF was already limited to a subset of claimants. While there are about 28,000 claimants with resolved mesothelioma claims in the Debtors' data, the original matching key was restricted to approximately 12,000 claimants—or about 40% of resolved mesothelioma claimants—by limiting to mesothelioma claims resolved through settlement or verdict, since 2005, and with a full SSN available. Therefore, a limitation to 10% of the 12,000 claimants originally sent to DCPF would actually correspond to a sample of only 4% of overall mesothelioma claimants.

Morgan R. Hirst
Partner

JONES DAY® - One Firm Worldwide™

110 North Wacker Drive
Suite 4800
Chicago, Illinois 60606
Office +1.312.269.1535
Mobile +1.773.490.2039
mhirst@jonesday.com

This e-mail (including any attachments) may contain information that is private, confidential, or protected by attorney-client or other privilege. If you received this e-mail in error, please delete it from your system without copying it and notify sender by reply e-mail, so that our records can be corrected.

This transmittal may be a confidential R+C attorney-client communication or may otherwise be privileged or confidential. If it is not clear that you are the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this transmittal in error; any review, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this transmittal is strictly prohibited. If you suspect that you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by telephone at 1-860-275-8200, or e-mail at it-admin@rc.com, and immediately delete this message and all its attachments.

NOTICE TO RECIPIENT | This e-mail is meant for only the intended recipient of the transmission, and may be a communication privileged by law. If you received this e-mail in error, any review, use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this e-mail is strictly prohibited. Please notify us immediately of the error by return e-mail and please delete this message from your system. Thank you in advance for your cooperation.

^{***}This e-mail (including any attachments) may contain information that is private, confidential, or protected by attorney-client or other privilege. If you received this e-mail in error, please delete it from your system without copying it and notify sender by reply e-mail, so that our records can be corrected.***

Case 22-00303 Doc 73-5 Filed 03/23/23 Entered 03/23/23 20:02:39 Desc Tab 5 Page 10 of 10

For more inform	nation about Or	ick, please	visit http:/	//www.	orrick.com
	acion aboat on	icit, picasc		,	0111011100111

In the course of our business relationship, we may collect, store and transfer information about you. Please see our privacy policy at https://www.orrick.com/Privacy-Policy to learn about how we use this information.

This e-mail (including any attachments) may contain information that is private, confidential, or protected by attorney-client or other privilege. If you received this e-mail in error, please delete it from your system without copying it and notify sender by reply e-mail, so that our records can be corrected.

This e-mail (including any attachments) may contain information that is private, confidential, or protected by attorney-client or other privilege. If you received this e-mail in error, please delete it from your system without copying it and notify sender by reply e-mail, so that our records can be corrected.

The original matching key sent to DCPF was already limited to a subset of claimants. While there are about 28,000 claimants with resolved mesothelioma claims in the Debtors' data, the original matching key was restricted to approximately 12,000 claimants—or about 40% of resolved mesothelioma claimants—by limiting to mesothelioma claims resolved through settlement or verdict, since 2005, and with a full SSN available. Therefore, a limitation to 10% of the 12,000 claimants originally sent to DCPF would actually correspond to a sample of only 4% of overall mesothelioma claimants.

TAB 6

	Page 2 of 5	5	
			1
1	INITED STATES	S RAN	KRUPTCY COURT
-			NORTH CAROLINA
2	CHARLO'	TTE D	IVISION
3	IN RE:	_	Cogo No. 20 20600 (TCM)
3	IN RE:	:	Case No. 20-30608 (JCW) (Jointly Administered)
4	ALDRICH PUMP LLC, ET AL.,	:	(10,
			Chapter 11
5	Debtors,	:	Charlotte, North Carolina
6		:	Thursday, January 26, 2023
			9:30 a.m.
7		:	
8		: :	
O	OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF	:	AP 22-03028 (JCW)
9	ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY		
1.0	CLAIMANTS, on behalf of the	:	
10	estates of Aldrich Pump LLC and Murray Boiler LLC,	:	
11	and narray Borrer BEe,	•	
	Plaintiff,	:	
12		_	
13	v.	:	
	INGERSOLL-RAND GLOBAL	:	
14	HOLDING COMPANY LIMITED,		
15	et al.,	:	
13	Defendants,	:	
16		: :	
1 17	OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF		TD 00 03000 (TGH)
17	OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY	:	AP 22-03029 (JCW)
18	CLAIMANTS, on behalf of the	:	
	estates of Aldrich Pump LLC		
19	and Murray Boiler LLC,	:	
20	Plaintiff,	:	
	11011101111	•	
21	v.	:	
22	TRANE TECHNOLOGIES PLC,	•	
4 4	et al.,	•	
23		:	
0.4	Defendants,		
24		:	
25		• •	

	Page 3 of 55			
				2
1	ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, INC. ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY			
2	SETTLEMENT TRUST, et al.,	:	(Transferred from District of Delaware)	
3	Plaintiffs,			
4	v.			
5	ALDRICH PUMP LLC, et al.,			
6	Defendants,	: :		
7	AC&S ASBESTOS SETTLEMENT :	•	Miscellaneous Pleading	
8	TRUST, et al.,		No. 23-00300 (JCW) (Transferred from District	
9	Petitioners,	•	New Jersey)	
10	v.			
11	ALDRICH PUMP LLC, et al.,			
12	Respondents,			
13	VERUS CLAIM SERVICES, LLC,			
14	Interested Party,			
15	NON-PARTY CERTAIN MATCHING CLAIMANTS,			
16	Interested Party.			
17		: :		:
18	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. CRAIG WHITLEY,			
19	UNITED STATES	BANI	KRUPTCY JUDGE	
20	Audio Operator:	COUR	T PERSONNEL	
21	Transcript prepared by:	JANI	CE RUSSELL TRANSCRIPTS	
22		1418	Red Fox Circle rance, CO 80550	
23		(757) 422-9089 sell31@tdsmail.com	
24				
25	Proceedings recorded by electroproduced by transcription serv		sound recording; transcript	

	Page 5 of 55		
		4	
1	APPEARANCES (continued):		
2	For Defendants, Trane Technologies Company LLC	McCarter & English, LLP BY: GREGORY J. MASCITTI, ESQ.	
3	and Trane U.S. Inc.:	825 Eighth Avenue, 31st Floor New York, NY 10019	
4		Condon Lov Dila	
5		Cordes Law, PLLC BY: STACY C. CORDES, ESQ. 1800 East Boulevard	
6		Charlotte, NC 28203	
7		McGuireWoods, LLP BY: BRADLEY R. KUTROW, ESQ.	
8		201 North Tryon St., Suite 3000 Charlotte, NC 28202	
9	For DCPF:	Young Conaway	
10		BY: KEVIN A. GUERKE, ESQ. 1000 North King Street	
11		Wilmington, Delaware 19801	
12		Alexander Ricks PLLC BY: FELTON PARRISH, ESQ.	
13 14		1420 E. 7th Street, Suite 100 Charlotte, NC 28204	
	For Matching Claimants:	Waldrep Wall	
15 16		BY: THOMAS W. WALDREP, JR., ESQ. 370 Knollwood Street, Suite 600 Winston-Salem, NC 27103	
17		Hogan McDaniel	
18		BY: DANIEL K. HOGAN, ESQ. 1311 Delaware Avenue	
		Wilmington, DE 19806	
19	For Fiduciary Duty	Brooks Pierce	
20	Defendants:	BY: JEFFREY E. OLEYNIK, ESQ. AGUSTIN M. MARTINEZ, ESQ.	
21		P. O. Box 26000 Greensboro, NC 27420	
22			
23			
24			
25			

	Page 6 of 55			
		5		
1 2	ALSO PRESENT:	JOSEPH GRIER, FCR 521 E. Morehead St, Suite 440 Charlotte, NC 28202		
3		SHELLEY ABEL		
4		Bankruptcy Administrator 402 West Trade Street, Suite 200 Charlotte, NC 28202		
5		charrest, no local		
6	APPEARANCES (via telephone):			
7	For Debtors/Defendants, Aldrich Pump LLC and Murray			
8	Boiler LLC:	110 North Wacker Dr., Suite 4800 Chicago, IL 60606		
9		K&L Gates, LLP		
10 11		BY: DAVID F. McGONIGLE, ESQ. 210 Sixth Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15222-2613		
		Ficesburgh, FA 13222-2013		
12	For Travelers Insurance Companies, et al.:	Steptoe & Johnson LLP BY: JOSHUA R. TAYLOR, ESQ.		
13		1330 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036		
14 15	For Asbestos Trusts:	Ballard Spahr BY: TYLER B. BURNS, ESQ.		
16		919 North Market St., 11th Floor Wilmington, DE 19801-3034		
17				
18				
19				
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				
25				

1 PROCEEDINGS (Call to Order of the Court) 2 THE COURT: Have a seat, everyone. Good morning. 3 (Counsel greet the Court) 4 THE COURT: Pretty much a full house this morning. 5 We are here, of course, in the Aldrich Pump and Murray 6 7 Boiler cases and the associated adversary proceedings. We've got an agenda. I guess, the one I'm looking at, is that the 8 base case, is at 1590. It's filed, also, in the adversaries. 9 So I won't repat all that. That's just stated for the record. 10 11 Let's go ahead and get appearances and we'll see where 12 All right. we are. MR. HIRST: Good morning, your Honor. Morgan Hirst of 13 Jones Day for the debtors. I'm joined by Michael Evert from 14 15 Evert Weathersby; Rick Rayburn, Jack Miller from Rayburn Cooper; and Brad Erens from Jones Day is on the phone and is 16 17 going to have a few comments to make on the mediation part of this. 18 19 THE COURT: All right, very good. 20 All right. How about for --21 MR. MASCITTI: Greg Mascitti, McCarter & English, on behalf of Trane Technologies Company LLC and Trane U.S. Inc. 22 I'm joined by local counsel, Stacy Cordes and Brad Kutrow. 23 THE COURT: All right. 24 MS. RAMSEY: Good morning, your Honor. Natalie 25

Ramsey, Robinson & Cole, for the Asbestos Claimants' Committee, 1 2 along with my partner, Davis Lee Wright; Jim Wehner from Caplin & Drysdale; and Rob Cox from Hamilton & Stephens. 3 4 THE COURT: Okay. FCR? 5 MR. GUY: Good morning, your Honor. Jonathan Guy for 6 7 the FCR and I'm joined by the FCR. Thank you. 8 THE COURT: All right. 9 Others in the courtroom needing to announce? 10 11 MR. MARTIN: Good morning, your Honor. Lance Martin from Ward and Smith on behalf of the Asbestos Trusts and Tyler 12 13 Burns of Ballard Spahr is on the phone as well. THE COURT: Okay, very good. 14 15 MR. MARTIN: Thank you. THE COURT: Mr. Oleynik. 16 MR. OLEYNIK: Jeff Oleynik, Brooks Pierce, here today 17 18 for the Fiduciary Duty Defendants, together with my colleague, Agustin Martinez, who just finished clerking for Judge Robinson 19 of Business Court, and like many lawyers in this room, another 20 distinguished Wake grad. 21 22 THE COURT: Okay. Welcome. Shelley Abel, Bankruptcy Administrator. 23 MS. ABEL: 24 THE COURT: Okay.

25

Yes.

Mr. Roten?

MR. ROTEN: Good morning, your Honor. Russell Roten 1 from Duane Morris, representing Certain Insurers. 2 THE COURT: Anyone else? 3 Mr. Waldrep. 4 MR. WALDREP: Your Honor, Tom Waldrep of Waldrep Wall, 5 here representing the Matching Claimants. And I'd like to 6 7 introduce Dan Hogan from Delaware. THE COURT: All right. Welcome. Glad to have you 8 here. 9 10 MR. HOGAN: Thank you. 11 THE COURT: Yes, sir. MR. GUERKE: Good morning, your Honor. Kevin Guerke 12 13 from Young Conaway on behalf of third party, Delaware Claims Processing Facility. I'm here today with North Carolina 14 15 counsel, Felton Parrish. THE COURT: That got it in the courtroom? 16 17 (No response) 18 THE COURT: Other appearances telephonically? Anyone? MR. McGONIGLE: Your Honor, David McGonigle, David 19 20 McGonigle, your Honor, from K&L Gates, special insurance counsel to the debtors. 21 THE COURT: Others? 22 MR. TAYLOR: Good morning, your Honor. Joshua Taylor 23 from Steptoe & Johnson on behalf of the Travelers Insurers. 24 THE COURT: Others? 25

```
1
         (No response)
 2
             THE COURT: Anyone else?
 3
         (No response)
             THE COURT: Okay, good. Very good.
 4
             Well, it's -- we've got a calendar full of status
 5
    hearings and a roomful of, courtroom full of people. So I
 6
    think there must be some divergence there.
 7
             Why don't y'all bring me up to speed as to where the
 8
    case is and we'll get initial comments and then take a look at
 9
    the docket.
10
11
             MR. HIRST: So, your Honor, I'm not sure we have
    initial comments today. I think most of them can be handled
12
    in --
13
             THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
14
15
    response).
             MR. HIRST: -- the order that the agenda's in.
16
17
    think we'll get everybody up to date then. I'm not sure if the
    ACC or the FCR --
18
19
             THE COURT: Anyone else feel different?
20
         (No response)
21
             THE COURT: All right. Let's start at the top, then.
22
             MR. HIRST:
                         Okay.
             So the first thing we have up on the agenda, your
23
24
    Honor, is the motion directing the parties to mandatory
25
    mediation. And Mr. Erens, I believe, is on the phone and was
```

```
going to provide the Court with an update as to where we're at
 1
 2
    on that.
 3
             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
             Mr. Erens?
 4
             Is it Star 6?
 5
             We're not hearing you if you're speaking, Mr. Erens.
 6
             MR. HIRST: Your Honor, we were, luckily, prepared for
 7
    this possibility and so I'm going to hand it off to Mr. Evert
 8
    to give the mediation status update.
 9
10
             MR. ERENS:
                         No, I'm on, your Honor.
11
             THE COURT:
                         There we go.
                         I had to Star 6, as you indicated.
             MR. ERENS:
12
             THE COURT:
                         Is this the Patrick Mahomes move, that
13
    you're well enough to play?
14
                         Right.
15
             MR. ERENS:
             THE COURT:
                         Okay, Mr. Erens.
                                            Try again.
16
17
             MR. ERENS:
                         All right. Thank you, your Honor.
                                                              Sorry
18
    about that.
                    We're pleased to announce that -- I think the
19
             Yeah.
20
    Court is generally aware -- that we have agreement among the
21
    mediation parties on mediation or mediators and, in this case,
    it's, the agreement is two co-mediators rather than one
22
               The two co-mediators that have been agreed to by the
23
    parties are Eric Green and Tim Gallagher, both very well-known
24
    mediators within the, the, the business and the industry, so to
25
```

speak.

1

We've been in the process for the last couple of weeks 2 of working with the parties on the mediation procedures order. 3 We're very close to done. We were hoping to have it before the 4 hearing, but it just didn't happen. We assume that we'll be 5 able to submit it fairly shortly, just finishing last-minute 6 7 comments and parties and the like and we need to recirculate it, probably, one more time. The order does provide that the 8 mediation, subject to the availability of the co-mediators, 9 would begin no later than 90 days after entry of the order. 10 11 So our expectation is that the mediation will commence no later than approximately May 1 and we'll obviously start 12 13 working with the parties soon on logistics in terms of scheduling meetings and the locations and the like. 14 15 So that's all in good shape and as I said, we, our 16 intent is to submit the order shortly. 17 THE COURT: Anyone else want to weigh in with regard 18 to the mediation? Anyone?

(No response)

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

then.

THE COURT: All right, very good. We'll move along,

Thank you, Mr. Erens.

MR. ERENS: Sure. Thank you, your Honor.

MR. HIRST: All right, your Honor. Morgan Hirst again for the debtors.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

```
I think I'll take Docket Nos. 2 through 8 kind of
together and maybe I'll just start with an overall status on
third-party trust discovery.
         THE COURT: Before you do that, let me make, mention
to the clerk.
         On that first matter, you do not need to continue it
over.
      We'll just wait for the order.
         THE COURTROOM DEPUTY:
                               Okay.
         THE COURT: Okay? All right.
         Go ahead.
        MR. HIRST: Okay.
         So on, the ones that actually aren't on the agenda and
are not, therefore, before, your Honor, I just want to give an
update.
         Paddock subpoena, your Honor, may be aware, is, I
think, now close to completed. We had our last hearing in
Delaware in front of Judge Silverstein on, I believe it was,
January 6th where she overruled all further efforts to modify
or, or limit the data we were going to receive. Paddock has
produced the information, all the information in response to
the subpoena. There's, I think, a dozen or so we're meeting
and conferring with them about. So we expect that,
essentially, to be wrapped.
         On Manville, which is pending in the District of
Columbia District Court, your Honor, there's still motions to
```

transfer that to your Honor pending. We have not heard back from the District Court there.

That takes us to the two that are now in front of your Honor, the DCPF subpoenas, which are, and the related trusts, and Matching Claimants, which are Nos. 2, 3, 4, yeah, 2, 3, and 4 on the agenda. And then the Verus subpoenas, which are 6, 7, and 8, which were recently transferred over to your Honor.

On DCPF, we were last before your Honor on November 30th.

10 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 11 response).

MR. HIRST: At that time you denied the motions to quash, but ordered that there be sampling and you also denied the motion to proceed anonymously. On the motion to proceed anonymously, we actually need to get an order in front of your Honor on that. I think that may have slipped through the cracks. On the motion to quash, we're kind of waiting for the sampling discussion to take place so we could incorporate that in the order. We did make a proposal, the debtors did, to the ACC, the FCR, and DCPF on December 19th. We met and conferred with ACC, FCR, DCPF and the Verus parties as well 'cause by then they had been transferred. We met with them on January 12th. We, since that time, exchanged some correspondence with Ms. Ramsey, answering some questions, and then this morning about an hour before court we got a proposal back from the ACC.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

14 I understand that is the ACC's proposal only and not a proposal on behalf of the Trusts, which are subject to the We have actually not heard from them other than in the meet and confer since that point. So we really don't know where they stand on our proposal, "they" being the DCPF Trusts and the, the Verus Trust. So we're still waiting to hear back from them. And I think on DCPF, the only other update is we understand they've produced the information to the DBMP subpoena within the last week, that they have produced all of that data. On Verus, it's now, largely, I think in lockstep with It was transferred from the District Court in New Jersey to your Honor on the 4th. I know that has now hit the docket and was assigned to your Honor and it's up for status today, which is -- what did I say before this -- I think Items 5, 6, 7. The one thing in the transfer order is the parties agreed that the, any production that Verus and the Trusts did

would be consistent with whatever orders are entered on the DCPF subpoena.

And other than that on third-party discovery, I think that is the status report.

Then we're on No. 8, Non-Matching MR. EVERT: Claimants' Motion to Proceed Anonymously.

```
1
             MR. HIRST: Oh, yeah. There -- and then -- I
 2
    should -- yeah. I apologize.
             No. 8 on the docket is the Verus Matching Claimants'
 3
    Motion to Proceed Anonymously.
 4
 5
             THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
 6
    response).
                         I don't know how your Honor would like to
 7
             MR. HIRST:
    handle that. We can set it for a date, I'm sure. You've heard
 8
    those motions a lot in the past. I can tell you we, on behalf
 9
    of the debtors, will be happy to have those ruled on the papers
10
11
    on the motions to proceed anonymously since we don't really
    want to argue them again, but we're happy to do so if, if
12
13
    that's what your Honor prefers.
             THE COURT: Okay, very good.
14
15
             ACC?
                          Thank you, your Honor.
16
             MS. RAMSEY:
17
             So we, we believe that we are making some progress
18
    with respect to the discussion on sampling. As the debtor
    indicated, it sent its proposed sample on December 19th.
19
    then had a meet and confer on January the 12th where we
20
    discussed questions that we had regarding the debtors' sample
21
22
    and on January the 17th the FCR proposed a different sample.
    We then engaged in further dialogue. I understood that the
23
    debtor did not accept --
24
             THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
25
```

response).

1

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

MS. RAMSEY: -- the FCR's proposal and as Mr. Hirsh 2 [sic] indicated, then turned to our expert to ask our expert to 3 work with what the debtor had proposed to see if it could 4 propose a compromise that might be acceptable to all parties. 5 We shared that with the FCR last evening and with the debtor 6 7 this morning. None of the other parties have seen that yet. We thought it was important to get buy-in first from the 8 primary parties. Obviously, the parties are not in a position, 9 the other parties, to react to it as yet, but I will represent 10 11 to the Court that it is, largely, a simplified version of what the debtor had proposed, essentially reducing the number of 12 13 strata by about half. We also have some agreement with the debtors that we've reached with respect to the time frame for 14 15 the sample.

So I think that we're making very good progress and we're very likely to get there. There seems to be agreement, generally, on the number of claims to be sampled, on the time frame to be sampled, and now the question is just the strata to be applied. But even looking at those, we don't believe we're substantially far from reaching agreement.

THE COURT: Okay, good.

MS. RAMSEY: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Guy.

MR. GUY: Your Honor, I'm not sure if we're up to No.

```
9 yet, but if we are, I don't want to --
 1
 2
             THE COURT: Somewhere between 2 and 9.
             MR. GUY: Maybe I'll wait till everybody's finished,
 3
    then I can get to 9.
 4
 5
             THE COURT: Okay.
             Anyone else need to weigh in on, on where we are on
 6
    the, on the various questions of, of the trust discovery and
 7
 8
    the subpoenas and the motions to quash and the like?
 9
         (No response)
             THE COURT: Is there anyone wanting to be heard on the
10
11
    new matter we're -- we're -- the one that just got to us to be
    heard on the, with argument, or do we, can we resolve that on
12
13
    the papers filed?
             MR. HIRST: Is the, the Verus --
14
15
             MR. EVERT:
                         No. 8.
             MR. HIRST:
16
                         Yep.
17
             THE COURT: Right. Yeah, the one that --
18
             MR. EVERT: The Match, the Matching Claimants' motion,
19
    your Honor.
                         What's our number? Let's see.
20
             THE COURT:
21
             MR. EVERT:
                         No. 8, I believe.
22
             THE COURT:
                         Yeah.
                                Right.
             How do we feel about that?
23
             Folks are just with us, Verus Claims. Anyone feel the
24
25
    need to have a, a verbal hearing or file other pleadings or
```

```
other briefs?
 1
 2
        (No response)
             THE COURT: Doesn't sound like it. You want to just
 3
    give me that under submission and I, I'll try to give you a
 4
 5
    decision at our next hearing date? I think that's the 14th.
                         That's right. That's fine.
 6
             MR. HIRST:
 7
             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
                         That should take care of that.
             All right.
 8
             MR. EVERT: Your Honor, just before we get to No. 9,
 9
    Michael Evert on behalf of the debtors.
10
11
             I, I am hopeful Ms. Ramsey's optimistic comments are
    accurate and I'm sure they are accurate. I'm sure she is
12
13
    optimistic and, and I hope we are, too. We haven't had a
    chance to look at it. She sent it this morning, so.
14
15
             THE COURT: Sure.
             MR. EVERT:
                         Just -- I -- I didn't -- but, but I
16
17
    hope she's right.
             THE COURT: Well, how do y'all want to approach that,
18
    just kick it over to the 14th and hope that everyone's ready to
19
20
    go then?
             MR. EVERT: I, I think that's probably right, your
21
            I mean, obviously, Mr. Guy, the FCR, has the sampling
22
    motion -- it is No. 9 -- that we're about to talk about. I
23
    don't know if that's going to create further discussion or not.
24
             But I think for the purposes of, of the technical 2
25
```

```
1
    through 7 --
 2
             THE COURT: Right.
             MR. EVERT: -- I quess, then I think, yes. Our next
 3
    hearing is actually in two, is really in two weeks.
 4
 5
             THE COURT:
                         Right.
             MR. EVERT: It's the 14th.
 6
 7
             THE COURT: Right.
             MR. EVERT: So we're going to be here pretty quickly.
 8
             So that would be my suggestion, your Honor, is carry
 9
    it over. We'll continue to meet and confer. And again,
10
11
    obviously, hopefully, Ms. Ramsey's right.
             THE COURT: Everyone good with that?
12
             MS. RAMSEY: That's acceptable to the Committee, your
13
    Honor, again subject to the FCR's --
14
15
             THE COURT: Whatever happens later --
             MS. RAMSEY: Yes.
16
17
             THE COURT: -- in the morning, right.
18
             MR. GUY: Yes, your Honor. I mean, I -- we can get to
    it when everybody's ready. I'm not sure.
19
20
             Are we at that point?
21
             MR. EVERT: I -- I -- your Honor, I think we are to
    No. 9 on the agenda.
22
             THE COURT: Okay.
23
             Mr. Guy.
24
             MR. GUY: Reminds me of a Beatles' song. I guess
25
```

1 | that's a reference I'm too old.

closer to one.

Your Honor, the reason we wanted to be here in person is to talk about sampling and as is always the case in these cases, things move very quickly and you think you have a disagreement and then suddenly when you sit down you're getting

7 When I was writing my notes last night I said, "Well, 8 I want an order, please, your Honor."

9 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 10 response).

MR. GUY: Because when we were back with you in October I said "I'd like an order so that the parties would actually be required to talk" --

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).

MR. GUY: -- "then we would get closure and then if we couldn't agree." I think the parties are working in good faith, but we're clearly not here yet.

What I'd like, your Honor, is for the parties to get there by the next hearing. And there's been exchanges and I think there's no reason why that can't happen other than just people carving the time and sitting down. We repeatedly make the offer, "We'll make our experts available." I think the experts should be talking, not the lawyers. And I'd like it to happen in the next two weeks.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

The reason I raise it -- and I've said this before, I apologize for being a bit of a broken record -your Honor. but in 2019, your Honor, Aldrich had 1500 meso claims filed against it. Murray had 1100 meso claims filed against it. And Aldrich had 900 lung cancer and Murray, 800. I'm just making the numbers simple. Aldrich paid 66 percent of its claims. Murray paid 35 percent of its claims. Every meso claimant that was pending when this case was filed is dead now, or likely dead. Not every one of those claims that were filed were paid. Not every one was dismissed, but if we just assume a thousand a year, talking like three people a day. The people who are dying tomorrow were Mr. Grier's clients when this case started and as the Court knows, we have a deal on the table. We have a QSF on the table. There's been discussions with the debtors and the insurers and we're ready to move. We're ready to get this case confirmed and it's held up on all sorts of issues that the Court's familiar with that I'm not going to argue today. But --Joe, if you could pull up the fees? Your Honor, this is, you've seen this chart before and I update it every time I'm before you. If any of the other parties feel the need THE COURT: to move closer to a monitor, go, go right ahead. All right.

```
I think that is an old one, Joe. I think we
 1
             MR. GUY:
 2
    need January.
             Well, let, let me approach, your Honor. 'Cause I --
 3
             MR. HIRST: Here's, here's a current one.
 4
 5
             MR. GUY: There you go.
             Your Honor, and I have this, a hard copy if you'd like
 6
 7
    to receive it, but you probably have enough paper, already.
 8
    But I'll bring it up.
 9
             THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
             MR. GUY: May I approach, your Honor?
10
11
             THE COURT: You may.
             MR. GUY: And all the parties have --
12
13
             THE COURT: Okay.
             MR. GUY: We circulated these to the parties in
14
15
    advance of the hearing, your Honor.
16
        (Document handed to the Court)
17
             THE COURT: Very good.
18
             MR. GUY: Is that the one that's up?
             MR. GRIER: Yeah.
19
             MR. GUY: No.
20
21
             MR. GRIER: This is the one. It should be up.
22
             MR. GUY: Okay.
             Bestwall, $227 million, your Honor. They're over five
23
    years in. That's longer than America was in the Second World
24
          Paddock, 33 million, but that number's not getting any
25
```

bigger. Our number's getting bigger. We're at 70 now. We're
right up there with DBMP, even though they filed six months
before.

It's not a shortage of manpower and I don't want to put up all the various professionals, but everybody has their claims experts, their financial consultants. There's, there's experts here who can do this and they can do it quickly with the encouragement from the Court. I don't think an order's necessary, your Honor, but strict encouragement so that when we get before the Court on the 14th we at least know exactly where we stand. We don't want to be in this situation like Bestwall.

Your Honor, I, I just want to talk generically about sampling because I think there's been a lot of confusion.

So in all of the other cases pre-Garlock, if you wanted to estimate what the debtor's asbestos liability was you looked at its settlement database and the parties' experts had access to that. It was kept confidential, but they had all that raw data. There was no need for a sample. They had it all and predictions were done off of that. Post-Garlock, Garlock makes the argument, the legal liability theory, and as you know, your Honor, we strongly resist that theory. We don't think it's correct, but point is is that's the debtor's theory in all these cases now. It's their theory that there was evidence suppression and that's the only reason we're talking about sampling, because of the privilege issue.

So in <u>Garlock</u>, we didn't get a chance because they had this database. It was the claims database. They didn't even meet and at trial we had two polar opposite theories.

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).

MR. GUY: The ACC's view -- and we agree with it -is, "If you're going to say that there was evidence
suppression, we want to see your files." No one wants to see
15,000 files. That's the only reason we're talking sampling
and I want to stress that, your Honor. It's got nothing to do
with predicting the legal liability off settlements. It's to
avoid privilege fights. Try to get the sample down to a
reasonable number so that when you have those attendant fights,
which you're going to have, it's not going to take the Court
thousands of hours. You're not going to need a special referee
to come in. It can be done. It can be done quickly.

The other thing that we're pushing for, your Honor, is we want to get to the point where even though the parties may not agree, well, we agree with your theory; we agree with their theory, at least they agree that the samples they have are random and that the protocol is acceptable to the experts from a statistical basis. They may not agree with what you're going to use it for, but they should at least agree that it's a random representative sample of what we've got. Because we want to avoid the situation we got to in Bestwall.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Your Honor, you remember when we were before you the argument was, "Well, we're working on this in Bestwall. We get a deal in Bestwall, well, we can take it over here." I kind of like, I quess I'm naïve a lot and I naïvely thought, "Well, That, that sounds like a good plan. "Your Honor, we got veah. to Bestwall. They had seven continuances. If we could pull out the order, Joe. A couple of days ago, the Bestwall order was entered. And this is the order that I was excitedly thinking would say, "Okay. Here are the details of the sampling protocol and we can all agree to that and we can use it here." 'Cause the, the same experts, same parties agree to it. All they've effectively agreed to, your Honor, is to fight about it later. That's the language: "All rights of the Parties to challenge the Initial Discovery Claims, the Debtor's Sample, the Additional Claims, or the Claimant Sample ... for any purpose other than discovery are preserved." So here's the specter that I want to avoid. We spent two years fighting over discovery. We get to estimation trial and either one of the sides puts up their hand and says, "That's not a valid sample," or, "It's not random. Throw it out. Let's start over." We don't want to be there. We want people to be paid. Bottom line, your Honor, is we don't want

to be talking about this two years from now and \$200 million

in. That's like a third of what's on the table. That money goes out the door, it goes out the door. It's not coming back to pay claimants.

Your Honor, that was very clear from the last hearing before Bestwall. And I, what I've handed you up is a transcript. You don't need to read the whole transcript, but Ms. Ramsey talked about this exact problem, which is claimants aren't getting paid and the Judge's reaction to that was at Page 35, and you can see it. And basically, what she said was, "It is in the claimants' best interest to get an end to this." That's what she said.

"I'm very anxious to get all these discovery disputes, you know, the claim sample and other discovery disputes, wrapped up so we can get on with this, so we can get these claimants paid. The more quickly we do that, the better off for everybody."

That sums it up perfectly. That's exactly what we want. And we filed our sampling motion back in September and it's now nearly February. I urge the parties to do this in the next two weeks so when we get back before February 14th -- and, and your Honor, I solicit your assistance in urging the parties to do that, however you think best to do, the order, gentle encouragement, harsh encouragement, whatever it is. Because we need to get there and we can get there.

Thank you, your Honor.

1 THE COURT: Thank you.

2 Others?

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

3 Ms. Ramsey.

MS. RAMSEY: Thank you, your Honor.

I feel a little compelled to respond to some of the discussion about Bestwall. Bestwall is its own, followed its own path, your Honor, very, very different from this case and I think we have all learned as we've gone along about the need to address these issues of sampling earlier in the case and we've all learned a lot about sampling. I, I was saying to someone earlier this morning I think I've spent about 30 hours on the phone with statisticians under, trying to understand how they do their work and the importance of construction of the sample and the use of a sample. And the difficulty with sampling is that in order to agree that a sample is appropriate, you have to have concluded before precisely what it is you're sampling and how it's going to be used. And, and the difficulty in these cases is that until the results of the sample come in and you have expert reports before the Court that detail how the sample is being used, you can't agree upfront that a sample is necessarily appropriate for every potential use.

And so to some extent, the language that is quoted in the Bestwall order is, is a little different, but some of that labor is going to be necessary here as well. There is no way upfront -- or there is a way, but the parties are probably not

it for purposes of discovery.

going to get there at this point -- to agree that a sample is appropriate for all potential uses. And so what we can do, I think, and achieve is I think that we can agree that the parties agree that the strata that has been selected is appropriate for estimation purposes. I think we can get there. I think we can agree on a mechanism or a protocol for determining the stratification and then selecting the files in the stratified random sample that is random. I think we can probably get to that point. And I think that we can agree to

Bestwall's a little different in that the origin of the disagreement was that the claimants did not agree with the, the strata and the mechanism that was used by the debtor to construct its sample and the debtor didn't agree with the strata and the mechanism used by the claimants. And so there, the reservation was broader. I think if we can agree to one sample here, we can get marginally closer, but I did want to make it clear so that there's no misunderstanding that there may still be disagreements at the time we get to estimation over the use of the sample and the propriety of the way that the sample was selected for the use to which it's being put.

So it's, it's a more complicated than it sounds circumstance to, to identify the strata, to select the stratification, and then to identify the different ways that statisticians put that information together to reach

conclusions and, and it can be completely clean or it can be subject to manipulation like a lot of math.

So, so I, I just wanted to make sure that the Court was aware that with respect to, to the sample we, we can make, I think, good headway. I think we can avoid some of the delays and the complications that came up when we were very first dealing with some of these issues in Bestwall, but there still will be some uncertainty and potential for disagreement at the end of the day.

The other point I just wanted to hit very quickly is Mr. Guy said the money's going out and it's not coming back.

Obviously, from the claimant perspective we do not agree with that. We understand that the funding agreement does not permit that to be the case. And so I just wanted to respond to that as well.

Thank you, your Honor.

17 THE COURT: Very good.

18 Mr. Evert.

MR. EVERT: Thank you, your Honor.

I guess I, I want to cover a couple things. I fear that we're conflating two issues here today and I, and I want to make sure that at least, at least I try to give it a shot to try to explain what I mean.

The FCR's motion, as Mr. Guy described, deals with the sampling of claims files for -- to -- for a lot of reasons.

He, he highlighted the privilege issue, which is obviously one 1 of the big reasons, but we're really talking about there a lot 2 of, a massive number of documents, I mean, and this, of course, 3 arises from the discovery requests to us that the ACC sent that 4 said, "Give me all your claims files." And it's a massive 5 amount of documents. Much of it is not electronic. So we're 6 7 talking hard paper. We're talking big numbers and it is, and we're talking most, what, what we would anticipate to be a lot 8 of privileged material. 9 So it is perfect for sampling as described in any 10 11 literature you look at, whether it's the case law, whether it's the Manual for Complex Litigation, it -- it -- it fits all the 12 13 benchmarks. We will definitely save considerable time and expense by coming up with a sample of the claims files. 14 15 of course, that's what the order in Bestwall refers to. What we were talking about earlier today were 16 discussions with the ACC and the Trusts about the Court's order 17 18 in regard to sampling of the trust discovery from DCPF. THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 19 response). 20 MR. EVERT: And as the Court knows, you -- and we --21 we -- we -- we didn't hide it. I'm not good at hiding 22 anything, anyway -- we, we were surprised by the Court's order 23 and we disagree with it. We, we don't think that, that the 24

trust discovery is appropriate for sampling. It's a dataset.

We haven't heard from the Trusts yet.

It's, it's all electronic. I can only imagine the uproar if we had showed up with our claims database and said to the other side, "You know, we're just going to give you a sample because that would be so," but we heard the Court and we reached out two weeks after the hearing and, and proposed a sampling protocol and as we said, the ACC got back to us this morning.

But for, for all those reasons, we, we believe that that's inappropriate for sampling, but here we are and I have to say that, in an unusual position for this case, I agree with a lot of what Ms. Ramsey said. The sampling depends, or the quality of the sampling depends on the objective, I think is what she was essentially saying, and we have all spent far too much time with statisticians over this, over this issue and until you know the precise objective you can't really, and precisely what is trying to be extrapolated from that sample, it's extremely difficult to determine whether the sample is statistically appropriate.

So part of the flaw, I believe, in the FCR's motion is that the assumption that the Court could actually hear now before it hears estimation proof the issue of whether the sample is appropriately drawn. You could hear it. I'm, I'm not sure you'd have enough information to rule on it and you certainly would increase the idea of bias associated with a statistical sample. I mean, we all know that, again, you look

at any of the literature on sampling and it all says the 1 sampled extrapolation is never going to be the same as 2 investigation of the whole dataset. If it is, it's merely 3 fortuitous, right? 4 Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 5 THE COURT: 6 response). 7 MR. EVERT: The, the sample's going to differ in some form or fashion when you try to extrapolate the whole dataset. 8 So that builds in for the Court an uncertainty, a complexity, 9 that's not there, right, when you, when you look at the entire 10 11 dataset. As a result, when you then layer on top of that the Court trying to reach a determination of whether a sample is 12 appropriate before the Court knows exactly what's going to be 13 extrapolated or exactly the goals, then you sort of double down 14 15 on the, on the complexity and the uncertainty associated with 16 sampling. 17 So we fully agree, and I, and it sounds like the ACC 18 agrees. So, so I think, again, this has been, I think --Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 19 THE COURT: 20 response). MR. EVERT: -- at the last hearing I said it's a bit 21 of a kumbaya moment for this case because we, you know, we, 22 we've fought over everything. It seems to be that all the 23

parties agree. When it comes to the claims files, we need to

sample because it's too voluminous and, and in our view, it's

24

difficult for the Court at this time to determine whether or not the sample is appropriate. Now if we can reach an agreement, all, all the better.

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).

MR. EVERT: But for the Court to say, "Oh, this is statistically significant or not," or, "This is," it's, it's hard to do at this time. Again, looking at the Manual for Complex Litigation and some of the case law, they all say that when, when the court is looking at samples sometimes the court decides, even if there are uncertainties associated with the sample, to take in the evidence and just let it go to the weight or the appropriate value of the sample. And I think that's very often where you end up in these sort of situations.

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).

MR. EVERT: So if we look at where they're going to be in Bestwall, as I understand it, they're both going to show up at estimation with their slightly different samples. 'Cause I think there, there are, is some similarity, as I understand it, between, between the stratified random samples that they're taking and they're both going to stand up and justify for the Court why their sample is either better or more appropriate or gives a better estimate, or whatever. What we're all trying to do is, of course, provide the Court with the best estimate we

can.

- THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).
- MR. EVERT: And so that's why, of course, for the
 trust discovery we wanted the entire dataset. That allows us
 to give the best estimate we can. That's why for the samples
 in <u>Bestwall</u> they decided, "Well, let us do ours and you do
 yours and then we'll get to the same spot."
 - So all that adds up to, I don't, I don't want to conflate the two issues. Mr. Guy's motion -- I'm sorry -- the FCR's motion --
- THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response).
 - MR. EVERT: -- originally sought for this issue to be heard when trust discovery was over, all right? So we're, we're not there yet. But also, was specifically targeted to claims files and it sounds like we're all in agreement. Claims files need to be sampled and it sounds like we're tending towards agreement that it needs to be a stratified random sample and that stratified random sample has some, at this point, has some similarities. That's all good. We'll continue to work on that. But I -- I -- I don't want the Court to hear, "Oh, that means that the, that the debtor agrees that the -- that" --
- THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative

Page 36 of 55 1 response). 2 MR. EVERT: -- "that the ruling on, on the, on trust discovery is appropriate." So I, I don't want those two 3 conflated. 4 Lastly, but -- lastly, what, what we would say is that 5 Ms. Ramsey in our meet, one of our meet and confers asked me if 6 we would have the same sample, if we would propose the same 7 sample for trust discovery and for claims file discovery and my 8 answer to her at that time is the same answer I would give now, 9 which is they can't be the same because the ACC wants 10 11 dismissals to be included in the claims file discovery and dismissals are not included in the trust discovery because, 12 13 because, of course, we were only seeking information on resolved claims. However, the methodology could be similar. 14 15 So I think that it sounds like the proposal that they have sent this morning has similar methodology to what's going 16 17 on in Bestwall. And so the effort is -- oh, it doesn't. 18 MS. RAMSEY: Huh-uh (indicating a negative response). I'm sorry. Okay. I misstated. 19 MR. EVERT: MS. RAMSEY: Huh-uh (indicating a negative response). 20 21 MR. EVERT: So it's similar to the methodology we proposed at least in this case. And so we're, we're trying to 22

But I -- I -- the -- to me, the samples are never going to be the same --

get somewhere to the middle.

23

24

```
THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
 1
 2
    response).
             MR. EVERT: -- because of this dismissal issue.
 3
             So I'm glad to answer any questions, but it's -- it's
 4
    -- it's a morass.
 5
             THE COURT: Okav.
 6
 7
             Anyone else before I go back to Mr. Guy?
             MS. RAMSEY: Can I -- shall I wait till Mr. Guy or --
 8
             THE COURT:
                         Well --
 9
             MR. GUY: I don't care. Go --
10
11
             MS. RAMSEY: I had one, one comment, your Honor, just
    with respect to, to the presentation by, by Mr. Evert.
12
             With respect to best information or limited
13
    information, again --
14
15
             THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
    response).
16
17
             MS. RAMSEY: -- that, that is one of the reasons that,
18
    that we sought discovery on all the files. Because no matter
    what, less information is less information. It's just the way
19
    it is. We, we understand that that is complicated and that it
20
21
    is going, would cause delay and we are prepared to, to limit
22
    our discovery with respect to, to a sample.
             But, but I did want to highlight that we find
23
    ourselves in, in somewhat of a similar situation and that in a
24
    best possible world we would know everything that the debtor
25
```

```
They would put it all --
 1
    knows.
 2
             THE COURT:
                         Sure.
             MS. RAMSEY: -- in some room, we would go through it,
 3
    and we would all be on the same page. But that is a very
 4
 5
    difficult proposition, we understand.
             THE COURT: Would that include the debtor having all
 6
 7
    the, the attorney file information from the plaintiffs'
    attorneys as well? I mean, if it were an open book, it would
 8
    be some, one thing and --
 9
             MS. RAMSEY: Well, the, the problem with that, your
10
11
    Honor, I think -- the Court is obviously right that if we're,
    if we're trying to actually examine that book -- but this is,
12
13
    the difficulty here is the debtor has put this at issue.
    not our position. Our position is --
14
15
             THE COURT: I, I don't want to argue about it --
             MS. RAMSEY: -- a settlement's a settlement.
16
17
             THE COURT: -- but my --
18
             MS. RAMSEY: Yes.
             THE COURT: -- my point is when we're talking about
19
    what we're looking at, whether we go with a sample or we go to
20
    totality to determine what people knew and what they asserted,
21
    it seems like if you're going to do what you were proposing, it
22
    would be everything. But, but let me ask the, the naïve
23
    question I've been asking all along in this case. I still
24
```

don't understand it.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

```
This is an estimation and at the end of the day the
claimants have the block. You -- Judge Hodges gave a very low
number as compared to where we ended up in Garlock.
tenth of what, what I think the claimants were asking for. So
at the end of the day, you, you weren't willing to go forward
with that and then negotiations break out.
         I still don't guite understand why we need entire
precision with regard to the estimation number to, to the point
of why can't you just come in and have one hearing and, and
tell me what your experts think and I pick a number and then
you move on, so.
        MS. RAMSEY: So your Honor, we, we actually -- the
Court may recall -- and I, I, I think it was this case -- we,
we filed a motion at one point suggesting that we do this in
stages --
        THE COURT: Right.
        MS. RAMSEY: -- and have a --
        THE COURT: Right.
        MS. RAMSEY: -- a estimate based on the database --
        THE COURT: It was in this one.
        MS. RAMSEY: -- first and then, if that didn't result
in anything --
        THE COURT: Right.
        MS. RAMSEY: -- go to the second step.
        We, we tend to agree with the Court. The, the
```

```
difficulty from the claimant perspective --
 1
 2
             THE COURT: Right.
             MS. RAMSEY: -- and I, I want to be very transparent
 3
    about this -- is that in addition to reaching a low number,
 4
 5
    Judge Hodges made some very critical determinations about the,
    the, the way that the plaintiffs and the tort lawyers behaved
 6
 7
    in the tort system.
             THE COURT: Of course.
 8
             MS. RAMSEY: And that is a responsibility that we
 9
    bear, is to not let that happen again on our watch. And so as
10
11
    we are looking ahead at what we, we anticipate the allegations
    to be and the evidence the debtor intends to put on to be, we
12
13
    have to be in a position --
             THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
14
15
    response).
             MS. RAMSEY: -- to respond to that and, and that is,
16
17
    largely, the motivation behind --
18
             THE COURT: Okay.
19
             MS. RAMSEY: -- our desire --
20
             THE COURT: I get it.
21
             MS. RAMSEY: -- for the discovery.
22
             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
23
             MS. RAMSEY: Thank you.
             THE COURT: All right.
24
25
             MR. EVERT: I, I just would also say, Judge, a couple
```

```
things.
```

11

One, recall that when we originally made the

3 estimation motion in front of you we proposed that you just

decide whether or not the 545 was sufficient --

5 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative

6 response).

7 MR. EVERT: -- the \$545 million agreement that we had

8 | with the --

9 THE COURT: Right.

10 MR. EVERT: -- with the FCR. And, and the Court said,

"No, no, no. I think I've got to come up with a number."

12 THE COURT: Right.

MR. EVERT: So, so what we -- we were -- we were

14 | trying to streamline it. Maybe -- may -- maybe if, if the

15 | Court wants to revisit that, we're glad to revisit that, but

16 | that's one thing.

And then the, the second is is I think that, you know,

18 from, from our perspective we're, we're trying to provide the

19 | Court with the best estimation --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. EVERT: -- that we can.

22 THE COURT: Sure.

23 MR. EVERT: And maybe the Court agrees with it, maybe

24 | the Court doesn't. But we, we want -- and I, I, I know, you

25 know, we had, we had a disagreement about this -- we would like

```
to get to a deal and we would like to get a trust going and we
 1
    would like to get the claimants paid fully, fairly, finally,
 2
 3
    all the, you know --
             THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
 4
    response).
 5
 6
             MR. EVERT: -- all --
 7
             THE COURT:
                         All the stuff.
                          -- all the "F" words --
             MR. EVERT:
 8
             THE COURT:
                          Right.
 9
                          -- that you like to say, so.
10
             MR. EVERT:
11
             THE COURT:
                          I think you're missing a couple.
                          Oh, well. PG=19, or whatever it is.
12
             MR. EVERT:
             THE COURT:
                          Right.
13
                          So, so as a result, Judge, I mean, I think
14
             MR. EVERT:
15
    that's a couple comments on your question.
16
             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
17
             Back to you, Mr. Guy.
18
             MR. GUY: Thank you, your Honor.
             THE COURT: Leave out the "F" words.
19
20
             MR. GUY: I sometimes forget this is the FCR's motion,
21
    but --
             Your Honor, I, I've never had a situation where
22
    everybody seems to be in agreement, but we can't get to yes --
23
24
             THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
25
    response).
```

```
MR. GUY: -- quickly. So let's just break it down,
 1
 2
    your Honor.
             What I heard was there's acceptance to the idea of
 3
    having one sample. Of course, right? The problem with
 4
    Bestwall is the debtor started with what was criticized as a
 5
 6
    cherry-picked sample. So now we have two samples.
 7
             THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
    response).
 8
             MR. GUY: And we're going to add a year to the
 9
    litigation, which is the Court's response in Bestwall.
10
11
    like really, another year? Another year and no one's getting
    paid?
12
             The experts haven't even sat down in this case once
13
    together to talk about an appropriate sample, or samples, or
14
15
    purposes, or what is random, what isn't. That's why I put the
    fee chart up. There's a lot of money being spent, but nothing
16
17
    much happening and we are -- I know the Court can see my
    frustration.
18
             There is no reason -- and I'm excluding any "F" word
19
    in this -- why these parties with their experts, with their
20
    professionals who are all very, very smart -- there's JDs and
21
22
    Ph.D.s all over the place -- they can't agree to yes on whether
    there's one sample and the size of it would be really
23
    problematic. That's the first thing.
24
```

The second thing is is it random or not.

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 1 2 response). MR. GUY: Yes or no. Is it cherrypicked? Your Honor 3 said, "I don't want a cherry-picked sample." Of course you 4 don't. The experts have -- their statistician, if they can't 5 come up with what is random and they agree this is random, that 6 7 would be really problematic. This is not trying to get the, the moon. We're just trying to figure out one or two samples, 8 the size of the sample, is it random or not. 9 I agree with what Mr. Evert said, Mr., Mr. Evert said 10 11 and what Ms. Ramsey said about, well, the purpose is going to show up later, but let's not be coy about it. We know what the 12 13 purpose is. The debtors want to say, "You suppressed evidence." The ACC want to say, "No, we didn't." And they're 14 15 going to point to whatever they can find to, in that sample of files, to support that, either way. And this is where the 16 experts say, "Well, 10 percent, is that enough? Five percent? 17 18 One percent? Three percent?" THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 19 20 response). MR. GUY: We think 10 percent's enough. If it's 21 there, it's there on both sides of that argument. 22 So this is all we're asking, is, please, in the next 23

two weeks before the 14th have the experts sit down. Have them

talk. I don't --- there's no point in me talking to Ms. Ramsey

24

about it.

1

3

4

5

6

7

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 2 response).

MR. GUY: Or to Mr. Evert. We, we can talk about it all day long. It won't make a difference. 'Cause we're not going to be ones who, as the experts, are going to say, "Look, I don't agree with the purpose that you're using the sample,

but I do agree that it was random." 8

THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 9 10 response).

MR. GUY: "And I do agree with the sampling protocol." So that is at least off the table so your Honor isn't facing the situation and the FCR isn't facing the situation two years from now where we have to do a total do-over.

So exactly what you said, your Honor. We're trying to get to an estimate. This is not perfection. It's never perfection in an asbestos case. Every estimate is always wrong.

So that's all I would urge, your Honor, is that the parties' experts please meet within the next two weeks and then we can come back to you on the 14th and we can say, with specificity, "Yeah, we've agreed to one sample. This is how big it is, 10 percent. We've agreed to, this is random. haven't agreed to the purpose. We reserve all rights on that," but at least we've taken those issues off the table. That

shouldn't be complicated.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me ask for comments on that last suggestion at the, at the very least we have the experts talk before the next hearing and give us a report back. I don't know. I know Valentine's Day might promote a little bit of harmony, but, but I have a meeting at 6:00. So I'm not going to be at liberty to go all night on that date. We might, if we adopted Mr. Guy's suggestion, have them to have a little meet and confer as well and then give us a report on where the, the sticking points lie and then set it for further on, hearing on the merits, if we have to.

MR. EVERT: Yeah. So your Honor, a couple comments.

One, it is only a couple weeks. I don't know everybody's schedules. And so if we were going to do that, I probably would suggest we, we plan on it for March instead --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. EVERT: -- of February. So that, that'd be first.

Secondly, and, and maybe this was not well articulated in our description of our meet and confer so far, I think -- I don't want to speak for Ms. Ramsey -- but I think we have agreement with the ACC where sampling is appropriate, that it should be a stratified random sample. That was, that was the way we approached this, is to say, "Here's our first question.

Do we agree that it should be a stratified random sample?" And

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

```
on our meet and confer Ms. Ramsey said, "I believe so," but
wasn't ready and then I think in her proposal this morning, as
I understand it, it is a stratified random sample.
         So, so we've got agreement on that. The, the next
question just becomes what are the strata and then what are
the, what are the population within the strata. So we've got,
we've got that to try to work through.
        So it would be unfair to say that, you know, we're
just at complete loggerheads about how to do this, you know.
And again, without getting too deep into the weeds of
statistics, you know, the, the stratified random -- here's
-- if - if -- if -- as you know in the asbestos
litigation, most complaints have lots and lots of defendants in
them, okay? If we, if we said, "We want to do a study to see
whether we are more likely to get dismissed in cases that have
less than 30 defendants named versus cases that have more than
30 defendants, " well, since there are very few cases with only
30 defendants and we just did a random sample we might only get
3 complaints that have less than 30 defendants. Well, that
doesn't do us any good. So we've got to stratify --
        THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
response).
        MR. EVERT: -- a sample within each. So that --
```

that's -- that's an ultra basic. And now, as, you know, as
Mr. Guy and Ms. Ramsey say, I've now exceeded my knowledge of

```
Page 48 of 55
                                                                  47
    stratification. I've gone just beyond the Peter Principle.
 1
    So --
 2
             THE COURT: Well, a nod's as good as a wink to a blind
 3
            My, my last class in statistics, well, the computers we
 4
    were using were running on Basic when I took it, so.
 5
 6
             MR. EVERT:
                         There you go. Hadn't made it to Fortran
 7
    yet.
          Not quite --
             THE COURT:
                         No.
 8
             MR. EVERT:
 9
                         -- yeah.
10
             THE COURT: Had not.
11
             MR. EVERT: I'm right there with you, Judge.
             So, so in any event, we, we have agreed on stratified
12
13
    random sample as the appropriate methodology. Now it's just a
    question of trying to get to the details within that. So we're
14
15
    getting a little somewhere.
             To -- but precisely to the Court, if we were going to
16
17
    try to say, "Okay. I want the experts to meet, " or, "I want
18
    there to be" --
             THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative
19
20
    response).
             MR. EVERT: -- if the Court said, "I want you guys to,
21
    basically, try harder, " then I think March would be the
22
23
    appropriate deadline.
```

THE COURT: Ms. Ramsey? 24

25

MS. RAMSEY: Thank you, your Honor.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I, I agree with Mr. Evert. We're -- we're --Yeah. it's a, it's a good day here in court for, for peace and goodwill. We are making, I think, good headway. With respect to the strata --THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response). MS. RAMSEY: -- the strata is identical in terms of, in terms of the focus here. There are not new strata proposed in what we have proposed today with the exception that Mr. Evert is correct, which is that we have added dismissals, but -- but we -- but -- but in the -- among the other types of strata that could be added would be things like age, jurisdiction, you know, those additional types of strata, we have not added. So we've taken the debtors' sample. We have stayed with the general strata categories. We have proposed to limit those by having wider groups of claims included within certain strata. And -- and I -- without, again, getting too in the weeds, it seems to me that what we're now talking about are whether our proposal is acceptable and, if not, then it might be appropriate for the experts to further weigh in. But we kind of know what we're talking about and, and I think we're kind of speaking the same language.

With respect to other agreements, we've also agreed

that, that the, the time period is going to be limited to cases that were filed after 2014. That, that's a, a significant agreement and I think moves us closer there.

With respect to the randomness, that's the easiest thing of all if we agree upfront on, on how, how the files within the strata are going to be selected.

So I think at this point we're not, we're talking about the size of, of the different strata. We're talking about how the strata, how to stratify those files, or how many from each of the categories. And frankly, I think based on the communications we've had so far we're going to be very close on that.

So I, I am optimistic, understanding that the debtor has not seen this yet and may disagree with what we've specifically proposed. I, I do think that we are so close we're going to get there without needing the experts to talk to each other. I think we're, we're within a limited pool of issues now that we are likely to be able to work out between ourselves, at least that's my hope, and we could certainly advise the Court before the 14th. If we find that is an impasse and we do need a meet and confer at that point, that might be appropriate, but I'm not sure the experts have a lot more to add at this point.

THE COURT: Okay.

Mr. Guy.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. GUY: That's great news because then we maybe don't need them to meet. I don't want to put this off till March, your Honor. It doesn't need to be put off till March. It's not that complicated. And I had a motion on file before the Court in September asking for the parties to talk for 90 days and if they couldn't agree, to get back. We ran through that, already. THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative response). MR. GUY: And that motion was put on hold under the representations, "We're talking. We're strenuously talking." And I am not criticizing anyone in this room. Everybody is very busy. I want this case to be put on the top, not on the bottom, and this can be done in the next two weeks. Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: I'm inclined to encourage the parties with, with the greatest of sincerity to see if you can't pull off this agreement before the 14th and we'll talk about it then and where it should go. I hear Mr. Guy loud and clear. I have the same frustrations about the case and I know some of you are since you're doing the work that, to a certain extent, we go around

in circles on these things and without ever getting to the

point of being able to make a resolution that, that can be appealed and decided wherever, whichever level it is. And I would like to get us moving.

You have only reinforced my, my belief that ordering mediation at this point was a good idea.

And Ms. Abel, thank you for, for bringing that to the fore.

And I'm, I'm gratified to see you starting to reach some agreements. We do need to make this an affordable exercise. The last thing we want to do is spend more on a, on professional fees in these cases than, than what the amount in controversy would be, whatever that number is. But it would be really embarrassing, I think, for all of us to get to the end of the case and end up with a settlement that has a number that the amount paid to the claimants is less than what was paid to the professionals. I don't think that would do any of us in our professions any good by reputation and it, it is certainly not fair to the people who need the money. The whole idea of 524 was that we need to be more efficient in the way we handle asbestos claims and that there is a mechanism that, that might avoid the necessity for litigation over, on a retail level.

So let's shoot for 2/14 and try to get agreement on, on this protocol that you're discussing and if not, then we'll, we'll plan on next steps. But at that juncture I would anticipate that by the March hearing I would want the

52 professionals, the statisticians, to, to get involved in 1 interfacing with one another to try to come to an agreement, 2 but I'll give you a little more time to work since there was a 3 proposal made this morning that no one's had a chance to react 4 to, okay? 5 Now where does that put us with the remainder of the 6 7 calendar? Is that it? MR. HIRST: No. 8 So your Honor, there's two last things that are --9 THE COURT: Oh, the motions to seal? 10 11 MR. HIRST: Yeah. These are easy because we've talked to the ACC. It's the ACC's motions. We, but it's our and the 12 13 non-debtor affiliates' confidentiality designations. We're going to withdraw those designations. So I 14 15 believe the ACC's withdrawing the motions. They're going to 16 file those complaints unsealed. 17 MR. COX: Your Honor, Rob Cox on behalf of the ACC. 18 We'll, we'll withdraw the motions to, to seal. And the way we've done this in the past, your Honor, is just to 19 file the fully unsealed, unredacted versions. And these are 20 the two complaints that were filed --21 THE COURT: Uh-huh (indicating an affirmative 22 23 response). MR. COX: -- the fraudulent transfer complaint and the 24

fiduciary duty complaint. We'll file that under a notice in

25

```
1
    each of those cases and that's the way we've handled it before.
 2
             THE COURT: Right, very good.
             And for the clerk's benefit, the motions are
 3
    withdrawn.
                The complaints that come in are not amended
 4
 5
    complaints or anything of that nature. They're just simply the
 6
    unredacted complaints.
 7
             Okay. What else on those two motions?
             MR. HIRST: That's all on those two motions and I
 8
    think that's all on the agenda.
 9
             THE COURT: All right.
10
11
             Anything else? Anyone got any, any other matters?
12
         (No response)
             THE COURT: Good. Well, you get early flights home.
13
    We'll see you again on Valentine's Day and I hope that everyone
14
15
    brings candy and flowers, so, for one another.
16
             MR. EVERT:
                         Thank you, your Honor.
17
             MS. RAMSEY: Thank you, your Honor.
18
             THE COURT: Just kidding. All right.
         (Proceedings concluded at 10:30 a.m.)
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

CERTIFICATE I, court approved transcriber, certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter. /s/ *Janice Russell* ____January 30, 2023 Janice Russell, Transcriber Date

TAB 7

Case 22-00303 Doc 73-7 Filed 03/23/23 Entered 03/23/23 20:02:39 Desc Tab 7 Page 2 of 3

Delaware Claims Processing Facility 1000 N. West Street Suite 300 Wilmington, DE 19801

Bill To	
DBMP Matter	

Invoice

Date	Invoice #
11/2/2022	12

Due Date	
11/30/2022	

When making a payment, please reference invoice number.

Make checks payable to Delaware Claims Processing Facility or Wire to:

Bank Name: The Huntington National Bank

ABA Number:044000024

Account Name: Delaware Claims Processing Facility

Account Number: 01892420716

Send billing inquiries to Accounting@delcpf.com

Case 22-00303 Doc 73-7 Filed 03/23/23 Entered 03/23/23 20:02:39 Desc Tab 7 Page 3 of 3

Delaware Claims Processing Facility 1000 N. West Street Suite 300 Wilmington, DE 19801

Bill To	
DBMP Matter	

Invoice

Date	Invoice #
1/18/2023	13

Due Date	
2/17/2023	

When making a payment, please reference invoice number.

Make checks payable to Delaware Claims Processing Facility or Wire to:

Bank Name: The Huntington National Bank

ABA Number:044000024

Account Name: Delaware Claims Processing Facility

Account Number: 01892420716

Send billing inquiries to Accounting@delcpf.com