Geoffrey S. Harper Texas Bar No. 00795408 gharper@winston.com John Michael Gaddis Texas Bar No. 24069747 mgaddis@winston.com WINSTON & STRAWN LLP 2121 N. Pearl Street, Suite 900 Dallas, TX 75201 (214) 453-6500 (214) 453-6400 (fax)

Counsel for Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS **DALLAS DIVISION**

In re:	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL) Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
MANAGEMENT, L.P.,)
Reorganized Debtor.)
S)
)
THE DUGABOY INVESTMENT) Case No. 3:25-cv-01876-K
TRUST,)
) Case No. 3:25-cv-02072-S
Appellant,)
V.) Case No. 3:25-cv-02579-B
HIGHLAND CAPITAL)
MANAGEMENT, L.P,) Case No. 3:25-cv-02724-L
et al.,)
Appellees.)

APPELLANT THE DUGABOY INVESTMENT TRUST'S MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING RULING ON MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE PROCEEDINGS ON APPEAL



Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy" or "Appellant") respectfully asks this Court to stay its proceedings and briefing deadlines pending Judge Kinkeade's ruling in a related case on a motion to consolidate, and would show as follows:

- 1. This case is one of four closely-related appeals from the same underlying bankruptcy case. *See In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054-sgj11. All four appeals involve the same parties and substantially identical factual records, and each appeal seeks review of closely related decisions by the same bankruptcy court judge.
- 2. The four appellate proceedings are as follows:

Appeal	Case Number:1	Judge:	Bankruptcy Court Order
<u>filed</u> :			appealed:
7/14/2025	3:25-cv-01876-K	Kinkeade	Order approving settlement
			(D4297)
8/4/2025	3:25-cv-02072-S	Scholer	Order denying motion to stay
			(D4333)
9/16/2025	3:25-cv-02579-B	Boyle	Order denying motion to
			recuse (D4379)
10/6/2025	3:25-cv-02724-L	Lindsay	Order granting motion to fix
			Class 11 interests (D4401)

3. The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure allow a district court, in its

¹ For convenience, Dugaboy will refer to each proceeding by the last four digits of its case number (*e.g.*, "1876 case" or "2072 appeal").

discretion, to consolidate multiple appeals into a single proceeding. *See* Bankruptcy Rule 8003(b)(2) ("When parties have separately filed timely notices of appeal, the district court . . . may join or consolidate the appeals."). As shown in the chart above, each of the four appeals at issue was commenced by Dugaboy in separately filed and timely notices of appeal.

- 4. The appeal before Judge Kinkeade (No. 25-1876) was the "first-filed" appeal, which empowers Judge Kinkeade to decide whether the other three appeals should be consolidated into his 1876 case. *See, e.g., Cadle Co. v. Whataburger of Alice*, 174 F.3d 599, 603 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining first-to-file rule); *Sutter Corp. v. P&P Indus., Inc.*, 125 F.3d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1997) (same). Under the first-to-file rule, Judge Kinkeade's court is the *only* court with the authority to rule on a motion for consolidation. *See id.*
- 5. On October 23, 2025, Dugaboy filed a "Motion to Consolidate Proceedings on Appeal" in Judge Kinkeade's case, in which Dugaboy asked Judge Kinkeade to consolidate the four appeals with his 1876 case as the lead case. *See* No. 25-1876, Dkt. 39. A copy of Dugaboy's filing in Judge Kinkeade's case is attached here as Exhibit 1.
- 6. The purpose of Dugaboy's proposed consolidation is not merely for the

convenience of the parties, but also to serve the interests of judicial economy by avoiding the waste and expense of litigating similar issues on substantially identical records before four different district court judges, creating a risk of potentially inconsistent judgments.

7. The same interests of judicial economy and avoiding wasteful duplication will also be served by staying all proceedings and briefing deadlines in the other three appellate cases, including the one in this Court, pending Judge Kinkeade's decision in the 1876 case whether to consolidate the four appeals.

For these reasons, Dugaboy respectfully asks this Court to stay all proceedings and briefing deadlines in Case No. 3:25-cv-02724-L, pending Judge Kinkeade's ruling on Dugaboy's Motion to Consolidate in the 1876 case.

Dated: October 24, 2025 Respectfully submitted,

WINSTON & STRAWN LLP

By: <u>/s/ Geoffrey S. Harper</u>

Geoffrey S. Harper
Texas Bar No. 00795408
gharper@winston.com
John Michael Gaddis
Texas Bar No. 24069747
mgaddis@winston.com
WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
2121 N. Pearl Street, Suite 900
Dallas, TX 75201
(214) 453-6500
(214) 453-6400 (fax)

Counsel for Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on October 24, 2025, a copy of this document was served electronically via the Court's CM/ECF system to the parties registered or otherwise entitled to receive electronic notices in this case.

/s/ Geoffrey S. Harper
Geoffrey S. Harper

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(b), I certify that on October 24, 2025 Dugaboy counsel Mike Gaddis conferred by email with John Morris, counsel for the Highland Appellees, and was informed that the Appellees are opposed to the relief requested in this Motion.

/s/ Geoffrey S. Harper
Geoffrey S. Harper

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

- 1. This document complies with the word limit of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013(f)(3)(A) because, excluding the portions excluded by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8015(g), this document contains 513 words.
- 2. This document complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8015(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8015(a)(6) because this document has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word, typeface Times New Roman, 14-point type (12-point type in footnotes).

/s/ Geoffrey S. Harper Geoffrey S. Harper Case 3:25-cv-02724-L Document 14-1 Filed 10/24/25 Page 1 of 207 PageID 105

EXHIBIT 1

Geoffrey S. Harper Texas Bar No. 00795408 gharper@winston.com John Michael Gaddis Texas Bar No. 24069747 mgaddis@winston.com WINSTON & STRAWN LLP 2121 N. Pearl Street, Suite 900 Dallas, TX 75201 (214) 453-6500 (214) 453-6400 (fax)

Counsel for Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

In re:) Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL) Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
MANAGEMENT, L.P.,)
Reorganized Debtor.)
-)
)
THE DUGABOY INVESTMENT) Case No. 3:25-cv-01876-K
TRUST,)
) Case No. 3:25-cv-02072-S
Appellant,)
V.) Case No. 3:25-cv-02579-E
HIGHLAND CAPITAL)
MANAGEMENT, L.P,) Case No. 3:25-cv-02724-L
et al.,)
Appellees.)

APPELLANT THE DUGABOY INVESTMENT TRUST'S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE PROCEEDINGS AND EXTEND RELATED DEADLINES ON APPEAL

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
INTRODU	CTION	1
DUGABO	Y'S PROPOSAL	2
BACKGRO	OUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY	3
LEGAL ST	ANDARD	5
ARGUME	NT	5
A.	For the sake of judicial efficiency and avoiding wasteful duplication, the Court should consolidate the four appeals into a single proceeding.	5
В.	The four appeals are closely related and inextricably intertwined	6
C.	The Court should vacate the current briefing deadlines in this case and direct the Parties to propose a new schedule for consolidated briefing.	9
D.	The Court should enlarge applicable word limits to allow sufficient space for the Parties to fully brief the issues on appeal.	10
Ε.	Highland was for consolidation before it was against it	10
CONCLUS	SION	13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

	Page(s)
Cases	
Cadle Co. v. Whataburger of Alice, 174 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 1999)	5
Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. v. Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P. (In re Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.), Civ. No. 3:21-CV-3129-B, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108176 (N.D. Tex. June 17, 2022)	1
Dondero v. Jernigan, No. 24-10287, 2025 WL 1122466 (5th Cir. Apr. 16, 2025)	4
Sutter Corp. v. P&P Indus., Inc., 125 F.3d 914 (5th Cir. 1997)	5
Statutes	
11 U.S.C. § 105	12
28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)	8
28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)	8
Other Authorities	
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8003	8
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8003(3)(A)	1
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8003(b)(2)	5
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004(a)(2)	8
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8015(a)(7)(B)	10
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1)(A)	1, 9–10
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019	6. 7

Case 3:25-cv-02824-K	Documentt 1349-1	Fillelet 0.101/21/21/21/21/21	Pagage 501207 Pagage 10. 189
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11			4, 9

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 8003(3)(A) and 9006(b)(1)(A) and for the sake of judicial economy, Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy" or "Appellant") respectfully moves to consolidate the four appeals listed in the caption, which involve the same parties and challenge closely related decisions by the same bankruptcy-court judge in the same underlying bankruptcy case. Dugaboy also respectfully requests that the Court vacate the briefing deadlines currently set in this case and direct the Parties to propose a new schedule for a single cycle of consolidated briefing on all the issues raised in the four appeals. Because this Court has the first-filed of the four appeals, it is this Court's decision whether to order consolidation. This Court has already consolidated two appeals in this case. In doing so, the Court recognized that judicial economy would not be served by the waste and expense of litigating similar issues on substantially identical records before two different judges, which also creates a risk of potentially inconsistent judgments.²

¹ In its order of August 8, 2025 (D19), this Court directed that the appeal originally docketed as 3:25-cv-01901-S before Judge Scholer be transferred to this Court and consolidated into the lead case No. 3:25-cv-01876-K. That time, the two appeals were brought by two different appellants (Dugaboy and James Daugherty) challenging the same underlying Bankruptcy Court order approving the Settlement (albeit arguing different grounds).

² Judge Boyle reached the same conclusion in a recent decision involving entities related to the parties here, when she consolidated two appeals with identical parties arising out of the same adversary proceeding. *Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. v. Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P. (In re Highland*

Today, we face four appeals before four different judges. This is an especially complex case that has been litigated for six years in the Bankruptcy Court, with a convoluted procedural history and massive record that will demand a considerable commitment of time and attention from the presiding judge. This is a monumental task to inflict on even one judge. But assigning *four* different federal district judges to duplicate the extensive preparation needed to resolve each of these appeals is grossly wasteful and inefficient. This situation cannot stand, and consolidation is the only solution that makes sense.

DUGABOY'S PROPOSAL

Dugaboy requests that the Court maintain this case (3:25-cv-01876-K) as the lead case, and consolidate the other three appeals into it, as follows:

Appeal	Case Number: ³	Judge:	Order appealed:
<u>filed</u> :			
7/14/2025	3:25-cv-01876-K	Kinkeade	Order approving settlement
	(lead case)		(D4297)
8/4/2025	3:25-cv-02072-S	Scholer	Order denying motion to stay
	(consolidated)		(D4333)
9/16/2025	3:25-cv-02579-B	Boyle	Order denying motion to
	(consolidated)		recuse (D4379)
10/6/2025	3:25-cv-2724–L	Lindsay	Order granting motion to fix
	(consolidated)		Class 11 interests (D4401)

Cap. Mgmt., L.P.), Civ. No. 3:21-CV-3129-B, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108176, at *9-*10 (N.D. Tex. June 17, 2022).

³ For convenience, Dugaboy will refer to each proceeding by the last four digits of its case number (*e.g.*, "1876 case" or "2072 appeal").

Once the appeals are consolidated, the Court should direct the parties to assemble a single consolidated record and propose a reasonable schedule for a single cycle of consolidated appellate briefing, with appropriate enlargements of time and word limits to reflect the number and complexity of the issues.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Although the underlying bankruptcy case has been litigated for six years, the Bankruptcy Court's decisions challenged in the current appeals each issued during the last few months:

- (1) Order approving settlement (D4297) on June 30, 2025.
- (2) Order denying motion to stay (D4333) on July 21, 2025.
- (3) Order denying motion to recuse (D4379) on Sept. 2, 2025.
- (4) Order fixing Class 11's allowed claim (D4401), Sept. 22, 2025.

The Debtor, Highland Capital Management, L.P., filed for Chapter 11 bank-ruptcy in 2019, and the Bankruptcy Court confirmed its reorganization plan in 2021 (D1943). Skipping over several years of convoluted procedural history, the events relevant to the current appeals took place within a very short and recent time frame between late June and mid-September of this year.

First, Highland and Hunter Mountain Investment Trust (HMIT) asked the Bankruptcy Court to approve a proposed settlement on May 19, 2025 (D4216). The Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on June 25, 2025, and approved the proposed settlement on June 30, 2025 (D4297).

On July 17, 2025, Dugaboy moved to stay the approval of the settlement so it

could investigate allegations of misconduct that cast doubt on the authority of HMIT's purported principal Mark Patrick to agree to the settlement (D4326). The Bankruptcy Court denied Dugaboy's motion on July 21, 2025 (D4333).

On August 15, 2025, Dugaboy filed a motion to recuse Chief Judge Jernigan (D4372), which the Bankruptcy Court denied on September 7, 2025 (D4379). Unlike prior recusal motions, this motion focused on the uniquely prejudicial circumstances created by Chief Judge Jernigan's novels, the apparent close similarity between Mr. Dondero and one of the villains in the books, and the attendant public controversy surrounding the books.⁴ And although the Fifth Circuit concluded that a previous recusal motion failed to meet the high bar for relief under the mandamus standard, it nevertheless remarked that "[d]ue to the similarities between the characters in Chief Judge Jernigan's novel and the litigants currently before her court, a strong argument could be made that she had a duty to recuse." No. 24-10287, 2025 WL 1122466, at *7 (5th Cir. April 16, 2025) (per curiam).

Finally, on September 18, 2025, the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on Highland's motion to fix the allowed amount of Dugaboy's Class 11 interests (D4362). At that hearing, Chief Judge Jernigan threatened Dugaboy's current counsel with Rule 11 sanctions if he continued to repeat arguments made by prior counsel

⁴ Dugaboy recently learned that Chief Judge Jernigan has a third novel forthcoming. *See* Exhibit F (marketing flyer for third book).

that she regarded as "precluded" by her prior decisions. Ex. E, Sept. 18 Hrg. Tr. at 76:4–77:3, 77:18–78:19. Over Dugaboy's strenuous objection, the court granted Highland's motion on September 22, 2025. This last decision, if it stands, purports to dispose of the last of Dugaboy's remaining interest in the bankruptcy estate. It is therefore a "final" appealable order with regard to Dugaboy.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure allow this Court, in its discretion, to consolidate multiple appeals into a single proceeding. *See* Bankruptcy Rule 8003(b)(2) ("When parties have separately filed timely notices of appeal, the district court . . . may join or consolidate the appeals."). As shown in the chart above, each of the four appeals at issue was commenced by Dugaboy in separately filed and timely notices of appeal. *See* Bankr. Dkt. Nos. 4322, 4353, 4396, and 4423.

The appeal before this Court (No. 25-1876) is the "first-filed" appeal, which empowers this Court to decide whether or to what extent the other three appeals should be consolidated into this case. *See, e.g., Cadle Co. v. Whataburger of Alice*, 174 F.3d 599, 603 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining first-to-file rule); *Sutter Corp. v. P&P Indus., Inc.*, 125 F.3d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1997) (same).

ARGUMENT

A. For the sake of judicial efficiency and avoiding wasteful duplication, the Court should consolidate the four appeals into a single proceeding

Dugaboy has pursued these four separate appeals in an abundance of caution

and timely notices of appeal after each of the four occasions that the Bankruptcy Court ruled against it. No party and no court wants to see this situation progress to a point where four different judges are reviewing four different sets of briefing. Fortunately, this Court has the power to prevent that outcome by consolidating the four appeals into one case under one judge with one record and one briefing schedule.

B. The four appeals are closely related and inextricably intertwined

Each of the four appeals involves orders issued by the Bankruptcy Court to the same parties within a narrow time frame between June 30 and September 22 of this year. As shown by the Statements of Issues filed in each of the four appellate proceedings (*see* Exhibits A, B, C, and D), there is considerable overlap among the issues presented for appeal. Furthermore, the facts and circumstances behind each of the four challenged orders are so inextricably intertwined as to make it effectively impossible for an appellate court to meaningfully review any one of them without considering its relation to the others.

By way of example, some of the connections among the four appeals include the following:

First Appeal, No. 25-1876: Several issues from the Rule 9019 settlement proceedings overlap into the other appeals. The Second Appeal's motion to stay involved an effort to develop evidence that would have voided the settlement by

showing that the purported representative of one settling party lacked authority to negotiate on that party's behalf. Also, both the First and Fourth Appeals feature substantially identical arguments over how to value an equity-holder's interest, but applied to different parties (HMIT's Class 10 at the June 25 hearing and Dugaboy's Class 11 at the September 18 hearing).

Second Appeal, No. 25-2072: As noted above, this appeal is closely connected to the First Appeal because the Motion for a Stay was meant to buy time to collect more evidence that might have changed the outcome of the Rule 9019 proceeding by, among other things, showing that the purported representative of one of the settling parties lacked authority to act on its behalf.

Third Appeal, No. 25-2579: The recusal issue connects to all the other appeals because Chief Judge Jernigan's bias against James Dondero and the entities associated with him pervades each of the other three decisions being appealed. Chief Judge Jernigan has already generated controversy by publishing two novels featuring a villain who is a thinly disguised version of Mr. Dondero. We now know that during the same time that the Bankruptcy Court made the four decisions at issue, Chief Judge Jernigan was also finishing her third novel that will hit the presses this fall. *See* Ex. F (promotional flyer for third book). Even worse, she is using the public controversy over her first two books to stimulate publicity and sales for her

third. *See id.* (quoting extensively from a 2023 Wall Street Journal article that discussed the controversy at length).

If Dugaboy's appeal on recusal succeeds and Chief Judge Jernigan is compelled to withdraw from the case, that could void any or all of the other orders that Dugaboy is appealing. With that potential consequence in mind, it makes sense that the same district-court judge who hears the recusal appeal should also resolve Dugaboy's challenges to Chief Judge Jernigan's other three orders.⁵

Fourth Appeal, No. 25-2724: As noted above, both the Fourth and the First Appeals involve substantially similar valuation arguments applied to different parties. On both occasions Dugaboy argued vigorously for an alternative methodology that the Bankruptcy Court declined to adopt. Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Court specifically said at the later proceeding involving Dugaboy and Class 11 that it would rule consistently with how it had previously ruled for HMIT and Class 10. The Bankruptcy Court's comments make clear that it considered its prior decision on HMIT to be "preclusive" of how it would rule on Dugaboy. *See* Ex. E (Sept. 18 hearing transcript at 18:12–13). To determine whether the Bankruptcy Court erred

(b) (allowing appeals "with leave of the court" from "other interlocutory orders and decrees").

⁵ The appeal on the recusal issue implicates questions of appealability and finality, which are discussed in detail in the Motion for Leave to Appeal (attached to this Motion as Exhibit G) that Judge Boyle ordered Dugaboy to file in the 2579 case (*see* Dkt. 2, Sept. 26, 2025 order; Dkt. 17, Oct. 10, 2025 Motion for Leave). In sum, that issue comes down to whether an appeal from a denial of

recusal is a final appeal that can be taken by right, or an interlocutory appeal that requires the Court's permission. *Compare* 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) *and* FRBP 8003 (allowing district courts to hear appeals "from final judgments, orders, and decrees") *with* § 158(a)(3) and FRBP 8004(a)(2),

in taking this approach, both the First and the Fourth Appeals should be heard by the same judge.

Furthermore, the Fourth Appeal cannot be separated from the recusal issues in the Third Appeal because it was at the September 18 hearing on the Class 11 valuation issue that Chief Judge Jernigan displayed a degree of bias far worse than what Dugaboy and Mr. Dondero had complained of in previous recusal motions. At this most recent hearing, Chief Judge Jernigan threatened Dugaboy's counsel with Rule 11 sanctions either if he continued to "recycle" arguments previously made by prior Dugaboy attorneys, or if he offers novel arguments that prior counsel never made. See Ex. E (Sept. 18 Hrg. Tr. 21:23-22:02; 61:9-62:1; 76:4-77:3; 77:17-78:19). Chief Judge Jernigan also insinuated that the arguments of Dugaboy's current counsel should be given less weight because Dugaboy had been represented by what she perceived as too many lawyers and law firms over the six-year course of this litigation. See id. at 76:18 ("a merry-go-round of lawyers"); 78:13-14 ("a revolving door of lawyers"). The effect (and presumably the purpose) of Chief Judge Jernigan's admonition was to create a chilling effect meant to deter Dugaboy's and Mr. Dondero's counsel from performing their ethical duty to zealously advocate on behalf of their clients.

C. The Court should vacate the current briefing deadlines in this case and direct the Parties to propose a new schedule for consolidated briefing.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(b)(1)(A) and this

Court's Electronic Order dated October 8, 2025 (Dkt. 38), Dugaboy also respectfully asks the Court under Rule 9006(b)(1)(A) to vacate the current briefing deadlines in this case⁶ because they do not allow sufficient time for Dugaboy's proposal for a single cycle of consolidated briefing on the issues raised in all four appeals. Instead, Dugaboy asks the Court to direct the parties to meet and confer and propose a reasonable schedule for consolidated briefing. Good cause exists for this alteration of deadlines (which Dugaboy is requesting well in advance of any current deadlines) because it is essential to achieve the benefits of efficiency and judicial economy that are the purpose of the proposed consolidation.

D. The Court should enlarge applicable word limits to allow sufficient space for the Parties to fully brief the issues on appeal.

In order to allow the Parties sufficient space to brief all their appellate issues within a single cycle of briefing, Dugaboy respectfully requests that the Court enlarge the word limits for appellate briefing set forth in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8015(a)(7)(B), as follows: 26,000 words for each Appellant's Opening brief; 26,000 words for Appellees' Response brief; and 13,000 words for each Appellant's Reply brief.

E. Highland was for consolidation before it was against it

Highland's opposition to this Motion to Consolidate is perplexing. Just two

⁶ Pursuant to this Court's order dated October 8, 2025 (Dkt. 38), the current deadlines are November 12, 2025 for Appellants' Opening briefs, December 17, 2025 for Appellees' Response, and January 7, 2026 for Appellants' Replies.

months ago, Highland filed an unopposed motion to consolidate the Dugaboy and Daugherty appeals (No. 25-1876 and No. 25-1901). *See* Aug. 8, 2025, No. 25-1876 Dkt. 18. In that motion, Highland argued that consolidation was proper because the two appeals "(a) are appeals of the same Settlement Order, (b) will be based on the same evidentiary record, and (c) may involve the same, similar, or related arguments." *Id.* ¶ 10. Highland also argued that "[c]onsolidating the Appeals will serve judicial economy, save Appellees the cost and expense of litigating two appeals of the same Settlement Order based on the same evidentiary record, and avoid potentially inconsistent judgments." *Id.* ¶ 12. This Court agreed, and granted the motion that same day. Aug. 8, 2025 order, Dkt. 19 (consolidating both appeals into the 1876 lead case).

Those were good arguments in August and they remain good arguments today. In fact, they are even stronger now because the only alternative to consolidation is to needlessly consume the time and attention of *four* federal judges on a duplicative review of a massive factual record. It's hard to imagine what Highland hopes to gain from pursuing separate appeals, which would also burden Highland with the task of writing four different appellate response briefs.

Just five days after moving to consolidate, Highland abruptly changed its tune when Dugaboy proposed to consolidate No. 25-2072 before Judge Scholer into No. 25-1876. Highland's counsel told Dugaboy that "the Highland Entities will oppose

consolidating the appeals of the HMIT 9019/363 Order with the appeal of the denial of the stay because the appeals involve different orders created at different times based on different records such that further consolidation would create the risk of confusion." Ex. H (August 13, 2025 email from J. Morris to G. Harper). Highland's counsel continued:

For example, the motion for the stay under 11 U.S.C. section 105 was based *exclusively* on documents and information (the Attorney General's 7/9/25 letter filed in the Bankruptcy Court seeking an indefinite stay of the entire bankruptcy case and a Complaint filed by the JOLs in the Cayman Islands on July 15, 2025) that were not considered by the Bankruptcy Court when it entered the HMIT 9019/363 Order for the simple reason that they did not exist." Ex. G.

Highland's argument against consolidation is not only wrong, but evinces an unjustifiably low estimation of the capabilities of this Court and its fellow district judges. As noted above, the reviewing court needs only to examine four orders issued by the Bankruptcy Court over a short time frame of less than three months. The set of docket entries relating to these orders is voluminous, but represents only a small fraction of the more than 4,000 entries that the main bankruptcy case has generated over its six-year history. Furthermore, any confusion resulting from documents being part of one case's record but not another will be cured by the consolidation order, which can direct the parties to re-designate a single comprehensive record that covers all of the issues being appealed. Finally, it is neither unusual nor

especially difficult for judges hearing appeals in bankruptcy cases to deal with massive dockets and numerous parties in interest and keep track of the relative chronology of key events. To the extent there may be legitimate concerns about confusion such as in the example quoted by Highland's counsel above (Ex. H), consolidation will curtail the complexity and confusion by simplifying these four appeals into one case with one record and one judge.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court should consolidate the No. 25-2072, No. 25-2579, and No. 25-2724 appeals into No. 25-1876. The Court should enlarge applicable word limits for appellate briefing as requested above, and direct the Parties to prepare a single consolidated Statement of Issues to be considered on appeal, a single consolidated Record that includes necessary materials for all the issues being appealed, and a proposed schedule for a single cycle of consolidated appellate briefing.

Dated: October 23, 2025 Respectfully submitted,

WINSTON & STRAWN LLP

By: /s/ Geoffrey S. Harper

Geoffrey S. Harper Texas Bar No. 00795408 gharper@winston.com John Michael Gaddis Texas Bar No. 24069747 mgaddis@winston.com WINSTON & STRAWN LLP 2121 N. Pearl Street, Suite 900 Dallas, TX 75201 (214) 453-6500 (214) 453-6400 (fax)

Counsel for Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on October 23, 2025, a copy of this document was served electronically via the Court's CM/ECF system to the parties registered or otherwise entitled to receive electronic notices in this case.

<u>/s/ Geoffrey S. Harper</u> Geoffrey S. Harper

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(b), I certify that the undersigned first had discussions more than two months ago about consolidating the instant appeals with Highland counsel John Morris, who indicated by email on August 13, 2025 that Highland opposed consolidation (see Exhibit H). On October 20 and 21, 2025, Dugaboy counsel Mike Gaddis exchanged emails with Mr. Morris to ask if Highland would oppose the instant Motion. Mr. Morris asked for more time to consider the issue. The undersigned and Mr. Gaddis had a phone conference with Mr. Morris early this morning (October 23, 2025) but were unable to reach agreement. The call ended with Mr. Morris saying he would get back to us today, but it is now 5:00 p.m. and we have heard nothing further from Highland counsel. Because the issue is pressing and the hour is late, Dugaboy concludes that Highland has not changed its view on consolidation and therefore opposes the relief requested in this Motion.

/s/ Geoffrey S. Harper Geoffrey S. Harper

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

- 1. This document complies with the word limit of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013(f)(3)(A) because, excluding the portions excluded by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8015(g), this document contains 3,186 words.
- 2. This document complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8015(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8015(a)(6) because this document has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word, typeface Times New Roman, 14-point type (12-point type in footnotes).

/s/ Geoffrey S. Harper
Geoffrey S. Harper

EXHIBIT A

Geoffrey S. Harper Texas Bar No. 00795408 gharper@winston.com John Michael Gaddis Texas Bar No. 24069747 mgaddis@winston.com WINSTON & STRAWN LLP 2121 N. Pearl Street, Suite 900 Dallas, TX 75201 (214) 453-6500 (214) 453-6400 (fax)

Michael J. Lang Texas State Bar No. 24036944 mlang@cwl.law Alexandra Ohlinger Texas State Bar No. 24091423 aohlinger@cwl.law CRAWFORD, WISHNEW & LANG PLLC 1700 Pacific Ave, Suite 2390 Dallas, Texas 75201

Telephone: (214) 817-4500

Counsel for Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS **DALLAS DIVISION**

In re:	§ Chapter 11
HICHIAND CADITAL MANACEMENT I D	§ Casa No. 10 24054 agi
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§ Case No. 19-34054-sgj §
Reorganized Debtor.	§
	§

APPELLANT THE DUGABOY INVESTMENT TRUST'S AMENDED STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE PRESENTED AND DESIGNATION OF ITEMS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE RECORD ON APPEAL

Pursuant to Rule 8009 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the "Bankruptcy Rules"), Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Appellant"), having filed a Notice of Appeal [Docket No. 4311] on July 14, 2025; and having filed Appellant The Dugabov Investment Trust's Statement of Issues to be Presented and Designation of Items to be Included in the Record on Appeal [Docket No. 4365] on August 11, 2025 in the above-captioned case; and having received correspondence from the Bankruptcy Clerk's Office [Docket No. 4367] asking Dugaboy to correct certain errors in its August 11, 2025 submission [Docket No. 4365]; hereby submits this Amended Statement of Issues to be Presented and Designation of Items to be Included in the Record on Appeal, and respectfully requests that the Clerk prepare and forward the items listed herein to the District Court for inclusion in the record in connection with this appeal.¹

STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

- 1. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in approving the settlement agreement and release entered into between the Highland Entities and the HMIT Entities pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure as being fair, equitable, and in the best interest of the estate?
- 2. Did the Bankruptcy Court err by approving a settlement agreement utilizing an improper valuation methodology and without sufficient supporting evidence?
- 3. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in approving the overly broad and vague release provisions contained within the settlement agreement?
- 4. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in approving the settlement agreement without allowing adequate time for the Cayman Islands Joint Official Liquidators to complete their investigation?
- 5. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in concluding Mark Patrick had the requisite corporate authority to enter into and bind the HMIT entities to the settlement agreement?

DESIGNATION OF ITEMS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE RECORD ON APPEAL

¹ Because of its voluminous nature, Docket #4255 will be delivered to the Clerk on a flash drive which will arrive tomorrow, August 13, 2025.

- 1. Notice of Appeal for Bankruptcy Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 [Docket No. 4311] filed by Appellant;
- 2. Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. § 363 Approving Settlement Between the Highland Entities and the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith [Docket No. 4297];
- 3. Docket entries kept by the bankruptcy clerk in case no. 19-34054-sg11;
- 4. Any opinion, findings of fact and conclusions of law of the bankruptcy court relating to the issues on appeal, including transcripts of all oral rulings: Transcript of hearing held June 25, 2025 before Judge Stacey C.G. Jernigan [Docket No. 4296] re: Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HMIT Entities (4216) [Docket No. 4297]; and
- 5. Each of the additional documents and items designated below:

Date Filed	Docket No.	Description/Docket Text
2/22/2021	1943	Order confirming the fifth amended chapter 11 plan, as modified and granting related relief (RE: related document(s)1472 Chapter 11 plan filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., 1808 Chapter 11 plan filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management,
		L.P.). Entered on 2/22/2021 (Okafor, M.)
5/19/2025	4216	Motion to compromise controversy with the HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith) Filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (Attachments: #1 Exhibit AProposed Order (Annable, Zachery)
5/19/2025	4217	Declaration re: (Declaration of Gregory V. Demo in Support of Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith) filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (RE: related document(s)4216 Motion to compromise controversy with the HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an

5/10/2025	4217.1	Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith)). (Attachments: #1 Exhibit 1 (Annable, Zachery)
5/19/2025	4217-1	Proposed Settlement Agreement
5/20/2025	4218	Notice of hearing filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust (RE: related document(s)4213 Motion to extend time to (Motion for an Order Further Extending Duration of Trusts) (RE: related document(s)4144 Order on motion to extend/shorten time) Filed by Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust, Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A # 2 Exhibit B), 4216 Motion to compromise controversy with the HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith) Filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit AProposed Order)). Hearing to be held on 6/25/2025 at 09:30 AM at https://us-courts.webex.com/meet/jerniga for 4213 and for 4216, (Annable, Zachery)
5/22/2025	4221	Amended Notice of hearing filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust (RE: related document(s)4213 Motion to extend time to (Motion for an Order Further Extending Duration of Trusts) (RE: related document(s)4144 Order on motion to extend/shorten time) Filed by Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust, Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A # 2 Exhibit B), 4216 Motion to compromise controversy with the HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith) Filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A-Proposed Order)). Hearing to be held on 6/25/2025 at 09:30 AM at https://us-courts.webex.com/meet/jerniga for 4213 and for 4216, (Annable, Zachery

6/9/2025	4228	Motion for expedited hearing on Emergency Motion for an Order Extending Duration of Time to Respond to Trusts' Motion Filed
		by Partner Dugaboy Investment Trust (related document #4227
		(Attachments: #1 Proposed Order Granting Motion for Expedited
		Hearing (Hesse, Gregory) Modified linkage on 6/10/2025 (mdo).
6/9/2025	4230	Objection to (related document(s): 4216 Motion to compromise
0/7/2023	4230	controversy with the HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an
		Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363
		Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing
		Actions Consistent Therewith) filed by Debtor Highland Capital
		Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust,
		Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust) filed by Partner
6/10/2025	4222	Dugaboy Investment Trust. (Hesse, Gregory)
6/10/2025	4232	Response opposed to (related document(s): 4227 Motion to
		extend time to Time to Respond to Trusts' Motion filed by Partner
		Dugaboy Investment Trust, 4228 Motion for expedited hearing
		(related documents 4216 Motion to compromise controversy) on
		Emergency Motion for an Order Extending Duration of Time to
		Respond To Trusts' Motion filed by Partner Dugaboy Investment
		Trust) filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other
		Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland
6/4.0/2.02.5	100.1	Litigation Sub-Trust. (Annable, Zachery)
6/10/2025	4234	Reply to (related document(s): 4232 Response filed by Debtor
		Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland
		Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust)
		to (I) Emergency Motion for an Order Extending Duration of
		Time to Respond to Trusts' Motion and (II) Motion for Expedited
		Hearing on Emergency Motion for an Order Extending Duration
		of Time to Respond to Trusts' Motion filed by Partner Dugaboy
6/20/2027	40.51	Investment Trust. (Hesse, Gregory)
6/20/2025	4251	Exhibit List for the June 25, 2025 Hearing filed by Partner
		Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related document(s)4230
6/20/2007	10.70	Objection). (Lang, Michael)
6/20/2025	4252	Witness List for the June 25, 2025 Hearing filed by Partner
		Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related document(s)4230
6/90/2027	10	Objection). (Lang, Michael)
6/20/2025	4255	Witness and Exhibit List filed by Debtor Highland Capital
	(to be	Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust,
	submitted to	Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (RE: related
	suominen 10	document(s) 4216 Motion to compromise controversy with the
		HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to

	Clerk on	Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement
	flash drive)	with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent
	,	Therewith)). (Attachments: #1 Exhibit 1, #2 Exhibit 2, #3 Exhibit
		3, #4 Exhibit 4, #5 Exhibit 5, #6 Exhibit 6, #7 Exhibit 7, #8
		Exhibit 8, #9 Exhibit 9, #10 Exhibit 10, #11 Exhibit 11, #12
		Exhibit 12, #13 Exhibit 13, #14 Exhibit 14, #15 Exhibit 15, #16
		Exhibit 16, #17 Exhibit 17, #18 Exhibit 18, #19 Exhibit 19, #20
		Exhibit 20, #21 Exhibit 21, #22 Exhibit 22, #23 Exhibit 23, #24
		Exhibit 24, #25 Exhibit 25, #26 Exhibit 26, #27 Exhibit 27, #28
		Exhibit 28, #29 Exhibit 29, #30 Exhibit 30, #31 Exhibit 31, #32
		Exhibit 32, #33 Exhibit 33, #34 Exhibit 34, #35 Exhibit 35, #36
		Exhibit 36, #37 Exhibit 37, #38 Exhibit 38, #39 Exhibit 39, #40
		Exhibit 40, #41 Exhibit 41, #42 Exhibit 42, #43 Exhibit 43, #44
		Exhibit 44, #45 Exhibit 45, #46 Exhibit 46, #47 Exhibit 47, #48
		Exhibit 48, #49 Exhibit 49, #50 Exhibit 50, #51 Exhibit 51, #52
		Exhibit 52, #53 Exhibit 53, #54 Exhibit 54, #55 Exhibit 55, #56
		Exhibit 56, #57 Exhibit 57, #58 Exhibit 58, #59 Exhibit 59, #60
		Exhibit 60, #61 Exhibit 61, #62 Exhibit 62, #63 Exhibit 63, #64
		Exhibit 64, #65 Exhibit 65, #66 Exhibit 66, #67 Exhibit 67, #68
		Exhibit 68, #69 Exhibit 69, #70 Exhibit 70, #71 Exhibit 71, #72
		Exhibit 72, #73 Exhibit 73, #74 Exhibit 74, #75 Exhibit 75, #76
		Exhibit 76, #77 Exhibit 77, #78 Exhibit 78, #79 Exhibit 79, #80
		Exhibit 80, #81 Exhibit 81, #82 Exhibit 82, #83 Exhibit 83, #84
		Exhibit 84, #85 Exhibit 85, #86 Exhibit 86, #87 Exhibit 87, #88
		Exhibit 88, #89 Exhibit 89, #90 Exhibit 90, #91 Exhibit 91, #92
		Exhibit 92, #93 Exhibit 93, #94 Exhibit 94, #95 Exhibit 95, #96
		Exhibit 96, #97 Exhibit 97, #98 Exhibit 98, #99 Exhibit 99,
		#100 Exhibit 100, #101 Exhibit 101, #102 Exhibit 102, #103
		Exhibit 103, #104 Exhibit 104, #105 Exhibit 105, #106 Exhibit
		106, #107 Exhibit 107, #108 Exhibit 108, #109 Exhibit 109,
		#110 Exhibit 110, #111 Exhibit 111, #112 Exhibit 112, #113
		Exhibit 113, #114 Exhibit 114, #115 Exhibit 115, #116 Exhibit
		116, #117 Exhibit 117, #118 Exhibit 118, #119 Exhibit 119,
		#120 Exhibit 120 , #121 Exhibit 121 , #122 Exhibit 122 , #123
		Exhibit 123 (Annable, Zachery)
6/20/2025	4256	Witness and Exhibit List filed by Creditor Hunter Mountain
		Investment Trust (RE: related document(s)4216 Motion to
		compromise controversy with the HMIT Entities. (Motion for
		Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11
		U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and
		Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith)). (Phillips, Louis

6/24/2025	4200	
6/24/2025	4280	Amended Witness and Exhibit List (Highland Capital
		Management, L.P., Highland Claimant Trust, and Litigation Sub-
		Trust Second Amended Witness and Exhibit List with Respect to
		Hearing to Be Held on June 25, 2025) filed by Debtor Highland
		Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant
		Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (RE: related
		document(s) 4255 List (witness/exhibit/generic), 4277 List
		(witness/exhibit/generic)). (Attachments: #1 Exhibit
		126 (Annable, Zachery)
6/25/2025	4293	Court admitted exhibits date of hearing June 25, 2025 (RE: related
		document(s) 4216 Motion to compromise controversy with the
		HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to
		Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement
		with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent
		Therewith) Filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P.,
		Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party
		Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (Court Admitted Debtors Exhibits
		#1 through #9; #11 through #56 & #58 through #123 & #126
		offered by attorney John Morris; Court Also Admitted Patrick
		Daugherty Exhibits #1 through #42 offered by attorney Drew K.
		York: Court also admitted Dugaboy Investment Trust Exhibit #3,
		which was a letter offered by attorney Michael J. Lang.) (Edmond,
		Michael) Modified on 6/30/2025 (emi). Modified on 6/30/2025
		` '
6/27/2025	4290	(emi). (Entered: 06/27/2025)
0/2//2023	4290	Stipulation by Highland Claimant Trust, Highland Litigation Sub-
		Trust and The Dugaboy Investment Trust. filed by Other
		Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland
		Litigation Sub-Trust (RE: related document(s)4223 Objection).
6/8 = /5 = =		(Annable, Zachery)
6/27/2025	4291	Stipulation withdrawing objection of The Dallas Foundation and
		Crown Global Life Insurance, LTD to Motion for Entry of an
		order pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. Section
		363 approving settlement with the HMIT Entities and authorizing
		actions consistent therewith (RE: related document(s) 4232
		Response filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P.,
		Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party
		Highland Litigation Sub-Trust, 4282 Stipulation filed by Creditor
		Hunter Mountain Investment Trust). Entered on 6/27/2025
		(Okafor, M.)
7/1/2025	4299	Motion to withdraw document Consent Motion to Dismiss HMIT
		Remand Proceedings with Prejudice (related document(s) 3699
L	<u> </u>	

	T	Motion for loops) Filed by Conditon House Manual In-
		Motion for leave) Filed by Creditor Hunter Mountain Investment
		Trust, Interested Party Hunter Mountain Trust (Attachments:
		#1 Proposed Order (Salzer, Ian)
7/1/2025	4300	Motion to withdraw document Consent Motion to Dismiss
		Delaware Action Proceedings with Prejudice (related
		document(s) 4000 Motion for leave) Filed by Creditor Hunter
		Mountain Investment Trust, Interested Party Hunter Mountain
		Trust (Attachments: #1 Proposed Order (Salzer, Ian)
7/7/2025	4304	Order withdrawing Emergency Motion for Leave to File
		Adversary Proceeding [Dkt. 3699] with prejudice (RE: related
		document(s)4299 Motion to withdraw document filed by
		Interested Party Hunter Mountain Trust, Creditor Hunter
		Mountain Investment Trust). IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED
		that the proceedings defined in the Dismissal Motion as: Hunter
		Mountain Investment Trust v. Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P., Case
		No. 3:23-cv-02071-E (N.D. Tex.), on remand to the Bankruptcy
		Court (including Hunter Mountain Investment Trusts Emergency
		Motion for Leave to File Adversary Proceeding filed at
		Bankruptcy Court Docket No. 3699 and all proceedings,
		decisions, and orders relating thereto), are dismissed with
		prejudice. Entered on 7/7/2025 (Okafor, M.)
7/14/2025	4311	Notice of appeal of Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and
//14/2023	4311	11 U.S.C § 363 Approving Settlement Between the Highland
		Entities and the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions
		_
		Consistent Therewith. Fee Amount \$298 filed by Creditor The
		Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related document(s)4297 Order
		on motion to compromise controversy). Appellant Designation
7/16/2025	4222	due by 07/28/2025. (Lang, Michael)
7/16/2025	4323	Notice regarding the record for a bankruptcy appeal to the U.S.
		District Court. (RE: related document(s)4311 Notice of appeal of
		Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C § 363
		Approving Settlement Between the Highland Entities and the
		HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith.
		filed by Creditor The Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related
		document(s)4297 Order on motion to compromise controversy).
		Appellant Designation due by 07/28/2025.) (Whitaker, Sheniqua)
7/17/2025	4326	Motion to Stay 9019 Order filed by Creditor The Dugaboy
		Investment Trust. Objections due by 8/7/2025. (Lang, Michael)
		Modified text on 7/21/2025 (mdo).
7/17/2025	4329	Notice of docketing notice of appeal. Civil Action Number: 3:25-
		cv-01876-K. (RE: related document(s)4311 Notice of appeal of

	ı	
		Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C § 363
		Approving Settlement Between the Highland Entities and the
		HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith.
		filed by Creditor The Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related
		document(s)4297 Order on motion to compromise controversy).
		Appellant Designation due by 07/28/2025.) (Whitaker, Sheniqua)
7/21/2025	4333	Memorandum of opinion (RE: related document(s)4308 Notice
		(generic) filed by Interested Party State of Texas, 4326 The
		Dugaboy Investment Trust's Motion to Stay 9019 Order filed by
		Creditor The Dugaboy Investment Trust). Entered on 7/21/2025
		(Okafor, M.)
7/21/2025	4334	Order denying stay requests (related document 4326 The
		Dugaboy Investment Trust's Motion to Stay 9019 Order and 4308
		Notice). Entered on 7/21/2025. (Okafor, M.) Additional
		attachment(s) added on 7/21/2025 (Okafor, M.
8/4/2025	4353	Notice of appeal . Fee Amount \$298 filed by Partner Dugaboy
		Investment Trust (RE: related document(s) 4333 Memorandum of
		opinion). Appellant Designation due by 08/18/2025.
		(Attachments: #1 Exhibit A (Harper, Geoffrey)
8/5/2025	4359	Notice of docketing notice of appeal. Civil Action Number: 3:25-
		cv-02072-S. (RE: related document(s)4353 Notice of appeal filed
		by Partner Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related document(s)
		4333 Memorandum of opinion). (Almaraz, Jeanette)

Dated: August 12, 2025 Respectfully submitted,

WINSTON & STRAWN LLP

By: /s/ Geoffrey S. Harper

Geoffrey S. Harper
Texas Bar No. 00795408
gharper@winston.com
John Michael Gaddis
Texas Bar No. 24069747
mgaddis@winston.com
2121 N. Pearl Street, Suite 900
Dallas, TX 75201
(214) 453-6500

(214) 453-6400 (fax)

Michael J. Lang
Texas State Bar No. 24036944

mlang@cwl.law
Alexandra Ohlinger
Texas State Bar No. 24091423
aohlinger@cwl.law

CRAWFORD, WISHNEW & LANG PLLC 1700 Pacific Ave, Suite 2390 Dallas, Texas 75201 Telephone: (214) 817-4500

Counsel for Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on August 12, 2025, a true and correct copy of this document was served electronically via the Court's CM/ECF system to the parties registered or otherwise entitled to receive electronic notices in this case.

/s/ Geoffrey S. Harper
Geoffrey S. Harper

EXHIBIT B

Geoffrey S. Harper Texas Bar No. 00795408 gharper@winston.com John Michael Gaddis Texas Bar No. 24069747 mgaddis@winston.com WINSTON & STRAWN LLP 2121 N. Pearl Street, Suite 900 Dallas, TX 75201 (214) 453-6500 (214) 453-6400 (fax)

Michael J. Lang Texas State Bar No. 24036944 mlang@cwl.law Alexandra Ohlinger Texas State Bar No. 24091423 aohlinger@cwl.law CRAWFORD, WISHNEW & LANG PLLC 1700 Pacific Ave, Suite 2390 Dallas, Texas 75201 Telephone: (214) 817-4500

Counsel for Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS **DALLAS DIVISION**

In re:	§ Chapter 11
	§
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§ Case No. 19-34054-sgj
	8
Reorganized Debtor.	§
	§

APPELLANT THE DUGABOY INVESTMENT TRUST'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE PRESENTED AND AMENDED DESIGNATION OF ITEMS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE RECORD ON APPEAL FROM THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S ORDER REGARDING STAY REQUESTS [ADDRESSING DE ## 4326 & 4308]

Pursuant to Rule 8009(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the "Bankruptcy Rules"), Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Appellant"), having filed a Notice of Appeal [Docket No. 4353] on August 4, 2025 in the above-captioned case from the Bankruptcy Court's July 21, 2025 *Memorandum Order and Opinion Regarding Stay Requests* [Addressing DE ## 4326 & 4308][Docket No. 4333], hereby submits this Statement of Issues to be Presented and Amended Designation of Items to be Included in the Record on Appeal, and respectfully requests that the Clerk prepare and forward the items listed herein to the District Court for inclusion in the record in connection with this appeal.¹

STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

- 1. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in faulting Dugaboy's Stay Request because Dugaboy did not make a "standard" request for a stay pending appeal pursuant to Federal Bankruptcy Rule 8007?
- 2. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in determining that the Bankruptcy Rule 9019 settlement proceeding was not "a proceeding involving a charitable trust"?
- 3. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in concluding there was insufficient evidence connecting Mark Patrick's involvement in this Court's Rule 9019 settlement proceedings to the allegations of wrongdoing against Patrick in the Cayman Islands proceeding?
- 4. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in failing to recognize that the new evidence of Mark Patrick's misconduct exposed in the Cayman Islands proceeding fatally undermines the 9019 settlement by establishing that Patrick lacked authority to enter into the settlement?
- 5. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in concluding that a stay was unnecessary because Dugaboy could still pursue remedies against Mark Patrick in the Cayman Islands proceeding?
- 6. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in failing to recuse itself under 28 U.S.C. § 455 due to the appearance of partiality created by the presiding judge's authorship of novels that bear striking factual and thematic similarities to the Highland Capital Management bankruptcy proceedings and portray hedge fund principals in an overtly negative

¹ Because of their voluminous nature, Docket Nos. 3445, 3596, and 4255 will be delivered to the Clerk on a flash drive which will be hand delivered on Wednesday, September 24, 2025.

light, thereby depriving Dugaboy of an impartial judge with respect to the stay motion?

DESIGNATION OF ITEMS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE RECORD ON APPEAL

- 1. Notice of Appeal for Bankruptcy Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 [Docket No. 4353] filed by Appellant;
- 2. Bankruptcy Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order Regarding Stay Requests [Addressing DE ## 4236 & 4308 [Docket No. 4333];
- 3. Docket entries kept by the bankruptcy clerk in case no. 19-34054-sg11;
- 4. Any opinion, findings of fact and conclusions of law of the bankruptcy court relating to the issues on appeal, including transcripts of all oral rulings: Transcript of hearing held June 25, 2025 before Judge Stacey C.G. Jernigan [Docket No. 4296] re: Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HMIT Entities (4216) [Docket No. 4297]; Transcript of hearing held September 18, 2025 before Judge Stacey C.G. Jernigan re: Motion to allow claims (Motion for Order Fixing Allowed Amount of Class 11 Interests) filed by Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust; and
- 5. Each of the additional documents and items designated below:

Date Filed	Docket No.	Description/Docket Text
2/22/2021	1943	Order confirming the fifth amended chapter 11 plan, as modified and granting related relief (RE: related document(s)1472 Chapter 11 plan filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., 1808 Chapter 11 plan filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P.) Feetand on 2/22/2021 (Olofor M.)
3/18/2021	2060	L.P.). Entered on 2/22/2021 (Okafor, M.) Motion to recuse Judge Jernigan Filed by Interested Party James
3/10/2021	2000	Dondero (Lang, Michael)
3/18/2021	2061	Brief in support filed by Interested Party James Dondero (RE: related document(s)2060 Motion to recuse Judge Jernigan). (Lang, Michael)
3/18/2021	2062	Support/supplemental document Appendix to Motion to Recuse filed by Interested Party James Dondero (RE: related

	T	
		(Attachments: # 1 Appendix Appendix) (Lang, Michael)
		Modified text on 7/21/2022(Ecker, C.).). Hearing to be held on
		8/31/2022 at 09:30 AM at https://us-
		courts.webex.com/meet/jerniga for 3406, (Lang, Michael)
8/15/2022	3444	Response opposed to (related document(s): 3406 Motion for leave
		Motion for Final Appealable Order and Supplement to Motion to
		Recuse Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 and Brief in Support filed by
		Interested Party James Dondero) filed by Debtor Highland Capital
		Management, L.P (Attachments: #1 Exhibit A (Annable,
		Zachery)
8/15/2022	3445	Exhibit List (Appendix in Support of Highland Capital
		Management, L.P.'s Objection to Motion for Final Appealable
	[to be	Order and Supplement to Motion to Recuse Pursuant to 28 USC
	submitted to Clerk on	455 and Brief in Support) filed by Debtor Highland Capital
	flash drive	Management, L.P. (RE: related document(s)3444 Response).
	Just urvej	(Attachments: #1 Exhibit 1, #2 Exhibit 2, #3 Exhibit 3, #4
		Exhibit 4, #5 Exhibit 5, #6 Exhibit 6, #7 Exhibit 7, #8 Exhibit
		8, #9 Exhibit 9, #10 Exhibit 10, #11 Exhibit 11, #12 Exhibit 12
		,#13 Exhibit 13 , #14 Exhibit 14 , #15 Exhibit 15 , #16 Exhibit 16
		,#17 Exhibit 17 , #18 Exhibit 18 , #19 Exhibit 19 , #20 Exhibit 20
		, #21 Exhibit 21 , #22 Exhibit 22 , #23 Exhibit 23 , #24 Exhibit 24
		, #25 Exhibit 25 , #26 Exhibit 26 , #27 Exhibit 27 , #28 Exhibit 28
		, #29 Exhibit 29 , #30 Exhibit 30 , #31 Exhibit 31 , #32 Exhibit 32
		, #33 Exhibit 33 , #34 Exhibit 34 , #35 Exhibit 35 , #36 Exhibit 36
		, #37 Exhibit 37 , #38 Exhibit 38 , #39 Exhibit 39 , #40 Exhibit 40
		, #41 Exhibit 41 , #42 Exhibit 42 , #43 Exhibit 43 , #44 Exhibit 44
		, #45 Exhibit 45 , #46 Exhibit 46 , #47 Exhibit 47 , #48 Exhibit 48
		, #49 Exhibit 49 , #50 Exhibit 50 , #51 Exhibit 51 , #52 Exhibit 52
		, #53 Exhibit 53 , #54 Exhibit 54 , #55 Exhibit 55 , #56 Exhibit 56
		, #57 Exhibit 57 , #58 Exhibit 58 , #59 Exhibit 59 , #60 Exhibit 60
		,#61 Exhibit 61 , #62 Exhibit 62 , #63 Exhibit 63 , #64 Exhibit 64
		, #65 Exhibit 65 , #66 Exhibit 66 , #67 Exhibit 67 , #68 Exhibit 68
		,#69 Exhibit 69 , #70 Exhibit 70 , #71 Exhibit 71 , #72 Exhibit 72
		, #73 Exhibit 73 , #74 Exhibit 74 , #75 Exhibit 75 , #76 Exhibit 76
		, #77 Exhibit 77 , #78 Exhibit 78 , #79 Exhibit 79 , #80 Exhibit 80
		, #81 Exhibit 81 , #82 Exhibit 82 , #83 Index 83 , #84 Exhibit 84
		, #85 Exhibit 85 , #86 Exhibit 86 (Annable, Zachery)
8/15/2022	3446	Motion to strike (related document(s): 3406 Motion for leave
		Motion for Final Appealable Order and Supplement to Motion to
		Recuse Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 and Brief in Support filed by
		Interested Party James Dondero) (Highland Capital Management,
	<u>I</u>	/ / 2 1

		L.P.'s Motion to (A) Strike Letters Attached to Appendix in Support of the Dondero Parties' Supplemental Recusal Motion [Docket No. 3406], or, (B) Alternatively, to Compel the Lawyers' Depositions) Filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P. (Annable, Zachery)
8/15/2022	3447	Declaration re: (Declaration of John A. Morris in Support of Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Motion to (A) Strike Letters Attached to Appendix in Support of the Dondero Parties' Supplemental Recusal Motion [Docket No. 3406], or, (B) Alternatively, to Compel the Lawyers' Depositions) filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P. (RE: related document(s)3446 Motion to strike (related document(s): 3406 Motion for leave Motion for Final Appealable Order and Supplement to Motion to Recuse Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 and Brief in Support filed by Interested Party James Dondero) (Highland Capi). (Annable, Zachery)
8/17/2022	3456	Notice of hearing filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P. (RE: related document(s)3446 Motion to strike (related document(s): 3406 Motion for leave Motion for Final Appealable Order and Supplement to Motion to Recuse Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 and Brief in Support filed by Interested Party James Dondero) (Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Motion to (A) Strike Letters Attached to Appendix in Support of the Dondero Parties' Supplemental Recusal Motion [Docket No. 3406], or, (B) Alternatively, to Compel the Lawyers' Depositions) Filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., 3449 Motion to compel Lawyers' Depositions. Filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P. (Ecker, C.)). Hearing to be held on 8/31/2022 at 09:30 AM at https://us-courts.webex.com/meet/jerniga for 3446 and for 3449, (Annable, Zachery)
8/22/2022	3463	Reply to (related document(s): 3444 Response filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P.) filed by Interested Party James Dondero. (Lang, Michael)
8/24/2022	3466	Amended Notice of hearing filed by Interested Party James Dondero (RE: related document(s)3406 Motion for Final Appealable Order and Supplement to Motion to Recuse Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 and Brief in Support Filed by Interested Party James Dondero (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Appendix) (Lang, Michael) Modified text on 7/21/2022(Ecker, C.)., 3446 Motion to strike (related document(s): 3406 Motion for leave Motion for Final Appealable Order and Supplement to Motion to Recuse Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 and Brief in Support filed by

		Interested Party James Dondero) (Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Motion to (A) Strike Letters Attached to Appendix in Support of the Dondero Parties' Supplemental Recusal Motion [Docket No. 3406], or, (B) Alternatively, to Compel the Lawyers' Depositions) Filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., 3449 Motion to compel Lawyers' Depositions. Filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P. (Ecker, C.), 3462 Order converting the August 31, 2022 at 9:30 AM Hearing on (A) The motion for final appealable order and supplement to motion to recuse and (B) related motions to strike and compel to a preliminary status/scheduling conference (RE: related document(s)3406 Motion for leave filed by Interested Party James Dondero, 3446 Motion to strike document filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., 3449 Motion to compel filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P.). Entered on 8/19/2022 (Ecker, C.)). Status Conference to be held on 8/31/2022 at 09:30 AM at https://us-courts.webex.com/meet/jerniga. (Lang, Michael)
8/26/2022	3470	Amended motion for final appealable order and proposed supplement to the record filed by Interested Party James Dondero (RE: related document(s)3406 Motion for leave Motion for Final Appealable Order and Supplement to Motion to Recuse Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 and Brief in Support). (Attachments: #1 Appendix (Lang, Michael) MODIFIED text to match PDF on 9/1/2022 (Ecker, C.).
8/26/2022	3471	Stipulation by James Dondero and Highland Capital Management, L.P filed by Interested Party James Dondero (RE: related document(s)3446 Motion to strike (related document(s): 3406 Motion for leave Motion for Final Appealable Order and Supplement to Motion to Recuse Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 and Brief in Support filed by Interested Party James Dondero) (Highland Capi, 3449 Motion to compel Lawyers' Depositions.). (Lang, Michael)
9/1/2022	3479	Order denying amended motion of James Dondero, Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors, L.P., Nexpoint Advisors, L.P. The Dugaboy Investment Trust Get Good Trust and, Nexpoint Real Estate Partners, LLC, F/K/A HCRE Partners, A Delaware Limited Liability Company for final appealable order and supplement to motion to recuse pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 455 (RE: related document(s)3470 Brief filed by Interested Party James Dondero). Entered on 9/1/2022 (Okafor, Marcey)

	T ====	
10/31/2022	3595	Response opposed to (related document(s): 3541 Motion to recuse
		Judge Stacey G. C. Jernigan filed by Interested Party James
		Dondero, 3570 Motion to recuse Judge Stacey G. C. Jernigan -
		AMENDED filed by Interested Party James Dondero) filed by
		Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P (Annable, Zachery)
10/31/2022	3596	Support/supplemental document (Appendix in Support of
	F. 1	Highland's Objection to Renewed Motion to Recuse Pursuant to
	[to be	28 U.S.C. 455 and Brief in Support) filed by Debtor Highland
	submitted to	Capital Management, L.P. (RE: related document(s)3595
	Clerk on	Response). (Attachments: #1 Exhibit 1, #2 Exhibit 2, #3 Exhibit
	flash drive]	3 , #4 Exhibit 4 , #5 Exhibit 5 , #6 Exhibit 6 , #7 Exhibit 7 , #8
		Exhibit 8, #9 Exhibit 9, #10 Exhibit 10, #11 Exhibit 11, #12
		Exhibit 12, #13 Exhibit 13, #14 Exhibit 14, #15 Exhibit 15, #16
		Exhibit 16, #17 Exhibit 17, #18 Exhibit 18, #19 Exhibit 19, #20
		Exhibit 20, #21 Exhibit 21, #22 Exhibit 22, #23 Exhibit 23, #24
		Exhibit 24, #25 Exhibit 25, #26 Exhibit 26, #27 Exhibit 27, #28
		Exhibit 28, #29 Exhibit 29, #30 Exhibit 30, #31 Exhibit 31, #32
		Exhibit 32, #33 Exhibit 33, #34 Exhibit 34, #35 Exhibit 35, #36
		Exhibit 36 (Annable, Zachery)
3/3/2023	3673	Brief in support filed by Interested Party James Dondero (RE:
		related document(s)3570 Motion to recuse Judge Stacey G. C.
		Jernigan - AMENDED). (Lang, Michael)
3/6/2023	3675	Memorandum of Opinion and Order Denying Amended Renewed
		Motion to Recuse Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 455 (RE: related
		document(s)3570 Motion to recuse Judge filed by Interested Party
		James Dondero). Entered on 3/6/2023 (Okafor, Marcey)
3/6/2023	3676	Order Denying Amended Renewed Motion to Recuse Pursuant to
		U.S.C. Section 455 (related document #3570) Entered on
		3/6/2023. (Okafor, Marcey)
5/19/2025	4216	Motion to compromise controversy with the HMIT Entities.
		(Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019
		and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities
		and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith) Filed by Debtor
		Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland
		Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust
		(Attachments: #1 Exhibit AProposed Order (Annable, Zachery)
5/19/2025	4217	Declaration re: (Declaration of Gregory V. Demo in Support of
		Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019
		and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities
		and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith) filed by Debtor
		Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland
L	I	1 5 , ,

5/19/2025	4217-1	Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (RE: related document(s)4216 Motion to compromise controversy with the HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith)). (Attachments: #1 Exhibit 1 (Annable, Zachery) Proposed Settlement Agreement
3/19/2023	421/-1	Proposed Settlement Agreement
6/9/2025	4230	Objection to (related document(s): 4216 Motion to compromise controversy with the HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith) filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust) filed by Partner Dugaboy Investment Trust. (Hesse, Gregory)
6/20/2025	4251	Exhibit List for the June 25, 2025 Hearing filed by Partner Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related document(s)4230 Objection). (Lang, Michael)
6/20/2025	4252	Witness List for the June 25, 2025 Hearing filed by Partner Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related document(s)4230 Objection). (Lang, Michael)
6/20/2025	(to be submitted to Clerk on flash drive)	Witness and Exhibit List filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (RE: related document(s) 4216 Motion to compromise controversy with the HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith)). (Attachments: #1 Exhibit 1, #2 Exhibit 2, #3 Exhibit 3, #4 Exhibit 4, #5 Exhibit 5, #6 Exhibit 6, #7 Exhibit 7, #8 Exhibit 8, #9 Exhibit 9, #10 Exhibit 10, #11 Exhibit 11, #12 Exhibit 12, #13 Exhibit 13, #14 Exhibit 14, #15 Exhibit 15, #16 Exhibit 16, #17 Exhibit 17, #18 Exhibit 18, #19 Exhibit 19, #20 Exhibit 20, #21 Exhibit 21, #22 Exhibit 22, #23 Exhibit 23, #24 Exhibit 24, #25 Exhibit 25, #26 Exhibit 26, #27 Exhibit 27, #28 Exhibit 28, #29 Exhibit 29, #30 Exhibit 30, #31 Exhibit 31, #32 Exhibit 32, #33 Exhibit 33, #34 Exhibit 34, #35 Exhibit 35, #36 Exhibit 36, #37 Exhibit 37, #38 Exhibit 38, #39 Exhibit 39, #40 Exhibit 40, #41 Exhibit 41, #42 Exhibit 42, #43 Exhibit 43, #44

		T
		Exhibit 44, #45 Exhibit 45, #46 Exhibit 46, #47 Exhibit 47, #48
		Exhibit 48, #49 Exhibit 49, #50 Exhibit 50, #51 Exhibit 51, #52
		Exhibit 52, #53 Exhibit 53, #54 Exhibit 54, #55 Exhibit 55, #56
		Exhibit 56, #57 Exhibit 57, #58 Exhibit 58, #59 Exhibit 59, #60
		Exhibit 60, #61 Exhibit 61, #62 Exhibit 62, #63 Exhibit 63, #64
		Exhibit 64, #65 Exhibit 65, #66 Exhibit 66, #67 Exhibit 67, #68
		Exhibit 68, #69 Exhibit 69, #70 Exhibit 70, #71 Exhibit 71, #72
		Exhibit 72, #73 Exhibit 73, #74 Exhibit 74, #75 Exhibit 75, #76
		Exhibit 76, #77 Exhibit 77, #78 Exhibit 78, #79 Exhibit 79, #80
		Exhibit 80 , #81 Exhibit 81 , #82 Exhibit 82 , #83 Exhibit 83 , #84
		Exhibit 84, #85 Exhibit 85, #86 Exhibit 86, #87 Exhibit 87, #88
		Exhibit 88, #89 Exhibit 89, #90 Exhibit 90, #91 Exhibit 91, #92
		Exhibit 92, #93 Exhibit 93, #94 Exhibit 94, #95 Exhibit 95, #96
		Exhibit 96, #97 Exhibit 97, #98 Exhibit 98, #99 Exhibit 99,
		#100 Exhibit 100, #101 Exhibit 101, #102 Exhibit 102, #103
		Exhibit 103, #104 Exhibit 104, #105 Exhibit 105, #106 Exhibit
		106, #107 Exhibit 107, #108 Exhibit 108, #109 Exhibit 109,
		#110 Exhibit 110, #111 Exhibit 111, #112 Exhibit 112, #113
		Exhibit 113, #114 Exhibit 114, #115 Exhibit 115, #116 Exhibit
		116 , #117 Exhibit 117 , #118 Exhibit 118 , #119 Exhibit 119 ,
		#120 Exhibit 120, #121 Exhibit 121, #122 Exhibit 122, #123
		Exhibit 123 (Annable, Zachery)
6/20/2025	4256	Witness and Exhibit List filed by Creditor Hunter Mountain
		Investment Trust (RE: related document(s)4216 Motion to
		compromise controversy with the HMIT Entities. (Motion for
		Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11
		U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and
		Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith)). (Phillips, Louis)
6/20/2025	4257	Witness and Exhibit List filed by Interested Parties Crown Global
		Life Insurance, Ltd, The Dallas Foundation (RE: related
		document(s)4216 Motion to compromise controversy with the
		HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to
		Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement
		with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent
		Therewith)). (Attachments: #1 Exhibit 1 - Charitable DAF/CLO
		HoldCo Organization Chart, #2 Exhibit 2 - Rand Structure Chart,
		#3 Exhibit 3 - July 9, 2021 Memo on DAFs and Sponsoring Orgs,
		#4 Exhibit 4 - Charitable Respondents Response and Disclosures
		(Okin, Matthew)
6/23/2025	4271	
0/23/2023	'1 ∠ / 1	Amended Witness and Exhibit List filed by Debtor Highland
		Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant

		Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (RE: related
		document(s)4253 List (witness/exhibit/generic)). (Attachments:
		#1 Exhibit 66, #2 Exhibit 67 (Annable, Zachery)
6/23/2025	4272	Amended Witness and Exhibit List filed by Interested Parties
		Crown Global Life Insurance, Ltd, The Dallas Foundation (RE:
		related document(s)4257 List (witness/exhibit/generic)).
		(Attachments: #1 Exhibit 5, #2 Exhibit 66, #3 Exhibit 7 7,4
		Exhibit 8, 8, Exhibit 9 (Curry, David)
6/23/2025	4273	Objection to (related document(s)): 4255 List
		(witness/exhibit/generic) filed by Debtor Highland Capital
		Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust,
		Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust) filed by Partner
		Dugaboy Investment Trust. (Ohlinger, Ali)
6/23/2025	4277	Amended Witness and Exhibit List filed by Debtor Highland
		Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant
		Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (RE: related
		document(s)4255 List (witness/exhibit/generic)). (Attachments:
		#1 Exhibit 124, #2 Exhibit 125 (Annable, Zachery)
6/24/2025	4279	Witness and Exhibit List with Respect to Hearing to be Held on
		June 25, 2025 filed by Partner Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE:
		related document(s)4213 Motion to extend time to (Motion for an
		Order Further Extending Duration of Trusts) (RE: related
		document(s)4144 Order on motion to extend/shorten time)).
		(Attachments: #1 Exhibit 1 (Deitsch-Perez, Deborah)
6/24/2025	4280	Amended Witness and Exhibit List (Highland Capital
		Management, L.P., Highland Claimant Trust, and Litigation Sub-
		Trust Second Amended Witness and Exhibit List with Respect to
		Hearing to Be Held on June 25, 2025) filed by Debtor Highland
		Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant
		Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (RE: related
		document(s) 4255 List (witness/exhibit/generic), 4277 List
		(witness/exhibit/generic)). (Attachments: #1 Exhibit
		126 (Annable, Zachery)
6/25/2025	4293	Court admitted exhibits date of hearing June 25, 2025 (RE: related
0,25,2025	1273	document(s) 4216 Motion to compromise controversy with the
		HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to
		Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement
		with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent
		Therewith) Filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P.,
		Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party
		_
		Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (Court Admitted Debtors Exhibits

6/07/2025	4200	#1 through #9; #11 through #56 & #58 through #123 & #126 offered by attorney John Morris; Court Also Admitted Patrick Daugherty Exhibits #1 through #42 offered by attorney Drew K. York: Court also admitted Dugaboy Investment Trust Exhibit #3, which was a letter offered by attorney Michael J. Lang.) (Edmond, Michael) Modified on 6/30/2025 (emi). Modified on 6/30/2025 (emi). (Entered: 06/27/2025)
6/27/2025	4290	Stipulation by Highland Claimant Trust, Highland Litigation Sub- Trust and The Dugaboy Investment Trust. filed by Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (RE: related document(s)4223 Objection). (Annable, Zachery)
6/27/2025	4291	Stipulation withdrawing objection of The Dallas Foundation and Crown Global Life Insurance, LTD to Motion for Entry of an order pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. Section 363 approving settlement with the HMIT Entities and authorizing actions consistent therewith (RE: related document(s) 4232 Response filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust, 4282 Stipulation filed by Creditor Hunter Mountain Investment Trust). Entered on 6/27/2025 (Okafor, M.)
7/1/2025	4299	Motion to withdraw document Consent Motion to Dismiss HMIT Remand Proceedings with Prejudice (related document(s) 3699 Motion for leave) Filed by Creditor Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, Interested Party Hunter Mountain Trust (Attachments: #1 Proposed Order (Salzer, Ian)
7/1/2025	4300	Motion to withdraw document Consent Motion to Dismiss Delaware Action Proceedings with Prejudice (related document(s) 4000 Motion for leave) Filed by Creditor Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, Interested Party Hunter Mountain Trust (Attachments: #1 Proposed Order (Salzer, Ian)
7/7/2025	4304	Order withdrawing Emergency Motion for Leave to File Adversary Proceeding [Dkt. 3699] with prejudice (RE: related document(s)4299 Motion to withdraw document filed by Interested Party Hunter Mountain Trust, Creditor Hunter Mountain Investment Trust). IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the proceedings defined in the Dismissal Motion as: Hunter Mountain Investment Trust v. Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P., Case No. 3:23-cv-02071-E (N.D. Tex.), on remand to the Bankruptcy Court (including Hunter Mountain Investment Trusts Emergency

		Motion for Leave to File Adversary Proceeding filed at
		Bankruptcy Court Docket No. 3699 and all proceedings,
		decisions, and orders relating thereto), are dismissed with
		prejudice. Entered on 7/7/2025 (Okafor, M.)
7/10/2025	4308	Notice Letter from the Office of the Texas Attorney General
7/10/2025	1500	Requesting a Stay filed by Interested Party State of Texas. (Stone,
		Johnathan)
7/14/2025	4311	Notice of appeal of Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and
		11 U.S.C § 363 Approving Settlement Between the Highland
		Entities and the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions
		Consistent Therewith. Fee Amount \$298 filed by Creditor The
		Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related document(s)4297 Order
		on motion to compromise controversy). Appellant Designation
		due by 07/28/2025. (Lang, Michael)
7/16/2025	4323	Notice regarding the record for a bankruptcy appeal to the U.S.
		District Court. (RE: related document(s)4311 Notice of appeal of
		Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C § 363
		Approving Settlement Between the Highland Entities and the
		HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith.
		filed by Creditor The Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related
		document(s)4297 Order on motion to compromise controversy).
		Appellant Designation due by 07/28/2025.) (Whitaker, Sheniqua)
7/17/2025	4326	Motion to Stay 9019 Order filed by Creditor The Dugaboy
		Investment Trust. Objections due by 8/7/2025. (Lang, Michael)
		Modified text on 7/21/2025 (mdo).
7/17/2025	4329	Notice of docketing notice of appeal. Civil Action Number: 3:25-
		cv-01876-K. (RE: related document(s)4311 Notice of appeal of
		Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C § 363
		Approving Settlement Between the Highland Entities and the
		HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith.
		filed by Creditor The Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related
		document(s)4297 Order on motion to compromise controversy).
		Appellant Designation due by 07/28/2025.) (Whitaker, Sheniqua)
7/21/2025	4333	Memorandum of opinion (RE: related document(s)4308 Notice
7.21.2020	1333	(generic) filed by Interested Party State of Texas, 4326 The
		Dugaboy Investment Trust's Motion to Stay 9019 Order filed by
		Creditor The Dugaboy Investment Trust). Entered on 7/21/2025
		(Okafor, M.)
7/21/2025	4334	Order denying stay requests (related document 4326 The
,,21,2020	1551	Dugaboy Investment Trust's Motion to Stay 9019 Order and 4308
		Dagacoy in resultent Trust's Protion to Stay 7017 Order and 4500

	T	T
		Notice). Entered on 7/21/2025. (Okafor, M.) Additional
		attachment(s) added on 7/21/2025 (Okafor, M.)
8/4/2025	4353	Notice of appeal. Fee Amount \$298 filed by Partner Dugaboy
		Investment Trust (RE: related document(s) 4333 Memorandum of
		opinion). Appellant Designation due by 08/18/2025.
		(Attachments: #1 Exhibit A) (Harper, Geoffrey)
8/5/2025	4359	Notice of docketing notice of appeal. Civil Action Number: 3:25-
		cv-02072-S. (RE: related document(s)4353 Notice of appeal filed
		by Partner Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related document(s)
		4333 Memorandum of opinion). (Almaraz, Jeanette)
8/15/2025	4372	Motion to recuse Judge Filed by Interested Parties James
		Dondero, NexPoint Advisors, L.P., NexPoint Asset Management,
		L.P., NexPoint Real Estate Advisors, L.P., The Dugaboy
		Investment Trust, The Get Good Non Exempt Trust No 2
		(Attachments: #1 Proposed Order (Harper, Geoffrey)
9/2/2025	4379	Order denying fifth motion to recuse judge (related document
		#4372) Entered on 9/2/2025. (Okafor, M.)
9/16/2025	4396	Notice of appeal. Fee Amount \$298 filed by Partner Dugaboy
		Investment Trust (RE: related document(s)4379 Order on motion
		to recuse Judge). Appellant Designation due by 09/30/2025.
		(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Harper, Geoffrey)
9/18/2025	4403	4403 Hearing held on 9/18/2025. (RE: related document(s) 4362
J/10/2023	1103	Motion to allow claims (Motion for Order Fixing Allowed
		Amount of Class 11 Interests) filed by Other Professional
		Highland Claimant Trust (Appearances: J. Morris for
		Reorganized Debtor; G. Harper for Dugaboy. Evidentiary
		hearing. Motion approved. Counsel to upload order.) (Edmond,
		Michael) (Entered: 09/22/2025)

Dated: September 24, 2025 Respectfully submitted,

WINSTON & STRAWN LLP

By: /s/ Geoffrey S. Harper

Geoffrey S. Harper
Texas Bar No. 00795408
gharper@winston.com
John Michael Gaddis
Texas Bar No. 24069747
mgaddis@winston.com
2121 N. Pearl Street, Suite 900
Dallas, TX 75201
(214) 453-6500
(214) 453-6400 (fax)

Michael J. Lang
Texas State Bar No. 24036944

mlang@cwl.law
Alexandra Ohlinger
Texas State Bar No. 24091423
aohlinger@cwl.law

CRAWFORD, WISHNEW & LANG PLLC 1700 Pacific Ave, Suite 2390 Dallas, Texas 75201 Telephone: (214) 817-4500

Counsel for Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on September 24, 2025, a true and correct copy of this document was served electronically via the Court's CM/ECF system to the parties registered or otherwise entitled to receive electronic notices in this case.

/s/ Geoffrey S. Harper Geoffrey S. Harper

EXHIBIT C

Geoffrey S. Harper
Texas Bar No. 00795408
gharper@winston.com
John Michael Gaddis
Texas Bar No. 24069747
mgaddis@winston.com
WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
2121 N. Pearl Street, Suite 900
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 453-6500
(214) 453-6400 (fax)

Michael J. Lang
Texas State Bar No. 24036944
mlang@cwl.law
Alexandra Ohlinger
Texas State Bar No. 24091423
aohlinger@cwl.law
CRAWFORD, WISHNEW & LANG PLLC
1700 Pacific Ave, Suite 2390
Dallas, Texas 75201
Telephone: (214) 817-4500

Counsel for Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§ Chapter 11
WALL AND GARDEN AND CHARLES A D	§
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§ Case No. 19-34054-sgj
Reorganized Debtor.	8
11001 g	§

Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust's Statement of Issues to be Presented and Designation of Items to be Included in the Record on Appeal from the Bankruptcy Court's Order Denying Motion to Recuse Judge [Docket No. 4379]

Pursuant to Rule 8009(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the "Bankruptcy Rules"), Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Appellant"), having filed a Notice of Appeal [Docket No. 4396] on September 16, 2025, from the Bankruptcy Court's order of September 2, 2025, denying its motion to recuse judge [Docket No. 4379], and having received correspondence from the Clerk of Court requesting corrections to its designations [Docket No. 4430], submits this *Statement of Issues to be Presented and Amended Designation of Items to be Included in the Record on Appeal*, and respectfully requests that the Clerk prepare and forward the items listed to the District Court for inclusion in the record in connection with this appeal.¹

STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

- 1. Did the Bankruptcy Court's order approving the proposed Highland/HMIT settlement under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019 and 11 U.S.C. § 363 (Docket No. 4297) constitute a "final" judgment or order, thereby giving this Court jurisdiction for appellate review of the Bankruptcy Court's Order denying the Motion to Recuse?
- 2. Did the Bankruptcy Court's Order Fixing Allowed Amount of Class 11 Interests (Docket No. 4401) constitute a "final" judgment or order, thereby giving this Court jurisdiction for appellate review of the Bankruptcy Court's Order denying the Motion to Recuse?
- 3. Did the Bankruptcy Court abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify itself from this proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) due to the presiding judge's authorship of novels that bear striking factual and thematic similarities to the Highland Capital Management bankruptcy proceedings and portray hedge-fund principals in an overtly negative light, thereby creating a situation in which its impartiality might reasonably be questioned?
- 4. Did the Bankruptcy Court abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify itself from this proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) due to the presiding judge's authorship of novels that bear striking factual and thematic similarities to the Highland Capital Management bankruptcy proceedings and portray hedge fund principals in an overtly negative light, thereby manifesting an actual personal bias or prejudice against Mr. James Dondero and others affiliated with him?

¹ Because of their voluminous nature, Docket Nos. 3445, 3596, and 4255 will be delivered to the Clerk on Monday on a flash drive.

- 5. Did the Bankruptcy Court abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify itself from this proceeding under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 5006, which requires disqualification from a bankruptcy proceeding if the disqualifying circumstances provided by 28 U.S.C. § 455 are present?
- 6. Did the Bankruptcy Court abuse its discretion by refusing to recuse itself from this proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 144, when a party to the proceeding has filed a timely and sufficient affidavit alleging that the Bankruptcy Court has a personal bias or prejudice against him?
- 7. Did the Bankruptcy Court abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify itself from this proceeding when the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed that "[d]ue to the similarities between the characters in Chief Judge Jernigan's novel and the litigants currently before her in court, a strong argument could be made that she had a duty to recuse"? *Dondero v. Jernigan*, No. 24-10287, 2025 WL 1122466, at *7 (5th Cir. Apr. 16, 2025).
- 8. Did the Bankruptcy Court abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify or recuse itself after the hearing of September 18, 2025, at which it threatened Dugaboy's counsel with Rule 11 sanctions for "recycling" arguments previously made by the "revolving door of lawyers" that had represented Dugaboy over the previous several years, thus seeking to impose a chilling effect on Dugaboy's right to zealous advocacy by its chosen counsel?
- 9. Is a declination to recuse reviewed for an abuse of discretion or, as other circuit courts have held, *de novo*?

DESIGNATION OF ITEMS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE RECORD ON APPEAL

- 1. Notice of Appeal for Bankruptcy Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 [Docket No. 4396] filed by Appellant;
- 2. Bankruptcy Court's September 2, 2025 Order Denying Fifth Motion to Recuse Judge [DE #4372], [Docket No. 4379];
- 3. Docket entries kept by the bankruptcy clerk in case no. 19-34054-sg11;
- 4. Any opinion, findings of fact, and conclusions of law of the bankruptcy court relating to the issues on appeal, including transcripts of all oral rulings; and
- 5. Each of the additional documents and items designated below:

Date Filed	Docket No.	Description/Docket Text
2/22/2021	1943	Order confirming the fifth amended chapter 11 plan, as modified and granting related relief (RE: related document(s)1472 Chapter 11 plan filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., 1808 Chapter 11 plan filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P.). Entered on 2/22/2021 (Okafor, M.)
3/18/2021	2060	Motion to recuse Judge Jernigan Filed by Interested Party James Dondero (Lang, Michael)
3/18/2021	2061	Brief in support filed by Interested Party James Dondero (RE: related document(s)2060 Motion to recuse Judge Jernigan). (Lang, Michael)
3/18/2021	2062	Support/supplemental document Appendix to Motion to Recuse filed by Interested Party James Dondero (RE: related document(s)2060 Motion to recuse Judge Jernigan). (Lang, Michael)
3/23/2021	2083	Order denying motion to recuse (related document #2060) Entered on 3/23/2021. (Okafor, M.)
4/6/2021	2169	Amended notice of appeal filed by Interested Party James Dondero (RE: related document(s)2149 Notice of appeal). (Lang, Michael)
4/15/2022	2205	Statement of issues on appeal, filed by Interested Party James Dondero (RE: related document(s)2083 Order on motion to recuse Judge). (Lang, Michael)
4/15/2021	2206	Appellant designation of contents for inclusion in record on appeal filed by Interested Party James Dondero (RE: related document(s)2169 Amended notice of appeal). Appellee designation due by 04/29/2021. (Lang, Michael)
2/9/2022	3264	DISTRICT COURT MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - The Recusal Order is not a final, appealable order, is not subject to the collateral order doctrine, and is not an appealable interlocutory order under § 1292 (a) and the Court is without jurisdiction over this appeal of the Bankruptcy Court's Recusal Order. The Court further denies Appellants leave to appeal the Recusal Order under § 1292 (b), denies Appellants' request to withdraw the reference of their motion to recuse, and denies Appellants' request to construe their appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus. Accordingly, the Court dismisses this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. (Ordered by Judge Ed Kinkeade on 2/9/2022). Civil Action number:3:21-cv-00879-K, DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction (RE:

10/14/2022	3567	
10/11/2022	3307	Agreed Scheduling Order on renewed motion to recuse (related document #3541) Entered on 10/14/2022. (Okafor, Marcey)
10/17/2022	3570	Motion to recuse Judge Stacey G. C. Jernigan - AMENDED Filed by Interested Party James Dondero (Lang, Michael)
10/17/2022	3571	Brief in support filed by Interested Party James Dondero (RE: related document(s)3570 Motion to recuse Judge Stacey G. C. Jernigan - AMENDED). (Attachments: #1 Appendix (Lang, Michael)
10/31/2022	3595	Response opposed to (related document(s): 3541 Motion to recuse Judge Stacey G. C. Jernigan filed by Interested Party James Dondero, 3570 Motion to recuse Judge Stacey G. C. Jernigan - AMENDED filed by Interested Party James Dondero) filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P (Annable, Zachery)
10/31/2022	3596 [to be sub- mitted to Clerk on flash drive]	Support/supplemental document (Appendix in Support of Highland's Objection to Renewed Motion to Recuse Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455 and Brief in Support) filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P. (RE: related document(s)3595 Response). (Attachments: #1 Exhibit 1, #2 Exhibit 2, #3 Exhibit 3, #4 Exhibit 4, #5 Exhibit 5, #6 Exhibit 6, #7 Exhibit 7, #8 Exhibit 8, #9 Exhibit 9, #10 Exhibit 10, #11 Exhibit 11, #12 Exhibit 12, #13 Exhibit 13, #14 Exhibit 14, #15 Exhibit 15, #16 Exhibit 16, #17 Exhibit 17, #18 Exhibit 18, #19 Exhibit 19, #20 Exhibit 20, #21 Exhibit 21, #22 Exhibit 22, #23 Exhibit 23, #24 Exhibit 24, #25 Exhibit 25, #26 Exhibit 26, #27 Exhibit 27, #28 Exhibit 28, #29 Exhibit 29, #30 Exhibit 30, #31 Exhibit 31, #32 Exhibit 32, #33 Exhibit 33, #34 Exhibit 34, #35 Exhibit 35, #36 Exhibit 36 (Annable, Zachery)
3/3/2023	3673	Brief in support filed by Interested Party James Dondero (RE: related document(s)3570 Motion to recuse Judge Stacey G. C. Jernigan - AMENDED). (Lang, Michael)
3/6/2023	3675	Memorandum of Opinion and Order Denying Amended Renewed Motion to Recuse Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 455 (RE: related document(s)3570 Motion to recuse Judge filed by Interested Party James Dondero). Entered on 3/6/2023 (Okafor, Marcey)
3/6/2023	3676	Order Denying Amended Renewed Motion to Recuse Pursuant to U.S.C. Section 455 (related document #3570) Entered on 3/6/2023. (Okafor, Marcey)
5/19/2025	4216	Motion to compromise controversy with the HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and

	1	
5/10/2025	4217	11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith) Filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (Attachments: #1 Exhibit AProposed Order (Annable, Zachery)
5/19/2025	4217	Declaration re: (Declaration of Gregory V. Demo in Support of Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith) filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (RE: related document(s)4216 Motion to compromise controversy with the HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith)). (Attachments: #1 Exhibit 1 (Annable, Zachery)
5/19/2025	4217-1	Proposed Settlement Agreement
6/9/2025	4230	Objection to (related document(s): 4216 Motion to compromise controversy with the HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith) filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust) filed by Partner Dugaboy Investment Trust. (Hesse, Gregory)
6/20/2025	4251	Exhibit List for the June 25, 2025 Hearing filed by Partner Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related document(s)4230 Objection). (Lang, Michael)
6/20/2025	4252	Witness List for the June 25, 2025 Hearing filed by Partner Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related document(s)4230 Objection). (Lang, Michael)
6/20/2025	4255 (to be sub- mitted to Clerk on flash drive)	Witness and Exhibit List filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (RE: related document(s) 4216 Motion to compromise controversy with the HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith)).

		(Attachments: #1 Exhibit 1, #2 Exhibit 2, #3 Exhibit 3, #4 Ex-
		hibit 4, #5 Exhibit 5, #6 Exhibit 6, #7 Exhibit 7, #8 Exhibit 8,
		#9 Exhibit 9 , #10 Exhibit 10 , #11 Exhibit 11 , #12 Exhibit 12 ,
		#13 Exhibit 13 , #14 Exhibit 14 , #15 Exhibit 15 , #16 Exhibit 16
		,#17 Exhibit 17 , #18 Exhibit 18 , #19 Exhibit 19 , #20 Exhibit 20
		,#21 Exhibit 21 , #22 Exhibit 22 , #23 Exhibit 23 , #24 Exhibit 24
		, #25 Exhibit 25 , #26 Exhibit 26 , #27 Exhibit 27 , #28 Exhibit 28
		, #29 Exhibit 29 , #30 Exhibit 30 , #31 Exhibit 31 , #32 Exhibit 32
		, #33 Exhibit 33 , #34 Exhibit 34 , #35 Exhibit 35 , #36 Exhibit 36
		, #37 Exhibit 37 , #38 Exhibit 38 , #39 Exhibit 39 , #40 Exhibit 40
		, #41 Exhibit 41 , #42 Exhibit 42 , #43 Exhibit 43 , #44 Exhibit 44
		, #45 Exhibit 45 , #46 Exhibit 46 , #47 Exhibit 47 , #48 Exhibit 48
		, #49 Exhibit 49 , #50 Exhibit 50 , #51 Exhibit 51 , #52 Exhibit 52
		, #53 Exhibit 53 , #54 Exhibit 54 , #55 Exhibit 55 , #56 Exhibit 56
		, #57 Exhibit 57 , #58 Exhibit 58 , #59 Exhibit 59 , #60 Exhibit 60
		, #61 Exhibit 61 , #62 Exhibit 62 , #63 Exhibit 63 , #64 Exhibit 64
		, #65 Exhibit 65 , #66 Exhibit 66 , #67 Exhibit 67 , #68 Exhibit 68
		, #69 Exhibit 69 , #70 Exhibit 70 , #71 Exhibit 71 , #72 Exhibit 72
		, #73 Exhibit 73 , #74 Exhibit 74 , #75 Exhibit 75 , #76 Exhibit 76
		, #77 Exhibit 77 , #78 Exhibit 78 , #79 Exhibit 79 , #80 Exhibit 80
		, #81 Exhibit 81 , #82 Exhibit 82 , #83 Exhibit 83 , #84 Exhibit 84
		, #85 Exhibit 85 , #86 Exhibit 86 , #87 Exhibit 87 , #88 Exhibit 88
		, #89 Exhibit 89 , #90 Exhibit 90 , #91 Exhibit 91 , #92 Exhibit 92
		, #93 Exhibit 93 , #94 Exhibit 94 , #95 Exhibit 95 , #96 Exhibit 96
		, #97 Exhibit 97 , #98 Exhibit 98 , #99 Exhibit 99 , #100 Exhibit
		100, #101 Exhibit 101, #102 Exhibit 102, #103 Exhibit 103,
		#104 Exhibit 104, #105 Exhibit 105, #106 Exhibit 106, #107
		Exhibit 107, #108 Exhibit 108, #109 Exhibit 109, #110 Exhibit
		110, #111 Exhibit 111, #112 Exhibit 112, #113 Exhibit 113,
		#114 Exhibit 114, #115 Exhibit 115, #116 Exhibit 116, #117
		Exhibit 117, #118 Exhibit 118, #119 Exhibit 119, #120 Exhibit
		120 , #121 Exhibit 121 , #122 Exhibit 122 , #123 Exhibit 123
		(Annable, Zachery)
6/20/2025	4256	Witness and Exhibit List filed by Creditor Hunter Mountain In-
		vestment Trust (RE: related document(s)4216 Motion to compro-
		mise controversy with the HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an
		Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Ap-
		proving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Ac-
		tions Consistent Therewith)). (Phillips, Louis)
		dons consistent Therewith, (Thimps, Louis)

6/00/2005	40.77	WY. 17 19 19 17 1 M 11 Y 17 1 A
6/20/2025	4257	Witness and Exhibit List filed by Interested Parties Crown Global Life Insurance, Ltd, The Dallas Foundation (RE: related document(s)4216 Motion to compromise controversy with the HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith)). (Attachments: #1 Exhibit 1 - Charitable DAF/CLO HoldCo Organization Chart, #2 Exhibit 2 - Rand Structure Chart, #3 Exhibit 3 - July 9, 2021 Memo on DAFs and Sponsoring Orgs, #4 Exhibit 4 - Charitable Respondents Response and Disclosures (Okin, Matthew)
6/23/2025	4271	Amended Witness and Exhibit List filed by Debtor Highland Cap-
		ital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant
		Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (RE: related
		document(s)4253 List (witness/exhibit/generic)). (Attachments:
6/22/2025	1050	#1 Exhibit 66, #2 Exhibit 67 (Annable, Zachery)
6/23/2025	4272	Amended Witness and Exhibit List filed by Interested Parties
		Crown Global Life Insurance, Ltd, The Dallas Foundation (RE:
		related document(s)4257 List (witness/exhibit/generic)). (Attach-
		ments: #1 Exhibit 5, #2 Exhibit 66, #3 Exhibit 7 7,4 Exhibit 8 ,8,
6/23/2025	4273	Exhibit 9 (Curry, David) Objection to (related document(s)): 4255 List (witness/exhibit/ge-
0/23/2023	42/3	neric) filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other
		Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland
		Litigation Sub-Trust) filed by Partner Dugaboy Investment Trust.
		(Ohlinger, Ali)
6/23/2025	4277	Amended Witness and Exhibit List filed by Debtor Highland Cap-
		ital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant
		Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (RE: related
		document(s)4255 List (witness/exhibit/generic)). (Attachments:
		#1 Exhibit 124, #2 Exhibit 125 (Annable, Zachery)
6/24/2025	4279	Witness and Exhibit List with Respect to Hearing to be Held on
		June 25, 2025 filed by Partner Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE:
		related document(s)4213 Motion to extend time to (Motion for an
		Order Further Extending Duration of Trusts) (RE: related docu-
		ment(s)4144 Order on motion to extend/shorten time)). (Attach-
6/24/2025	4200	ments: #1 Exhibit 1 (Deitsch-Perez, Deborah)
6/24/2025	4280	Amended Witness and Exhibit List (Highland Capital Management, L. P., Highland, Claimant, Trust, and Litigation Sub Trust
		ment, L.P., Highland Claimant Trust, and Litigation Sub-Trust
		Second Amended Witness and Exhibit List with Respect to Hearing to Be Held on June 25, 2025) filed by Debtor Highland Capital
		ing to Be Held on June 25, 2025) filed by Debtor Highland Capital

		Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (RE: related document(s) 4255 List (witness/exhibit/generic), 4277 List (witness/exhibit/generic)). (Attachments: #1 Exhibit 126 (Annable,
6/25/2025	4293	Zachery) Court admitted exhibits date of hearing June 25, 2025 (RE: related document(s) 4216 Motion to compromise controversy with the HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith) Filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (Court Admitted Debtors Exhibits #1 through #9; #11 through #56 & #58 through #123 & #126 offered by attorney John Morris; Court Also Admitted Patrick Daugherty Exhibits #1 through #42 offered by attorney Drew K. York: Court also admitted Dugaboy Investment Trust Exhibit #3, which was a letter offered by attorney Michael J. Lang.) (Edmond, Michael) Modified on 6/30/2025 (emi). Modified on 6/30/2025 (emi). (En-
6/27/2025	4290	tered: 06/27/2025) Stipulation by Highland Claimant Trust, Highland Litigation Sub-Trust and The Dugaboy Investment Trust. filed by Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (RE: related document(s)4223 Objection). (Annable, Zachery)
6/27/2025	4291	Stipulation withdrawing objection of The Dallas Foundation and Crown Global Life Insurance, LTD to Motion for Entry of an order pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. Section 363 approving settlement with the HMIT Entities and authorizing actions consistent therewith (RE: related document(s) 4232 Response filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust, 4282 Stipulation filed by Creditor Hunter Mountain Investment Trust). Entered on 6/27/2025 (Okafor, M.)
6/30/2025	4296	Transcript regarding Hearing Held 06/25/2025 before Judge Stacy G.C. Jernigan (266 pages) RE: Motion for an Order Further Extending Duration of Trusts (4213); Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HMIT Entities (4216). THIS TRANSCRIPT WILL BE MADE ELECTRONICALLY AVAILABLE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC 90 DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF

		FILING. TRANSCRIPT RELEASE DATE IS 09/29/2025. Until that time the transcript may be viewed at the Clerk"s Office or a copy may be obtained from the official court transcriber. Court Reporter/Transcriber Kathy Rehling, kathyrehlingtranscripts@gmail.com, Telephone number 972-786-3063. (RE: related document(s) 4294 Hearing held on 6/25/2025. (RE: related document(s) 4213 Motion to extend time to (Motion for an Order Further Extending Duration of Trusts) (RE: related document(s) 4144 Order on motion to extend/shorten time) Filed by Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust, Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust (Appearances: J. Morris and Pachulski team for Reorganized Debtor; R. Loigman for Post-Confirmation Trusts; D. Deitsch-Perez for Dugaboy; L. Young for UST. Evidentiary hearing. Motion granted. Counsel to upload order.), 4295 Hearing held on 6/25/2025. (RE: related document(s) 4216 Motion to compromise controversy with the HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith) filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (Appearances: J. Morris and Pachulski team for Reorganized Debtor; R. Loigman for Post-Confirmation Trusts; L. Phillips for HMIT Entities; M. Lang for Dugaboy; D. Curry for Dallas Foundation; L. Young for UST. Evidentiary hearing. Motion granted. Counsel to upload order.)). Transcript to be made available to the public on
6/30/2025	4297	09/29/2025. (Rehling, Kathy) Order approving settlement between the Highland Entities and the HMIT Entities and authorizing actions consistent therewith (re-
		lated document # 4216) Entered on 6/30/2025. (Okafor, M.)
7/1/2025	4299	Motion to withdraw document Consent Motion to Dismiss HMIT Remand Proceedings with Prejudice (related document(s) 3699 Motion for leave) Filed by Creditor Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, Interested Party Hunter Mountain Trust (Attachments: #1 Proposed Order (Salzer, Ian)
7/1/2025	4300	Motion to withdraw document Consent Motion to Dismiss Delaware Action Proceedings with Prejudice (related document(s) 4000 Motion for leave) Filed by Creditor Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, Interested Party Hunter Mountain Trust (Attachments: #1 Proposed Order (Salzer, Ian)

7/7/2025	4204	
7/7/2025	4304	Order withdrawing Emergency Motion for Leave to File Adver-
		sary Proceeding [Dkt. 3699] with prejudice (RE: related docu-
		ment(s)4299 Motion to withdraw document filed by Interested
		Party Hunter Mountain Trust, Creditor Hunter Mountain Invest-
		ment Trust). IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the proceedings
		defined in the Dismissal Motion as: Hunter Mountain Investment
		Trust v. Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P., Case No. 3:23-cv-02071-E
		(N.D. Tex.), on remand to the Bankruptcy Court (including
		Hunter Mountain Investment Trusts Emergency Motion for Leave
		to File Adversary Proceeding filed at Bankruptcy Court Docket
		No. 3699 and all proceedings, decisions, and orders relating
		thereto), are dismissed with prejudice. Entered on 7/7/2025
		(Okafor, M.)
7/10/2025	4308	Notice Letter from the Office of the Texas Attorney General Re-
		questing a Stay filed by Interested Party State of Texas. (Stone,
		Johnathan)
7/14/2025	4311	Notice of appeal of Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and
		11 U.S.C § 363 Approving Settlement Between the Highland En-
		tities and the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent
		Therewith. Fee Amount \$298 filed by Creditor The Dugaboy In-
		vestment Trust (RE: related document(s)4297 Order on motion to
		compromise controversy). Appellant Designation due by
		07/28/2025. (Lang, Michael)
7/16/2025	4323	Notice regarding the record for a bankruptcy appeal to the U.S.
		District Court. (RE: related document(s)4311 Notice of appeal of
		Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C § 363 Ap-
		proving Settlement Between the Highland Entities and the HMIT
		Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith. filed by
		Creditor The Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related docu-
		ment(s)4297 Order on motion to compromise controversy). Ap-
		pellant Designation due by 07/28/2025.) (Whitaker, Sheniqua)
7/17/2025	4326	Motion to Stay 9019 Order filed by Creditor The Dugaboy Invest-
		ment Trust. Objections due by 8/7/2025. (Lang, Michael) Modi-
		fied text on 7/21/2025 (mdo).
7/17/2025	4329	Notice of docketing notice of appeal. Civil Action Number: 3:25-
	-	cv-01876-K. (RE: related document(s)4311 Notice of appeal of
		Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C § 363 Ap-
		proving Settlement Between the Highland Entities and the HMIT
		Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith. filed by
		Endices and radiotizing rections consistent increwith, filed by

		Creditor The Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related docu-
		ment(s)4297 Order on motion to compromise controversy). Ap-
		pellant Designation due by 07/28/2025.) (Whitaker, Sheniqua)
7/21/2025	4333	
//21/2023	4333	Memorandum of opinion (RE: related document(s)4308 Notice
		(generic) filed by Interested Party State of Texas, 4326 The Duga-
		boy Investment Trust's Motion to Stay 9019 Order filed by Cred-
		itor The Dugaboy Investment Trust). Entered on 7/21/2025
		(Okafor, M.)
7/21/2025	4334	Order denying stay requests (related document 4326 The Duga-
		boy Investment Trust's Motion to Stay 9019 Order and 4308 No-
		tice). Entered on 7/21/2025. (Okafor, M.) Additional attach-
		ment(s) added on 7/21/2025 (Okafor, M.)
8/4/2025	4353	Notice of appeal. Fee Amount \$298 filed by Partner Dugaboy In-
		vestment Trust (RE: related document(s) 4333 Memorandum of
		opinion). Appellant Designation due by 08/18/2025. (Attach-
		ments: #1 Exhibit A) (Harper, Geoffrey)
8/5/2025	4359	Notice of docketing notice of appeal. Civil Action Number: 3:25-
		cv-02072-S. (RE: related document(s)4353 Notice of appeal filed
		by Partner Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related document(s)
		4333 Memorandum of opinion). (Almaraz, Jeanette)
8/15/2025	4372	Motion to recuse Judge Filed by Interested Parties James Don-
		dero, NexPoint Advisors, L.P., NexPoint Asset Management,
		L.P., NexPoint Real Estate Advisors, L.P., The Dugaboy Invest-
		ment Trust, The Get Good Non Exempt Trust No 2 (Attachments:
		#1 Proposed Order (Harper, Geoffrey)
9/22/2025	4401	Order Granting Motion for Order Fixing Allowed Amount of
		Class 11 Interests (related document # 4362) Entered on
		9/22/2025. (Grandstaff, Travis)

Dated: October 9, 2025 Respectfully submitted,

WINSTON & STRAWN LLP

By: <u>/s/ Geoffrey S. Harper</u>

Geoffrey S. Harper Texas Bar No. 00795408 gharper@winston.com John Michael Gaddis Texas Bar No. 24069747 mgaddis@winston.com 2121 N. Pearl Street, Suite 900 Dallas, TX 75201 (214) 453-6500 (214) 453-6400 (fax)

Michael J. Lang
Texas State Bar No. 24036944
mlang@cwl.law
Alexandra Ohlinger
Texas State Bar No. 24091423
aohlinger@cwl.law
CRAWFORD, WISHNEW & LANG PLLC
1700 Pacific Ave, Suite 2390

Dallas, Texas 75201 Telephone: (214) 817-4500

Counsel for Appellant
The Dugaboy Investment Trust

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on October 9, 2025, a copy of this document was served electronically via the Court's CM/ECF system to the parties registered or otherwise entitled to receive electronic notices in this case.

<u>/s/ Geoffrey S. Harper</u> Geoffrey S. Harper

EXHIBIT D

Geoffrey S. Harper Texas Bar No. 00795408 gharper@winston.com John Michael Gaddis Texas Bar No. 24069747 mgaddis@winston.com WINSTON & STRAWN LLP 2121 N. Pearl Street, Suite 900 Dallas, TX 75201 (214) 453-6500 (214) 453-6400 (fax)

Counsel for Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§ Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CADITAL MANACEMENT I D	§ Care No. 10 24054 ari
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§ Case No. 19-34054-sgj §
Reorganized Debtor.	§
	§

Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust's Statement of Issues to be Presented and Amended Designation of Items to be Included in the Record on Appeal From the Bankruptcy Court's Order Fixing Allowed Amount of Class 11 Interests

Pursuant to Rule 8009(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the

"Bankruptcy Rules"), Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Appellant"), having filed a Notice of Appeal [Docket No. 4423] on October 6, 2025, from the Bankruptcy Court's September 22, 2025 Order Fixing Allowed Amount of Class 11 Interests [Docket No. 4401], and having received the Clerk's letter of October 23, 2025 requesting corrections to the record designations, submits this Statement of Issues to be Presented and Amended Designation of Items to be Included

items to the District Court for inclusion in the record in connection with this appeal.¹

STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

in the Record on Appeal, and respectfully requests that the Clerk prepare and forward the listed

- 1. Did the Bankruptcy Court misapply the absolute-priority rule in determining that the Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's (HMIT's) Class 10 interests were entitled to 100% of any excess funds left over after all senior creditor classes were paid in full, in disregard of equity interests that allocated 99.5% to HMIT and 0.5% to Dugaboy?
- 2. Did the Bankruptcy Court err when it allocated potential excess funds in a way that effectively gave HMIT more than 100% of what it was entitled to, in contravention of black-letter law holding that a senior class cannot receive more than 100% without the consent of the junior class? See In re Idearc, Inc., 423 B.R. 138, 170 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009).
- 3. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in determining the value of Dugaboy's interest only as a fixed dollar amount, rather than a *pro rata* percentage reflecting its equity ownership share?
- 4. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in allowing Highland to use a valuation methodology for determining the allowed amount of Dugaboy's claim based on limited partners' prepetition capital accounts, which were derived from untested and unvetted figures created for tax purposes that bore little if any relation to true market value, when nothing in the confirmed Reorganization Plan allowed for such a method?
- 5. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in believing that "res judicata" required it to use the same methodology to value Dugaboy's Class 11 interests as it had previously used to value HMIT's Class 10 interests?

1

¹ Because of its voluminous nature, Docket No. 4255 will be delivered to the Clerk on a flash drive that will arrive tomorrow.

- 6. Did the Bankruptcy Court err at the hearing on September 18, 2025, when it invoked "res judicata" to threaten Dugaboy's counsel with Rule 11 sanctions for "recycling" arguments previously made by the "revolving door of lawyers" that had represented Dugaboy over the previous several years, thus seeking to impose a chilling effect on Dugaboy's right to zealous advocacy by its chosen counsel?
- 7. Did the Bankruptcy Court's Order Fixing Allowed Amount of Class 11 Interests (Docket No. 4401) constitute a "final" judgment or order, thereby giving the District Court jurisdiction for appellate review of the Bankruptcy Court's Order denying Dugaboy's Motion to Recuse?

DESIGNATION OF ITEMS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE RECORD ON APPEAL

- 1. Notice of Appeal for Bankruptcy Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 [Docket No. 4423] filed by Appellant;
- 2. Bankruptcy Court's *Order Fixing Allowed Amount of Class 11 Interests* [Docket No. 4401];
- 3. Docket entries kept by the bankruptcy clerk in case no. 19-34054-sg11;
- 4. Any opinion, findings of fact, and conclusions of law of the bankruptcy court relating to the issues on appeal, including transcripts of all oral rulings; and
- 5. Each of the additional documents and items designated below:

Date Filed	Docket No.	Description/Docket Text
2/22/2021	1943	Order confirming the fifth amended chapter 11 plan, as modified
		and granting related relief (RE: related document(s) 1472 Chapter
		11 plan filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., 1808
		Chapter 11 plan filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management,
		L.P.). Entered on 2/22/2021 (Okafor, M.)
9/14/2022	3521-5	Claimant Trust Agreement
2/27/2024	4199	Stipulated and Agreed Order resolving (A) HCLOM, Ltd.'s
		Scheduled claims 3.65 and 3.66; and (B) Highland Capital
		Management, L.P.'s (1) Objection and (2) Motion for a bad faith

		finding and an award of attorney's fees against HCLOM, Ltd., and James Dondero in connection therewith (related document #3657,
		4176) Entered on 12/27/2024. (Dugan, Sue)
5/19/2025	4216	Motion to compromise controversy with the HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith) Filed by Debtor
		Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (Attachments: #1 Exhibit AProposed Order (Annable, Zachery)
5/19/2025	4217	Declaration re: (Declaration of Gregory V. Demo in Support of Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith) filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (RE: related document(s) 4216 Motion to compromise controversy with the HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith)). (Attachments: #1 Exhibit 1 (Annable, Zachery)
5/19/2025	4217-1	Proposed Settlement Agreement
6/9/2025	4230	Objection to (related document(s): 4216 Motion to compromise controversy with the HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith) filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust) filed by Partner Dugaboy Investment Trust. (Hesse, Gregory)
6/20/2025	4251	Exhibit List for the June 25, 2025 Hearing filed by Partner Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related document(s) 4230 Objection). (Lang, Michael)
6/20/2025	4252	Witness List for the June 25, 2025 Hearing filed by Partner Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related document(s) 4230 Objection). (Lang, Michael)
6/20/2025	4255	Witness and Exhibit List filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust,
	(to be submitted to	Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (RE: related

	Clerk on	document(s) 4216 Motion to compromise controversy with the
	flash drive)	HMIT Entities. (Motion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to
		Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11 U.S.C. 363 Approving Settlement
		with the HMIT Entities and Authorizing Actions Consistent
		Therewith)). (Attachments: #1 Exhibit 1, #2 Exhibit 2, #3 Exhibit
		3 , #4 Exhibit 4 , #5 Exhibit 5 , #6 Exhibit 6 , #7 Exhibit 7 , #8
		Exhibit 8, #9 Exhibit 9, #10 Exhibit 10, #11 Exhibit 11, #12
		Exhibit 12, #13 Exhibit 13, #14 Exhibit 14, #15 Exhibit 15, #16
		Exhibit 16, #17 Exhibit 17, #18 Exhibit 18, #19 Exhibit 19, #20
		Exhibit 20, #21 Exhibit 21, #22 Exhibit 22, #23 Exhibit 23, #24
		Exhibit 24, #25 Exhibit 25, #26 Exhibit 26, #27 Exhibit 27, #28
		Exhibit 28, #29 Exhibit 29, #30 Exhibit 30, #31 Exhibit 31, #32
		Exhibit 32, #33 Exhibit 33, #34 Exhibit 34, #35 Exhibit 35, #36
		Exhibit 36, #37 Exhibit 37, #38 Exhibit 38, #39 Exhibit 39, #40
		Exhibit 40, #41 Exhibit 41, #42 Exhibit 42, #43 Exhibit 43, #44
		Exhibit 44, #45 Exhibit 45, #46 Exhibit 46, #47 Exhibit 47, #48
		Exhibit 48, #49 Exhibit 49, #50 Exhibit 50, #51 Exhibit 51, #52
		Exhibit 52, #53 Exhibit 53, #54 Exhibit 54, #55 Exhibit 55, #56
		Exhibit 56, #57 Exhibit 57, #58 Exhibit 58, #59 Exhibit 59, #60
		Exhibit 60, #61 Exhibit 61, #62 Exhibit 62, #63 Exhibit 63, #64
		Exhibit 64, #65 Exhibit 65, #66 Exhibit 66, #67 Exhibit 67, #68
		Exhibit 68, #69 Exhibit 69, #70 Exhibit 70, #71 Exhibit 71, #72
		Exhibit 72, #73 Exhibit 73, #74 Exhibit 74, #75 Exhibit 75, #76
		Exhibit 76, #77 Exhibit 77, #78 Exhibit 78, #79 Exhibit 79, #80
		Exhibit 80, #81 Exhibit 81, #82 Exhibit 82, #83 Exhibit 83, #84
		Exhibit 84, #85 Exhibit 85, #86 Exhibit 86, #87 Exhibit 87, #88
		Exhibit 88, #89 Exhibit 89, #90 Exhibit 90, #91 Exhibit 91, #92
		Exhibit 92, #93 Exhibit 93, #94 Exhibit 94, #95 Exhibit 95, #96
		Exhibit 96, #97 Exhibit 97, #98 Exhibit 98, #99 Exhibit 99, #100 Exhibit 100, #101 Exhibit 101, #102 Exhibit 102, #103
		Exhibit 103, #104 Exhibit 104, #105 Exhibit 105, #106 Exhibit
		106, #107 Exhibit 107, #108 Exhibit 108, #109 Exhibit 109,
		#110 Exhibit 110 , #111 Exhibit 111 , #112 Exhibit 112 , #113
		Exhibit 113, #114 Exhibit 114, #115 Exhibit 115, #116 Exhibit
		116, #117 Exhibit 117, #118 Exhibit 118, #119 Exhibit 119,
		#120 Exhibit 120 , #121 Exhibit 121 , #122 Exhibit 122 , #123
		Exhibit 123 (Annable, Zachery)
6/20/2025	4256	Witness and Exhibit List filed by Creditor Hunter Mountain
		Investment Trust (RE: related document(s) 4216 Motion to
		compromise controversy with the HMIT Entities. (Motion for
		Entry of an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and 11
L	l .	1 2

Trust, Interested Party Highland Litigation Sub-Trust (RE: related document(s) 4255 List (witness/exhibit/generic)). (Attachments:

#1 Exhibit 124, #2 Exhibit 125 (Annable, Zachery)

filed by Creditor The Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related document(s) 4297 Order on motion to compromise controversy). Appellant Designation due by 07/28/2025.) (Whitaker, Sheniqua)

5 /0.1 /0.00 F	4000	
7/21/2025	4333	Memorandum of opinion (RE: related document(s) 4308 Notice (generic) filed by Interested Party State of Texas, 4326 The Dugaboy Investment Trust's Motion to Stay 9019 Order filed by Creditor The Dugaboy Investment Trust). Entered on 7/21/2025 (Okafor, M.)
8/4/2025	4353	Notice of appeal. Fee Amount \$298 filed by Partner Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related document(s) 4333 Memorandum of opinion). Appellant Designation due by 08/18/2025. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (Harper, Geoffrey)
8/8/2025	4362	Motion to allow claims (Motion for Order Fixing Allowed Amount of Class 11 Interests) Filed by Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit AProposed Order) (Annable, Zachery)
8/12/2025	4368	Amended appellant designation of contents for inclusion in record on appeal and statement of issues on appeal. filed by Partner Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related document(s) 4365 Appellant designation). (Harper, Geoffrey)
8/15/2025	4371	Notice of hearing filed by Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust (RE: related document(s) 4362 Motion to allow claims (Motion for Order Fixing Allowed Amount of Class 11 Interests) Filed by Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit AProposed Order)). Hearing to be held on 9/18/2025 at 02:30 PM at https://us-courts.webex.com/meet/jerniga for 4362, (Annable, Zachery)
8/29/2025	4378	Order Approving Motion to Conform Plan to Fifth Circuit Mandate (related document # 4302) Entered on 8/29/2025. (Okafor, M.)
9/8/2025	4384	Response opposed to (related document(s): 4362 Motion to allow claims (Motion for Order Fixing Allowed Amount of Class 11 Interests) filed by Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust) filed by Creditor The Dugaboy Investment Trust. (Harper, Geoffrey)
9/11/2025	4389	Stipulation by Highland Claimant Trust and The Dugaboy Investment Trust. filed by Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust (RE: related document(s) 4384 Response). (Annable, Zachery)
9/15/2025	4393	Reply to (related document(s): 4384 Response filed by Creditor The Dugaboy Investment Trust) (Reply in Support of Motion for Order Fixing Allowed Amount of Class 11 Interests) filed by Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust. (Annable, Zachery)

9/15/2025	4394	Amended Witness and Exhibit List (Highland Claimant Trust's Witness and Exhibit List with Respect to Hearing to Be Held on September 18, 2025) filed by Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust (RE: related document(s) 4362 Motion to allow claims (Motion for Order Fixing Allowed Amount of Class 11 Interests)). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 # 2 Exhibit 2 # 3 Exhibit 3 # 4 Exhibit 4 # 5 Exhibit 5 # 6 Exhibit 6 # 7 Exhibit 7 # 8 Exhibit 8 # 9 Exhibit 9 # 10 Exhibit 10) (Annable, Zachery)
9/15/2025	4395	Witness and Exhibit List for Hearing to be Held on September 18, 2025 filed by Partner Dugaboy Investment Trust (RE: related document(s) 4362 Motion to allow claims (Motion for Order Fixing Allowed Amount of Class 11 Interests)). (Harper, Geoffrey)
9/18/2025	4398	Court admitted exhibits date of hearing September 18, 2025 (RE: related document(s) 4362 Motion to allow claims (Motion for Order Fixing Allowed Amount of Class 11 Interests) filed by Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust (Court Admitted Debtors/Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. exhibits #1, #2, #3, #4, #5, #6, #7, #8, #9 & #10 offered by attorney John Morris, found at doc. #4394.) (Edmond, Michael)
9/22/2025	4401	Order Granting Motion for Order Fixing Allowed Amount of Class 11 Interests (related document # 4362) Entered on 9/22/2025. (Grandstaff, Travis)

Dated: October 23, 2025 Respectfully submitted,

WINSTON & STRAWN LLP

By: /s/ Geoffrey S. Harper

Geoffrey S. Harper Texas Bar No. 00795408 gharper@winston.com John Michael Gaddis Texas Bar No. 24069747 mgaddis@winston.com 2121 N. Pearl Street, Suite 900 Dallas, TX 75201 (214) 453-6500 (214) 453-6400 (fax)

Counsel for Appellant
The Dugaboy Investment Trust

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on October 23, 2025, a copy of this document was served electronically via the Court's CM/ECF system to the parties registered or otherwise entitled to receive electronic notices in this case.

/s/ Geoffrey S. Harper Geoffrey S. Harper

EXHIBIT E

1	IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION
2 3) Case No. 19-34054-sgj-11 In Re:) Chapter 11
4 5 6	HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P., September 18, 2025 2:30 p.m. Docket Reorganized Debtor. MOTION FOR ORDER FIXING ALLOWED AMOUNT OF CLASS 11 INTERESTS FILED BY HIGHLAND
8) CLAIMANT TRUST (4362)
9	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE STACEY G.C. JERNIGAN,
10	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE.
11	APPEARANCES:
12 13 14	For the Reorganized John A. Morris Debtors: PACHULSKI STANG ZIEHL & JONES, LLP 780 Third Avenue, 34th Floor New York, NY 10017-2024 (212) 561-7760
15 16 17	For Dugaboy Investment Geoffrey Scott Harper Trust: WINSTON & STRAWN, LLP 2121 N. Pearl Street, Suite 900 Dallas, TX 75201 (214) 453-6500
18 19	Recorded by: Michael F. Edmond, Sr. UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 1100 Commerce Street, 12th Floor Dallas, TX 75242
20	(214) 753-2062
21	Transcribed by: Kathy Rehling 311 Paradise Cove
22	Shady Shores, TX 76208 (972) 786-3063
23	
2425	Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording; transcript produced by transcription service.

DALLAS, TEXAS - SEPTEMBER 18, 2025 - 2:47 P.M.

THE COURT: All right. Our other matter is Highland Capital, Case No. 19-34054. We have a motion to fix the allowed amount of our Class 11 interests. We'll get our lawyer appearances, please.

MR. HARPER: Your Honor, Geoffrey Harper with Winston & Strawn for Dugaboy Investment Trust.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Harper for Dugaboy.

MR. MORRIS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. John Morris; Pachulski, Stang, Ziehl & Jones; for Highland.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Morris for Highland.

Do we have any other appearances?

All right. Well, I've got your pleadings and your witness and exhibit list, to the extent you end up putting evidence on. And Mr. Morris, you may begin.

MR. MORRIS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Nice to be in your courtroom, as always.

OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE REORGANIZED DEBTORS

MR. MORRIS: We're here today because we need to be here today. We're here today because we have the burden of proving our motion to fix, in specific dollar amounts, each of the unvested contingent interests that are in Class 11. And we have to do that because the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement require that. Those documents, which are now four-and-a-half years old, require that all disputed claims in

equity interests be resolved before the Claimant Trust can be dissolved itself, a process that we're very interested to begin.

That's why we're here today, to fix those allowed amounts. And how do we do that? We do it the same way we did it in June, basically. We're using the same methodology that we did in June. You just look at the capital account balances as of the petition date, and, you know, that gets us to where we need to be.

I've got a very short PowerPoint --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: -- to just highlight some of the issues that we believe are relevant today. Mr. Seery, the Claimant Trustee and the CEO of Highland Capital Management, LP, is here today to give what I hope will be brief testimony in order to meet our burden.

I do just, before I get to the PowerPoint, want to briefly address the objection. As the Court knows, I think there are four or five different holders of the unvested contingent Class 11 interests, but only one of which has objected. I don't know what the position is of the rest of them, but they're not here. And the objection itself is meritless. As we say in our papers, you know, the request that all distributions after senior claims are satisfied be distributed on a pro rata between the holders of the Class 10 and 11

Claims violates about a half a dozen orders of this Court.

You can't reconcile it with the subordination provisions and the creation of separate classes in the Claimant Trust

Agreement or in the plan. You can't reconcile it with the fixing of the HMIT Class 10 interests that we did in June. I mean, what does it mean if you're not just going to distribute stuff without regard to that number?

Mr. Dondero signed an agreement on behalf of HCLOM that resolved HCLOM's claim, put it in Class 10. HCLOM has never been a limited partner. It has no -- you can't do what they want. This is really pushing the limits of Rule 11, in our view, because they're asking you to violate probably a half a dozen different court orders.

So I don't want to beat the drum too loudly because it's just not worth it here. I just want to meet my burden of proof. If I may just hand out these small decks.

THE COURT: You may.

(Pause.)

MR. MORRIS: So, Your Honor, the first slide here is just to highlight the provision in the plan, the definition of contingent Claimant Trust interests that applies here. You know, as always I cite to the record. Actually, before I get to this, I'd like to just to move into evidence -- I should have done that first; I apologize -- I'd like to move into evidence Exhibits 1 through 10, which can be found on

Highland's amended witness and exhibit list that was filed at Docket 4394.

THE COURT: All right. Any objections to that?

MR. HARPER: No, Your Honor.

MR. MORRIS: Okay.

THE COURT: Those 1 through 10 will be admitted.

MR. MORRIS: Thank you.

(Reorganized Debtors' Exhibits 1 through 10 are admitted.)

MR. MORRIS: So with respect to the first slide, it's just a snapshot of one of the definitions in the plan. The plan definition of Claimant -- Contingent Claimant Trust Interest establishes that the limited partnership interests that were held by the Class A members under the prepetition limited partnership agreement will be subordinated to the class that's being established for the holders or the former holders of the Class B and C interests.

And that's important, and that's important because that is the basis upon which the separate classes were created. And so, you know, this definition is given effect in Article 3 of the plan. Article 3, Section H-10 and 11, that's the provisions of the plan that establish the two different classes. And the creation of the separate classes and the subordination provision weren't adopted by accident, right? Your Honor made a very specific finding in Paragraph 36 of the confirmation order that says the plan properly separately

classifies the equity interests in Class 10 from the equity interests in Class 11 because they represent different types of equity security interests in the Debtor and different payment priorities.

There is a reason why this was done, and everybody knew it. Here we are, four-and-a-half years later, revisiting an order that was entered, at least as to this aspect, without objection. Right? What are they doing?

The concept of subordination, if we go to the next slide, was adopted also in the Claimant Trust Agreement, in Section -- Article 5, Section 5.1-C. Again, I've highlighted two portions. The first portion actually does relate to the notion of pro rata treatment, because that's what Dugaboy says, it's got to be pro rata. It is pro rata within a class. It's not pro rata between classes. You have horizontal pro rata. So if you're in Class 10, it's pro rata. There was only one member of Class 10 until we had the HCLOM agreement, and that was HMIT. But in Class 11, you had a bunch of different. And so, yeah, they have to be treated in their class the same.

But the bottom is really why we're here today, because it says the equity interests distributed to the allowed holders of Class A limited partners -- and that's what we're trying to get to. That's why we have to fix the amount. You fix the amount in order to get it to an allowed claim or an allowed

interest. Because it's not even allowed today, right? You get to allowed because it's fixed and it's no longer disputed. And the holders of the Class A limited partnerships, quote, shall be subordinated.

So I don't, I just don't understand how anybody could come here and suggest that Class 10 and 11 should be treated pro rata. It violates the Plan. It violates the Claimant Trust Agreement.

The next slide is just a calculation of the amounts. Mr. Seery will describe the methodology as to how we got to these numbers. Basically, the December 31st, 20- -- it's not written on the back of a napkin. It's written on the front of a tax return. Okay. We didn't write this, right? This isn't made up. He's going to tell you there's nothing subjective about this.

We took the tax returns that Jim Dondero signed when he controlled Highland. That was the starting point, the end of 2018. That's the first column. The second column, we take it to the petition date, and we use Highland's financial statements to do that. And then just for illustrative purposes we take it out until the end of 2019, to show the fluctuation in the value of the capital accounts in the -- just for illustrative purposes.

But the real point is to determine what the capital accounts were as of the petition date. That's when their

interests are being valued.

And Mr. Dondero and Dugaboy know their objection is baseless. And how do we know that? If you go to the last slide. You'll remember -- I mean, there's so many lawyers who have represented Dugaboy, it's a problem. It's a real problem for them. And it's why you can get a new lawyer here who probably, in fairness, probably doesn't have the historical and institutional knowledge to understand that this makes no sense.

Because last December you had Ms. Deitsch-Perez in here in opposition to the objection to the HCLOM claim, signing a settlement agreement on behalf of not just HCLOM but Dugaboy, if you look at Exhibit 8. She signed it on behalf of Dugaboy, too. And they agree that to resolve the dispute they would put HCLOM in Class 10 in a fixed amount, without anybody saying, oh, my goodness, but what's that going to mean for Dugaboy when we come back and we want to do this pro rata? Nobody thought about it then because it wasn't an issue for them.

They take it further. Apparently, Mark Patrick realized that that agreement was signed without his knowledge or consent on behalf of HMIT, and they have a little fight, and that's what led to where we are, where they are today. And they enter into an agreement to resolve their dispute, and that's at Exhibit 9. And that's an agreement, it's an

intercreditor agreement, they call it a participation agreement, between HCLOM and HMIT.

We had nothing to do with that. We didn't even know it was happening until it happened. But apparently they agreed that, if HMIT got a distribution in Class 10, they would give five percent of it to HCLOM, less HMIT's legal fees, another complication, but it's in Paragraph 1 of this agreement. This is how crazy this is. So they agreed to this. Again, second time, not a word about Dugaboy, not a word about how that's going to play out with some expected pro rata sharing.

But here's the best part, maybe the best part, the funniest part. Just four weeks ago, yet another lawyer for Dugaboy has an email communication with Louis Phillips, Mr. Phillips representing HMIT, and they have a back-and-forth. And I get involved because, as a result of the HMIT settlement, HMIT is going to get some payments from Highland. But now they have an obligation under this agreement to share it.

So there's instructions in there. You can look at Mr. Elms' (phonetic) email, right? So you have Ms. Deitsch-Perez in December, you had Mr. Elms, and he says, hey, you know that payment for HCLOM, send it to Dugaboy. Took the whole thing. Took the whole thing. It's right there. Gave wire instructions to send the money to Dugaboy, without ever saying, we need it because we have to take our piece. It's

five percent. They're getting five percent of what HMIT got.

Has nothing to do with the partnership agreement. It has

nothing to do with prorated. Has nothing to do with Dugaboy's

I think 0.01886 percent. Nothing to do with anything.

And yet when they get this motion now, oh, you know what, we don't like what's happening. They said nothing at confirmation about this. There's no appeal about this. There's no objection about this. The orders have been in place for years. They said nothing in June with HMIT. They said nothing when they got the cash. What are we doing?

So that's all I have, Your Honor. I just wanted to provide some context to make sure the Court understands at least Highland's perspective, both as to the validity of our position, because our position, what we're doing, is consistent with the plan. It's consistent with the Claimant Trust Agreement. It's consistent with the HMIT settlement. It's consistent even with the HCLOM/HMIT settlement that we weren't a party to, because under our proposal, under our methodology, they're going to be able to share the cash just as they agreed. Right? Everything works perfectly.

So at the end I'll put Mr. Seery on, he'll be brief, and we'll ask the Court to enter an order granting the motion.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Mr. Harper?

MR. HARPER: Thank you, Your Honor. 1 2 Please forgive the knee. They're working on it. 3 THE COURT: Okay. OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF DUGABOY INVESTMENT TRUST 4 5 MR. HARPER: Your Honor, I'll be very quick as well. I don't think there's any point in spending more time on this 6 7 than need be. We objected to the way that the plan was to set the value of the claim as to Hunter Mountain because of the 8 9 equity claim and we're objecting to it here. 10 THE COURT: Wait. Repeat what you just said. I'm 11 sorry. Just start over, --12 MR. HARPER: Certainly, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: -- if you don't mind. 14 MR. HARPER: I'm sorry, Your Honor. Dugaboy filed 15 objections earlier, the Court overruled them, when they 16 objected to the amount of the claim that Hunter Mountain was. 17 So, I mean, this -- the statement that we somehow didn't 18 object to this, this is, you know, we objected to it when the 19 Court --20 THE COURT: You objected a few weeks ago when we had 21 22 MR. HARPER: Yes. 23 THE COURT: -- the compromise and settlement motion 24 before the Court --25 MR. HARPER: I think this --

THE COURT: -- involving Hunter Mountain and the Claimant Trustee and the Reorganized Debtor. Is that what you're talking about?

MR. HARPER: I believe so, Your Honor. Yes.

THE COURT: Well, I'm asking you.

MR. HARPER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HARPER: But the point being -- and I think that one of the issues that we've got when we talk about Class 10 and Class 11, we need to recognize that everything in Class 10 and everything in Class 11 aren't the same. The claims of Hunter Mountain in Class 10 are equity claims. The claims of Dugaboy in Class 11 are equity claims. These are the people who owns the shares of the Debtor. And when we are talking about how those claims get valued, they get valued a certain way.

Now, we understand that the whole point of putting them in priorities of Class 1 through 10 is to determine priority of payment.

THE COURT: 11.

MR. HARPER: 11. I'm sorry, Your Honor. Is to determine priority of payment. It doesn't mean that, you know, as we sit around and determine each individual claim, that the way that we value them ends up being the same to determine how much of the claim is allowed. Just like, you

know, some -- each contract gets treated differently, is the
situation here.

And our point is the equity claims are unique. Equity is determined, it always has been, right, the answer is in every bankruptcy that I've ever been involved in, right, we pay off the creditors. If there's money left, which there often is not in a liquidation case, then that money gets paid to the equity holders pro rata.

Now, your plan --

THE COURT: Okay. Let me stop you a minute.

MR. HARPER: Sure.

THE COURT: I hope you're going to get to the resjudicata, essentially -- my words, not Mr. Morris's, but that's the substance. This has been decided.

MR. HARPER: So which part are you saying, Your Honor. Are you saying you believe it's res judicata because of the plan or are you saying you think it's res judicata because of the 9019 ruling a few weeks ago?

THE COURT: Well, both.

MR. HARPER: Okay. So the plan has very specific statements about what happens to extra money, Your Honor. There's provisions in both of them. Because, candidly, Your Honor, there would be a problem if there wasn't, right? What happens if more money comes into this plan than there are if we have nothing but claims that are set in stone for the

1 dollar value? 2 THE COURT: Okay. So you dispute that the plan 3 subordinated Class 11 --4 MR. HARPER: No, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: -- to Class 10? MR. HARPER: I do not. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay. Then --MR. HARPER: There's also provisions, however, in 8 9 there that says, despite that, once you set those claims, 10 there's a provision to deal with money after that. In other words, --11 12 THE COURT: Okay. You'll point out what plan 13 language --14 MR. HARPER: Sure. 15 THE COURT: -- you think supports your argument. 16 MR. HARPER: Certainly, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 MR. HARPER: Your plan also states and your order 19 states that, regardless of anything in the plan, that the 20 issues of contractual agreements and the issues of law and 21 equity get involved as well. And there is no possible doubt 22 that the partnership agreement has very specific ways that 23 these are supposed to be valued and the assets are supposed to

be paid out. It's in the contract there.

So that becomes critical, because if we go to part two,

24

25

which is, all right, if the answer is we're going to come out and determine the cash value here, there's two problems. One, when do we do this? Right? So, as you well know, right, under the bankruptcy law, the answer is we don't determine contingent fee and unliquidated until it's absolutely necessary. If the answer is we believe we've hit that point, that it's absolutely necessary and there is some reason that this will hold things up, then we should discuss that. But since they're asking for this bankruptcy to stay open for several more years, we question whether or not that's really the way to do this.

But secondly, the issue with the --

THE COURT: I want you to address --

MR. HARPER: Sure.

THE COURT: -- res judicata. How many times is it appropriate for this Court to consider the same issue? Isn't that exactly what I'm doing?

MR. HARPER: So --

THE COURT: I considered the plan language, which subordinated Class 11 to Class 10 based on they had different rights under the limited partnership agreement of Highland, which was part of the evidence. Your client didn't object, by the way, to that.

MR. HARPER: They did not.

THE COURT: Although the client objected to the plan

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

in numerous ways and appealed the confirmation order. So you're going to show me, I guess, why this isn't res judicata, because it looks to me like the plan decided it. Okay?

But then we have the other res judicata issue of, a few weeks ago, when this valuation methodology for Class 10 was proposed by the Debtor and there was testimony from Mr. Seery, and Dugaboy objected, and there was cross-examination, and I had no evidence from a different person about what would be a more appropriate methodology, and so I approved that.

So, from my perspective, you've got at least a double res judicata problem. So I really want you to tell me out of the gate why you don't think you have a double res judicata problem.

MR. HARPER: Your Honor, I don't want to be a smart aleck, so please forgive me, because one thing I was -- I assume you're actually meaning collateral estoppel, not res judicata, since --

THE COURT: Well, I guess it could be either one. MR. HARPER: And I'm not -- and please don't think that --

THE COURT: I mean, I guess it could be either one.

MR. HARPER: I mean, certainly, --

THE COURT: I guess it could be specific findings I made, and so therefore collateral estoppel might be the doctrine. But I think it's probably the ruling as well.

Maybe it's both. Okay.

MR. HARPER: Your Honor, let me --

THE COURT: We'll have a law school class decide that.

MR. HARPER: Yeah. I'm sorry, Your Honor, I didn't mean to be -- my only point being I didn't want to fail to address the Court's arguments directly, right? Obviously, there was not a ruling on the merits as to the value of Dugaboy's claim two weeks ago. Therefore, since there was not a ruling on the merits on that, there can't be res judicata on that issue.

What I think the Court is trying to say, I mean, I think, is that it believes or it thinks there's -- well, you said you do believe -- you believe there is an issue in that, by valuing the equity in Hunter Mountain, you believe that that has issue-preclusion and equitable estoppel, you know, collateral estoppel claims, meaning you now have determined that's what the equity is.

Your Honor, if that's the case, we lose. Right? I mean, I -- there you go.

THE COURT: Okay. It's a couple of things. It's a subordination issue that I think the plan and the confirmation order has created an estoppel effect, right?

MR. HARPER: Your Honor -- pardon me.

THE COURT: Subordination. Subordination is Class 11

is subordinated to Class 10. We're doing that because the limited partnership agreement clearly showed distinctions in these types of equity interests and we think that is probably the appropriate way to go in the plan, and no one objected, and I approved that.

MR. HARPER: So, Your Honor, obviously, we're going to go over the partnership agreement. If the Court would like, we'll do it right now.

THE COURT: No.

MR. HARPER: I mean, we can do it without a witness, but --

THE COURT: I'm just saying I'm trying to figure out why this hasn't been precluded by prior orders. I'll just say precluded since we don't know which estoppel doctrine is most germane, okay?

MR. HARPER: Yeah. I'm sorry, Your Honor. Just, again, I feel like I'm being -- just in terms of what legal argument I make in response, because, you know, the answer is different each way. So, but, so, again, I'm sorry if I'm acting like a gunner in law school. That's not the intent here.

My point just is I hear what the Court is saying. You know, truthfully, Your Honor, I think that the answer -- you know, happy to address that, feel like I am addressing that, because we can talk about it in more detail if you would like.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

If you'd like to do that now, or if you want them to put on their witness first, or we're happy to go through the documents if you want. THE COURT: I didn't know it was a complicated question I was asking. MR. HARPER: So, Your Honor, the contingent fee -- so let me start with one interesting hypothetical. So you set these values today. Let's say that, you know, theirs stays at -- I'm just going to round up -- \$350 million and ours comes in at \$700,000. The issue still remains, what happens if one of the claims that are out there nets money in excess of that? Where does the excess money go? This plan, the way it is currently being suggested and the way that the Court is suggesting if there is res judicata, has a fatal flaw in that the plan doesn't account for excess cash. There's -- it goes to nobody. That can't be the case, right? It has to go to somebody. THE COURT: I guess if there's more than three hundred --MR. HARPER: Fifty million? THE COURT: -- thirty-six million, --MR. HARPER: Sure. Where does it go? THE COURT: -- then Class 11 would get it. I mean,

MR. HARPER: They would get the \$700,000 only by

their -- so what happens if there's more than that? What happens if there's an extra \$10 million?

THE COURT: I think we're happy to have another court hearing and decide that.

MR. HARPER: Well, Your Honor, the point is you would have a -- you would have a plan which is per se flawed because it didn't take into account the residual cash issue. But our point is, the plan does.

Now, I agree with you that the problem that we have with this plan is there are provisions in there that are difficult to read together, meaning --

THE COURT: Okay. We've had an appeal up through the Fifth Circuit twice. Okay?

MR. HARPER: Your Honor, not on this issue.

THE COURT: Well, then it's barred. It's barred.

MR. HARPER: Well, no, Your Honor, because the answer is, you know, what we're now talking about is how one interprets the plan, not whether the plan itself is wrong.

Because there is no doubt there is a provision in the plan that says once -- it's in the contingent trust agreement -- it says once the allowed claims are paid, including that, then the rest goes to the equity holders. And that's after we've dealt with the Class 10 and 11. Right? So there's your excess out there.

Well, how is that done? The answer is we have claims

beyond the allowed claims. Now, the partnership agreement has a very specific subordination clause as far as what portions of the claims are subordinated and what are not.

Now, I agree, this is a very strange situation. How does one set the value of equity? Because there's a specific way to value the equity in the partnership agreement which they're not using. Instead, they said, let's just take a look, let's take a look at the capital account. And therefore, because the capital account on this date said x, let's determine that that must be it.

Now, we all know that has nothing to do with the actual value. It's a tax number. It's not there. But the partnership agreement has very specific language about what to do in a situation of liquidation. And it specifically says, and there is no possible ambiguity here, you pay all the claims. When those claims are done being paid, you then take the amount that's left over and you divide it proportionally among the parties.

Two caveats. On Page 12 of the partnership agreement, there is specific language about the portions of the Class B/C that need to get paid first. They have certain rights where they get paid first.

THE COURT: Why wasn't your client making this argument in February 2021 when the plan was performing?

MR. HARPER: Your Honor, I can't answer that. I do

not know. 1 2 THE COURT: Well, you can't change lawyers and use 3 that as an excuse. So what is your excuse? 4 MR. HARPER: Your Honor, my point is I think the plan 5 takes this into account. I think we're just fighting about 6 how one interprets it. 7 THE COURT: Okay. MR. HARPER: What I understood you saying is you 8 9 think --10 THE COURT: Well, I guess you can point out the 11 language that you think the Court would be interpreting before 12 we're done here today. 13 MR. HARPER: Sure, Your Honor. So if the Court --14 would you like me to do it now? Or I don't understand what 15 the Court's asking for. 16 THE COURT: You know what, you can do it as part of 17 your presentation of evidence --18 MR. HARPER: Sure. 19 THE COURT: -- if you want to do that. Okay? 20 MR. HARPER: Thank you, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 22 All right. Mr. Morris? 23 THE COURT: Your Honor, I just, before I call Mr.

The partnership agreement today is irrelevant. It's been

Seery, I just want to make a couple of points.

24

25

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

irrelevant since August 11, 2021 when the plan became effective and it was rejected. It was replaced by the Claimant Trust Agreement. So I don't really care what the limited partnership agreement says. Nobody has abided by it for years. Number two, nobody owns the equity today. Right? His client owns an interest, a contingent unvested interest in Class 11. It doesn't own equity in anything. Equity, according to the plan, was extinguished long ago. Okay? With that, I'd like to call Mr. Seery. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Seery, welcome back. MR. SEERY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. THE COURT: Please raise your right hand. JAMES P. SEERY, REORGANIZED DEBTORS' WITNESS, SWORN THE COURT: All right. Please be seated. MR. MORRIS: May I hand out the witness binders? THE COURT: You may. MR. MORRIS: I'll try and keep this brief, Your Honor. Mr. Seery -- I'd like to also -- may I also give the witness the demonstrative? THE COURT: You may. Thank you. MR. MORRIS: And I'm just going to open it up to

Slide 4, which is the demonstrative citing all of the evidence

Seery - Direct

24

that sets forth the confirmation, just to make this easier. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 4 MR. MORRIS: You're welcome. 5 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. MORRIS: 6 7 Are you ready to go, Mr. Seery? 8 I am. 9 Okay. And are you familiar with the motion that we're 10 here discussing today? 11 Yes, I am. Α 12 Did you authorize Highland to file that motion? 13 I did. 14 And why did you authorize Highland to file this motion? 15 Because the plan, the confirmation order, and the Claimant 16 Trust Agreement require that we fix all claims in order -- and 17 interests in order to close this case. We have a final 18 deadline to close this case on August 11th. We expect to be 19 dissolved and, frankly, cancelled by that date. The indemnity 20 trust may live on, unfortunately, because litigation may live 21 on, but the case, we expect to be closed. 22 Okay. And are you familiar -- and as part of the process, 23 are you personally familiar with the methodology that Highland 24 used to determine the amount of each unvested contingent Class

25

11 interest?

A Yes, I am.

- Q Can you describe for the Court the methodology that Highland adopted?
- A Yes. Similar to the discussion we had at the end of June, the Debtor was a limited partnership. There are no shares. The equity as it's divided in a limited partnership is owned by partners who have limited partnership interests. Those limited partnership interests, in accordance with the partnership agreement, receive allocations of profits and losses that are maintained and required to be maintained in what is called a capital account.

Each partner's interest in the partnership, their stake, their share, whatever word you want to use, is reflected in the partnership capital account that each partner has. So, unlike a corporation, each partner knows exactly what their capital account is at all times.

- Q Can we turn in the binder to Exhibit 5? And I guess my first question is, do you know what this document is?
- 19 | A I do, yes.
 - Q And what is this document?
 - A So Exhibit 5 is a bit of a combination of things, but it is the first page of the 2018 Highland Capital Management Limited Partnership tax return. And this is the return for the partnership that -- which became the Debtor. It was signed on 9/15/19, about one month before the filing, by Mr.

Dondero, under penalty of perjury that it's true, correct, and complete. And what it does is it reflects the partnership's income, losses, deductions, tax payments, for year 2018, ending 12/31/18.

What it also contains in the pages behind are what are referred to as Schedule K-1. In a partnership, when the partnership files a tax return, because it is a pass-through entity, profits and losses pass through to the partners pursuant to the terms of the partnership agreement. Those — that allocation of profits and losses, minus any distributions, is reflected in their capital account.

So each partner in a limited partnership gets a K-1 that's also reported to the IRS and that they use for their own individual partnership -- their own individual income tax returns, the partnership income or losses being part of what their tax makeup might be, depending on their other tax attributes. The K-1 contains the individual partner's specific partner capital account.

- Q Can you show us where --
- A Form 1065 -- excuse me.
- | Q Yeah.

A On Page 5, which we don't have here, has the gross amount of the partnership capital for 12/31/2018. So the individual accounts, the partner capital accounts, are reflected -- I apologize for my reading -- the individual capital accounts

are reflected in Section L of each of the K-1s. So you'll see 1 2 a few pages in, there's Strand with an ending capital account, 3 which would be the 12/31 capital account, of \$932,000. There 4 is Mark Okada individually, \$181,000. There's Mark Okada Trust I, \$36,000. There's Mark Okada Trust II, \$15,000. And 5 there's Dugaboy at \$693,900. It also reflects Hunter 6 7 Mountain, which we dealt with in June at \$370 million. So those are the capital accounts for each of Highland's 8 9 limited partners as of December 31st, 2018. Do I have that 10 right? 11 That's correct. 12 And that's -- is it your understanding that those are the 13 numbers that were reported by Mr. Dondero on behalf of Highland at the time? 14 15 That's correct. 16 Is it your understanding that each of the taxpayers who 17 received a K-1 relied on those numbers and paid taxes in 18 accordance with the amounts set forth in the K-1? 19 To be fair, I don't know exactly what each one did. I 20 know that when I --21 I appreciate that. 22 -- receive a K-1, that's what I do on my individual taxes 23 because that's what's required.

Q Okay. So how -- did you adjust the capital accounts that were reflected in the K-1s at year-end 2018? How do you bring

24

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

that up to the petition date of October 16, 2019? The partnership agreement requires that, as I said, partnership profits and losses and distributions are reflected in each partner's capital account. Highland studiously maintained that every month. Why did it do that? Well, it's required to do that under the partnership agreement. It was. It's also required -- and the partnership agreement contains that requirement because that's required by the Internal Revenue Service regulations. And those numbers and the distribution and allocation of income, losses, and distributions has to have what is referred to as substantial economic effect in order to give the partnership the ability to pass through losses and income on different bases. And can you turn to Exhibit 7? Is that the document that you relied upon to bring the year-end 2018 capital accounts current as of the petition date? Well, this is a -- this is a snapshot from the monthly operating report. These were filed every month during the case. This one you can see is filed, it should be sometime in December. I can't see the filing date. But it does reflect the 11/30/19 capital accounts as well as the 10/31/19 capital account and then the 10/15 filing date capital account. Now, this is the gross amount. So each individual partner -- because Highland keeps it for itself and then it allocates

to each partner that's ultimately reflected on the K-1. The

attachment is some of the output from our Oracle system. This was our accounting system. And this reflects the changes that would be running through the P&L that would hit the balance sheet.

And you'll see at the very last page of Exhibit 7 the 370

-- I can't -- I'm having trouble reading -- the partner

capital account of 396,613, and that's the 10/15 number. It's

off by a thousand dollars. And it does reflect some of the

larger changes during the first half of the year.

So that number went up. If you'll recall the 12/31/18 number that we saw before, it went up during the first 10 months of the year. And that's reflected in a number of the lines above, but right on that page you can see the two biggest drivers. There's something called the Highland Select Equity Fund. This is a \$109 million credit. That is the write-up of Trussway, which was an asset that was owned. That took a big write-up during that first 10 months of the year from a very low basis, and that's reflected in the P&L, then reflected through the balance sheet and into the capital accounts.

Ten lines above that you'll see a \$74 million debit. That's the reserve taken for the Redeemer -- the initial Redeemer award in April.

So these are the entries that roughly reflect what's going on in the Highland accounts that then roll through to the

1 | capital accounts for each partner.

Q And just to make this really clear, this document that

| we're looking at, Exhibit 7, was a monthly operating report

4 | that was filed in the bankruptcy case; is that your

5 | understanding?

A Yes.

2

3

- Q And that was prepared while Mr. Dondero was still in control of Highland; is that right?
- 9 | A This one was, yes. But we did it every month --
- 10 | Q Yeah. Just -- just --
- 11 \parallel A -- all the way.
- MR. MORRIS: And it's the very last page, Your Honor,
 where it has the total partner capital, \$396 million --
- 14 \$613,941. That's the number that you see in the middle column
- 15 | on our demonstrative, okay?
- 16 | THE WITNESS: That's --
- MR. MORRIS: And that's where it comes from.
- 18 | THE WITNESS: That's correct.
- 19 | BY MR. MORRIS:
- 20 | Q Okay. And then am I correct that what you did is you took
- 21 | that number and multiplied it by the limited partnership
- 22 | interest that each of the limited partnership partners had?
- 23 | Former limited partners?
- 24 A Roughly. But if they had gotten distributions that were
- 25 | outsized, then they could have been non pro rata. The general

partner was allowed to do that. Then they would have been -it would have led to different adjustments. But in this
instance, I think that they would have reflected on a straight
basis without any changes through the partnership accounting
for those first 10 months of the year.

- Q Okay. So, to summarize, can we say that Exhibit 7 shows the economic activity at Highland from year-end 2018 through the date of this document, and that that's why there's a difference in the capital accounts, and the bottom line is the 396 number that we see here?
- 11 A At a high level. So this is a trial balance out of 12 Oracle, so they are subject to adjustments.
 - Q Okay. Did you make any adjustment?
- 14 | A Not up to the petition date, no.
- 15 | Q Okay. Is there any subjectivity at all in any of the 16 | analysis that you've prepared?
- 17 | A No.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

13

18

19

20

21

22

- Q Did you rely on anything other than the tax returns and Highland's books and records that were prepared prior to the time you became an independent director?
- A The books and records also include the audited financials, which contain the same numbers. So those audited financials which were signed off by the same people, --
- 24 | Q Great.
- 25 \parallel A -- they're also -- and the partners' capital is the same.

Q Thank you for your completeness.

Highland contends that once the Class 11 interests are fixed, they will receive no distributions from the Claimant Trust until the Class 10 interests are paid in full. Do I have that right?

- A Yeah. The 10s need to get paid in full before the 11s can get paid.
- Q And what's the basis for that position?
 - A That's the plan, the confirmation order, and the Claimant Trust Agreement setting up a hard waterfall on how distributions run through the various classes of 1 to 11.
 - Q Okay. Are you aware that in -- at least in their objection, Dugaboy took the position that any distributions after Class 9 and all senior obligations are paid in full had to be made pro rata among all of the former limited partners?
- A I'm aware that that's what they said.
- 17 | Q Does that make any sense to you?
 - A No, it doesn't, not at all.
- 19 | Q Why not?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

18

20

21

22

23

24

25

A That is simply not the plan, it's not the confirmation order, and it's not the Claimant Trust Agreement. The plan set up a specific priority, and delineated between Class 10 and Class 11, and made Class 10 senior to Class 11. That respected the old partnership agreements, which no longer exist and was rejected. That waterfall is a hard waterfall.

So the idea that it would be pro rata would be anathema to the way -- the structure of the plan.

- Q Okay. And we were here in June, and Class 11 -- Class 10 was fixed on a net basis of somewhere at around \$330 million.
- 5 | Do you recall that?

- A That's correct. That -- Class 11 wasn't -- Class 10 wasn't set there. HMIT's claim in Class 10 was set at that amount, which was their capital account, less the amount of the -- potentially the amount of the note that they owed to Highland.
- Q Is there any conceivable chance that HMIT will ever be paid in full?
- A No. It's simply not -- it's metaphysically certain that it won't be paid in full.
- 15 | Q And --
 - A We have a limited amount of cash to cover expenses. We have \$10 to \$15 million more in assets. We owe the Class 9s, provided all the senior expenses are paid and all the indemnification obligations are paid and there are no more statute of limitations that we have to worry about and all litigation risks are gone, we owe the Class 9 \$10 million. Provided all those things are true, we owe the Class 10, including HCLOM, about three hundred and -- now, after application of the note, about \$330 million. There is no world, no universe, that we will ever have a penny more than

34

1 | is required -- than we could pay through Class 10.

Q Okay.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

MR. MORRIS: I have no further questions, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Harper, cross?

MR. HARPER: Thank you, Your Honor.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. HARPER:

- Q Good afternoon, Mr. Seery.
- 9 A Good afternoon.
- 10 | Q My name is Geoffrey Harper. I don't think you and I have 11 | ever met before; is that right?
- 12 A That's correct.
- 13 | Q So listen, I'm going to try to go quick and just run by a
- 14 | couple things with you real quick, some of which I'm going to
- 15 | try to make speedier by just trying to make sure your
- 16 | testimony that you gave earlier you still agree with today as
- 17 \parallel we sit here.
- 18 But when we take a look at the equity between Dugaboy and
- 19 | Hunter Mountain, or the Class A and the Class B and C
- 20 | interests, forgetting for a moment the plan and just asking
- 21 | you, I mean, you would agree with me that under the
- 22 | partnership agreement they get paid pro rata based on profits,
- 23 | correct?
- 24 | A No, I disagree.
- 25 | Q Okay. Let's take a look, if you will, at Exhibit 1. Do

- 1 | you have that with you in that notebook?
- 2 | A The rejected partnership agreement? Yeah.
- 3 | Q Sure. So let's take a look at -- as we look at the
- 4 | partnership agreement, let's take a look at Section 3.2,
- 5 | allocations of profits and losses. It indicates that profits
- 6 | are to be done -- so 3.2-A says, you know, we're going to do
- 7 ones from prior ones and cumulative profits again for prior
- 8 | periods, and then Section 3 says it will be done to all
- 9 | partners in proportion to their respective percentage
- 10 | interests, correct?
- 11 A 3 point -- I'm just trying to see where you are reading
- 12 || from.
- 13 Q So I'm on Page 8.
- 14 | A Yes.
- 15 || Q 3.2.
- 16 | A Yes.
- 17 || Q A.
- 18 | A Yes.
- 19 0 Little iii.
- 20 A It says, then to all partners in proportion to their
- 21 | respective percentage interests.
- 22 | Q All right. So, subject to A and B, which has to do with
- 23 | payments for prior periods, then profits are to be assigned
- 24 | based on the proportional interest, correct?
- 25 | A Allocation of profits, yes.

36

- 1 | Q Correct.
 - A That's what it --
- 3 | Q Now, --

- $4 \parallel A$ That's what it says.
- 5 | Q Now, your point is there's a difference between allocation
- 6 | and payment, and you're right. So let's take a look at
- 7 | Section 3.9. This is on Page 12. The -- there is a certain
- $8 \parallel -- \text{ if I look at 3.9-B, there are priority distributions that}$
- 9 | are to be provided to the Class B/C interests, correct?
- 10 | A That's correct.
- 11 | Q And those are fairly minor in the grand scheme, is -- with
- 12 | the dollars we're talking about, correct?
- 13 | A I'd disagree with that, but --
- 14 | Q Okay. So in light of that we're talking 300-and-some-odd
- 15 | -- \$360 million for what you're valuing the total equity at
- 16 | for Dugaboy -- I mean, for, excuse me, Hunter Mountain, what
- 17 | we're actually looking at for priority distributions are every
- 18 | calendar year they get \$1.6 million -- they're guaranteed to
- 19 | get at least \$1.6 million, correct?
- 20 | A Just the premise of your question, I'm not valuing the
- 21 | equity at anything.
- 22 | Q Okay.
- 23 | A We're fixing the amount of a class interest under a plan.
- 24 | So I'm not -- I'm not valuing anything.
- 25 | Q Okay. I want to make sure that --

A I think the value of Class 11 is zero.

Q Sir, I want to make sure that we say this clearly. So when you're saying you're -- you are not offering testimony as to what you think it's actually worth, are you estimating as to what it was worth at any given point in time?

- A We're fixing the amount of a claim. Just like a claim --
- $7 \parallel Q$ Right.

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

21

22

23

24

25

- A -- doesn't always get a hundred cents, a fixed amount of the interest under this plan doesn't always get a hundred cents.
- Q Oh, I understand that. But you're fixing the amount of the claim and you're choosing a figure based on the value of that equity interest as of a date certain, correct?
- A I'm picking a figure or fixing a figure based on the capital accounts that were maintained by the partnership as of the petition date.
- 17 | Q Okay.
- 18 | A What their actual value might be, I don't know.
- 19 Q Okay. I'm sorry. I wanted to make sure I wrote that down 20 specifically.

All right. Now, other than the priority distributions that are provided here in Section 3.9 -- and by the way, even the ones that are provided here don't give -- that just says they get paid first in certain circumstances; it doesn't say that they get paid more, correct?

A I don't know it. I'm not an expert on the entire partnership agreement.

- Q Fair enough. Have you looked at Section 5.3?
- 4 | A I have, yes.

1

2

- 5 Q Now, 5.3 talks about how it would be handled under a 6 dissolution and a liquidation, correct?
- 7 || A That's what it says, dissolution and winding up, yes.
- 8 Q And if I -- the portion of Section 5.3 on Page 23
- 9 | indicates that the liquidation will take place, and then the
- 10 | way the cash will be put out is on the second page, Page 24.
- 11 | We have A, B, and C. A would be payment of, you know, certain
- 12 | expenses, B would be payment of creditors, and C is to the
- 13 partners and assignees, to the extent of and proportion to the
- 14 | balance in their capital account, as provided in the Treasury
- 15 | Regulation Code, correct?
- 16 | A The -- you gave a quick summary of it. You didn't read
- 17 | the whole thing. But some of those words are there, yes.
- 18 | Q And then D tell us, to the partners in proportion to their
- 19 | respective percentage interests, correct?
- 20 \parallel A That's what it says, yes.
- $21 \parallel Q$ All right. So C tells us it's going to be in proportion
- 22 | to their capital accounts and C -- and D tells us to the
- 23 | partners in proportion to their respective percentage
- 24 | interests, correct?
- 25 \parallel A That's what this section says, yes.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

All right. So when you were determining the amount of the claims, other than just looking at the tax returns for what was listed as capital accounts, did you take into account the way that the partnership agreement said that those interests should be valued and paid? You didn't read anything about valuing anything here. What I -- what we did take into account when we set the plan and fixed it was the priority that, in the previous provision you read to me, said, notwithstanding any other provision of this agreement, that that priority gave HMIT, the holder of the B/C, priority to the Class A. So when we put it forth, put the plan forth and constructed it, we wanted to make sure that we didn't get an objection from any of the equity holders, particularly HMIT, saying, well, I should be senior. So the plan was structured with Class 10 being senior to Class 11. All right. So, again, let's -- I only want to focus on what you said as it -- I understand the plan, and I'm trying to -- we're going to get to the plan next. But if we're focusing just on the partnership agreement for a second, when you said them being senior pursuant to the partnership agreement, the only way that they are senior in the partnership agreement is a limited amount of priority distributions, correct?

They were entitled to priority distributions; that's

40

1 correct.

2

7

8

9

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

- All right. And those are limited by the specific terms as to what they're entitled to, correct? 3
- 4 I assume they are. I've not -- I'm not an expert on how 5 the partnership agreement lays out the priority of B/C to A, but it clearly laid out a priority. 6
 - Do you know, in the history of the Debtor, was there ever a time that the priority distribution provisions were used such that the Class B/C were paid to the exclusion of the As?
- 10 That the B/C were paid? I don't know the answer.
 - Okay. Now, as you noted, you then went to the plan and noted that there were certain parts to which the -- certain claims that were subordinated, right? I mean, the Class -- as we've said, used the exact words, the Class As are subordinated to the equity trust interests distributed to the allowed holders of the Class B/C, correct?
 - Yeah. Which section are you reading from? But that's the -- that's the gist of the plan, yes.
 - I was actually reading from -- I'm on the Claimant Trust agreement, --
 - That's what I thought.
- 22 -- Page 26.
- 23 Yeah, that's -- that's different from the plan.
- 24 You agree that the plan incorporates the Claimant Trust 25 agreement?

41

- 1 MR. MORRIS: Could we --
- 2 | THE WITNESS: Yes. And the Claimant Trust Agreement
- 3 | reflects the plan.
- 4 | BY MR. HARPER:
- 5 | Q Okay.

- A But you said you were reading from the plan, so --
- 7 | Q I apologize. Sir, I truly am, I'm trying -- I'm not
- 8 | trying to mislead you and I'm sorry if it sounds like I am.
- 9 | A Uh-huh.
- 10 \parallel Q So if I take a look at the Claimant Trust Agreement, --
- 11 | A Uh-huh.
- 12 | Q -- Article 4 of the trust interests, Section C, little c,
- 13 | notes that the Claimant Trust shall issue contingent interests
- 14 | to the holders of allowed Class 10 B/C limited partnership
- 15 | interests and the holders of allowed Class 11 Class A limited
- 16 | partnership interests, correct?
- 17 | A I believe it says a lot more than that, but yes.
- 18 \parallel Q I'm sorry. I'm literally just reading the first sentence.
- 19 | A I don't have it in front of me, so I'll assume you're --
- 20 | Q I'm sorry.
- 21 \parallel A -- you're relatively close to a fair reading.
- 22 | Q Let me hand you a copy.
- 23 | A Thank you.
- 24 | Q I did not realize you did not have a copy. My fault.
- 25 | Sir, I'm on Page 26. Now, in the middle of that paragraph,

there's a sentence that reads -- tell me if I'm reading this 1 2 correctly: Contingent trust interests shall not vest and the equity holders shall not have any rights under this agreement 3 unless and until the Claimant Trustee files with the 4 bankruptcy court a certification that all GUC beneficiaries 5 have been paid indefeasibly in full. And then there's more, 6 7 but did I read that part correctly? 8 I think you were close, yes. 9 Has that been done? 10 Α No. 11 So as of this moment, the GUC certificate has not been 12 filed and there's nothing that has vested or rights to any 13 payments from the equity holders, correct? 14 That's correct. They're not vested as interests under 15 this Claimant Trust Agreement. There has been a fixing of the 16 claim of HMIT, and they are entitled to the rights they have 17 under the settlement agreement, and distributions have been 18 made to HMIT on account of that settlement agreement, 19 including the closing of the transfers of the assets as well 20 as cash payment. 21 All right. Understood, sir. Now, we had an earlier 22 question about whether there was any equity holder left or 23 not. I mean, this is not a term that I'm making up. This is

a term in the Claimant Trust Agreement, correct?

I'm -- what term?

24

25

Α

43 Equity holders, sir. 1 2 Yes, that's in this -- in this agreement in this 3 paragraph. 4 Okay. Now, what I was reading earlier was the last 5 sentence under Section C, which says, The equity trust interests distributed to allowed holders of Class A limited 6 7 partnership interests shall be subordinated to the equity trust interests distributed to allowed holders of Class B/C 8 limited partnership interests. 9 10 Did I read that correctly? 11 That's correct. Α 12 Now, let's take a look, if we can, real quick now to 13 Section 9.2. This will be on Page 33. 14 MR. MORRIS: Do you have a copy for me? 15 MR. HARPER: Oh, I'm sorry. I thought the Claimant Trust was an exhibit. My fault. 16 17 MR. MORRIS: Excerpts, yeah. 18 MR. HARPER: Oh, I'm sorry. 19 MR. MORRIS: That's the agreement, yeah. 20 MR. HARPER: My fault. 21 THE COURT: I have a notebook of the Reorganized

Debtors' exhibits. But the Claimant Trust Agreement, as well as the plan, I just have excerpts that they used as exhibits. And some of what you're reading is not in their excerpts.

22

23

24

25

So if I pulled the Dugaboy witness and exhibit list at

Docket Entry 4395, do you have the full copies of these or what?

MR. HARPER: No, Your Honor. We did not list it as an exhibit, Your Honor, although, you know, obviously, the Court takes judicial notice of its own filings and pleadings.

THE COURT: Okay. Are you asking me to do that, so I can read along, or what?

MR. HARPER: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I truly believed that they -- at this moment, and this is my own fault, --

THE COURT: Well, as you can see on their exhibit list in bold at Number 2 and 3, they have excerpts of the plan, excerpts of the Claimant Trust Agreement. So I realized --

MR. HARPER: I --

THE COURT: -- that you were reading places that are not in their excerpts.

MR. HARPER: I'm sorry, Your Honor. And even worse than that, I only brought three copies. I would hand you mine real quick, but then I can't read this one. But I'm happy to give you mine the second I read 9.2 out loud.

THE COURT: Okay. Are you about to read from the plan or the Claimant Trust Agreement?

MR. HARPER: I'm reading from the Claimant Trust Agreement.

THE COURT: Okay. That's Docket No. 1811 on the main

45

I'll find it. 1 docket. 2 MR. HARPER: Yes, Your Honor. 1811-2, filed on 3 January 22nd, 2021. 4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. HARPER: At least pursuant to what I'm holding. THE COURT: Okay. 6 7 (Pause.) THE COURT: This is taking longer than I want it to, 8 9 since there are -- no. 10 MR. HARPER: Your Honor, if it'll be easier, I'll 11 hand this, I'll just have him read it out loud --12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 MR. HARPER: -- and I'll trust he's going to get it. 14 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 15 BY MR. HARPER: 16 Would you read Section 9.2 out loud for us real quick? 17 "Upon dissolution of the Claimant Trust, any remaining 18 Claimant Trust assets that exceed the amounts required to be 19 paid under the plan will be transferred, in the sole 20 discretion of the Claimant Trustee, in cash or in kind, to the holders of the Claimant Trust interests, as provided in the 21 22 Claimant Trust Agreement." 23 All right. So if there is money beyond what is allowed, 24 the claimant can -- has the -- or the Trustee has the right, 25 in his own discretion, to decide whether to do it in cash or

- in assets, and then it's to be provided to the holders. So my question to you is, who gets it?
- 3 | A At the dissolution, we would pay the next class in line.
- 4 || So --
- 5 | Q All right. So let's go -- let's talk about what you said
- 6 | earlier. You said, for example, that there was no way on
- 7 | God's green earth -- and that's my term, not yours; I
- 8 | apologize -- that they would ever get past the Class 10,
- 9 | correct?
- 10 | A That's correct.
- 11 | Q Now, you're aware that there are numerous matters that are
- 12 on appeal, correct?
- 13 \parallel A There are some matters on appeal, yes.
- 14 | Q Including whether or not -- there's the gateway provision
- 15 \parallel and how that's going to apply.
- 16 | A That's not -- that's not on appeal.
- 17 | Q So it has been sent back and the Court has just made a
- 18 | revision and there may or may not be an appeal from that,
- 19 | correct? Although there is actually -- you say there's no
- 20 | appeal. Is there not something before the United States
- 21 | Supreme Court right now on that issue?
- $22 \parallel A$ There is a cert petition.
- 23 | Q Okay. So it's -- someone is attempting to obtain a
- 24 | further appeal on that, correct?
- 25 | A I treat a cert petition as different than an appeal, but

47

1 | okay.

- 2 | Q I apologize. I see I'm not the only one that wants to do
- 3 | the Law Review route. So let me hit on the issue there.
- 4 | There are additional claims, depending on how those appeals,
- 5 | that could very well change the amount of money that would
- 6 | come into the estate, true?
- 7 | A False.
- 8 | Q False?
 - A False.

- 10 | Q Hmm. And your reason for that is what?
- 11 | A There are no additional assets that the estate can recover
- 12 | that would go into the estate. Those are -- the order you
- 13 | referred to is actions against the estate or its fiduciaries
- 14 | that would deplete the indemnity trust.
- 15 | Q That's fair. Let me try it differently. There are
- 16 \parallel additional claims that could be pursued by, for example,
- 17 | Dugaboy?
- 18 \parallel A Not for the estate.
- 19 | Q No, not for the estate, but for Dugaboy themselves.
- 20 || Correct?
- 21 | A I don't believe there are, but what would that have to do
- 22 | with distributions from the estate?
- 23 | Q Fair. It has to do with the valuation, but I understand
- 24 | your question there. When you sat there and you said, all
- 25 | right, I'm going to decide how much the claim is to be allowed

- 1 | under -- as I understand, the way that you have set this up,
- 2 | you believe that the equity holder Hunter Mountain will
- 3 | receive some money, correct?
- 4 | A They may -- they've already received some money. They may
- 5 | receive more money. I don't know whether they will.
- 6 | Q Okay. But they may receive more. But you believe that
- 7 | there is, if I understood, you said there's no chance that it
- 8 | will be -- filter down to the Class 11, correct?
- 9 A Metaphysically certain.
- 10 \parallel Q Okay. Now, as to the other, besides Hunter Mountain,
- 11 | Class 10 claimant, that entity was what?
- 12 | A I apologize. I don't understand your question.
- 13 | Q So there's two different Class 10, correct, claims?
- 14 | A Correct.
- 15 | Q One is Hunter Mountain?
- 16 | A Yes.
- 17 | Q And I was asking you to just state what the other one was.
- 18 | A It's called Highland CLO Management Limited. It's -- we
- 19 | refer to it as HCLOM.
- 20 | Q Right. And HCLOM was not an equity holder, correct?
- $21 \parallel A$ It was not.
- 22 Q And they are not referred to under either the plan or the
- 23 | contingent trust as an equity holder, correct?
- 24 | A They weren't an equity holder. I'm not --
- 25 | Q Right. And their valuation is --

- 1 | A I don't -- I don't think they're referred to at all.
- 2 | Q All right. They had a note, correct?
- 3 | A They had a note that we said was worthless. We brought an
- 4 | action against them for bad faith. They insisted that -- we
- 5 | insisted they get zero and they pay us millions of dollars.
- 6 We ended up settling it. They insisted on a Class 10 claim
- 7 | with limited rights.
- 8 | Q And that Class 10 claim, you know, the agreement was that
- 9 | they were going to get five percent of any amount of money
- 10 | that Hunter Mountain got?
- 11 | A That's incorrect.
- 12 | Q Sir, are you familiar with the intercreditor and
- 13 | participation agreement signed between HCLOM and HMIT?
- 14 | A I have seen that, yes.
- 15 | Q Okay. And you agree that in the intercreditor and
- 16 | participation agreement, HMIT agreed that they would pay five
- 17 | percent of the money that they received to HCLOM. Correct?
- 18 | A That's between HCLOM and HMIT. We make our distribution
- 19 | to HCLOM. They have a fixed claim for \$10-and-change million
- 20 | by order of this Court.
- 21 | Q Correct. So it started with a -- they wanted a
- 22 | percentage, and then they also got a set amount of money based
- 23 | on a settlement agreement with you under the -- that was
- 24 | fixed, correct?
- 25 | A Apologies for how this sounds, but you have no -- that's

50

1 | not even close to what happened or what these agreements say.

Q Sir, I truly apologize. Why don't -- would you please fix that for me?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

THE COURT: Fix what?

MR. HARPER: Oh, I'm sorry.

THE COURT: What does that mean?

BY MR. HARPER:

- Q You said that was inaccurate, so I'm asking you, would you please tell me the accurate -- the valuation for it.
- 11 | A HCLOM had a claim for --
- 12 | Q Uh-huh.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

- 13 | A -- \$10 million.
- 14 | Q Okay.
 - A It was objected to, because we stated that it was frivolous and it came out of the stripping of assets from Josh Terry's Acis -- controlled Acis -- before he controlled it.

We also filed a bad faith motion, which we would have prevailed on, we're quite confident, for damages against HCLOM. At the hearing, HCLOM's counsel, which is also Dugaboy's counsel, and also at that time HMIT's counsel, made a proposal that we settle the claim. We took advice -- I took advice of counsel and agreed to the settlement. And that was a settlement of the claim. We wanted to zero it out and we wanted to put them in Class 11 and they wanted to be in Class

51

10. So we gave them an allowed or a fixed claim with limited, extremely limited rights, in Class 10 for \$10-and-change million. That stipulation was signed by HCLOM, the Debtor, HMIT, and Dugaboy approving it.

Okay.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

And that was entered by the Court.

I'm sorry that you thought my explanation was dramatically different than that. I think the answer is I must not have heard what I said. Let me just make sure that we're on the same page, though. The way that that claim was valued had nothing to do with equity, correct?

It --

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

THE WITNESS: It -- it --

THE COURT: Sustained.

THE WITNESS: We weren't valued -- the claim --

THE COURT: You don't have to answer.

THE WITNESS: Okay. Sorry.

BY MR. HARPER:

That claim was valued via the terms of a settlement, correct?

The amount was fixed. We didn't value what their claim was worth.

I'm sorry.

```
1
         Their claim --
    Α
2
         The amount of the claim that you --
 3
         Their claim is --
         -- allowed --
 4
         I would value their claim at zero.
 5
 6
         Okay. The amount of the claim that was allowed was a
 7
    negotiated settlement. Fair?
         Their classification was -- was negotiated. The amount,
 8
 9
    because it was subordinated and because it was sitting in a
10
    class that was unlikely to get much of a distribution, we
    didn't really negotiate the amount.
11
12
         Okay.
              MR. HARPER: Your Honor, that's it.
13
14
              THE COURT: Redirect?
15
              MR. MORRIS: I have no further questions, Your Honor.
16
              THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. We appreciate your
17
    testimony, Mr. Seery.
18
              THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor.
19
         (The witness steps down.)
20
              THE COURT: Any other evidence from the Reorganized
21
    Debtor?
22
              MR. MORRIS: No, Your Honor.
23
              THE COURT: All right. Any evidence from Dugaboy?
24
              MR. HARPER: No, Your Honor.
25
              THE COURT: All right. I'll hear closing argument.
```

CLOSING ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE REORGANIZED DEBTOR

MR. MORRIS: As usual, Your Honor, I feel like I'm trying to hit a moving target, because I think the argument that I heard today has nothing to do with the objection that was filed.

As I understood the objection that was filed, Dugaboy was saying that, once Class 9 and senior obligations were paid in full, that somehow Class 10 and 11 should share any further recoveries on a prorated basis because they were the former limited partners. That's what we came here to debate. And on a bait-and-switch, as far as I'm concerned, we're now here on some absurd hypothetical about what happens to a dollar after \$330-some-odd million gets distributed in the future.

It's never going to happen. I think the Court knows it's never going to happen. And I think the only evidence in the case that you just heard from Mr. Seery is that, in response to counsel's questions and his hypotheticals about what happens if Dugaboy brings a claim in the future, it would have nothing to do with distributions from the estate. Right?

Just a completely irrelevant issue.

At the end of the day, if Dugaboy thinks the partnership agreement should have been interpreted and applied in a different way, they should have raised that issue in their objection in January 2021. I think Your Honor has it exactly right. I don't know whether it's res judicata, collateral

estoppel. It's probably both. But it does border on Rule 11 in my mind because I don't think there's a good faith basis in law or in fact to suggest either that distributions should be made pro rata to Class 10 and Class 11 when senior obligations are satisfied or that there's some hypothetical world that exists that's going to -- there's no evidence, right?

The funny thing is, we were here in June, and one of the things Your Honor said to Mr. Lang was, I don't know what you want me to do here. Highland put on a case. They put on a witness. They put in documents. They had evidence. They proved that this methodology was reasonable. You've given me nothing.

They're still giving you nothing. Right? They don't have a witness, they don't have documents, they don't -- they're relying on a partnership agreement that was rejected that hasn't been an effective -- in effect for years. They know what's happening. And they can continue to fight forever, if that's what they choose to do, and it's why creditors are not getting paid yet. It's unfortunate. But if that's the threat, that someday there's going to be more lawsuits, we'll just continue to husband our resources. But we are going to dissolve this estate. Make no mistake about it. That's the goal, that's our obligation, and we're going to fulfill that obligation.

They know what's happening. Mr. Lang stood here in June

and told Your Honor that if you fix Hunter Mountain's claim at the \$300-some-odd million, Dugaboy will never get a dime. And he guaranteed it. If you just go to the transcript and just do a search for dime, you'll find his quote. They knew then what's happening. They know now what's happening.

And that's not some evil plan of Mr. Seery. It's not because Judge Jernigan is biased or anything. It's because we followed a judicial procedure that got us to this point. We had trials. We had evidence. We put in documents. We made arguments. We had a plan. We have a Claimant Trust Agreement. That's what we're doing. There's no reason to upset the applecart.

We ask the Court to grant the order and let's move on. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Harper?

MR. HARPER: Thank you, Your Honor.

CLOSING ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF DUGABOY INVESTMENT TRUST

MR. HARPER: Your Honor, I'm the first one to say, just like you did, that there's issues based on what's already happened here. Okay? So I get that.

THE COURT: Maybe I should say déjà vu all over again. Maybe that's a more legally term.

MR. HARPER: Your Honor, --

THE COURT: That's what it feels like to the Court,

okay?

MR. HARPER: I apologize. Because I've got to tell you, I thought I went out of my -- I attempted to, apparently wrongly, go out of my way to not do that as much. And you'll note that, for example, in our response, we noted other places that we objected to that we were not trying to re-argue with you. We were preserving our right to object so it didn't look like we were waiving anything, but we were not going to re-argue that point.

And I'm trying not to do that again today. I hear the Court saying they think otherwise. I mean, you know, obviously, we think that this concept of how the Hunter Mountain interest was valued is horrific, bizarre, and has no basis. Happy to -- and I think, candidly, we heard that for the first time today under oath from Mr. Seery, who said that under no circumstances did he attempt to value this, under no circumstances did he try to determine what the claim would be under the partnership agreement. In other words, how much the person was entitled to, that's something he didn't bother valuing.

Instead, he just said, hey, here's what I'm going to allow, which we negotiated with a settlement, and I'm choosing it based on what a tax return said and what someone said was the value of the capital account and in direct contrast to what the partnership agreement specifically says how those

will be paid out and how those claims will be valued.

Now, Your Honor, I recognize and I'm not here today to say we're going to try to redo what the Court has done, as much as I would like to. That does, however, leave us in a situation of, what do we do about these other claims?

We have put ourselves in a situation, this Court has,
where -- and I understand them to say there's just no way in
hell it could happen -- but Your Honor, you cannot have a plan
that does not take into account additional payments, and this
plan does. That's what Section 9.2, which I can provide the
Court, says. It says, under the Claimant Trust Agreement, 9.2
says if there's money at the end it's going to get paid back.
So it makes assumption that it's there and it goes.

So the question then becomes, how do we value these and when do we value these?

We know that 11 U.S.C. Section 502(b) says we don't sit around and estimate. I mean, we should only be doing the claims and placing a value on them once they have been made certain and liquidated. However, Section 502(b) says the Court can make an estimate if waiting would cause undue delay. And that's the issue.

What we've been trying to say throughout, Your Honor, is, why are we doing this now? The answer is, at some point in time, we will be done. When we are done, we will know how much money is left. When that time comes, the answer is we

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

need to then say, all right, here's how much money goes to the equity holders. Not to HCLOM, they have a claim which they negotiated, they have their -- but how much money goes to the equity holders. And --THE COURT: Can I stop you? MR. HARPER: Certainly. THE COURT: Didn't Dugaboy, through the Stinson law firm, object to the extension of the Claimant Trust, which we had a hearing on in June, --MR. HARPER: Yes. THE COURT: -- same as the Hunter Mountain settlement? MR. HARPER: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. I'm just trying to reconcile that with you suggesting we can push off to some later time --MR. HARPER: Because we lost that, Your Honor. THE COURT: -- resolution of Classes 10 and 11. MR. HARPER: Your Honor, we lost that. If the answer is we are now closing the estate and we are saying these claims are done, the trusts are done, we're ready to go, then you're right, it is time to value it. And I agree with that. If all --THE COURT: That's what we're trying to do now. Well, I mean, --MR. HARPER: All right. With everything that's on

appeal, with everything that's standing out there, there's more coming. Or not. We'll know soon. They're appealing to the United States Supreme Court right now. Excuse me, they're filing a cert petition to the United States Supreme Court right now, which at least one witness does not consider to be a form of an appeal. But we've got claims out there not only with the district court and otherwise. So the issue is, it makes sense to wait until we actually know how much money there is, and then we do it.

THE COURT: What do you think is out there? I mean, I almost feel like, do you know something I don't know? I've only had one case in 19-1/2 years on the bench where there was this serendipitous, oh my gosh, we've got value for equity beyond our wildest imagination. You know what kind of case it was? It was a bitcoin exchange.

You look like you're in severe pain.

MR. HARPER: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I apologize.
Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HARPER: But it has nothing to do with the --

THE COURT: Okay. I will tell you my little story.

It won't take long.

MR. HARPER: Oh, no. Again, please.

THE COURT: I had a bitcoin exchange. It was a Chapter 15. It was called Mt. Gox. And at the time, it filed

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

bankruptcy because 800,000 bitcoin went missing. Hacked. Bitcoin was worth between 300 and 400 U.S. dollars for one bitcoin. And guess what happened? I don't know what the cost of bitcoin is right now, but it's a heck of lot higher than that. So there was oodles of money. One time in 19-1/2years. And I quess I can remember maybe one time in 17 years practicing law before that. Do you know something the rest of us don't know? Is there a stash of bitcoin somewhere that Mr. Seery just hasn't stumbled upon yet? MR. HARPER: Your Honor, the -- without getting into privilege, I will tell you my client believes there's more out there, a lot more. THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm pretty sure --MR. HARPER: But --THE COURT: -- there was an exchange of information in discovery before the Hunter Mountain hearing. MR. HARPER: Correct. THE COURT: That's what I was told. MR. HARPER: Again, Your Honor, I can only -- I'm sorry, Your Honor. I --THE COURT: Mr. Dondero testified at the last hearing, and that would have been the time to tell me, there's a stack of bitcoin. A stack, whatever. But --

MR. HARPER: Your Honor, I don't know if anybody's

suggesting there is a stack of bitcoin.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HARPER: You know, that may --

THE COURT: Well, then what are we doing, is my question? I'm just trying to rationalize the objection.

MR. HARPER: Your Honor, what we're trying to do is actually have the claims valued and the claims set having some basis in reality, which they don't now.

THE COURT: Well, we had a plan confirmation hearing in February 2021 --

MR. HARPER: And I'm not -- right.

THE COURT: -- where, here's Class 10, here's Class

11. Class 11 is subordinated in distribution rights to Class

10. I don't think it was arbitrary. I think it was just

trying to give some meaning to different terms in the

partnership agreement. But whether it was arbitrary or not,

res judicata, collateral estoppel, nobody objected. Okay. No

one caused me to focus on the bona fides of doing that.

MR. HARPER: I understand, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And Dugaboy objected like crazy to the plan. Okay? So that's why I started out with my at what point can you stop making an argument.

MR. HARPER: So if I understand what you're saying, can I stop making arguments, while they may be new, but they nonetheless seem to be attacking things that you have concerns

about that have already been decided.

THE COURT: Repeat that?

MR. HARPER: Your Honor, the answer is we know that Section 9.2 must mean something, right? So 9.2 tell us that, if there's money left over, it goes back and it's going to get divided between the equity holders. Right? So the answer is

THE COURT: If there's money left over, --

MR. HARPER: -- there is an expectation --

THE COURT: -- it's going to be divided among the equity holders? That's not exactly what it says.

MR. HARPER: All right, Your Honor. What it says is that, to the extent that there is money beyond the allowed claims, it will be paid out to the holder -- to the people who have interests in the trust. Based on the way the trust is defined and the different provisions, I would say the way I read that is the only -- the people that are left at the end of the day would be the equity holders, and the reason being the 10 and 11 cannot be paid until all claims above, there's been a certification that they've been paid in full. So they will get no more, right? So that's what we learned from looking at the provision there.

So, therefore, if there is leftover money -- so the answer is we have already made, when we did this, an assumption that there are going to be certain claims of the Hunter Mountain

that are going to be -- have priority, and then there's going to be leftover money that's got to go back. Well, it certainly can't be a case that to the extent there's leftover money ...

And Your Honor, I'm not trying to say it's because I care about the leftover money. My point is it has to mean something, right? We know that the basic rule of contract interpretation and law interpretation is we have to assume every provision means something.

THE COURT: Well, do we have to assume the provisions of the plan setting forth treatment for Class 10 and Class 11 mean something?

MR. HARPER: And the way that --

THE COURT: I think they're pretty clear.

MR. HARPER: Okay. With the exception that they say that they incorporate this. And by the way, the exact same language you're talking about is in here as well. They both say this. It's subordinated. But the question is, are they 100 percent subordinated? Doesn't that mean, by the way, if there is extra money, does it 100 percent go to -- if what the Court is saying is accurate -- and again, I'm not trying to -- I mean, obviously, you wrote it, so you get to say this is how I interpret my --

THE COURT: I didn't write the plan.

MR. HARPER: I'm sorry, Your Honor. You signed --

you had approved it. So you get to say, this is what I meant.

So imagine a world where there's extra money. Does it 100 percent go to Hunter Mountain? Do they -- because it goes to the two equity holders. Because they, under this term, because our claim is subordinated, if there's extra money, does it 100 percent go to them?

And that just can't be. Right? So because of that, we know that subordination ain't to everything. It goes to the allowed amount of a specific claim, which then leads us to the following. How did we decide this?

Now, I understand, Your Honor, and I'm not trying to reargue what was already there, but what we know and what we just heard testimony on is there was no attempt whatsoever, in deciding what to declare to be an allowed claim, to actually look at how much this was worth or how much it says it will be paid.

I mean, normally, when we determine a contract -
THE COURT: I heard a lot of testimony about the

19 | methodology --

MR. HARPER: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: -- and what the reason was for choosing the methodology. And as Mr. Morris alluded to, I turned to Dugaboy at the Hunter Mountain settlement hearing and said, do you have evidence of a more appropriate methodology?

MR. HARPER: And Your Honor, in the record --

THE COURT: And the answer was no. So I had one witness credibly testifying here's the methodology I used, and no countervailing evidence.

MR. HARPER: And that same witness has now told you that the way he did it was, I took a look at these tax returns, I said, hey, here's what this says. I did not bother looking at what would have actually have been owed or paid or valued under the actual partnership agreement and terms. And Your Honor, that's just not how we do things.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I can take judicial notice of what I heard at the previous hearing.

MR. HARPER: And --

THE COURT: His cross-exam, then, too.

MR. HARPER: Certainly. And you can take judicial --

THE COURT: And I'm not sure I heard anything inconsistent. I think I just got a shorthand version today of what he testified to in a longer version in June.

MR. HARPER: With the exception of he paid no attention to the documents, to which, by the way, those documents are also, if the Court is taking judicial notice of, were exhibits before.

THE COURT: I didn't hear him say he paid no attention to the documents.

MR. HARPER: Okay. Fair enough, Your Honor. He paid no attention to the liquidation provisions or how they say

claims would be paid or how they would be valued, to the extent there is one. And maybe that would be more precise. And again, I appreciate the Court making sure that we are clear in the record.

Your Honor, at the end of the day, let me be -- let me start off with -- let me end with where I started, and so that we don't -- because my whole point was not to find myself in the position I've somehow found myself with the Court. Look, if the Court believes that this was fully resolved before, then there's nothing to do today. I agree. I disagree that it was fully decided, but if the Court believes it was and if the Court believes, hey, you didn't make an objection before so you are stuck with this, then the answer is, Your Honor, we have nothing else to say.

THE COURT: What did I not decide then that you think I should decide today?

MR. HARPER: How to value Dugaboy's interest. If you believe that was decided in the last hearing, I missed that.

I certainly don't see it in the order. I see a settlement agreement and a settlement agreement that provided certain claims. Now we've got a decision, to this.

Our point is we don't even think this ought to be done now. But obviously, Your Honor, what was done before is on appeal. We'll hear what the courts up there have to say. But for this point right now, if you believe the answer is, as a

matter of law, based on what was said before, that automatically covers here, Your Honor, I respect the Court and I won't argue with you on it.

I mean, if that's what you are going to say, then, Your Honor, we agree, we lose, if that's your view. And Your Honor, that's what I'm trying to say. I'm not trying to get in an argument with you. If your belief is that was decided before, then --

THE COURT: I'm just asking questions.

MR. HARPER: Yeah. I understand, Your Honor. And I'm just -- but I see frustration here, and I'm trying to avoid that by saying one thing I feel very -- I go out of my way with courts to try to say, is look, if you believe this, we win; if you believe this, we lose.

Your Honor, if you think that this was covered before and that somehow that resolved, then we're done. I've got nothing for you. Because I certainly am not going to try to do that. I don't think it was. I personally -- and I'm doing my best not to reargue the issues that the Court has already decided. But if the Court feels that I have no choice but to do so, then, you know, I'm sorry for doing so, because that was not my intent. I've never seen a judge who appreciates, as you said, déjà vu all over again and having the same argument. I'm trying not to do that. But Your Honor, that's all we have.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. HARPER: Thank you.

THE COURT: Movant gets the last word, if any, in rebuttal.

MR. MORRIS: I do have a few comments, Your Honor. I'll try to be brief.

I'm trying to deal with each pellet that's coming out of a shotgun, because this was not the objection. The notion that this isn't the time to value the Class 11 unvested contingent interests is wrong. We're on the clock. Dugaboy knows they're on the clock.

As Your Honor pointed out, they actually objected to the extension of the Claimant Trust Agreement by a year, although withdrew that objection after they got their precious reservation of rights.

The case has to end. I know Mr. Dondero doesn't like that, but it is going to end. The litigation may go on, as Mr. Seery pointed out, but the bankruptcy, right, the Claimant Trust Agreement, the Claimant Trust is going to be dissolved soon. And it can only be dissolved.

And I'll try and finish where I started. I said we're here because the plan requires us requires us to be here. The Claimant Trust Agreement requires us to be here because we have to resolve all of the undisputed claims and interests, and that's what we're doing today.

I'm not a scholar on res judicata and collateral estoppel. I will tell you that the evidence we presented today pertains to the Class 11 interest holders. So to that extent, I think the Court needs to make findings as to what those Class 11 interest holders' claims should be allowed at. It's the same methodology but it's different numbers and it's different interest holders. And I would ask the Court to make specific findings that those unvested contingent interests in Class 11 be allowed in the amount set forth in our motion based on the methodology that Mr. Seery presented to the Court.

I hear a lot of complaints about the methodology, but I want to make this clear for the appellate court. There is not a scintilla of evidence that Dugaboy has ever presented on what the methodology should be, how the Class 11 interests should be calculated, or what their calculations ought to be. We're still left with nothing.

Your Honor asked the question in June, and I think if they had come here with new evidence, right, we wouldn't say res judicata, we wouldn't say collateral estoppel, we would say, oh, the Court has to make a decision on what methodology is appropriate, what methodology is reasonable.

Your Honor is only given one choice today. And so you just have to decide, is the methodology appropriate for the Class 11 stakeholders or the Class 11 interest holders?

Because there's no alternative. Again, appellate court, no

evidence. Appellate court, no evidence of value. We have these hypotheticals. Oh, Mr. Dondero is going to bring more lawsuits. Wait 'til you see the next one, because all of the other ones have been so successful.

Why isn't he here to testify? Why isn't he here -- why are they not putting in evidence of value? Why are they not doing anything to rebut Mr. Seery's knowledgeable, informed testimony that there will never be any assets available to satisfy Class 10 and Class 11.

And again, I'll go back to Mr. Lang. He knew it. At least, at least I -- I have a lot of respect for Mr. Lang. At least he was able to stand up here and say, if you do it, Dugaboy gets not a dime. He was right. And that's the way it should be because that's what the plan says because that's what the asset base is. Again, there's nothing evil going on here. We're just doing our job.

The whole issue of what happens in this completely speculative hypothetical situation that there's a nickel left over after the allowed amounts get paid, that whole issue is absolutely irrelevant to what we're doing here today. It's irrelevant because the only issue before the Court is what's the value of the interests in the class; it's not what happens if there's more money left over. That's one reason why it's irrelevant.

It's also irrelevant because we hear time and time again

that Dugaboy believes the plan provides that it will get the residual. If it will get the residual, then why is it crying? And if it doesn't provide for a mechanism of what happens if there's a nickel left over after \$330 million is found in some bitcoin account, right, somebody's going to have to come back here and ask for a plan modification and we'll deal with it then. It has nothing to do with the motion before the Court today, and I don't want the Court to go down a path that, in our view, is completely irrelevant. It either provides what Dugaboy thinks, in which case who cares, or it doesn't, and you know what, when somebody finds that bitcoin we'll come back and ask for a plan modification and we'll figure out what to do then.

I have nothing further, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. HARPER: Your Honor?

MR. MORRIS: Thank you.

MR. HARPER: I know -- I'm sorry. I have been asked -- my associate reached out to me, he's asked me to say one sentence. If it's okay with the Court, I don't think he'll want to respond, I think he'll just shake his head and --

THE COURT: Usually the movant gets the last word, so this better be important.

MR. HARPER: Your Honor, I have been -- I'm sorry.

You may not -- I have been asked to raise one issue with you,

which simply is that, in case it was not clear earlier, that our view as to which claim -- because the point is, you know, again, we said if there's something left over at the end and how to deal with some issues, what's subordinated, what's not, the point that we have been trying to make is that we think that the partnership agreement talks about priority distributions are made. Those are priority, and those are the only ones to which, you know, Dugaboy believes subordinated. Your Honor, that's what my client -- that's it, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HARPER: And again, I'm sorry for doing that out of order. I appreciate you.

THE COURT: Well, I have allowed a lot of discussions and questioning about the limited partnership agreement, and if I erred on that, I erred on the side of allowing our objector, Dugaboy, to fully make its argument. But I do still, at the end of this hearing, believe what I believed or suggested at the beginning, and that is this is really more about the plan and the confirmation order.

The confirmation order approved the plan. The confirmation order approved the Claimant Trust Agreement. And I thought some sort of preclusion doctrine is really the issue here.

And just to tie that all together, again, I allowed

questioning and argument about the Highland December 2015

limited partnership agreement that created three classes -- A,
B, and C -- limited partnership interests, but ultimately the
arguments about that seem irrelevant at this late stage. I'm
trying to pick the right word. Because the time to have
argued that the terms of the limited partnership agreement
don't support a separation into Class 10, Class 11 of the
Class B and C and Class A limited partnership interests, this
is just not justified treating Class B and C limited
partnership interests, classifying them in Class 10 to get
paid ahead of Class 11, that was all very relevant at the plan
confirmation hearing. There could have been argument about
this just doesn't make sense in light of my reading of the
limited partnership agreement, and I could have really drilled
down and thought about the merits of those arguments.

But Dugaboy, who vehemently objected to the plan, never made that argument. No one ever made the argument about the inappropriateness of separating out the limited partnership interests the way the plan does. And the way the plan is structured, I do believe is supportive of the Reorganized Debtors' motion here today. I think the settlement with HMIT and the evidence I heard then and the order I entered then is further supportive of the motion that is before me today.

The motion that is before me today I think is not only permissible by Section 502(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, but I

think the statement is absolutely true that it's time for this case to end. As we know very well, a plan was confirmed

February 2021, went effective August 2021. Here we sit, more than four years later, and everything that really should have happened by now has happened towards completing the plan, with the exception of a few loose ends that were described at the June Hunter Mountain settlement hearing and have further been addressed to some extent in today's motion.

We have a few appeals, I don't know how many, from time to time people have reported at Highland hearings, but there may be a handful of appeals left. But it is appropriate at this juncture, all these years later, with all that has happened towards completion of the plan, to allow the Highland Claimant Trust to get an order fixing the allowed amount of the Class 7 interests under the plan.

I find that the methodology proposed is reasonable. It is my only evidence of what is reasonable, Dugaboy having chosen not to put on evidence. The methodology amounts to looking at the dollars used by the Debtor multiple times to allocate to the various limited partnership interests values that were signed off on by Mr. Dondero.

So it's hard to understand why we're here, but I do accept as reasonable methodology the methodology suggested by Reorganized Highland and the Claimant Trust. And so therefore I will fix the allowed amount of the Dugaboy Class 11

interests in the amount of \$740,081.61; Strand Advisors at \$994,707.76; Mark K. Okada's at \$192,754.38; Mark and Pamela Okada Family Trust Exempt Trust Number 1 at \$38,868.17; and Mark and Pamela Okada Family Trust Exempt Trust Number 2, its Class 11 interests at \$16,657.79.

So these are simply the amounts being allocated as to the Class 11 interests. I don't think anything I'm doing shall be deemed to vest the Class 11 interests at this point in time. And the Court reserves the right to supplement and amend the written form of order on this. Mr. Morris, if you would please upload it, and we will get it signed.

Anything else?

MR. MORRIS: No, Your Honor, other than I might not get that to you until tomorrow.

THE COURT: Oh. That's quite all right. I've got plenty to do.

MR. MORRIS: Because I'm hoping to make my way back up north.

THE COURT: Plenty to do before I leave.

MR. MORRIS: Yeah.

THE COURT: Anything further from you, Mr. Harper?

MR. HARPER: No, Your Honor. Thank you so much. I appreciate everything.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HARPER: Again, I'm sorry I sort of stuck a --

post-surgery, I could either take painkillers or appear in court, and so I'm sorry if I'm grimacing. It has nothing to do with you.

THE COURT: Well, I just, I don't know if it's worthwhile for me to say this or not, but I really am perplexed, okay? '

MR. HARPER: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I really am very perplexed about this hearing we had today. And I'm really -- Mr. Morris said this is almost Rule 11-sanctionable, and I don't think that was a farfetched statement.

MR. HARPER: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I think a lot of us who have been involved with this case for a very long time, we're just very weary of the déjà vu all over again. And we're almost too weary to move for sanctions, entertain sanctions.

Do you hear what I'm saying? I really want you to hear what I'm saying. It's been a merry-go-round of lawyers. I don't know what else term to use for it. How many lawyers do you think have appeared for Dugaboy in five years or however long this has been? I guess it's been more than five years.

MR. HARPER: I think there's been more than five.

The short answer is, Your Honor, I have no idea. I do

understand what the Court is saying. I think --

THE COURT: What do you think it is? Do you think

1 it's three, six, nine, more? 2 MR. HARPER: Your Honor, I would have to tell you I 3 honestly have no earthly idea. 4 THE COURT: Really? 5 MR. HARPER: I apologize. THE COURT: Really? 6 7 MR. HARPER: Yeah. THE COURT: Okay. Your firm has been involved 8 9 representing different clients, by the way. 10 MR. HARPER: Yes, we have, Your Honor. We were 11 representing -- we have had to wall those people off 12 appropriately. 13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MR. HARPER: But yes, I had spoken with them and we 15 have walled accordingly. We didn't want to raise any issues 16 regarding conflict. I hear what Your Court is saying. I understand there's a 17 18 fine line to walk between the objections that need to be 19 preserved. And if the Court feels that -- walk it over, I 20 appreciate it. Message is taken. 21 THE COURT: No. I'm just --22 MR. HARPER: Understood, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Well, I started out with perplexed. 24 don't understand the recycling. It feels like recycling of

25

arguments --

MR. HARPER: Understood, Your Honor. 1 2 THE COURT: -- and thinking it's okay. Thinking it's 3 okay. 4 MR. HARPER: Your Honor, I understand what you've 5 said and the message has been received. THE COURT: All right. 6 7 MR. HARPER: Your bitcoin case reminded me of my -our magical-appearing insurance policy case we had with Judge 8 9 Hale years ago. So, it's --10 THE COURT: Okay. I don't know about that. But I'm 11 going to say weary. I'm going to say weary. You said I 12 seemed frustrated. Yes, probably. But more than anything 13 else, I am just weary that we have a revolving door of 14 lawyers. 15 MR. HARPER: I understand, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: That doesn't make it okay to make the 17 same argument --18 MR. HARPER: Of course. 19 THE COURT: -- again and again and again. 20 MR. HARPER: Absolutely, Your Honor. Could not agree 21 more. 22 THE COURT: Okay. We're adjourned. 23 MR. HARPER: Thank you, Your Honor. 24 MR. MORRIS: Thank you, Your Honor. 25 THE CLERK: All rise.

Certified Electronic Court Transcriber

Coop 2:1	F ov 0.00774 M. Dogument 2.0 F. Filed 1.0/2.0/2F. Dogo 940569207 DogoNal171.04.0
Case 3.2	<mark>5-cv-02826-K Document 39-5 Filed 10/23/25 Page 860ინ82</mark> 07 Pa ලි eტმ ID1 262 80
1	INDEX
2	PROCEEDINGS 2
3	OPENING STATEMENTS
4	By Mr. Morris 2 By Mr. Harper 11
5	WITNESSES
6	Reorganized Debtors' Witnesses
7	
8	James P. Seery - Direct Examination by Mr. Morris 24
9	- Cross-Examination by Mr. Harper 34
10	EXHIBITS
11	Reorganized Debtors' Exhibits
12	Exhibits 1 through 10 Received 5
13	CLOSING ARGUMENTS
14	By Mr. Morris 53
15	By Mr. Harper 55
16	RULINGS 72
17	END OF PROCEEDINGS 79
18	INDEX 80
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

EXHIBIT F



A COLD-CASE LEGAL THRILLER

BY STACEY JERNIGAN

Chief Judge Stacey Jernigan Brings AI, Influencers, and Social Media to the Crime-Solving Forefront in Her Latest Novel


Disclaimer: Chief Judge, Stacey Jernigan is recognized as a public figure. As such, she has previously been featured in prominent media sources such as NPR, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Daily Beast*, *LA Weekly*, and *The Dallas Morning News*, regarding statements on cases as well as in response to an individual who incorrectly asserted that one of her fictional characters was based on them. It must be emphasized here that Jernigan is an author of fiction—and that all characters in this story are also fictional.

That said, Jernigan's history as both Chief Judge and former lawyer lends an authentic voice to the nature of Judge Avery Lassiter's process as she unravels the murder case of wealthy hotel heiress Gigi Mesero.

With a nod to Hulu's Only Murders in the Building, this whodunit murder mystery involves podcasters who stir up a lethal social media and influencer sensation amid societal true crime fervor. In Mystic Spires Post-Mortem: A Cold-Case Legal

Thriller by Stacey Jernigan (Brown Books Publishing Group; On sale: October 14, 2025), the sharp and resourceful judge Avery Lassiter is intent on getting to the bottom of a murder case at the Mystic Spires Hotel that has remained unsolved for eight years. When Lassiter hosts a Gigi Mesero—themed murder mystery dinner, each of her law clerks play the role of a murder suspect introducing evidence on themselves. Unable to come to a unanimous decision on the murderer, one of the clerks suggests asking a generative AI platform who it thinks murdered Gigi. This new lead inspires further research, reaching out to a few blogs and podcasts that previously covered the case.

Overnight, a wave of media frenzy ensues. From social media attacks, to leaked confidential information, to a famed podcaster hunting down the new suspect for a livestreamed unsolicited interview—resulting in two more deaths—the case quickly spirals out of control. As the case comes to a head, readers, alongside Lassiter, must ask themselves in what ways AI and social media are helping versus potentially harming the procedure of crime investigation.









ADVANCE PRAISE FOR MYSTIC SPIRES POST-MORTEM

"Mystic Spires Post-Mortem is a twisty, time-hopping legal thriller that reads like a prestige mini-series—smart, moody, and addictive. When a hotel heiress is found murdered, the investigation unspools across decades, slowly revealing a web of secrets, ambition, and betrayal. Chief Judge Stacey Jernigan crafts a sharp, propulsive story with vivid Dallas flavor, compelling legal drama, and characters who stay with you long after the last page."

-AMY PEASE, BESTSELLING AUTHOR OF NORTHWOODS

"Part murder mystery, part legal thriller, and part social commentary, Jernigan's *Mystic Spires Post-Mortem* is a truly unique take on the genre. It was fascinating to see how the author pieced together the story—and to watch it unfold through the eyes of all the players, both good and bad. I'll be looking for more of her work in the future!"

-TAMARA BERRY. EDGAR-AWARD-WINNING AUTHOR OF BURIED IN A GOOD BOOK

"Mystic Spires deliciously blends timeless murder-mystery motifs and hyper-modern perspectives on crime-solving—and all in the Great State of Texas!"

—KIM SANDERS, FORMER HOMICIDE DETECTIVE FOR THE DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT, AWARD-WINNING AUTHOR OF *HERMIT OF PARADISE: A NOVEL*







ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Stacey Jernigan, a native Texan, has been a judge in Dallas, Texas since 2006. Before that, she was a lawyer and partner at a large international law firm specializing in corporate restructuring matters. She is also an occasional adjunct professor at the SMU Dedman School of Law. Stacey is married to a retired law enforcement officer (Dallas Police Department), with whom she has an adult son and daughter, as well as two Cavalier King Charles Spaniels. She is a frequent speaker at legal conferences around the country and is an avid writer and international traveler. *Mystic Spires Post-Mortem* is her third novel.

"But with technology—with all of these AI tools—are we prone to trust it more than humans in crime-solving and a court of law? Maybe more than we should? And are we at risk of delegating our own thinking—our own reasoning process? Are we going to just, more and more, defer to the machines to sort through a set of facts or legal issues to tell us what to think? That scares me to death. What about cogito ergo sum? 'I think, therefore I am'? We are facing an existential threat here, maybe. If we begin delegating our thinking, we are done."

-FROM *MYSTIC SPIRES POST-MORTEM*





THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

JUDGE'S FICTIONAL THRILLER SPARKS REAL-LIFE COURTROOM DRAMA

Plot featuring crooked hedge-funder inspires actual financier to try to get jurist booted off case

By Erin Mulvaney July 29, 2023 9:12 pm ET

When she isn't handling cases as a U.S. bankruptcy judge, Stacey Jernigan writes legal thrillers, most recently "Hedging Death," whose sweeping plot features a troubled biotech company, a crooked financier and Mexican criminal cartels.

In true write-what-you know fashion, her fictional heroine, Avery Lassiter, bears a striking similarity to the author herself. They are both judges in Texas, former corporate lawyers and dog lovers married to police officers.

James Dondero, former chief executive of hedge-fund company Highland Capital Management, sees another similarity in the novel—between one of the villains and himself.

Dondero says he is the inspiration for Cade Graham, a Dallas hedge-fund playboy suspected of insurance fraud and faking his own death in a fiery car crash. And in a plot twist not yanked from the novel, he is pushing for the judge-cum-writer to step aside from a case she is handling that involves none other than the real-life hedge-funder—Dondero.

Like many fictional works, Jernigan's book includes a disclaimer that its characters "are absolutely fictional." Nevertheless, citing "unquestionable parallels" between his life and Graham's, Dondero is arguing that the fictional depiction exposes Jernigan's real-life bias against him in the long-running legal case.



James Dondero cites 'unquestionable parallels' between his life and that of a villain in the novel.

Jernigan has rebuffed his efforts so far, at one point quoting Oscar Wilde: "Life imitates art far more than art imitates life."

Highland Capital, once a pioneer in trading speculative corporate loans, filed for bankruptcy in 2019 after it became embroiled in a series of legal disputes. The case landed in Jernigan's court. Dondero, who was subsequently ousted from Highland, has been fighting with the bankrupt firm and its creditors over its winddown.

Dondero claims Jernigan, who has held him in civil contempt twice, hasn't been fair to him during the bankruptcy proceedings. He has sought her recusal several times—to no avail. Dondero has asked a federal district court to reconsider.

His latest attempt to boot Jernigan cited her fiction writing as evidence of her negative views of the hedge-fund industry. Her first novel, "He Watches All My Paths," revolves around death threats to the fictional Judge Lassiter. Her second follows the manhunt for the criminal. Both are self-published.

Dondero sees parallels between himself and Graham, one of the villains in the second novel. The novel describes Graham as a "well-known wealthy playboy and high-flying Dallas hedge fund manager," and as "a real piece of work...a ton of people hate



JORDAN FRAKER

him, don't trust him, and can't figure out how on earth he manages to make so much money in both good times and bad times." The novel involves Graham in a plot to murder American retirees in Mexico for insurance money.

According to Dondero, the fictional hedge fund, called Ranger, handles assets similar to those of his former firm, which he said in a court filing was once called Ranger Asset Management. Jernigan's novels show disdain for hedgefund managers, he says, citing passages that describe the industry as having "outrageous amounts of hubris" and a "bro culture."

In a written statement to The Wall Street Journal, Dondero said: "The impartiality of judges-and the appearance of impartiality—is a critical component of the federal judiciary. We are well past the point that a reasonable person would see bias."





Jernigan, who has been a judge since 2006, has said he has inundated the court with thousands of pages of material related to recusal requests that were untimely and without merit. The judge, who didn't respond to requests for comment, addressed her fiction briefly in one March opinion, saying that even though some of her work is loosely based on real life, no characters were inspired by Dondero. Jernigan's opinion said she had "never once heard" that Ranger was Highland's original name.

In the ruling, Jernigan said she "regrets this sideshow," but added that many sitting judges write books, though usually nonfiction rather than fiction.

In 2013 Senior U.S. District Judge Michael Ponsor published "The Hanging Judge," a novel about a death-penalty trial. The book came about a dozen years after he presided over the first death-penalty trial in Massachusetts in 50 years, though the facts of the case were far different.

Federal Judge Frederic Block wrote a legal thriller called 'Race to Judgment.'

Frederic Block, a senior U.S. district judge in New York, wrote a legal thriller "Race to Judgment," described on Amazon. com as a "reality-fiction" novel, which is loosely based on a number of high-profile cases he handled. Of course judges should be careful about what they write, he says, but they have important stories to share.

In her order declining to step aside, Jernigan said there were countless examples of authors, from Agatha Christie to Ernest Hemingway, who weave fictional plots that are loosely based on real-life events. "The Presiding Judge is somewhat embarrassed to discuss these literary greats in the same paragraph in which she is mentioning her own fiction works—it is merely to make a point," she said in the ruling.

Dondero's legal team hired law professor Steve Leben of the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law to take a look.

"To be sure, the two judges aren't identical, and the book doesn't come across as nonfiction," Leben wrote to the



AGATON STROM FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

court this month. "But while it's common for fiction authors to draw on their own lives, experiences, and viewpoints to varying degrees, Jernigan has made the similarities numerous and obvious." He concluded the judge ought to recuse herself.





Dondero's former hedge fund Highland, for its part, has opposed his recusal attempts and called him a "vexatious litigant," petitioning this month to limit his legal maneuvering.

Legal ethics experts said what matters is whether Jernigan's impartiality might be reasonably questioned.

"It is a pretty novel situation—pun vaguely intended," said Indiana University law professor Charles Geyh. While many judges write outside of court, he said, "this is complicated as a work of fiction, and the way we evaluate it is tricky."

At least some readers of "Hedging Death" are fans. It scored 4.9 of five stars on Amazon.com, based on eight reviews.

One of her judicial colleagues lauded it in the American Bankruptcy Institute Journal, calling it a courtroom drama with a "Texas flavor" and a surprise ending. "The book," Judge Harlin Hale wrote, "truly has something for every insolvency professional!"

For the full article, click here:

https://www.wsj.com/arts-culture/books/texas-bankruptcy-judge-stacey-jernigan-novel-hedge-fund-dondero-a 5e84c50





METADATA

Title	lortem
Subtitle A Cold-Case Legal T	hriller
Author	rnigan
ISBN	547251
Format	
Retail price	\$17.99
Size	6 x 9
Pages	224
BISAC 1 Fiction / Mystery & Det	tective
BISAC 2 Fiction /	
BISAC 3Fiction	/ Legal
Publication Date October 14	1, 2025
Distribution Ingram, Baker, & '	Taylor
PublisherBrown	Books
Publisher Websitewww.BrownBook	ks.com
Author Websitewww.SJnove	ls.com

SYNOPSIS

Judge Avery Lassiter is determined to find the truth—with unintended consequences.

Gigi Mesero was more than a wealthy heiress and entrepreneur. She was also the victim of a strange murder at the Mystic Spires Hotel in Dallas, Texas, a case that has remained unsolved for eight years. The mysterious circumstances of the crime, however, haven't allowed it to be forgotten. Some believe it was Gigi's own sister, a popular social media influencer. Some believe it was one of her numerous seedy lovers looking to steal her fortune. Others believe it wasn't murder at all. With a whole slew of theories, detectives and online sleuths have exhausted all avenues. However, when Judge Avery Lassiter becomes obsessed with personally investigating the murder, she and her friends and family will stir up new clues, controversies, and cover-ups.

A tale about lies, technology, and the shifting world of criminal investigation, *Mystic Spires Post-Mortem* invites readers to follow a dangerous trail of death and corruption alongside a cast of determined investigators.



EXHIBIT G

Geoffrey S. Harper
Texas Bar No. 00795408
gharper@winston.com
John Michael Gaddis
Texas Bar No. 24069747
mgaddis@winston.com
WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
2121 N. Pearl Street, Suite 900
Dallas, TX 75201
(214) 453-6500
(214) 453-6400 (fax)

Michael J. Lang Texas State Bar No. 24036944 mlang@cwl.law CRAWFORD, WISHNEW & LANG PLLC 1700 Pacific Ave, Suite 2390 Dallas, Texas 75201 Telephone: (214) 817-4500

Counsel for Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

In re:) Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL) Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
MANAGEMENT, L.P.,)
Reorganized Debtor.)
-)
)
THE DUGABOY INVESTMENT)
TRUST,)
)
Appellant,) Case No. 3:25-cv-02579-B
v.)
HIGHLAND CAPITAL)
MANAGEMENT, L.P,)
et al.,)
Appellees.)

TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY, APPELLANT THE DUGABOY INVESTMENT TRUST'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL ORDER DENYING FIFTH MOTION TO RECUSE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

			Page
INTRODU	JCTIO1	V	1
FACTUAI	L BAC	KGROUND	2
QUESTIO	N PRE	SENTED	7
RELIEF S	OUGH	T	7
ARGUME	NT AN	ND AUTHORITIES	8
A.	Stan	dard for Final Appeals	8
B.	Stan	dard for Interlocutory Appeals	9
C.	Beca	ne Extent Required, the Court Should Grant Leave to Appeal tuse the Bankruptcy Court Has Already Issued Final ealable Orders on Matters Intertwined with Recusal	10
	1.	The Bankruptcy Court's approval of the Rule 9019 Settlement is a final appealable order.	10
	2.	The Class 11 Order is a final order directly related to the recusal issue.	12
	3.	Recusal is necessary based on the Court's continuing and escalating displays of bias	13
D.	Gran	Taken As An Interlocutory Appeal, Leave Should Be ated to Appeal Under 28 U.S.C. §158(a)(3) and 28 U.S.C. 92(b).	14
	1.	The issue of whether Judge Jernigan should have recused herself presents a controlling question of law	14
	2.	A substantial ground for difference of opinion exists as to the issue of recusal.	15
	3.	An immediate appeal of the recusal issue will materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation	16
E.	Leave to Appeal Should Be Granted For Reasons of Practicality and Fairness.		
CONCLU	SION		1 Q

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)
Cases
Ades-Berg Investors v. Breeden (In re Bennett Funding Group), 439 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2006)11
Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 2012 WL 718933 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2012)
Amaro-Borilla v. Barr, 792 F. App'x. 493 (9th Cir. 2020) (mem. op.)
Andrade v. Chojnacki, 338 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2003)
In re ASARCO, LLC, 650 F.3d 593 (5th Cir. 2011)9
<i>In re Bartee</i> , 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000)9
<i>In re Coastal Plains Inc.</i> , 338 B.R. 703 (N.D. Tex. 2006)
In re Cobalt Int'l Energy, Inc. Securities Litig., 2016 WL 949065 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2016)
In re CTLI, LLC, 534 B.R. 895 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015)
Dondero et al. v. Jernigan et al., No. 25-355 (pet. filed Sept. 22, 2025)
Dondero et al. v. Jernigan (In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.), Civ. No. 3:21-CV-0879-K, 2022 WL 394760 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2022)
Dondero v. Jernigan, No. 24-10287, 2025 WL 1122466 (5th Cir. Apr. 16, 2025)3, 7, 16, 18

<i>Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd.</i> , 299 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2002)
Kelley v. Cypress Fin. Trading Co., L.P., 518 B.R. 373 (N.D. Tex. 2014)
In re Kizzee–Jordan, 626 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2010)9, 10
<i>In re Moody</i> , 849 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1988)12
<i>In re O'Connor</i> , 258 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2001)10
Panda Energy Intern., Inc. v. Factory Mut. Ins., 2011 WL 610016 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2011)16
Pemex Exploracion y Produccion v. BASF Corp., 2011 WL 11569219 (S.D. Tex. Feb 11, 2011)
In re Reagor-Dykes Motors, L.P., 613 B.R. 878 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2020)11
Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589 U.S. 35 (2020)
Ryan v. Flowserve Corp., 444 F. Supp. 2d 718 (N.D. Tex. 2006)14, 15, 16
In re Saco Local Development Corp., 711 F.2d 441 (1st Cir.1983)12
In re Searex Energy Servs., Civ. No. No. 09–5817, 2009 WL 2868243 (E.D. La. Sept. 1, 2009)10
Smith v. Revie (In re Moody), 817 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1987)9
Matter of Texxon Petrochemicals LLC, 67 F. 4th 259 (5th Cir. 2023)17

In re Tullius, 500 F. App'x. 286 (5th Cir. 2012)	10
Statutes	
28 U.S.C. § 158(a)	8
28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)	8
28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)	1, 10, 14
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)	10, 14, 16
Other Authorities	
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8003	1
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004(a)(2)	1
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004(b)(1)	2
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019	6, 10, 11
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11	5, 13

Pursuant to the Court's order of September 26, 2025, (Dkt. 2), Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy") respectfully files this Motion for Leave to Appeal.

INTRODUCTION

To the extent the Court's leave is required for Dugaboy to appeal the order denying the motion to recuse, the Court should grant such leave. Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8004(a)(2), a party must seek leave to appeal an interlocutory order prior to final disposition of a case. While Dugaboy did not seek leave before appealing the order denying recusal, it appealed without leave only because, based on its interpretation of current controlling case law, no such leave was required because the appeal is of a final order and as of right. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8003. The bankruptcy court has issued at least two final orders on matters intertwined with the recusal motion that is the subject of this appeal. The appeal was not deemed by Dugaboy as interlocutory and, therefore, Dugaboy had no intention of violating any procedural rule. But because the Court has specifically instructed Dugaboy to file a Motion for Leave, Dugaboy now so files. And to the extent such leave is required, the Court should grant the motion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND¹

This Motion seeks the Court's leave to appeal from the bankruptcy court's September 2, 2025 "Order Denying Fifth Motion to Recuse Judge." Bankr. Dkt.² 4379. This recusal motion (Bankr. Dkt. 4372) focuses squarely on the uniquely prejudicial circumstances created by Chief Judge Stacey G.C. Jernigan's publication of two fiction novels with numerous similarities to her real cases and litigants, in particular a villain bearing very close similarity to Mr. Dondero. And from being deterred by the ensuing public controversy, Chief Judge Jernigan worked on a forthcoming third book during the same time frame she issued the orders that Dugaboy seeks to appeal.³ Indeed, in a stunning decision, Chief Judge Jernigan is seeking to use the controversy and the filing of further recusal motions as a key part of her publicity campaign to sell her new book.⁴ Not only does her marketing campaign give Chief Judge Jernigan a direct financial interest in further recusal proceedings involving Mr. Dondero, it effectively pressures her to stick to her guns

Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004(b)(1), a motion for leave to appeal must include "(A) the facts needed to understand the question presented; (B) the question itself; (C) the relief sought; (D) the reasons why leave to appeal should be granted; and (E) a copy of the interlocutory order or decree and any related opinion or memorandum." A copy of the Bankruptcy Court's Order denying the motion to recuse is attached as Exhibit A.

² "Bankr. Dkt" refers to the main bankruptcy case, *In re Highland Management, L.P.*, Bankr. N.D. Tex. Case No. 19-34054-sgj-11.

Ex. B (publicity flyer for forthcoming third novel).

⁴ See id. (quoting extensively from a 2023 Wall Street Journal article that interviewed Mr. Dondero and discussed the controversy at length).

and reject any further recusal requests for fear of disappointing her fan base and losing sales.

Dugaboy's impetus for filing the recent recusal motion stems from the Fifth Circuit's April 16, 2025 decision on rehearing of a mandamus petition from the Bankruptcy Court's denial of a previous recusal motion. *Dondero v. Jernigan*, No. 24-10287, 2025 WL 1122466, at *7 (5th Cir. Apr. 16, 2025). In that decision, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the lack of any precedent for the situation created by Chief Judge Jernigan's novels, stating that "[d]ue to the similarities between the characters in Chief Judge Jernigan's novel and the litigants currently before her court, a strong argument could be made that [Chief Judge Jernigan] had a duty to recuse," but ultimately declined to order recusal because it concluded that the extremely high standard for mandamus relief had not been met. See id. (emphasis added). In other words, the Fifth Circuit suggested a motion to recuse might have succeeded if brought under the ordinary abuse-of-discretion standard in a regular appeal. See id.

Dugaboy took up that challenge, filing a new recusal motion that encouraged Chief Judge Jernigan to "step back" before proceeding with an appeal. Bankr. Dkt. 4372 at 5. Instead, Chief Judge Jernigan denied that motion. Bankr. Dkt. 4379.

Shortly after declining to recuse, Chief Judge Jernigan held a hearing and

issued an Order (Bankr. Dkt. 4401)⁵ in which she granted Highland's Motion to Fix the Allowed Amount of Dugaboy's Class 11 Interests (see Bankr. Dkt. 4362). The purpose and effect of the Class 11 Order was to "fix" the value of Dugaboy's claims to a ceiling of a specific dollar amount and cut off any avenue for possible further recoveries. In other words, this was a "final order" with respect to Dugaboy's claims. See, e.g., In re Coastal Plains Inc., 338 B.R. 703, 713 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (explaining finality for appellate purposes in "the unique procedural posture of bankruptcy cases"). Moreover, Chief Judge Jernigan repeatedly stated on the record that she thought the objections to the motion were extremely close to being sanctionable because the entire issue was final and subject to res judicata. See, e.g., Exhibit C, Sept. 18, 2025 Hearing Transcript at 76:8–16; 13:12–19. Since Chief Judge Jernigan stressed that the matter had either become final weeks earlier or was certainly final by the time of the hearing, the Bankruptcy Court's Class 11 Order again showed that an appeal was appropriate as a matter of course and was not interlocutory. See id. 13:12–19; 164:4–13.

Furthermore, the concerns behind the recusal motion came on full display at the September 18, 2025 hearing on the Class 11 Motion, thus closely connecting the appeals on these two matters. In what was perhaps the most extreme display to date

Dugaboy is challenging this Order in another appeal, N.D. Tex. Case No. 3:25-cv-02724-L, currently before Judge Lindsay.

of bias against Mr. Dondero and anyone associated with him, Chief Judge Jernigan threatened Dugaboy's current counsel, Geoffrey Harper, with Rule 11 sanctions if he continued to "recycle" arguments previously made by prior Dugaboy attorneys, while also rebuking him for offering novel arguments that prior counsel never made. *See* Ex. C, Hrg. Tr. 21:23–22:02; 61:9–62:1; 76:4–77:3; 77:17–78:19.

See 76:8–16:

THE COURT: I really am very perplexed about this hearing we had today. And I'm really—Mr. Morris said this is almost Rule 11-sanctionable, and I don't think that was a farfetched statement.

MR. HARPER: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I think a lot of us who have been involved with this case for a very long time, we're just very weary of the *déjà vu* all over again. And we're almost too weary to move for sanctions, entertain sanctions. Do you hear what I'm saying? I really want you to hear what I'm saying. It's been a merry-goround of lawyers. I don't know what else term to use for it. How many lawyers do you think have appeared for Dugaboy in five years or however long this has been?

Compare, e.g., 21:23–22:06:

THE COURT: Why wasn't your client making this argument in February 2021 when the plan was performing?

MR. HARPER: Your Honor, I can't answer that. I do not know.

THE COURT: Well, you can't change lawyers and use that as an excuse. So what is your excuse?

Chief Judge Jernigan's threat was clear: Lawyers who represent Dugaboy or Dondero due so at their own peril. Parties who seek to preserve objections as required by law—as even opposing counsel conceded was necessary at that time—

were risking monetary sanctions or worse from Chief Judge Jernigan. And new arguments were also dangerous. So at the same time Chief Judge Jernigan was circulating publicity about her new book and seeking to drum up interest because of the issues raised in this case, Chief Judge Jernigan was making further rulings and arguments. Indeed, had Chief Judge Jernigan ruled otherwise, it would have required significant changes to her publisher's promotional materials⁶ and probably depressed her book sales.

The effect (and presumably the purpose) of the Bankruptcy Court's admonition was to create a chilling effect meant to deter Dugaboy's and Mr. Dondero's counsel from performing their ethical duty to zealously advocate on behalf of their clients.

As Chief Judge Jernigan herself has repeatedly stated, the issue is final. Now is the time to resolve the merits of Dugaboy's appeal on the recusal issue. Both the Class 11 ruling and the approval of the Rule 9019 settlement have brought the overall bankruptcy case close to completion, especially on the issues of concern to Dugaboy.⁸ By contrast, to the extent Dugaboy participates in further bankruptcy-

See Ex. B., publicity flyer for forthcoming third novel that extensively discusses the longrunning controversies between Chief Judge Jernigan and Mr. Dondero.

See, e.g., Ex. C, Sept. 18, 2025 Hrg. Tr. at 73:24–74:2 ("I think the statement is absolutely true that it's time for this case to end.").

This near finality of the overall case, combined with final orders specifically addressing Dugaboy's interests, is what distinguishes the current recusal motion from an earlier recusal appeal that Judge Kinkeade denied in 2022. See Dondero et al. v. Jernigan (In re Highland Capital

court proceedings, Chief Judge Jernigan's escalating pattern of bias will cause it further harm. Finally, if Dugaboy is forced to wait years for all remaining claims to be resolved, it may be too late and too difficult to unwind the wrongful transactions that have harmed its interests.

QUESTION PRESENTED

To the extent that this appeal would be interlocutory and leave is needed, the question that would be presented on appeal is whether Chief Judge Jernigan abused her discretion in denying Dugaboy's motion to recuse.⁹

RELIEF SOUGHT

To the extent leave is needed, Dugaboy asks this Court to allow it to appeal the denial of its Fifth Motion for Recusal. If successful, Dugaboy will seek an order requiring Chief Judge Jernigan to recuse herself from this bankruptcy case and any other present or future matters involving James Dondero or others associated with him. Dugaboy will also seek vacatur or reversal of all potentially bias-tainted

Mgmt., L.P.), Civ. No. 3:21-CV-0879-K, 2022 WL 394760 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2022) (Kinkeade, J.).

Abuse of discretion is the Fifth Circuit's standard for reviewing a judge's denial of a motion to recuse on direct appeal. See, e.g., Andrade v. Chojnacki, 338 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2003). But other circuits apply a de novo standard of review. See, e.g., Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 299 F.3d 635, 639 (7th Cir. 2002); Amaro-Borilla v. Barr, 792 F. App'x. 493, 494 (9th Cir. 2020) (mem. op.). In seeking review of the Fifth Circuit decision discussed above (Dondero v. Jernigan, No. 24-10287, 2025 WL 1122466 (5th Cir. Apr. 16, 2025)), Dugaboy and Mr. Dondero have filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court presenting this question: "Should a judge's order declining to recuse be reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion?" See Dondero et al. v. Jernigan et al, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Case No. 25-355 (Sept. 22, 2025).

decisions or actions taken by Chief Judge Jernigan starting from the time she began writing her books, including at minimum the four decisions that are the subject of Dugaboy's appeals.¹⁰

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

A. Standard for Final Appeals.

District courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals "from final judgments, orders, and decrees." 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). Because the jurisdictional statute allows appeal from both "cases and proceedings" in bankruptcy court, *see id.* § 158(a), the Supreme Court has held that "proceedings" within a larger bankruptcy case can separately support final appeals if they give final resolution to particular parties or discrete disputes. *Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC*, 589 U.S. 35, 37 (2020). Because a bankruptcy case "embraces an aggregation of individual controversies, orders in bankruptcy cases qualify as 'final' when they definitively dispose of discrete disputes within the overarching bankruptcy case." *Id.*

The Fifth Circuit has likewise held that for purposes of determining the finality of a bankruptcy order, each matter that arises between the filing of the bankruptcy petition and the issuing of a closing order is treated as a separate

8

This recusal order is one of four decisions by the Bankruptcy Court that Dugaboy is now appealing. These related appeals before other District Courts are of the Order Approving Settlement Between the Highland Entities and the HMIT Entities (Dkt. 4297), the Order Regarding Stay Requests (Dkt. 4333), and the Order Fixing Allowed Amount of Class 11 Interests (Dkt. 4401).

proceeding. See Smith v. Revie (In re Moody), 817 F.2d 365, 367–68 (5th Cir. 1987). The Fifth Circuit "has long rejected adoption of a rigid rule that a bankruptcy case can only be appealed as a single judicial unit at the end of the entire bankruptcy proceeding." In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277, 282 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). And this Court has previously held that a "final" order in a bankruptcy case includes any order that "ends a discrete judicial unit in the larger case." Coastal Plains, 338 B.R. at 713.

The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly recognized that because of the complexity of bankruptcy cases and subsidiary proceedings and the large number of interested parties, what constitutes a "final" judgment or order in the bankruptcy context is more broad and flexible than in other types of proceedings. *See In re ASARCO, LLC*, 650 F.3d 593, 599–600 (5th Cir. 2011). "Our approach to determining whether an order is ... appealable in a bankruptcy case is flexible," and views "finality in bankruptcy proceedings . . . in a practical, less technical light." *In re Kizzee–Jordan*, 626 F.3d 239, 242 (5th Cir. 2010). Instead, in the Fifth Circuit "[a]n appealed bankruptcy order will be considered final if it constitutes either a final determination of the rights of the parties to secure the relief they seek, or a final disposition of a discrete dispute within the larger bankruptcy case." *Id.* at 242.

B. <u>Standard for Interlocutory Appeals.</u>

District courts also have jurisdiction to hear appeals "from interlocutory

orders and decrees . . . of bankruptcy judges entered in cases and proceedings referred to the bankruptcy judges under section 157 of this title." 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). Whether to grant leave for an interlocutory appeal is within the discretion of the district court. *In re O'Connor*, 258 F.3d 392, 399–400 (5th Cir. 2001). In making this determination, district courts in the Fifth Circuit typically analyze the standards set forth under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). *In re Searex Energy Servs.*, Civ. No. No. 09–5817, 2009 WL 2868243, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 1, 2009). Under this standard, (1) a controlling issue of law must be involved; (2) the question must be one where there is substantial ground for difference of opinion; and (3) an immediate appeal must materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); *Kelley v. Cypress Fin. Trading Co., L.P.*, 518 B.R. 373, 377 (N.D. Tex. 2014).

- C. To the Extent Required, the Court Should Grant Leave to Appeal Because the Bankruptcy Court Has Already Issued Final Appealable Orders on Matters Intertwined with Recusal.
 - 1. <u>The Bankruptcy Court's approval of the Rule 9019 Settlement</u> is a final appealable order.

"A bankruptcy case need not be appealed as a single judicial unit at the end of the entire bankruptcy proceeding." *In re Tullius*, 500 F. App'x. 286, 289 (5th Cir. 2012). Instead, an appealable order "will be considered final if it constitutes either a final determination of the rights of the parties to secure the relief they seek, or a final disposition of a discrete dispute within the larger bankruptcy case." *Kizzee*—

Jordan, 626 F.3d at 242. Here, the Bankruptcy Court's approval of the proposed settlement (Bankr. Dkt. 4297) resolves pending litigation claims between two of the biggest players, Highland Capital and Hunter Mountain Investment Trust (HMIT), for amounts putatively valued in the hundreds of millions that dwarf the values of smaller claims belonging to Dugaboy and other creditors. ¹¹ The approval of a settlement between the largest players disposing of the vast majority of the money is a significant step toward ending and winding up most of the core bankruptcy case. Fifth Circuit law is clear that such a settlement is close enough to a final judgment or final order for the whole case, which allows Dugaboy to pursue final appeals on intertwined matters such as the denial of recusal. See, e.g., In re Reagor-Dykes Motors, L.P., 613 B.R. 878, 887 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2020) ("An order approving a settlement under Rule 9019 has res judicata effect as a final order.").

The finality of a bankruptcy court's approval of a settlement under Rule 9019 also depends on whether the appellants will have another chance to object to the settlement agreement. *See Ades-Berg Investors v. Breeden (In re Bennett Funding Group)*, 439 F.3d 155, 160 (2d Cir. 2006). In this case, they did not. *See* Bankr. Dkt. 4297 (Bankruptcy Court's order). For these reasons, the Bankruptcy Court's approval of the Rule 9019 settlement creates sufficient finality for the case as a

¹¹ See, e.g., Highland and HMIT's motion to approve the settlement, Bankr. Dkt. 4216 (May 19, 2025), at 4–5.

whole to allow Dugaboy to pursue the denial of recusal as a final appeal by right.

The Class 11 Order is a final order directly related to the *2*. recusal issue.

The Bankruptcy Court's Order Fixing the Allowed Amount of Class 11 Interests (Bankr. Dkt. 4401) is also a final appealable order because it "fixed" the purported dollar value of Dugaboy's claims and closed off any avenue for possible further recoveries. In other words, this was effectively a final judgment on the "discrete judicial unit" of Dugaboy's claims. See Coastal Plains, 338 B.R. at 713. The Fifth Circuit has held that "as long as an order allowing a claim or priority [in a bankruptcy proceeding] effectively settles the amount due the creditor, the order is 'final." In re Moody, 849 F.2d 902, 903 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing In re Saco Local Development Corp., 711 F.2d 441, 448 (1st Cir.1983)). The Bankruptcy Court's Class 11 Order did precisely that, finding that "Class 11 [Dugaboy] is subordinated to Class 10 [HMIT] such that holders of Allowed Class 11 Interests cannot receive any distributions from the Claimant Trust until the holders of allowed Class 10 Interests are paid in full." Bankr. Dkt. 4401 ¶ 8.

Both the 9019 Order and the Class 11 ruling meet the bankruptcy standard for final judgments, one because it resolved most of the remaining claims for the case as a whole, and the other because it specifically resolved Dugaboy's claims. The recusal order, which is directly intertwined to both those appeals, can be pursued as a final appeal simultaneously with them.

3. Recusal is necessary based on the Court's continuing and escalating displays of bias.

The facts of Chief Judge Jernigan's conduct at the September 18 hearing on the Class 11 motion (as described above) are so egregious as to underscore the need for recusal. Most garden-variety recusal motions do not feature a judge who (1) has written and continues to write novels featuring a villain who is a thinly disguised impersonation of a major litigant in the case before her, (2) seeks publicity and extra sales of those same novels by trading on the controversy over prior recusal motions—where further rulings will no doubt appear in future publicity campaigns; or (3) has threatened counsel with Rule 11 sanctions for preserving objections by repeating colorable and non-frivolous arguments made by prior counsel, in a transparent effort to chill and deter Mr. Dondero's chosen counsel from zealously advocating on his behalf. If this Court denies Dugaboy's Motion for Leave to Appeal, there will be no restraint on and no recourse from Judge Jernigan's continuing and escalating hostility toward Dugaboy and Mr. Dondero, with his counsel effectively muzzled by baseless threats of sanctions.

D. Even Taken As An Interlocutory Appeal, Leave Should Be Granted to Appeal Under 28 U.S.C. §158(a)(3) and 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). 12

Dugaboy's appeal is final and not interlocutory for the reasons given above. But even if it were interlocutory, the Court should grant leave to appeal the recusal decision as an interlocutory order. As explained below, the issues presented in the underlying appeal meet the three criteria for granting leave to file an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b).

1. The issue of whether Judge Jernigan should have recused herself presents a controlling question of law.

The first prerequisite for allowing an interlocutory appeal is that the primary issue in the underlying appeal presents a controlling question of law. "Whether an issue of law is controlling generally hinges upon its potential to have some impact on the course of the litigation." *Ryan v. Flowserve Corp.*, 444 F. Supp. 2d 718, 723 (N.D. Tex. 2006). Courts have reasoned that "[a]lthough the resolution of an issue need not necessarily terminate an action in order to be 'controlling,' it is clear that a question of law is 'controlling' if reversal of the [order] would terminate the action." *Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners*, 2012 WL 718933, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2012). Chief Judge Jernigan's decision to deny the recusal motion will have a substantial impact on the remainder of the litigation to the extent that Dugaboy or Mr. Dondero

14

By arguing that this appeal meets the standards for granting leave to file an interlocutory appeal, Dugaboy does not waive its primary argument that this appeal is a final appeal for which leave is not required.

participate in further proceedings before Chief Judge Jernigan, as they or their counsel will likely face the same biased treatment. Any future rulings are at risk of being similarly tainted (or at least of being perceived as tainted). By contrast, these problems will go away if Chief Judge Jernigan recuses herself and is replaced by a different judge.

Furthermore, if this Court determines at the merits stage that Chief Judge Jernigan should have recused herself from Dugaboy and Dondero-related matters when she began writing her novels, then many of her prior decisions (including the four orders that Dugaboy is appealing) may be vacated or reversed. Thus, regardless of how this Court rules on the Motion for Leave, the issue of recusal remains central to the bankruptcy and its resolution and is therefore "controlling" for purposes of this analysis.

A substantial ground for difference of opinion exists as to the *2*. issue of recusal.

The second prerequisite for interlocutory appeal requires that the "controlling question of law" be one on which there is a "substantial ground for difference of opinion." In re Cobalt Int'l Energy, Inc. Securities Litig., 2016 WL 949065, *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2016). A substantial ground for a difference of opinion exists here because this is a "novel and difficult question of first impression." Ryan, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 723–24. The Fifth Circuit specifically noted that the question whether a federal judge writing fiction novels about actual participants in her cases presents

grounds for recusal was without precedent. No. 24-10287, 2025 WL 1122466, at *7 ("To our knowledge, no court . . . has ever analyzed § 455(a) on facts like these."). No court has had to decide on such unique facts before, showing a substantial ground for a difference of opinion. 13

3. <u>An immediate appeal of the recusal issue will materially</u> advance the ultimate termination of this litigation.

Finally, the third prerequisite is whether allowing an interlocutory appeal will materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. This is because the "institutional efficiency of the federal court system is among the chief concerns motivating § 1292(b)," and judicial economy is therefore at the very heart of the analysis. *Ryan*, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 723.

An interlocutory appeal materially advances the ultimate termination of the litigation when it conserves the time and resources of the courts and parties involved. "An appeal materially advances the termination of litigation when it accelerates or simplifies trial proceedings." *Panda Energy Intern., Inc. v. Factory Mut. Ins.*, 2011 WL 610016, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2011). "Whether an immediate appeal may

A second possible "substantial ground for difference of opinion" exists because (as discussed above) there is a circuit split on the standard of review for a recusal denial on a direct appeal after final judgment. The Fifth Circuit says the standard is abuse of discretion, while other circuits apply de novo review. *Compare Andrade v. Chojnacki*, 338 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2003) (abuse of discretion) *with, e.g., Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd.*, 299 F.3d 635, 639 (7th Cir. 2002) *and Amaro-Borilla v. Barr*, 792 F. App'x. 493, 494 (9th Cir. 2020) (mem. op.) (de novo). As noted above, Dugaboy and Mr. Dondero have petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to resolve this circuit split. *Dondero et al. v. Jernigan et al.*, No. 25-355 (pet. filed Sept. 22, 2025).

materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation requires courts to assess whether interlocutory appeal will speed up or slow down the litigation." *Pemex* Exploracion y Produccion v. BASF Corp., 2011 WL 11569219, at *12 (S.D. Tex. Feb 11, 2011).

If the present Motion is denied, the recusal decision will not face meaningful review under an ordinary appellate standard until the final resolution of the bankruptcy for all parties, which could be years away. Waiting until the ultimate conclusion of the underlying bankruptcy for all parties to allow Dugaboy's appeal to move forward would result in needless delay and wasteful expense for everyone involved. By allowing appeal now and proceeding to briefing on the merits, this case can more quickly be put back on track to its final resolution.

E. Leave to Appeal Should Be Granted For Reasons of Practicality and Fairness.

If Dugaboy is not allowed to proceed with a timely appeal, it may lose the recusal issue by default. If Dugaboy must wait years until the ultimate conclusion of the bankruptcy proceeding for all parties before this Court can even consider the merits of its arguments, Dugaboy risks losing its chance for meaningful relief to the encroachment of equitable mootness. Under this doctrine, courts can dismiss appeals of bankruptcy decisions to favor the finality of reorganization plans. See Matter of Texxon Petrochemicals LLC, 67 F. 4th 259, 261 (5th Cir. 2023). Equitable mootness allows such dismissals when the debtor's reorganization has progressed to

the point that granting the requested relief would be impractical or inequitable to other parties. *In re CTLI, LLC*, 534 B.R. 895, 910 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015). Even if effective relief could "conceivably be fashioned," courts may deny motions as equitably moot if implementing such relief would disrupt the reorganization process or harm the interests of other parties. *Id*.

As a result of this equitable Catch-22, Dugaboy is told on the one hand to delay its appeal until final judgment in the main bankruptcy proceeding, but once it gets there it risks being told that it is "too late" and equity now demands that it yield what it was owed to those who now have it. *See id*. The Fifth Circuit has already recognized that Dugaboy will be prejudiced if forced to wait for the conclusion of the entire bankruptcy proceeding. *See* No. 24-10287, 2025 WL 1122466, at *3 ("If a party could not challenge bias until appealable final judgment has issued, prejudice will have already worked its evil.").

Accordingly, if this Motion for Leave is not granted, Dugaboy may never get its day in court to appeal Judge Jernigan's denial of recusal under a regular appellate standard of review.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court should grant this Motion for Leave to Appeal because final orders have been entered in this bankruptcy as to Dugaboy's interests, and therefore Dugaboy may pursue the present appeal as a final appeal by right.

Alternatively, this Court should treat Dugaboy's Motion for Leave to Appeal as seeking an interlocutory appeal and grant it. An immediate appeal will materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation and will provide meaningful and necessary guidance on novel and important issues on which substantial grounds for difference of opinion exist. All the requirements for interlocutory review are satisfied here, and Dugaboy's appeal on the recusal issue should be allowed to proceed on its merits.

Dated: October 10, 2025 Respectfully submitted,

WINSTON & STRAWN LLP

By: /s/ Geoffrey S. Harper

Geoffrey S. Harper Texas Bar No. 00795408 gharper@winston.com John Michael Gaddis Texas Bar No. 24069747 mgaddis@winston.com 2121 N. Pearl Street, Suite 900 Dallas, TX 75201 (214) 453-6500 (214) 453-6400 (fax)

Michael J. Lang
Texas State Bar No. 24036944
mlang@cwl.law
CRAWFORD, WISHNEW & LANG PLLC
1700 Pacific Ave, Suite 2390
Dallas, Texas 75201
Telephone: (214) 817-4500

Counsel for Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on October 10, 2025, a true and correct copy of this document was served electronically via the Court's CM/ECF system to the parties registered or otherwise entitled to receive electronic notices in this case.

/s/ Geoffrey S. Harper Geoffrey S. Harper

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(b), the undersigned hereby certifies that on October 10, 2025 he conferred with John Morris, counsel for the Highland Appellees, and was informed that the Appellees are opposed to the relief requested in this Motion.

/s/ Geoffrey S. Harper
Geoffrey S. Harper

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

- 1. This document complies with the word limit of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013(f)(3)(A) because, excluding the portions excluded by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8015(g), this document contains 4,742 words.
- 2. This document complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8015(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8015(a)(6) because this document has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word, typeface Times New Roman, 14-point type (12-point type in footnotes).

/s/ Geoffrey S. Harper
Geoffrey S. Harper

EXHIBIT H

From: John A. Morris

To: Harper, Geoffrey

Cc: Jeff Pomerantz; Gregory V. Demo; Hayley R. Winograd; Zachery Annable; Drew K. York; Jason S. Brookner;

Drake Rayshell; Joshua Smeltzer; "Michael Lang"; Gaddis, Mike

Subject: FW: A Second Request to Consolidate Appeals re Highland Capital 9019 motions

Date: Wednesday, August 13, 2025 9:06:00 AM

Attachments: image009.png image002.png

3 25-cv-1876 Dkt 21--Appellees" Motion to Dismiss Appeal as Moot.pdf

3 25-cv-1876 Dkt 22--Seery Declaration ISO Appellees" Motion to Dismiss Appeal as Moot.pdf

Geoffrey:

In case you did not see it, attached is Highland's Motion to Dismiss the appeals of the HMIT 9019/363 Order and supporting declaration (the "MTD"). If granted, the motion will (for lack of a better word) moot your email below.

But if it is not, the Highland Entities will oppose consolidating the appeals of the HMIT 9019/363 Order with the appeal of the denial of the stay because the appeals involve different orders entered at different times based on different records such that further consolidation would create the risk of confusion.

For example, the motion for the stay under 11 U.S.C. section 105 was based *exclusively* on documents and information (the Attorney General's 7/9/25 letter filed in the Bankruptcy Court seeking an indefinite stay of the entire bankruptcy case and a Complaint filed by the JOLs in the Cayman Islands on July 15, 2025) that were not considered by the Bankruptcy Court when it entered the HMIT 9019/363 Order for the simple reason that they did not exist.

Having said that, we are available to confer on any questions concerning the briefing of the MTD.

Regards,

John

John A. Morris

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP

Direct Dial: 212.561.7760

Tel: 212.561.7700 | Fax: 212.561.7777

jmorris@pszjlaw.com vCard | Bio | LinkedIn



Los Angeles | New York | Wilmington, DE | Houston | San Francisco

From: Harper, Geoffrey < GHarper@winston.com>

Sent: Tuesday, August 12, 2025 6:56 PM

To: John A. Morris < <u>imorris@pszjlaw.com</u>>; Drew K. York < <u>dyork@grayreed.com</u>>; Jason S. Brookner

<ibrookner@grayreed.com>; Drake Rayshell <drayshell@grayreed.com>; Joshua Smeltzer

<ismeltzer@grayreed.com>; Michael Lang <mlang@cwl.law>; Gaddis, Mike

< MGaddis@winston.com>

Cc: Jeff Pomerantz < jpomerantz @pszjlaw.com >; Gregory V. Demo < GDemo@pszjlaw.com >; Hayley

R. Winograd < hwinograd@pszjlaw.com>; Zachery Annable < zannable@haywardfirm.com>

Subject: A Second Request to Consolidate Appeals re Highland Capital 9019 motions

Counsel:

Thanks for everyone's cooperation and working through the consolidation of the two appeals of the court's 9019 settlement approval. I am writing to request that everyone agree to one further consolidation. As you know, the bankruptcy court issued an order denying the motion to stay the 9019 Order and Dugaboy has appealed that denial. I believe that the issues related to the stay are intertwined with the 9019 approval order such that it makes sense to consolidate this appeal in as well. (After all, one possible outcome of separate appeals would be the strange situation where one court stops the settlement approval order right after another court approves it.)

If everyone is in agreement to this further consolidation, we are happy to take the laboring oar in drafting a proposed motion and order and sending it around for approval to the group.

Geoffrey Harper

Partner

Winston & Strawn LLP 2121 North Pearl Street, Suite 900 Dallas, TX 75201

D: +1 214-453-6476 M: +1 214-763-6894 F: +1 214-453-6400

Bio | VCard | Email | winston.com



From: John A. Morris < <u>imorris@pszjlaw.com</u>> Sent: Wednesday, August 6, 2025 11:25 AM

To: Harper, Geoffrey <<u>GHarper@winston.com</u>>; Drew K. York <<u>dyork@grayreed.com</u>>; Jason S. Brookner <<u>jbrookner@grayreed.com</u>>; Drake Rayshell <<u>drayshell@grayreed.com</u>>; Joshua Smeltzer <<u>jsmeltzer@grayreed.com</u>>; Michael Lang <<u>mlang@cwl.law</u>>; Gaddis, Mike

<<u>MGaddis@winston.com</u>>

Cc: Jeff Pomerantz < jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com >; Gregory V. Demo < GDemo@pszjlaw.com >; Hayley

R. Winograd hwinograd@pszjlaw.com; Zachery Annable kwinograd@pszjlaw.com; Zachery <a href="mailto:kwinograd@pszjlaw.com"

Subject: RE: Highland: Motion to Consolidate HMIT 9019 Appeals

Thank you.

John A. Morris

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP

Direct Dial: 212.561.7760

Tel: 212.561.7700 | Fax: 212.561.7777

jmorris@pszjlaw.com vCard | Bio | LinkedIn



Los Angeles | New York | Wilmington, DE | Houston | San Francisco

From: Harper, Geoffrey < GHarper@winston.com>

Sent: Wednesday, August 6, 2025 12:17 PM

To: John A. Morris < <u>imorris@pszjlaw.com</u>>; Drew K. York < <u>dyork@grayreed.com</u>>; Jason S. Brookner

<jbrookner@grayreed.com>; Drake Rayshell <drayshell@grayreed.com>; Joshua Smeltzer

<jsmeltzer@grayreed.com>; Michael Lang <mlang@cwl.law>; Gaddis, Mike

<MGaddis@winston.com>

Cc: Jeff Pomerantz < jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com >; Gregory V. Demo < GDemo@pszjlaw.com >; Hayley

R. Winograd hwinograd@pszjlaw.com; Zachery Annable kwinograd@pszjlaw.com; Zachery <a href="mailto:kwinograd@pszjlaw.com"

Subject: RE: Highland: Motion to Consolidate HMIT 9019 Appeals

Dugaboy does not oppose the consolidation.

Geoffrey Harper

Partner

Winston & Strawn LLP 2121 North Pearl Street, Suite 900 Dallas, TX 75201

D: +1 214-453-6476 M: +1 214-763-6894

F: +1 214-453-6400

Bio | VCard | Email | winston.com



From: John A. Morris < imorris@pszjlaw.com > Sent: Wednesday, August 6, 2025 11:08 AM

To: Drew K. York dyork@grayreed.com; Jason S. Brookner jbrookner@grayreed.com; Drake Rayshell dyork@grayreed.com; Michael Lang mlang@cwl.law; Harper, Geoffrey GHarper@winston.com; Gaddis, Mike MGaddis@winston.com

Cc: Jeff Pomerantz <<u>jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com</u>>; Gregory V. Demo <<u>GDemo@pszjlaw.com</u>>; Hayley R. Winograd <<u>hwinograd@pszjlaw.com</u>>; Zachery Annable <<u>zannable@haywardfirm.com</u>>

Subject: RE: Highland: Motion to Consolidate HMIT 9019 Appeals

Thank you, Drew.

Can someone please respond on behalf of Dugaboy?

John

John A. Morris

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP

Direct Dial: 212.561.7760

Tel: 212.561.7700 | Fax: 212.561.7777

jmorris@pszjlaw.com vCard | Bio | LinkedIn



Los Angeles | New York | Wilmington, DE | Houston | San Francisco

From: Drew K. York < dyork@grayreed.com>
Sent: Wednesday, August 6, 2025 12:07 PM

To: John A. Morris jmorris@pszjlaw.com; Jason S. Brookner jbrookner@grayreed.com; Drake Rayshell drayshell@grayreed.com; Joshua Smeltzer jsmeltzer@grayreed.com; Michael Lang mailto:mailt

Cc: Jeff Pomerantz < jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com >; Gregory V. Demo < GDemo@pszjlaw.com >; Hayley R. Winograd < hwinograd@pszjlaw.com >; Zachery Annable < zannable@haywardfirm.com >

Subject: RE: Highland: Motion to Consolidate HMIT 9019 Appeals

John,

Mr. Daugherty does not oppose the motion to consolidate to Judge Kinkeade.

Regards,

Drew

From: Drew K. York < dyork@grayreed.com>
Sent: Tuesday, August 05, 2025 2:26 PM

To: John A. Morris jmmaris@pszjlaw.com">jmmaris@pszjlaw.com; Jason S. Brookner jmmaris@pszjlaw.com; Drake Rayshell drayshell@grayreed.com; Joshua Smeltzer jsmaris@grayreed.com; Michael Lang mailto:simmaris@grayreed.com; Michael Lang mailto:simmaris@grayreed.com; Michael Lang mailto:simmaris@grayreed.com; Michael Lang mailto:simmaris@grayreed.com; Michael Lang mailto:simmaris@grayreed.com; mgaddis@winston.com

Cc: Jeff Pomerantz <<u>jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com</u>>; Gregory V. Demo <<u>GDemo@pszjlaw.com</u>>; Hayley R. Winograd <<u>hwinograd@pszjlaw.com</u>>; Zachery Annable <<u>zannable@haywardfirm.com</u>>

Subject: RE: Highland: Motion to Consolidate HMIT 9019 Appeals

Hi John,

Working to confirm our position. Will get back to you by tomorrow.

Regards,

Drew

Drew K. York

Partner

Tel 469.320.6114 | Fax 469.320.6883 | dyork@grayreed.com 1601 Elm St., Suite 4600 | Dallas, TX 75201 grayreed.com | Connect with me on LinkedIn



CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This electronic transmission and any attachments constitute confidential information which is intended only for the named recipient(s) and may be legally privileged. If you have received this communication in error, please contact the sender immediately. Any disclosure, copying, distribution or the taking of any action concerning the contents of this communication by anyone other than the named recipient(s) is strictly prohibited.

From: John A. Morris < <u>imorris@pszjlaw.com</u>> Sent: Tuesday, August 05, 2025 10:34 AM

To: Drew K. York <<u>dyork@grayreed.com</u>>; Jason S. Brookner <<u>jbrookner@grayreed.com</u>>; Drake Rayshell <<u>drayshell@grayreed.com</u>>; Joshua Smeltzer <<u>jsmeltzer@grayreed.com</u>>; Michael Lang <<u>mlang@cwl.law</u>>; <u>gharper@winston.com</u>; <u>mgaddis@winston.com</u>

Cc: Jeff Pomerantz < jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com >; Gregory V. Demo < GDemo@pszjlaw.com >; Hayley R. Winograd < hwinograd@pszjlaw.com >; Zachery Annable < zannable@haywardfirm.com >

Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: Highland: Motion to Consolidate HMIT 9019 Appeals

Resending with Mr. Gaddis' correct e-mail address.

John A. Morris

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP

Direct Dial: 212.561.7760

Tel: 212.561.7700 | Fax: 212.561.7777

jmorris@pszjlaw.com vCard | Bio | LinkedIn



Los Angeles | New York | Wilmington, DE | Houston | San Francisco

From: John A. Morris

Sent: Tuesday, August 5, 2025 11:30 AM

To: Drew K. York <<u>dyork@grayreed.com</u>>; Jason S. Brookner <<u>jbrookner@grayreed.com</u>>; Drake Rayshell <<u>drayshell@grayreed.com</u>>; Joshua Smeltzer <<u>jsmeltzer@grayreed.com</u>>; Michael Lang <<u>mlang@cwl.law</u>>; <u>ngaddis@winston.com</u>; <u>gharper@winston.com</u>

Cc: Jeff Pomerantz < jpomerantz @pszjlaw.com >; Gregory V. Demo < <u>GDemo@pszjlaw.com</u> >; Hayley R. Winograd < <u>hwinograd@pszjlaw.com</u> >; Zachery Annable < <u>zannable@haywardfirm.com</u> >

Subject: Highland: Motion to Consolidate HMIT 9019 Appeals

Counsel:

Dugaboy and Mr. Daugherty each appealed the Bankruptcy Court's Order granting Highland's motion to approve the HMIT settlement pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and Bankruptcy Code section 363.

Since the appeals were assigned to different judges, Highland intends to move to consolidate the appeals before Judge Kinkeade (Case No. 3:25-cv-01876-K, the first assigned appeal) for purposes of judicial economy, to save Appellees the cost and expense of litigating two appeals of the same Order based on the same evidentiary record, and to avoid potentially inconsistent judgments.

Please let us know if your respective client is opposed or unopposed to the relief requested.

Regards,

John

John A. Morris

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP

Direct Dial: 212.561.7760

Tel: 212.561.7700 | Fax: 212.561.7777

jmorris@pszjlaw.com vCard | Bio | LinkedIn



Los Angeles | New York | Wilmington, DE | Houston | San Francisco

The contents of this message may be privileged and confidential. If this message has been received in error, please delete it without reading it. Your receipt of this message is not intended to waive any applicable privilege. Please do not disseminate this message without the permission of the author. Any tax advice contained in this email was not intended to be used, and cannot be used, by you (or any other taxpayer) to avoid penalties under applicable tax laws and regulations.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL) Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
MANAGEMENT, L.P.,)
Reorganized Debtor.)
S)
	_)
THE DUGABOY INVESTMENT) Case No. 3:25-cv-01876-K
TRUST,)
) Case No. 3:25-cv-02072-S
Appellant,)
V.) Case No. 3:25-cv-02579-B
HIGHLAND CAPITAL)
MANAGEMENT, L.P,) Case No. 3:25-cv-02724-L
et al.,)
Appellees.	_)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE PROCEEDINGS AND EXTEND RELATED DEADLINES ON APPEAL

The Court has considered Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust's *Motion* to Consolidate Proceedings and Extend Related Deadlines on Appeal (the "Motion")¹ in which Dugaboy has asked this Court to consolidate the four related appellate proceedings captioned above (the "Appeals") into a single consolidated appellate proceeding. Based on the evidence and argument presented by the parties, the Court hereby finds and concludes that the Motion to Consolidate is well taken

¹ Capitalized terms not otherwise defined in this Order shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Motion.

and that consolidation of the Appeals serves the interest of judicial efficiency.

Accordingly, it is hereby **ORDERED THAT**:

- 1. The Motion to Consolidate Appeals is **GRANTED**.
- 2. The three Appeals in Case No. 3:25-cv-02072-S, Case No. 3:25-cv-02579-B, and Case No. 3:25-cv-02724-L, are hereby consolidated under Case No. 3:25-cv-01876-K, which is designated as the lead case for the Appeals.
- 3. All future filings related to the Appeals shall be filed on the docket for Case No. 3:25-cv-01876-K.
- 4. The current briefing deadlines in Case No. 3:25-cv-01876-K are hereby vacated.
- 5. To further expedite the efficient progress of the Consolidated Appeal, the Parties shall meet and confer to address the following matters:
 - a) Preparing a single consolidated Statement of Issues that, as much as practicable, streamlines the issues presented for appellate review;
 - b) Designating a single consolidated Record that includes all items previously designated for inclusion in the records of the four separate proceedings; and
 - c) Proposing a reasonable schedule of deadlines for a single cycle of consolidated briefing on all appealed issues.

i. To allow the Parties sufficient space to properly brief their appealed issues, the Court will enlarge the word limits as follows: 26,000 words for each Appellant's Opening Brief; 26,000 words for Appellees' Response Brief; and 13,000 words for each Appellant's Reply Brief.

6. No later than one (1) week after the entry of this Order, the Parties shall file a joint report with this Court addressing their compliance with the matters in Paragraph (4) above. If the Parties are unable to agree on particular points, they may file separate statements outlining their respective positions.

IT IS SO ORDERED this [] day of October, 2025.

Ed Kinkeade United States District Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL) Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	
Reorganized Debtor.)
)
	_)
THE DUGABOY INVESTMENT) Case No. 3:25-cv-01876-K
TRUST,)
) Case No. 3:25-cv-02072-S
Appellant,)
V.) Case No. 3:25-cv-02579-B
HIGHLAND CAPITAL)
MANAGEMENT, L.P,) <u>Case No. 3:25-cv-02724-L</u>
et al.,)
Appellees.	_)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING RULING ON MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE PROCEEDINGS ON APPEAL

The Court has considered Appellant The Dugaboy Investment Trust's *Motion* to Stay Proceedings Pending Ruling on Motion to Consolidate Proceedings on Appeal (the "Motion to Stay")¹ in which Dugaboy has asked this Court to stay its proceedings and briefing deadlines in Case No. 3:25-cv-02724-L pending Judge Kinkeade's decision in Case No. 3:25-cv-01876-K on Dugaboy's motion to consolidate the four related appellate proceedings captioned above into a single

-

¹ Capitalized terms not otherwise defined in this Order shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Motion.

consolidated appellate proceeding. The Court concludes that the Motion to Stay is well taken. Accordingly, it is hereby **ORDERED THAT**:

- 1. The Motion to Stay is **GRANTED**.
- 2. All proceedings and briefing deadlines in Case No. 3:25-cv-02724-L are hereby stayed pending Judge Kinkeade's ruling on the motion to consolidate in Case No. 3:25-cv-01876-K.

IT IS SO ORDERED this day of October, 2025.

Sam A. Lindsay United States District Judge