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August 21, 2025

## **VIA ECF AND EMAIL**

The Honorable John P. Mastando III United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York One Bowling Green New York, NY 10004

Re: In re Eletson Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No. 23-10322 (JPM)

Dear Judge Mastando:

We write on behalf of Eletson Holdings Inc. ("<u>Holdings</u>"). During the August 20, 2025, hearing before this Court, Holdings, among others, referred to an August 19, 2025, status conference held before the Honorable Lewis J. Liman in the case entitled *Eletson Holdings*, *Inc. v. Levona Holdings*, *LTD.*, Case No. 23-cv-07331 (S.D.N.Y.).

Attached hereto as **Exhibit A** is a transcript of that status conference (the "<u>Transcript</u>"). During the August 20, 2025, hearing, counsel for the Purported Nominees stated:

. . . I explained to the bankruptcy court that we do not represent Gas, and it is our understanding that while we have—my clients have rescinded those prior board and registry notices, that the management of Gas continues, I think I wrote, consistent with the status quo order.


Transcript, 19:4-9. Counsel for the Purported Nominees continued:

We don't see any reason to disturb the ongoing management of the company [Gas]. We do believe that in terms of rationale, Justice Belen had it right. Whatever the corporate governance disputes that are happening, let us separate that from the ongoing day-to-day business operations of the company [Gas]. And until disturbed, those rulings by Justice Belen also do provide at least a binding contract between the parties, whatever effect they may or may not have with respect to third parties.

Transcript, 20:7-15.



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In colloquy with counsel to the Purported Nominees, the Court responded "Okay. So listen, I've heard you. The status quo injunction by the arbitrator is no longer in effect. The arbitrator is *functus officio*." Transcript, 21:13-15.

Respectfully	submitted,
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/s/ Kyle J. Ortiz

Kyle J. Ortiz Partner

## **EXHIBIT A**

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	PARTETEC . A . O. C.
1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
3	ELETSON HOLDINGS INC., et al.,
4	Petitioners,
5	v. 23 Civ. 7331 (LJL)
6	LEVONA HOLDINGS LTD.,
7	Respondent. Conference (Remote)
8	x New York, N.Y.
9	August 19, 2025 10:03 a.m.
10	Before:
11	HON. LEWIS J. LIMAN,
12	District Judge
13	APPEARANCES
14 15	GOULSTON & STORRS PC Attorneys for Petitioners BY: JENNIFER B. FUREY, ESQ.
16	QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP
17	Attorneys for Respondent  BY: ISAAC NESSER, ESQ.
18	GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
19	Attorneys for Intervenors BY: HAROLD S. SHAFTEL, ESQ.
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1	THE COURT: Good morning. This is Judge Liman. Do I
2	have counsel for Levona on the line?
3	MR. NESSER: Yes, your Honor. Good morning.
4	THE COURT: And who is it for Levona?
5	MR. NESSER: It's Isaac Nesser at Quinn Emanuel.
6	THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Nesser.
7	MR. NESSER: Good morning.
8	THE COURT: And do I have counsel on for the
9	intervenors?
10	MR. SHAFTEL: Yes, your Honor. It's Hal Shaftel from
11	Greenberg Traurig. Good morning.
12	THE COURT: Good morning.
13	Do I have any counsel for any other parties on the
14	line?
15	Okay. Mr. Nesser, we'll start with you.
16	MR. NESSER: Your Honor, I believe Eletson was on as
17	well. I'm sorry.
18	THE COURT: Okay. That's the reason why I asked if
19	anybody else was on the line.
20	MS. FUREY: Oh, and I—I'm sorry, your Honor. I did
21	not realize. I picked it up from speakerphone and did not
22	depress my mute button. Jennifer Furey. I'm from Goulston &
23	Storrs, representing Eletson Holdings and Eletson Corp.
24	THE COURT: Good morning, Ms. Furey.
25	MS. FUREY: Good morning.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Nesser, why don't I start with you. I approved the schedule for the filing of the opening brief and the Rule 56.1 statement. I'd like to hear from you what discovery, if any, is necessary for me to rule on the anticipated motion. I realize that I still have some requests with respect to the Eletson documents outstanding, but I'd like to understand from you your view with respect to the status of the case, where we are, what remains to be done, was the foreign deposition done of Murchinson, and anything else that you want me to know, leaving aside for a moment the question of the status quo injunction.

MR. NESSER: Of course, your Honor. Thank you.

So in terms of depositions, Levona took four depositions. We took a deposition of Mr. Kertsikoff, who is also the designee for Apargo; we took the deposition of Reed Smith, and the designee for that was Mr. Solomon; we took a deposition of Marina Orfanoudaki, who is or was an employee of Eletson; and we also deposed Castalia Advisors, Mr. Goodgal, who were financial advisors to Eletson and appear on some of the documents.

We noticed, as the Court, of course, is aware, two additional depositions—one of Ms. Karastamati and one of Mr. Hadjieleftheriadis. Neither of those appeared for their depositions, notwithstanding the Court's two orders directing both of them to show up. As a result of that, I did want to

make a note, your Honor, in addition to the vacatur brief, we intend to file a motion for sanctions by virtue of the nonappearance and other discovery violations that we believe occurred in connection with the motions to compel and so forth, and so those are—we expect that will be filed shortly as well.

So those are the depositions that we took.

THE COURT: And what relief are you seeking with respect to the motion for sanctions? Does it include dismissal?

MR. NESSER: Well, your Honor, there's nothing to dismiss, as far as we understand, because it's just our petition to vacate. But we are seeking preclusion sanctions. We are seeking adverse inferences. There's also monetary damages, you know, a monetary sanctions component by virtue of some of the other violations.

THE COURT: Okay. Understood.

MR. NESSER: Thank you.

And so those are the depositions we've taken on their side.

On the intervenor side, there's a deposition of Mr. Spears, who was also a designee for Levona; there was a deposition of Mr. Lichtenstein; there was a deposition in Canada of Murchinson, and the designee was Mr. Bistricer, and that's been completed. Your Honor is aware, they also—or your Honor granted discovery to be issued for a deposition of

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Mr. Kanelos. I don't know precisely what happened with that.

My understanding, secondhand, is that that was served, there

were discussions with Mr. Kanelos and his attorney, there was

some inability to reach agreement around logistics, and so as a

result of that, my understanding is that the intervenors have

elected not to proceed with the deposition and not to, you

know, move to compel that deposition, and so as I understand

it, that's just not going to happen, as things stand.

Those are the depositions that were noticed of which we are aware, and so at this point we're not aware of any that remain to be scheduled.

of course, your Honor, relative to the point you made at the very top, this is all putting aside the two outstanding motions to compel that we have—the motion to compel the documents from Eletson that it obtained on the Microsoft server; and the motion to compel documents from Reed Smith pursuant to the crime fraud exception. Our view, your Honor, is that the existing record is sufficient to vacate the award, but of course we continue to believe that both of those motions are well founded and well framed and should be granted. We weren't certain how your Honor was intending to proceed with those, to the remainder of the petition, but I did want to note that those are outstanding, as of course your Honor knows.

I think that's the update.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let me then hear from

you, Ms. Furey, whether you have anything to add, and then I'll hear from Mr. Shaftel.

MS. FUREY: Your Honor, not at this time. We've participated in all of the discovery but do not have any outstanding requests ourselves, so discovery is—other than the pending motions that Mr. Nesser just mentioned, discovery is completed from our perspective.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Mr. Shaftel, does anything remain in terms of discovery from your perspective?

MR. SHAFTEL: Thank you, your Honor. In short, with the various rulings on scope behind us, there are no open discovery issues. I would like to just clarify or correct, from our perspective, some of the descriptions that Levona provided about the status and the background.

In terms of—let me first start, in terms of the Reed Smith and the Microsoft motion practice, which we have not put papers in on, we are not taking the position that any of the briefing or the progress of the case ought to be slowed because of that, so I think we are in agreement. We obviously have certain views on the briefing schedule, but it's not contingent on any of that outstanding motion practice.

In terms of—and not to beg you, I don't think, today to litigate the merits of future discovery motions. In terms of Mr. —

THE COURT: Well, let me interrupt you for a second,

Mr. Shaftel.

MR. SHAFTEL: Sure.

THE COURT: I take it, in part because you haven't asked for any of the Reed Smith documents, that I'm not going to hear an argument from you in terms of reliance on advice of counsel being some kind of a defense to fraud on the arbitrators.

MR. SHAFTEL: Your Honor, it is not my expectation that there is any advice of counsel defense to be asserted. I obviously have not seen the motion to be filed and served. But it is in part the reason that I wanted, in transparency, to flag for the Court that from our perspective, those documents subject to the motion practice are not material to the dispute at hand, including in terms of advice of counsel.

THE COURT: Okay. I interrupted you, sir.

MR. SHAFTEL: Your Honor is perfectly allowed to do that.

I think I was going to touch upon the depositions of—Mr. Kertsikoff was presented, not only as a 30(b)(6) for Apargo, which is the Cypriot entity in which he has an economic interest, he was also—he was fully prepared and has personal knowledge, presented as the 30(b)(6) witness for the other two Cypriot entities as well, Fentalon and Desimusco. He was at the Quinn Emanuel office for 10-plus hours and I think about eight hours of testimonial time. When we left at 8:30 at

night, give or take, he was served with papers—not representing Mr. Kertsikoff personally, but—served with papers in an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy action. And I raise that not, again, to litigate the propriety of service on this call, but it was exactly why Ms. Karastamati and Mr. Hadjieleftheriadis did not come to New York. They are not directors or officers of the entities. We couldn't command their appearance. But it was prescient. And they did have private advice from counsel in Greece about potential immigration, the ability to smoothly and timely exit the U.S., not only of service of process. Your Honor may recall from prior submissions Holdings had threatened to issue warrants of some kind against them. I think they were—

THE COURT: Mr. Shaftel, you'll address all of that in response to the opposition to sanctions.

MR. SHAFTEL: Fair enough.

THE COURT: Suffice it to say, disregard of two orders of mine, when you've had a full opportunity to raise the matters, is not a matter that the Court takes lightly. That said, when you put in your papers, I'm fully prepared to give them the attention they deserve.

MR. SHAFTEL: We appreciate that, your Honor.

I believe the only—just to complete the circle, with respect to Mr. Kanelos, it was I think more than just—to provide a brief report—more than logistical issues. He has or

had Greek counsel who declined to speak with me but did speak to a Greek lawyer. We retained—we were never comfortable with what documents he was collecting or willing to search for. I believe he took the position he wanted private notes available at his deposition. He demanded, I believe, to clear—all exhibits to be shown him in advance. Consideration was given to enforcing the subpoena in Greece, and it was determined that that could not be within any realistic time frame or likely couldn't be handled by the Greek courts in any realistic time frame, particularly because of the ongoing criminal proceeding against Mr. Kanelos. Any motion or application in Greece was going to get entangled in that. So for those reasons, we declined and did not proceed.

THE COURT: Okay. That was your voluntary election.

THE COURT: Okay. That was your voluntary election.

I understand that.

MR. SHAFTEL: And I think from our perspective, again, we don't see any further open discovery items.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. NESSER: Your Honor, may I just note one thing?

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Nesser. But counsel, please

identify yourself for the record when you ask to speak. I now recognize your voice. I'm not sure the court reporter does.

MR. NESSER: I apologize. It's Isaac Nesser at Quinn Emanuel for Levona.

Your Honor, I just wanted to note that we disagree

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with counsel's assertion that Desimusco and Fentalon appeared for their 30(b)(6) depositions. Ms. Karastamati and Mr. Hadjieleftheriadis had been designated as their 30(b)(6) We prepared on that basis. After those designees. depositions, after Mr. Shaftel indicated that those witnesses were not appearing, and I believe after they defaulted on their appearance, we got a notice announcing to us that Mr. Kertsikoff had been now designated to testify on behalf of the other entities as well. We didn't agree with that. We had no time to prepare. We had insufficient time during the deposition to take discovery from the other two. seven-hour deposition. Maybe it went a little bit long, but it was not, you know, the additional seven hours for each to which we would have been entitled. And maybe most important, Mr. Kertsikoff was not prepared. I believe he testified he had spoken over the weekend with, you know, his brother—his cousins for 10 minutes, or 20 minutes, for the purpose of preparing to testify on a long list of 30(b)(6) topics, and he was in fact not prepared when we asked him the questions. we don't need to litigate that now, but I just want the Court to be aware that that's not agreed. THE COURT: All right. Let me now turn to the request

THE COURT: All right. Let me now turn to the request for an extension of time by the intervenor. Mr. Nesser, I gather you oppose that. Tell me whether that's correct and why you oppose it.

MR. NESSER: So, your Honor, first, I did want to note, we told Mr. Shaftel we had no objection to the page extension. We had discussed—our opening brief is now 50 pages. We had agreed with them having 50, provided we get 20 on reply, and I believe that was agreed to. But it's tied in with the scheduling issues to some extent. So that's a more minor matter, but I did want to make a note of it.

On the schedule, look, we're sympathetic to

Mr. Shaftel and to his colleagues, but as we've said in the

past, when there have been requests for extensions, the delay

in resolution of the case is causing prejudice to Levona every

day, and so we've been consistent or I've been consistent in

communicating instructions from my client that they're just not

comfortable agreeing to extensions of the schedule under that

circumstance.

THE COURT: And is a two-week delay really going to cause incremental prejudice to your client? I mean, I understand the desire to get this case resolved, but—

MR. NESSER: Your Honor, at minimum, my understanding—this is Isaac Nesser at Quinn Emanuel. Your Honor, at minimum, my understanding is there are tens of thousands of dollars a day in revenue that's being diverted just from the leasing of the ships every day that this doesn't get resolved. My understanding as well is that money—apparently money is being diverted from the company to

pay various lawyers. And so it does appear to be a situation in which, on an ongoing basis, that pot of money is being spent in a way that does harm Levona's interests with every day that passes.

I will note, your Honor, that in an effort to resolve the issue, what we proposed—which is the same as what we proposed last time they asked for extra time—is, if they will agree to turn over the ships or to preserve the status quo, to coin a phrase, so that money does not continue to be spent out the door, then, you know, we would I think in that circumstance be more comfortable with the additional time. But in the context where they are, every day, in our view, misusing the company and its resources and misdirecting its resources, we do believe there is incremental injury.

THE COURT: And the harm that you're identifying I take it can't be addressed through the bankruptcy court? Or is that another issue?

MR. NESSER: Your Honor, I'm, candidly, not certain.

I don't believe so. I mean, there of course have been multiple orders of the bankruptcy court already, directing the intervenors and their principals and associated entities to take actions that would mitigate some of this prejudice, and they've been violated, willfully, and deliberately, and the result of that is that, as I understand it, there are hundreds of thousands of dollars of monetary sanctions, coercive

sanctions that have already been awarded and are continuing to accrue daily, and so in the context where they're deliberately ignoring and violating multiple court orders of the bankruptcy already, it doesn't seem to us that an additional order of the bankruptcy court directing them to stop doing things is going to have an effect, at least in the short term.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from you, Mr. Shaftel, in terms of the extension.

MR. SHAFTEL: Yes. Thank you, your Honor. We obviously flatly disagree with the economic scenario that was depicted. Not sure it can get resolved on this call, but I think the shoe is on the other foot in terms of who is interfering with business operations, for what purpose, and potentially causing—or in fact causing harm to the value of the business. That is one reason—maybe the reason—why we've never dragged our feet in this case at all, and are looking, and have always looked, to litigate efficiently and quickly.

Now last week, or two weeks ago—I guess it was last week—notwithstanding all of the purported concerns that Levona is expressing, okay, they asked to push back the briefing a week, to which we consented. Frankly, just that very one week, all right, which is half of the two weeks we're seeking, ought to be almost automatically added to our side of the ledger. It's a case that's been pending for two years. I for one embrace, at least to the question your Honor was asking, what

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is—and both sides are going to be pointing fingers of what is the practical harm for another two weeks. These are important matters and they ought to be litigated fairly, on the merits, and not having one party squeezed or unnecessarily and unfairly When we set out the schedule for a two-week briefing turnaround way back in May or the spring, it was not contemplated that we would be facing 50 pages rather than 25 pages of briefing, and as we, quite frankly, wrote to the Court yesterday, we're not in a position, given schedules and resources, to effectively brief 50 pages in two weeks. And for clarity, I do assume the 50 pages covers all—I know organized, reorganized Holdings has indicated, I believe, that they may file a joinder, but we're not imagining or anticipating additional substantive briefing on top of the 50. So it is our view, in context, in fairness, having just given the other side—consented to the other side taking an additional week and agreeing to—in recognizing the oversized briefing, we don't believe that the request is a stretch, and there's no algorithm, but we did apply the principle of doubling the pages so doubling the standard turnaround time.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. I'm going to rule. I'm going to give intervenors one additional week. So your responsive papers are due on September 10th.

With respect to the enlargement, your request for an enlargement, intervenor's request for the equivalent

enlargement of briefing pages to 50 pages is granted. And Levona will be entitled to 20 pages on reply. So that's my order with respect to that.

Let me loop back for a moment with respect to the 30(b)(6) depositions, and I guess it's a question for you, Mr. Shaftel. I just went back to look at the motion to compel and my order on the motion to compel. The motion to compel at docket 501 was one for each of the three individuals to sit for deposition in their personal capacity and each respectively in their 30(b)(6) capacity. I granted that motion, and I compelled each of them to sit. Now I didn't lay out in haec verba that I was directing them each to sit individually in their personal capacity and in their corporate capacities, but given that that was the relief that was sought and I granted the relief sought without qualification, how could you have understood my order any differently?

MR. SHAFTEL: Your Honor, we did appreciate and I believe understand the order. We were not in a position to command these individuals to attend deposition in New York.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay.

All right. Let me now turn to Mr. Nesser. The reference in your letter to the status quo injunction, I was a little bit confused by the reference in two respects. One is the quite obvious respect that it's curious to have a notion that an injunction issued by an arbitrator who is functus

officio could remain in place. There's no mechanism, since the arbitrator is a functus officio, for there to be a request for a modification of the injunction or for enforcement of the injunction. That's the first way in which I found it curious.

The second way in which I found the reference curious is because it was in a letter without a request for any kind of relief, and I'm accustomed to either getting letter motions or other motions. So it was not clear to me what you were asking for, and particularly in light of Mr. Shaftel's reference to the fact that parties should have an opportunity to respond, the obvious question was, if there should be relief, shouldn't it be in the form of a motion?

MR. NESSER: Your Honor, it's Isaac Nesser at Quinn Emanuel for Levona. I'll take the issues—I'll take the second issue first.

Our view is that the intervenors and Reed Smith and the bankruptcy have been repeatedly misrepresenting your Honor's orders, and of course, your Honor, it's not the first time we've dealt with this. Several months ago—or I can't remember anymore how long ago, maybe it was more than that, but—we had the entire episode in which they were representing to multiple courts around the world, including in the bankruptcy court, that the award had been confirmed, and we brought that to your Honor in a letter and, you know, explained what was happening, and your Honor thereafter clarified or

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reiterated that the award had not been confirmed and the award remained subject to ongoing proceedings on our vacatur position. And so our view is that the current situation is similar to that episode in the sense that we are now having precisely the same situation in which they are saying things about your Honor's order that are just not true. Your Honor plainly vacated the status quo injunction. That issue actually was litigated in letters after the decision came back. And your Honor then reissued the award and the amended award, and again stated, plainly, that the status quo injunction is And so if it would be preferable, in the Court's view, for us to formally file a motion seeking-I don't know what it would mean—perhaps sanctions for the misrepresentation of what your Honor said and did, we can do that, if the Court would prefer it. But we don't think there's anything to The Court's order is the Court's order, and it was clear.

On the issue of the functus officio point, we agree, your Honor, that the arbitrator is of course functus officio.

The court who issued that injunction, so to speak, doesn't exist anymore, so the injunction, therefore, by its terms, dissolves, or necessarily dissolves. And so we agree that the status quo injunction doesn't exist. But that's separate and apart from the fact that the status quo injunction, by explicit order of your Honor, was vacated.

THE COURT: All right. What I'd like you to do is that if there is relief that you want, to proceed by way of formal motion. I don't know whether that relief is clarification, listening to you; I don't know whether the relief is an order that persons who are properly subject to my jurisdiction not misrepresent my orders, or whether it's a motion for sanctions against those who are subject to my jurisdiction. But plainly, my orders should not be misrepresented. I try to be quite clear. My view is that the status quo injunction is no longer in effect. So if you want an order, you'll proceed in a way that you deem appropriate.

MR. NESSER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me now loop back to the question of the crime fraud exception, unless there's something else that the parties want to address.

MR. SHAFTEL: Your Honor, I apologize. It's Hal Shaftel trying to interrupt. But on the phone it's hard.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. SHAFTEL: Yes. If I could ask to be heard on the status quo issue. And we would encourage this to be addressed by a formal motion. I do not believe we here have misrepresented anything, certainly not advertently, but I don't believe we misrepresented anything about the order. This issue really arose in the bankruptcy court. There was a directive from some motion practice pending since January for the

intervenors to rescind certain board nominations and stock registry changes, which we timely complied with, in response to the bankruptcy court's order. In that context—really, again, I think expressly stated in transparency—I explained to the bankruptcy court that we do not represent Gas, and it is our understanding that while we have—my clients have rescinded those prior board and registry notices, that the management of Gas continues, I think I wrote, consistent with the status quo order.

I will say that it has been my understanding that the February 2024 opinion and order of the Court, which referred to—contained the language about vacating the status quo order, did so on the assumption that there was going to be a final judgment. It requested final judgment, I believe it was before my time. I believe the parties submitted competing final judgments, and then events overtook consideration of those judgments, including I think a remand to Justice Belen.

As we understand it—we would like briefing on this—the vacating of the status quo injunction was also in tandem with the affirmative relief back at that time, in February of 2024, that was being granted, including to the nominees with respect to the preferred shares. That would have rendered the status quo injunction moot, unnecessary. But right now we have sort of half of that opinion and order—frankly, less than half—with respect to the status quo

injunction being applied, yet the other half, if your Honor will, not being mathematical, with respect to the affirmative relief in favor of the nominees, not being applied. And that I think creates the disconnect. And to, you know, to proceed the way that is being suggested really would be providing Levona with a victory before it has a victory, and we don't think it is going to have one. We don't see any reason to disturb the ongoing management of the company. We do believe that in terms of rationale, Justice Belen had it right. Whatever the corporate governance disputes that are happening, let us separate that from the ongoing day-to-day business operations of the company. And until disturbed, those rulings by Justice Belen also do provide at least a binding contract between the parties, whatever effect they may or may not have with respect to third parties. So we do see this as—

THE COURT: That's actually a very interesting observation you made, Mr. Shaftel. In terms of a binding contract between the parties, as I understand it, you don't represent a party, so if, hypothetically, Eletson, who Ms. Furey represents, and Levona, who Mr. Nesser represents, decided, we don't want certain type of relief, what standing would you have?

MR. SHAFTEL: So there are two responses, your Honor.

One, of course, the Cypriot preferred nominees did, if
you will, stipulate to be bound by the arbitrator's final

award, so we would urge that that be the basis for standing.

Secondly—and I was explicit in our letter to your Honor yesterday about this—Levona is pointing to positions which—I don't want to get tripped up on the nomenclature of the entities, but that the Reed Smith firm has taken on behalf of certain clients or purported clients, and Levona's letter pointed to those statements in the bankruptcy court, and those are positions taken long before my involvement or my client's involvement in the case. That is one reason we believe it would be appropriate for those clients—Reed Smith on behalf of those clients, or purported clients, to be heard as well.

Because this is a—

THE COURT: Okay. So listen, I've heard you. The status quo injunction by the arbitrator is no longer in effect. The arbitrator is functus officio. If there is a party with standing who wants relief from this Court that that party believes the Court is empowered to provide, then they can ask me for that relief.

Mr. Shaftel, you've made arguments that—I suppose it's your client. I'm really not sure who you're speaking for, or whether you're speaking for Gas. You referenced Mr. Solomon. But again, if they're parties who want relief, and they've got standing, they can move the Court for relief. Mr. Nesser can also move the Court if there have been misrepresentations or the need for clarity with respect to my

orders. But there's nothing in my February order that maintains the status quo injunction in effect. If somebody wants something more in terms of relief and they have standing to ask for it, the docket is open, the courthouse doors are open, they can make the motion.

MR. NESSER: Your Honor, it's Isaac Nesser. May I make a quick comment.

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Nesser.

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MR. NESSER: So look, I'm not certain whether we informed the Court of the relevant development in the bankruptcy court or not, or perhaps whether the Court is aware of it independently, but we filed a motion for sanctions against the intervenors in the bankruptcy court several months ago, by virtue of acts that they had taken in which they had purported to change the Eletson Gas board of directors and change the share registry. The bankruptcy court granted that motion—that's ECF 1759 in the bankruptcy court—and held the intervenors in contempt of court for their violation of the bankruptcy court's lift stay order. Mr. Shaftel a few minutes ago stated that in his view the intervenors have complied with that order. It's not our understanding there has been compliance with that order. I expect that will be an issue that will be taken up again with the bankruptcy court in due But our view and our understanding is that there are monetary sanctions, coercive monetary sanctions accruing

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against the intervenors right now in realtime. And part of why that matters to the issues that we've been discussing in the context of the status quo injunction is because, what is the status quo, your Honor? The status quo is, the common of Gas is owned by Eletson Holdings. That was the bankruptcy court's That's Ms. Furey's clients. The preferred shares, the plan. status quo-by order of the bankruptcy court at ECF 1759 that I was just discussing, the preferred shares, the status quo is that Levona owns those shares. And so with respect to Mr. Shaftel, his clients are not management of Gas at all as of now, and perhaps, you know, that will be changed, depending on how your Honor rules on the award, but at this point in time the common is owned by Holdings and the preferred is owned by Levona, and the notion that Mr. Shaftel's clients are continuing, and their principals are continuing to operate Gas in defiance of those orders and that reality, is the issue that we're concerned about, and that is the reason why we brought the issue of the status quo injunction to your Honor's attention, because the entire basis, and sole basis upon which they're purporting to be able to continue to act as officers of this company is the notion that the status quo injunction somehow froze them, in effect, in that capacity. But that's just simply not true. The status quo injunction is no longer in effect, the company is owned by its owners, and the owners have the right to appoint officers and to determine the acts of

the company.

THE COURT: Mr. Nesser, when I made my comments earlier that the status quo injunction was no longer in effect, I was not oblivious to the points that you're making.

MR. NESSER: Yeah.

THE COURT: But I also wanted to be careful to preserve the appropriate prerogatives, which is that unless and until I have a hearing with respect to the appeals that are pending before me—and there are certainly issues that are in front of the bankruptcy court—the issue in front of me, the status quo injunction, I've said what I've said, and that whoever wants to bring this transcript to the attention of the bankruptcy court, they're welcome to, for whatever worth the bankruptcy court ascribes to it. And you can make your respective motions.

It does occur to me—and I will put an order on the docket to this effect—I am aware that there are appeals piling up before me from bankruptcy court orders. I do intend to turn to those in relatively short order. What I will put on the docket in those cases is that if there is a party who believes that all of the motions should now be decided and are ripe for decision and want argument on them, they should so indicate.

I'll put that out as an order in all of the bankruptcy cases so that if there are people who are not on this line, they will be on notice.

Is there anything else, Mr. Nesser, that you want to bring to my attention before I turn back to the question of the crime fraud?

MR. NESSER: No, your Honor. I was actually just going to bring to your attention that the sanctions order of the bankruptcy court is now pending on appeal with your Honor, but you got there first.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Shaftel, is there anything else from you that you want to raise before I get to the question of the crime fraud?

MR. SHAFTEL: Your Honor, thank you. I do fundamentally disagree that monetary sanctions have or are being incurred by the nominees. They have been—they are in compliance with Judge Mastando's directive with respect to the stock registry and the board and the board nominations. But we do have Judge Mastando's order on appeal to your Honor. So I just wanted to state our position and clarify what I think was not an accurate description of the bankruptcy proceedings.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Nesser, with respect to crime fraud, is there a particular need for me to address that expeditiously? I'm sensitive to the fact that there is an appeal pending before the Second Circuit that does pertain to what role Reed Smith has with respect to all of this, and while Reed Smith has taken a position with respect to the crime fraud exception, Ms. Furey also has a client who has, at a minimum, a

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claim with respect to the privileged information and therefore a right to be heard, which makes the issue sensitive. It also may make the issue, depending on the position that the Second Circuit takes and the position that Eletson, as represented by Ms. Furey, takes, it may make the whole crime fraud issue somewhat theoretical or academic.

MR. NESSER: Your Honor, it's Isaac Nesser at Quinn Emanuel for Levona. We've been struggling with the issue, your Honor, because, you know, we filed the motion a month or so ago or six weeks ago, eight weeks ago-I can't remember the date—with the hope that it might be resolved and the documents at issue produced to us in time for us to be able to use them in depositions and in our vacatur brief. Of course that's not where we currently are, and we have a schedule for filing the vacatur briefs and we intend to file it on that schedule. do very strongly believe, your Honor, that that motion should be granted. We do very strongly believe that the documents that we are requesting in that motion will be important for vacatur, and we are concerned—I don't want to put it too strongly, but we're concerned and we're wondering how that all gets worked out in the event that the vacatur submission is filed and pending and decided potentially while this motion is outstanding and potentially—and so I'm of course, your Honor, exquisitely sensitive to the fact that your Honor is well aware of all of this, and I hope I'm not being impertinent in any

respect, but that is our view.

With respect to the sensitivities with the Second Circuit, I believe your Honor addressed that issue already in connection with the motion to compel that we filed, and in opposition to that motion, I don't recall whether it was Reed Smith or Mr. — or the intervenors, but they made the argument that, you know, what are you talking about, you can't do this, the documents that are being sought are privileged, and the Second Circuit has, you know, put things up in the air with respect to privilege, and what your Honor said in response to that was, look, the crime fraud exception by definition means that the documents at issue are not privileged, and so if—

THE COURT: No. I understand that. I mean, if

THE COURT: No. I understand that. I mean, if

Ms. Furey, though, were to take the position that the documents

belonged to her—

MR. NESSER: Sure.

THE COURT: —and were to take the position that Eletson was prepared to turn them over to Levona, I might not need to address the crime fraud exception.

MR. NESSER: That's fair, your Honor, and I'll leave it to Ms. Furey to clarify what her client's position is on that issue. But look, it's, from Levona's perspective, just a timing issue and a sequencing issue, and, you know, if the Court has—we of course defer to how the Court, you know, intends to manage its own docket and manage these decisions,

and, you know, we're sensitive to that. But we do believe these documents are important, we do believe they should be produced, we do believe they'll be relevant and will make a difference in terms of the strength of the arguments that we're able to make in the brief that will be filed tomorrow, or whenever it should be filed. Perhaps we could do a supplement or whatever.

And your Honor, I don't want to lose track as well of the motion to compel Eletson to produce documents from the Microsoft database that's related—

THE COURT: I put that to the side for good reason.

MR. NESSER: Sure.

THE COURT: Because that does not just implicate the privilege. I understand it implicates the ability, as I understand it, of Eletson to operate. But I'll hear from Ms. Furey with respect to that.

MS. FUREY: Yes, your Honor. Thank you. Jennifer Furey on behalf of Eletson.

Eletson has taken the position that the documents on the Eletson server are their property and therefore Eletson is able to use them as it sees fit. And of course these documents are routine because they went to an undated bankruptcy order. There are documents on that server that are highly relevant to the issues in front of this Court. Reed Smith sought with the Second Circuit a stay on the use, disclosure, and review of

these documents, an administrative stay, and the Second Circuit denied its request. The stay that's currently in effect, as your Honor is aware, the Second Circuit deals with an entirely separate issue, which is Reed Smith's file, and so that stay—Reed Smith's file, of course, fits differently than the Eletson documents on Eletson's server. So we have—we introduced, as an exhibit, at the deposition of Vassilis Kertsikoff, a subset of documents from the server that did contain counsel on them. Levona counsel left the room for that introduction over, you know—once they were objected to by intervenor's counsel. We believe intervenor's counsel improperly invoked privilege on those documents, which, of course, in no world do we see it as intervenor's privilege to assert.

We plan on—how we had—we were going to propose handling this issue is we were going to submit that subset of documents that was introduced as an exhibit in connection with a joinder that we're planning on filing on Levona's vacatur petition, and we were going to do so under seal, just in the interest of caution, and do so such that intervenors can see them and the Court can view them, but they would not be viewed by Levona, as they have not yet been reviewed by Levona. So and if the Court determines it does not want to rely on those documents, it can disregard it, but if it does, then it of course can consider them.

1 THE COURT: How long is your joinder going to be, 2 Ms. Furey? 3 MS. FUREY: Within the 25-page limit. And that's in addition to the—that's not 4 THE COURT: 5 part of the 50 pages for Levona. 6 MS. FUREY: No, no. It's separate. And it addresses, 7 you know, in large part these documents that are on the server, as well as some issues—it's primarily focused on the issue of 8 9 the nominees, the purported transfer to the nominees. 10 THE COURT: Is there any reason, Mr. Nesser, or Ms. Furey, why I shouldn't give Mr. Shaftel 25 pages to respond 11 12 to that joinder on the same September 10th date? 13 MS. FUREY: I have no objection to that, your Honor. 14 MR. NESSER: Your Honor, Levona has no objection. 15 This is Isaac Nesser. 16 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Shaftel, just to 17 anticipate it, you've got 25 pages to respond by 18 September 10th. 19 MR. SHAFTEL: Okay. Thank you, your Honor. For the 20 court reporter, it's Hal Shaftel. If I could address that but 21 also certain other items, with the Court's permission? THE COURT: Go ahead. 22 23 MR. SHAFTEL: I did not—I guess I raised the issue. 24 I did not realize that we were going to have substantive 25 briefing on top of the 50, and at least with respect to those

25 pages, we would ask for additional time and an additional week, because now we have 75 pages, which I did not anticipate having to address, so we do make that request and ask for that courtesy.

On additional points that we heard, there's a lot of references to Reed Smith motions and appeals, and I do believe if we're going to be addressing any of those matters in a substantive fashion and the application and scope of the Second Circuit's stay, they should be heard, and I think we should be cautious on this call, without their presence, describing or saying too much about the status.

THE COURT: I agree with that, Mr. Shaftel, and I've tried to do that.

MR. SHAFTEL: Understood. And appreciate that.

In terms of what I am concerned about—and this is from the party who said, within practical reason, let's plow ahead with the motion practice—I was not embracing the concept of sort of having it both ways, that as Mr. Nesser on behalf of Levona said, well, maybe we have supplemental briefing down the road. I believe if there's a view that the documents and the discovery that your Honor still has to rule on is material and potentially will be used in any future motion practice, it should all be, for efficiency, done at once. So we do oppose—we do object to the notion that potentially we'll have this motion practice, yet Levona, Levona and Holdings, will

wait and potentially add supplemental briefing down the road.

I think that if the parties are—if Levona and Holdings intend
to retain the prospect of using future discovery, we should
calibrate this briefing schedule to that, so we don't have to
be, you know, briefing twice or however many times.

If I rule on the motion and I determine that I cannot grant the relief that's requested, then there may be a request by Levona to make a new motion based upon new evidence. I don't know right now whether I would grant that motion. They would have to show me some cause why I should permit them to make a second motion for summary judgment, or to vacate. But if there's additional documents that are disclosed and we end up having to have a hearing in this case, then on both sides, that evidence may be able to be used, particularly if it's documents that were requested during the time period for discovery. That's the important caveat, that there's a time period for discovery.

All right. Mr. Nesser, Ms. Furey, the position with respect to additional time for the response to the joinder?

MR. NESSER: Your Honor, it's Isaac Nesser. Our view is that there should not be additional time for the reasons I explained earlier.

THE COURT: Ms. Furey?

MS. FUREY: I agree, and in addition, the issues are obviously in parallel and very similar, so I think it's

entirely reasonable for the intervenors to respond to both in the same time frame. THE COURT: Yes. Mr. Shaftel, you've got resources at your firm. You'll do the opposition by September 10th. All right. The conference has been very helpful. Have a good day, everybody, and I look forward to receiving the papers from you. Thank you, all. ALL COUNSEL: Thank you.